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04 June 2007
South Caucasus 'region' an artificial construct?
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are commonly grouped together under a common
label - the "South Caucasus." But evidence of such unity is hard to find on
the streets of the nations' capitals. From RFE/RL.
By Salome Asatiani for RFE/RL (04/06/07)
In Tbilisi, one man, asked whether he considered Georgia part of a regional
bloc, said simply, "No, I don't. Georgia is Georgia."
Asked if Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had anything in common, he said,
"Absolutely nothing."
In Baku, the sentiment is similar, with a local resident saying: "I
don't want Azerbaijan to be in only the South Caucasus - it should
also be in stronger blocs."
And in the Armenian capital, one woman spoke nostalgically of a time
when the three countries had a greater sense of unity. "We used to
have many things in common," she said. "We were similar in our
temperament, lifestyle and human relationships; similar in almost
everything. I never felt like an outsider in either Baku or Tbilisi."
And now? "I think that all these things have changed a lot, and they've
gotten worse -- in religious matters, and in other ways as well."
What's changed over the years?
Not much, according to regional analysts. To them, the notion of a
"South Caucasus" or a "Transcaucasus" has always been an artificial
construct imposed from outside.
"Russian people - or, let's say, the Russian Empire - logically gave
the name 'Transcaucasus' to that part of its empire located beyond the
Caucasus mountain range as seen from the north," says Alexander
Iskandarian, the director of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Media
Institute.
"People who lived in the South Caucasus did not understand this unity,
because it hadn't existed before. Prior to this, inhabitants of the
South Caucasus had identified themselves as part of wider communities
- as citizens or subjects of the Persian Empire, the Ottoman
Empire. Or they identified themselves in more local terms."
Periods of union
There are a few examples of the three nations briefly coming together
into a single political unit. There was a short-lived federation
established in 1918, prior to Sovietization. Later, there was the
Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which existed within
the Soviet Union between 1922-36. Literature and popular culture
played their own role in highlighting the link between the three
nations.
Kurban Said's novel "Ali And Nino," first published in the 1930s, was
one such example. The novel, set around the time of the Russian
Revolution, chronicles the tragic love story between an Azerbaijani
man and a Georgian woman.
Soviet audiences, for their part, loved Giorgi Danelia's 1977 film "Mimino,"
which tells the story of a friendship between a Georgian and an Armenian
stranded in Moscow.
And then there are the innumerable jokes about "a Georgian, an Azerbaijani
and Armenian" that abounded during the Soviet era, all based on the general
stereotype of Caucasians as hospitable, eccentric, dark-haired, and - in the
case of the men - thickly mustached.
Also perpetuating the image of South Causasus unity were Soviet-era melodies
like the 1950s "Caucasus Table Song," in which three "brothers" - the cities
of Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan - sing a toast to their friendship and future
progress.
Tbilisi-based psychologist Gaga Nizharadze claims that such cultural
representations and stereotypes - despite being the result of a kind
of artificial homogenization - ultimately fostered some genuine unity
between Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians.
"We have carried out several research projects to determine whether there has
ever been such a thing as a general 'Caucasian identity,'" Nizharadze says.
"We found that it does exist, although it is very weakly felt. I can speak
from my own experience that, when meeting in Moscow for example, people from
the Caucasus have some commonalties, be it in subjective terms, or even in
terms of looks and appearance - 'You are all Caucasian.'"
Diverging identities
But it is also clear that in the post-Soviet years, the three countries have
proved more different than alike.
Nation-building efforts that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union
led to increased emphasis on religious identities. This exposed
differences among the three states, with Azerbaijan a primarily Muslim
country, and Armenia and Georgia adhering to different branches of
Christianity.
Likewise, newfound nationalism led to intellectual disputes over cultural
heritage.
Ultimately, despite their geographic proximity, the three countries
have generally fared poorly at interstate cooperation. Azerbaijan and
Georgia have forged some energy-transport deals, and Baku provided
much-needed energy supplies to Tbilisi during its standoff with
Russia. But otherwise, relations in the neighborhood have not always
been neighborly.
This is due in large part to their markedly different foreign policy
perspectives. While Georgia grows more oriented toward the West,
Armenia is seen as more tied to Moscow. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and
gas resources, has the luxury of straddling the fence, and even
seeking an individual role on the international level.
And then there is Nagorno-Karabakh, the ethnic Armenian exclave based
on Azerbaijani territory. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over the
disputed region in a bloody war that lasted from 1988-94, and tensions
over the exclave remain extremely heated.
Archil Gegeshidze, a political scientist based in Tbilisi, says the
unresolved "frozen conflict" remains the biggest hurdle to regional
unity. "The issue of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the
main problem, entailing differing foreign policy orientations and
different systems of security," Gegeshidze says. "When two countries
are at war, it is of course out of place to speak about any regional
unity."
Grouped for convenience?
Despite all the friction, however, the concept of a unified South Caucasus
region is still widely held in international politics.
NATO and the European Union, for example, use a single representative
in dealing with all three countries as a whole. (In February, EU South
Caucasus envoy Peter Semneby spoke with RFE/RL.)The EU launched its
Neighborhood Policy action plans simultaneously in Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, despite the countries' varying records on reform.
While Georgia grows more oriented toward the West, Armenia is seen as
increasingly pro-Russian. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and gas resources,
has the luxury of straddling the fence.
And there are numerous examples of efforts to promote regional integration --
the Eurasia Foundation's South Caucasus Cooperation Program and the Council
of Europe's 2006 Stability Pact for the South Caucasus, to name just two.
Many analysts cite the states' smallness and minimal global influence
as reasons they are often bunched together. Another, according to
psychologist Gaga Nizharadze, is that taking a regional approach
significantly simplifies things for outsiders.
"It is easier to carry out policies in relation to regions,"
Nizharadze says. "And for a foreign expert who comes and spends three
days in Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan, it is difficult to comprehend that
in reality he is dealing with different countries, different
languages, different religions, and that even historically we have
never been particularly great friends. But when seen from London or
New York, for instance, this is one geographical area, and it is much
easier to deal with it as one."
Baku-based political scientist Rasim Musabekov agrees. However, he believes a
regional approach does not necessarily have to ignore the three nations'
individual characteristics.
"From outside, for Europe, the South Caucasus is seen as a
region. However, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are each clearly
distinguished within it, because their policies are far from
identical," Musabekov says. "I think this is how Russia sees it as
well. Turkey and Iran are behaving in similar ways.
Therefore, in this sense, the 'region' exists only for outside players."
International actors may very well continue the practice of lumping Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia together, leading the three states to set aside their
differences temporarily when on the global stage.
But another possibility is that "South Caucasus" may gradually outlive
its usefulness, eventually serving only as an example of a failed
attempt to paint the three nations with one brush.
RFE/RL's Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian services contributed to this
report.
South Caucasus 'region' an artificial construct?
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are commonly grouped together under a common
label - the "South Caucasus." But evidence of such unity is hard to find on
the streets of the nations' capitals. From RFE/RL.
By Salome Asatiani for RFE/RL (04/06/07)
In Tbilisi, one man, asked whether he considered Georgia part of a regional
bloc, said simply, "No, I don't. Georgia is Georgia."
Asked if Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had anything in common, he said,
"Absolutely nothing."
In Baku, the sentiment is similar, with a local resident saying: "I
don't want Azerbaijan to be in only the South Caucasus - it should
also be in stronger blocs."
And in the Armenian capital, one woman spoke nostalgically of a time
when the three countries had a greater sense of unity. "We used to
have many things in common," she said. "We were similar in our
temperament, lifestyle and human relationships; similar in almost
everything. I never felt like an outsider in either Baku or Tbilisi."
And now? "I think that all these things have changed a lot, and they've
gotten worse -- in religious matters, and in other ways as well."
What's changed over the years?
Not much, according to regional analysts. To them, the notion of a
"South Caucasus" or a "Transcaucasus" has always been an artificial
construct imposed from outside.
"Russian people - or, let's say, the Russian Empire - logically gave
the name 'Transcaucasus' to that part of its empire located beyond the
Caucasus mountain range as seen from the north," says Alexander
Iskandarian, the director of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Media
Institute.
"People who lived in the South Caucasus did not understand this unity,
because it hadn't existed before. Prior to this, inhabitants of the
South Caucasus had identified themselves as part of wider communities
- as citizens or subjects of the Persian Empire, the Ottoman
Empire. Or they identified themselves in more local terms."
Periods of union
There are a few examples of the three nations briefly coming together
into a single political unit. There was a short-lived federation
established in 1918, prior to Sovietization. Later, there was the
Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which existed within
the Soviet Union between 1922-36. Literature and popular culture
played their own role in highlighting the link between the three
nations.
Kurban Said's novel "Ali And Nino," first published in the 1930s, was
one such example. The novel, set around the time of the Russian
Revolution, chronicles the tragic love story between an Azerbaijani
man and a Georgian woman.
Soviet audiences, for their part, loved Giorgi Danelia's 1977 film "Mimino,"
which tells the story of a friendship between a Georgian and an Armenian
stranded in Moscow.
And then there are the innumerable jokes about "a Georgian, an Azerbaijani
and Armenian" that abounded during the Soviet era, all based on the general
stereotype of Caucasians as hospitable, eccentric, dark-haired, and - in the
case of the men - thickly mustached.
Also perpetuating the image of South Causasus unity were Soviet-era melodies
like the 1950s "Caucasus Table Song," in which three "brothers" - the cities
of Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan - sing a toast to their friendship and future
progress.
Tbilisi-based psychologist Gaga Nizharadze claims that such cultural
representations and stereotypes - despite being the result of a kind
of artificial homogenization - ultimately fostered some genuine unity
between Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians.
"We have carried out several research projects to determine whether there has
ever been such a thing as a general 'Caucasian identity,'" Nizharadze says.
"We found that it does exist, although it is very weakly felt. I can speak
from my own experience that, when meeting in Moscow for example, people from
the Caucasus have some commonalties, be it in subjective terms, or even in
terms of looks and appearance - 'You are all Caucasian.'"
Diverging identities
But it is also clear that in the post-Soviet years, the three countries have
proved more different than alike.
Nation-building efforts that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union
led to increased emphasis on religious identities. This exposed
differences among the three states, with Azerbaijan a primarily Muslim
country, and Armenia and Georgia adhering to different branches of
Christianity.
Likewise, newfound nationalism led to intellectual disputes over cultural
heritage.
Ultimately, despite their geographic proximity, the three countries
have generally fared poorly at interstate cooperation. Azerbaijan and
Georgia have forged some energy-transport deals, and Baku provided
much-needed energy supplies to Tbilisi during its standoff with
Russia. But otherwise, relations in the neighborhood have not always
been neighborly.
This is due in large part to their markedly different foreign policy
perspectives. While Georgia grows more oriented toward the West,
Armenia is seen as more tied to Moscow. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and
gas resources, has the luxury of straddling the fence, and even
seeking an individual role on the international level.
And then there is Nagorno-Karabakh, the ethnic Armenian exclave based
on Azerbaijani territory. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over the
disputed region in a bloody war that lasted from 1988-94, and tensions
over the exclave remain extremely heated.
Archil Gegeshidze, a political scientist based in Tbilisi, says the
unresolved "frozen conflict" remains the biggest hurdle to regional
unity. "The issue of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the
main problem, entailing differing foreign policy orientations and
different systems of security," Gegeshidze says. "When two countries
are at war, it is of course out of place to speak about any regional
unity."
Grouped for convenience?
Despite all the friction, however, the concept of a unified South Caucasus
region is still widely held in international politics.
NATO and the European Union, for example, use a single representative
in dealing with all three countries as a whole. (In February, EU South
Caucasus envoy Peter Semneby spoke with RFE/RL.)The EU launched its
Neighborhood Policy action plans simultaneously in Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, despite the countries' varying records on reform.
While Georgia grows more oriented toward the West, Armenia is seen as
increasingly pro-Russian. Azerbaijan, rich in oil and gas resources,
has the luxury of straddling the fence.
And there are numerous examples of efforts to promote regional integration --
the Eurasia Foundation's South Caucasus Cooperation Program and the Council
of Europe's 2006 Stability Pact for the South Caucasus, to name just two.
Many analysts cite the states' smallness and minimal global influence
as reasons they are often bunched together. Another, according to
psychologist Gaga Nizharadze, is that taking a regional approach
significantly simplifies things for outsiders.
"It is easier to carry out policies in relation to regions,"
Nizharadze says. "And for a foreign expert who comes and spends three
days in Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan, it is difficult to comprehend that
in reality he is dealing with different countries, different
languages, different religions, and that even historically we have
never been particularly great friends. But when seen from London or
New York, for instance, this is one geographical area, and it is much
easier to deal with it as one."
Baku-based political scientist Rasim Musabekov agrees. However, he believes a
regional approach does not necessarily have to ignore the three nations'
individual characteristics.
"From outside, for Europe, the South Caucasus is seen as a
region. However, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are each clearly
distinguished within it, because their policies are far from
identical," Musabekov says. "I think this is how Russia sees it as
well. Turkey and Iran are behaving in similar ways.
Therefore, in this sense, the 'region' exists only for outside players."
International actors may very well continue the practice of lumping Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia together, leading the three states to set aside their
differences temporarily when on the global stage.
But another possibility is that "South Caucasus" may gradually outlive
its usefulness, eventually serving only as an example of a failed
attempt to paint the three nations with one brush.
RFE/RL's Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian services contributed to this
report.