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ARMENIA CANNOT CONSTANTLY "BLUFF" IN THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL GAME: INTERVIEW BY ARMEN AYVAZYAN
Regnum News Agency, Russia
June 4 2007
Interview by Armen Ayvazyan, PhD in Political Science, Director
of the "Ararat" Center for Strategic Research REGNUM: After the
May elections in Armenia the authorities have succeeded to further
strengthen their positions internally and, it seems, to gain a free
hand in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. How would you
then explain the unprecedented harsh statement of 28 May 2007 by the
leading Armenian internet-resources, who represent a rather serious
contingent of active and professional part of the Armenian society?
During the pre-election campaign the problem of Artsakh (Nagorno
Karabakh - REGNUM) and the liberated territory of Armenia (the regions
around Nagorno Karabakh currently under Armenian control are implied -
REGNUM) were practically left out from the discourse.
Almost all parties side-stepped this question, at best offering banal,
declarative and vague formulas about the necessity of achieving the
conflict's settlement by the way of "mutual concessions" and the like
and so on. Meanwhile, during a brief period after the elections the
rhetoric about the surrender of the liberated territory to Azerbaijan
has sharply galvanized. The announcements have been made on the
level of the co-chairmen of the OSCE's Minsk Group, to leave aside
the victorious proclamations by Azerbaijan's highest dignitaries,
about reaching agreements on factual capitulation of Yerevan and its
readiness to surrender six or even all seven districts of the former
Azerbaijani SSR. Rather than being categorically and unequivocally
refuted by official Yerevan, at times these discussions have been
receiving direct and indirect approval in the statements by Foreign
and Defense Ministers of Armenia about the inevitability of "painful
concessions" as well as in Yerevan's frequent speechlessness, which
many interpret as tacit consent. All of this compounded with the
secrecy of the negotiations is generating great concern in Armenian
society about the fate of the liberated territory, that is - about
their very own security.
REGNUM : What is the value of these territories for the Armenian
society?
The liberation of Armenian territories around the former
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has been generally viewed as a
military necessity - the only means of suppressing the Azerbaijani
launching points in 1991-1994. This explanation, reflecting the field
situation during the Artsakh war, is absolutely correct in a military
sense; nevertheless, it is not comprehensive and, consequently,
is deficient in several aspects.
Chronologically, this lone explanation corresponds to the strategic
thinking of the Armenian leaders in the early 1990s. They
refused to recognize several other components of the Karabakh
conflict, in particular, they were ignoring the incompatibility of
Armenian-Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic interests in the foreseeable
future; believing that the role of history in international politics is
anachronistic (an outdated reality); naively perceiving the developed
countries of the West as unbiased mediators and omnipotent guarantors
of security, at the same time perceiving the development of the
international political system as a unilinear progressive movement
in the direction of 'general well-being and freedom'.
This worldview was in many aspects erroneous and vulnerable, because
it viewed the problem of the liberated territory as alien to and
in isolation from the Armenian Question. While the essence of the
Armenian Question has been and remains in the creation of viable
political and territorial conditions for the Armenian people to
live freely and independently on their native soil of the Armenian
Highland. There is only one solution to the Armenian Question - to
restore Armenian statehood if not in the entirety of Armenia (350,000
sq/km), then at least on a substantial piece of it, such that safe
and long term existence and development of Armenian civilization
can be secured. In other words, the Armenian Question is about the
security of the Armenian nation, and it requires the provision of two
prerequisites: The first is the creation of comprehensive and strong
statehood, and the second is the territorial guarantees fortifying
the security and viability of that statehood.
The experience of independent existence in the last decade and
a half proves that Armenia has managed to survive only thanks
to establishing of its control over the 42,000 sq/km of native
Armenian land. This territory is that minimally necessary area with
fairly natural boundaries which provides for the security of modern
Armenia (including the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic). Armenian statehood will hardly be capable to survive,
let alone develop successfully, on a smaller territory.
Hence, the liberated territory is a guarantee of geopolitical weight
and international authority of modern Armenia. It is a precondition
for its military, water, food, energy, psychological, and, in the near
future, demographic security. It is a part of the Armenian homeland
in terms of history, cultural heritage and physical geography. The
liberated territory is the means for restoring the historically
traumatized psyche of the Armenians. It is a medium for the true
meaning of Armenia. Finally, the liberated territory is a just, though
minimal, compensation for the Armenian territorial, cultural, material
and human losses and sufferings caused by the Turkish and Azerbaijani
genocides, a compensation which has been attained by Armenian blood.
REGNUM: So, what is the formula of the settlement? And why is it so
unacceptable for the Armenian public?
The available information suggests that Armenia and Azerbaijan, upon
the mediation of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, work over a one
or two page document on the main principles of settlement. These
principles include the following: during the first phase of the
"settlement" the Armenian forces withdraw from the liberated
territory, except for the Kashatagh region (the Lachin corridor);
a multi-national peacekeeping force enters the conflict region,
then its re-settlement by the Azerbaijanis is organized. During the
second stage, the Kashatagh region is being gradually passed over to
the control of peacekeepers, and, then, according to official Baku,
Kashatagh and also Shushi are to be re-inhabited by the Azerbaijani
population. In 10-15 years a referendum is held on the future status
of Artsakh, which, as Baku states, will be held on the whole territory
of Azerbaijan and will in any case respect the "territorial integrity"
of Azerbaijan in the traditional meaning of this concept held by Baku.
Obviously, these principles are so far off from the legitimate
demands of the Armenian side that they can effectively never be
accepted. They had been already rejected once in 1996-1997. However,
the aforementioned document on the principles of the settlement may be
drawn up by using as blurred and ambiguous terms as to allow Yerevan
and Baku to interpret it each in their own ways.
Here is precisely the major menace for the Armenian side, since the
single clearly defined provision in this document will demand the
withdrawal of Armenian troops.
There also exists a widely held opinion that the Armenian authorities,
in an attempt to outmaneuver their adversaries, create a favorable
image in the eyes of the mediators and escape international isolation,
imitate the seriousness of their intentions in the negotiations and
play 'diplomatic poker' with Baku, hoping or being confident that
Baku itself will reject the proposed portfolio of settlement, as it
has happened more than once.
REGNUM: But perhaps imitation in the negotiations is a successful
tactic by Armenia? So far, Azerbaijan has adopted a principle of
"everything or nothing", thereby affording Armenia the chance to
preserve the status quo.
Even if we consider this an imitation of negotiations (unfortunately we
don't have enough evidence to be sure here), such imitation seriously
undermines Armenian interests.
First of all, the constant propaganda by the first political
dignitaries of the Republic of Armenia about the inevitability of
making territorial concessions infects the Armenian public with
defeatism, undermines the national victorious spirit among the
Armenians and the Armenian army, and does so on the threshold of
possible Azerbaijani further aggression. In the meantime, a significant
portion of the Armenian bureaucracy, as well as those young people
who aspire for careers in public service, in the absence of any other
official position, fully trust the rhetoric uttered by those at the
top of the bureaucratic pyramid regarding the proposed settlement of
the conflict, and they themselves take on the baton of propagating
the concessions, thus reinforcing the defeatist moods even further.
Second, the prolonged imitation of negotiations by Yerevan about
the readiness to make concessions on the one hand, and Baku's
uncompromising stance on the other, involuntarily condition and
persuade the Azeri public opinion as well as the international
community that the only possible option for resolution is the
withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the liberated territory -
i.e., the capitulation of the Armenian side.
Third, suchlike imitation sends out incorrect signals to the big
international actors engaged in the conflict (in the capacity of
third parties or mediators) about the true positions and demands of
the Armenian side. Armenia cannot constantly bluff in the regional
geopolitical game with such big players as the U.S., Russia and the
EU. Such diplomatic gambles are rather transparent and doomed to be
revealed, which could bring extremely unpleasant consequences for
the gambler himself.
Fourth, such a game weakens the negotiating positions of the Armenian
side, debilitating one's own position while, conversely, elevating
the expectations and demands of the opponent. We faced an identical
situation in 1996-1997. A passage I wrote about that period fully
corresponds to today's unfavorable situation: "The latest studies on
the theory and practice of negotiations have demonstrated that if one
of the negotiating parties (in our case - Armenia) adopts a soft and
compromising stance, conducting a so-called "friendly bargaining",
while the other party (in this case - Azerbaijan) takes an extremely
hard stance or "hard bargaining", then initiative and advantage always
lies with the latter. At the end, some agreements may be reached but
these will undoubtedly be in favor of the hard bargainer.
But the most important consequence is that such agreements do not
solve the problem, often leading to the resumption of the conflict.
REGNUM: And what can be said about the implementation of the document
about the principles of settlement?
Even if such a document is signed, it cannot be implemented as
long as a "Big Treaty", which should elaborate all the details,
is not concluded. But the latter cannot be concluded and ratified
for a long period to come, because the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict depends on specific details, rather than on clarification
of the general principles. In conflicts of this type, each and every
single seemingly miniscule detail is of the utmost importance.
For example, where the Armenian or the Azeri post will be stationed
- on this or that side of the hill - can play the same role in the
conflict as, say, the proclamation of the most important legal fact
- the future political status of Artsakh. Moreover, it is my strong
belief that in the Karabakh conflict the real power factors are far
more important than the pure legal elements. No legal document can
provide the Armenian side with the security guarantees equivalent to
land and territory. Even if, in the best case scenario, Azerbaijan
does recognize the independence of Artsakh (though Baku doesn't want
to even hear about it), such recognition will be merely a "paper"
element. The moment after conceding the liberated territory to the
enemy, Artsakh, as well as Syunik (the southernmost region of the
Republic of Armenia - REGNUM) will, in military sense, find themselves
in an undefendable situation and could be destroyed by a short-term
Azerbaijani military offensive (here it is apt to recall the fall
of Serbian Krajina). The conceding of territory will not exclude the
probability of war but, enticing Baku's appetite, will rather create
conditions for Azerbaijan to resume the war from the most favorable
positions. Let us also remember that Azerbaijan, with the disguised
encouragement and support of its ally Turkey, is yearning for and
planning the destruction of Armenia in its entirety.
In any case, both the signing and implementation of the "Big Treaty"
will be hindered not only by the difficulties in finding compromises
in the details, but also by the internal political problems in Armenia
and Azerbaijan, the interference by great and regional powers, various
possible provocations, as well as the resistance by the people and
leadership of Artsakh and the patriotic constituency within the
Armenian public.
Thus, the question of the "Big Treaty" will remain unresolved,
but a document on the principles of the settlement, if signed, will
legitimize Baku's demands in the international arena and will hang
upon Armenia's security as a "sword of Damocles". Consequently, the
signing of a document on the principles of the settlement requiring
the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the liberated territory
in itself immediately jeopardizes Armenia's national security in a
short-term context.
In the long run, the Karabakh conflict will be resolved in favour of
Armenia or Azerbaijan not at the negotiating table but as a result
of relative successes of these rival states in their respective
state-building processes. It is precisely this paramount challenge -
building a militarily and economically viable Armenian state - that
predetermines the fate of the liberated territory as an absolute and
inalienable strategic asset for Armenia and all Armenians.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Regnum News Agency, Russia
June 4 2007
Interview by Armen Ayvazyan, PhD in Political Science, Director
of the "Ararat" Center for Strategic Research REGNUM: After the
May elections in Armenia the authorities have succeeded to further
strengthen their positions internally and, it seems, to gain a free
hand in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. How would you
then explain the unprecedented harsh statement of 28 May 2007 by the
leading Armenian internet-resources, who represent a rather serious
contingent of active and professional part of the Armenian society?
During the pre-election campaign the problem of Artsakh (Nagorno
Karabakh - REGNUM) and the liberated territory of Armenia (the regions
around Nagorno Karabakh currently under Armenian control are implied -
REGNUM) were practically left out from the discourse.
Almost all parties side-stepped this question, at best offering banal,
declarative and vague formulas about the necessity of achieving the
conflict's settlement by the way of "mutual concessions" and the like
and so on. Meanwhile, during a brief period after the elections the
rhetoric about the surrender of the liberated territory to Azerbaijan
has sharply galvanized. The announcements have been made on the
level of the co-chairmen of the OSCE's Minsk Group, to leave aside
the victorious proclamations by Azerbaijan's highest dignitaries,
about reaching agreements on factual capitulation of Yerevan and its
readiness to surrender six or even all seven districts of the former
Azerbaijani SSR. Rather than being categorically and unequivocally
refuted by official Yerevan, at times these discussions have been
receiving direct and indirect approval in the statements by Foreign
and Defense Ministers of Armenia about the inevitability of "painful
concessions" as well as in Yerevan's frequent speechlessness, which
many interpret as tacit consent. All of this compounded with the
secrecy of the negotiations is generating great concern in Armenian
society about the fate of the liberated territory, that is - about
their very own security.
REGNUM : What is the value of these territories for the Armenian
society?
The liberation of Armenian territories around the former
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has been generally viewed as a
military necessity - the only means of suppressing the Azerbaijani
launching points in 1991-1994. This explanation, reflecting the field
situation during the Artsakh war, is absolutely correct in a military
sense; nevertheless, it is not comprehensive and, consequently,
is deficient in several aspects.
Chronologically, this lone explanation corresponds to the strategic
thinking of the Armenian leaders in the early 1990s. They
refused to recognize several other components of the Karabakh
conflict, in particular, they were ignoring the incompatibility of
Armenian-Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic interests in the foreseeable
future; believing that the role of history in international politics is
anachronistic (an outdated reality); naively perceiving the developed
countries of the West as unbiased mediators and omnipotent guarantors
of security, at the same time perceiving the development of the
international political system as a unilinear progressive movement
in the direction of 'general well-being and freedom'.
This worldview was in many aspects erroneous and vulnerable, because
it viewed the problem of the liberated territory as alien to and
in isolation from the Armenian Question. While the essence of the
Armenian Question has been and remains in the creation of viable
political and territorial conditions for the Armenian people to
live freely and independently on their native soil of the Armenian
Highland. There is only one solution to the Armenian Question - to
restore Armenian statehood if not in the entirety of Armenia (350,000
sq/km), then at least on a substantial piece of it, such that safe
and long term existence and development of Armenian civilization
can be secured. In other words, the Armenian Question is about the
security of the Armenian nation, and it requires the provision of two
prerequisites: The first is the creation of comprehensive and strong
statehood, and the second is the territorial guarantees fortifying
the security and viability of that statehood.
The experience of independent existence in the last decade and
a half proves that Armenia has managed to survive only thanks
to establishing of its control over the 42,000 sq/km of native
Armenian land. This territory is that minimally necessary area with
fairly natural boundaries which provides for the security of modern
Armenia (including the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic). Armenian statehood will hardly be capable to survive,
let alone develop successfully, on a smaller territory.
Hence, the liberated territory is a guarantee of geopolitical weight
and international authority of modern Armenia. It is a precondition
for its military, water, food, energy, psychological, and, in the near
future, demographic security. It is a part of the Armenian homeland
in terms of history, cultural heritage and physical geography. The
liberated territory is the means for restoring the historically
traumatized psyche of the Armenians. It is a medium for the true
meaning of Armenia. Finally, the liberated territory is a just, though
minimal, compensation for the Armenian territorial, cultural, material
and human losses and sufferings caused by the Turkish and Azerbaijani
genocides, a compensation which has been attained by Armenian blood.
REGNUM: So, what is the formula of the settlement? And why is it so
unacceptable for the Armenian public?
The available information suggests that Armenia and Azerbaijan, upon
the mediation of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, work over a one
or two page document on the main principles of settlement. These
principles include the following: during the first phase of the
"settlement" the Armenian forces withdraw from the liberated
territory, except for the Kashatagh region (the Lachin corridor);
a multi-national peacekeeping force enters the conflict region,
then its re-settlement by the Azerbaijanis is organized. During the
second stage, the Kashatagh region is being gradually passed over to
the control of peacekeepers, and, then, according to official Baku,
Kashatagh and also Shushi are to be re-inhabited by the Azerbaijani
population. In 10-15 years a referendum is held on the future status
of Artsakh, which, as Baku states, will be held on the whole territory
of Azerbaijan and will in any case respect the "territorial integrity"
of Azerbaijan in the traditional meaning of this concept held by Baku.
Obviously, these principles are so far off from the legitimate
demands of the Armenian side that they can effectively never be
accepted. They had been already rejected once in 1996-1997. However,
the aforementioned document on the principles of the settlement may be
drawn up by using as blurred and ambiguous terms as to allow Yerevan
and Baku to interpret it each in their own ways.
Here is precisely the major menace for the Armenian side, since the
single clearly defined provision in this document will demand the
withdrawal of Armenian troops.
There also exists a widely held opinion that the Armenian authorities,
in an attempt to outmaneuver their adversaries, create a favorable
image in the eyes of the mediators and escape international isolation,
imitate the seriousness of their intentions in the negotiations and
play 'diplomatic poker' with Baku, hoping or being confident that
Baku itself will reject the proposed portfolio of settlement, as it
has happened more than once.
REGNUM: But perhaps imitation in the negotiations is a successful
tactic by Armenia? So far, Azerbaijan has adopted a principle of
"everything or nothing", thereby affording Armenia the chance to
preserve the status quo.
Even if we consider this an imitation of negotiations (unfortunately we
don't have enough evidence to be sure here), such imitation seriously
undermines Armenian interests.
First of all, the constant propaganda by the first political
dignitaries of the Republic of Armenia about the inevitability of
making territorial concessions infects the Armenian public with
defeatism, undermines the national victorious spirit among the
Armenians and the Armenian army, and does so on the threshold of
possible Azerbaijani further aggression. In the meantime, a significant
portion of the Armenian bureaucracy, as well as those young people
who aspire for careers in public service, in the absence of any other
official position, fully trust the rhetoric uttered by those at the
top of the bureaucratic pyramid regarding the proposed settlement of
the conflict, and they themselves take on the baton of propagating
the concessions, thus reinforcing the defeatist moods even further.
Second, the prolonged imitation of negotiations by Yerevan about
the readiness to make concessions on the one hand, and Baku's
uncompromising stance on the other, involuntarily condition and
persuade the Azeri public opinion as well as the international
community that the only possible option for resolution is the
withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the liberated territory -
i.e., the capitulation of the Armenian side.
Third, suchlike imitation sends out incorrect signals to the big
international actors engaged in the conflict (in the capacity of
third parties or mediators) about the true positions and demands of
the Armenian side. Armenia cannot constantly bluff in the regional
geopolitical game with such big players as the U.S., Russia and the
EU. Such diplomatic gambles are rather transparent and doomed to be
revealed, which could bring extremely unpleasant consequences for
the gambler himself.
Fourth, such a game weakens the negotiating positions of the Armenian
side, debilitating one's own position while, conversely, elevating
the expectations and demands of the opponent. We faced an identical
situation in 1996-1997. A passage I wrote about that period fully
corresponds to today's unfavorable situation: "The latest studies on
the theory and practice of negotiations have demonstrated that if one
of the negotiating parties (in our case - Armenia) adopts a soft and
compromising stance, conducting a so-called "friendly bargaining",
while the other party (in this case - Azerbaijan) takes an extremely
hard stance or "hard bargaining", then initiative and advantage always
lies with the latter. At the end, some agreements may be reached but
these will undoubtedly be in favor of the hard bargainer.
But the most important consequence is that such agreements do not
solve the problem, often leading to the resumption of the conflict.
REGNUM: And what can be said about the implementation of the document
about the principles of settlement?
Even if such a document is signed, it cannot be implemented as
long as a "Big Treaty", which should elaborate all the details,
is not concluded. But the latter cannot be concluded and ratified
for a long period to come, because the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict depends on specific details, rather than on clarification
of the general principles. In conflicts of this type, each and every
single seemingly miniscule detail is of the utmost importance.
For example, where the Armenian or the Azeri post will be stationed
- on this or that side of the hill - can play the same role in the
conflict as, say, the proclamation of the most important legal fact
- the future political status of Artsakh. Moreover, it is my strong
belief that in the Karabakh conflict the real power factors are far
more important than the pure legal elements. No legal document can
provide the Armenian side with the security guarantees equivalent to
land and territory. Even if, in the best case scenario, Azerbaijan
does recognize the independence of Artsakh (though Baku doesn't want
to even hear about it), such recognition will be merely a "paper"
element. The moment after conceding the liberated territory to the
enemy, Artsakh, as well as Syunik (the southernmost region of the
Republic of Armenia - REGNUM) will, in military sense, find themselves
in an undefendable situation and could be destroyed by a short-term
Azerbaijani military offensive (here it is apt to recall the fall
of Serbian Krajina). The conceding of territory will not exclude the
probability of war but, enticing Baku's appetite, will rather create
conditions for Azerbaijan to resume the war from the most favorable
positions. Let us also remember that Azerbaijan, with the disguised
encouragement and support of its ally Turkey, is yearning for and
planning the destruction of Armenia in its entirety.
In any case, both the signing and implementation of the "Big Treaty"
will be hindered not only by the difficulties in finding compromises
in the details, but also by the internal political problems in Armenia
and Azerbaijan, the interference by great and regional powers, various
possible provocations, as well as the resistance by the people and
leadership of Artsakh and the patriotic constituency within the
Armenian public.
Thus, the question of the "Big Treaty" will remain unresolved,
but a document on the principles of the settlement, if signed, will
legitimize Baku's demands in the international arena and will hang
upon Armenia's security as a "sword of Damocles". Consequently, the
signing of a document on the principles of the settlement requiring
the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the liberated territory
in itself immediately jeopardizes Armenia's national security in a
short-term context.
In the long run, the Karabakh conflict will be resolved in favour of
Armenia or Azerbaijan not at the negotiating table but as a result
of relative successes of these rival states in their respective
state-building processes. It is precisely this paramount challenge -
building a militarily and economically viable Armenian state - that
predetermines the fate of the liberated territory as an absolute and
inalienable strategic asset for Armenia and all Armenians.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress