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UNDISCLOSED GEORGIAN-AMERICAN SECRETS: HISTORY HAS MORE TO TELL ABOUT MOSER
Ramaz Kartvelishvili
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
June 4 2007
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and the emergence of the
Soviet Union on the ruins of the Russian Empire prompted the United
States' appearance on the geopolitical arena. The US had it has its
own agenda for the future of the region, and in 1919, the US State
Department developed a strategy of how to deal with the former Russian
Empire. The US wanted to see the South Caucasian republics-Ukraine,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Crimea, Karelia, Murmansky-districted as
separate territorial units independent of Russia. To carry out this
strategy, the US needed a foothold in the territory of the former
Russian Empire. It chose the South Caucasus as its plaform.
Aleksi Chokheli, a candidate of sciences of history, has been looking
at the geopolitical games of this period. Chokheli says that accepting
former colonies of the Turkish (Ottoman) and Russian Empire, and
also those of Germany (which was defeated in World War I) under the
status of the so-called 'interim mandates' was an expression of the
"common democratic spirit of the world."
In South Caucasus, the allies of the World War I offered an interim
mandate to Armenia. The mandate was intended to secure the Armenian
state. At the time, Georgian authorities were trying to have the US
mandate extended to Georgia as well.
The Georgian Times interviewed Chokheli about this period of history.
Q: History shows what a fiasco Europe and the US experienced in their
attempts to protect the South Caucasian states from Russian invasion.
They were left all alone in the face of Russia. The US even failed
to implement its mandate over Armenia.
A: A number of objective reasons can be cited to explain why this
happened. But I will now dwell on the role of the US consulate in
Georgia, which was spearheading the US policy in the South Caucasus.
More specifically, I will talk about its last boss, consul Charles
Moser. He witnessed the political turmoil that wracked Georgia in
those two years of crisis. I would say that that his performance,
and even his personality, shows the moderate course of the US that
proved so fatal for South Caucasus, including Georgia.
It is hard to say whether it was due to his political intuition or
pragmatic far-sighted policy, but history shows that the US established
its own consulate in Batumi even before World War I started, and when
the US joined the war, the consulate moved to Tbilisi.
The consulate served as a department of the General Consulate based in
Moscow, and after the demise of the Russian Empire, it was subordinated
directly to the US State Department. Following the invasion of Georgia
by the Tsarist Russian Empire the US consulate officially moved to
Constantinople, but in fact it stopped functioning.
Q: Did the US consulate serve as embassy as well, or was it strictly
limited to consulate duties?
A: It is rather obvious that when there is no embassy in a country,
the consulate assumes embassy status. The activity of the first
consul of the US to Georgia W. Smith is evidence of this. He served
in Georgia until June of 1919.
At that time, Tbilisi was a cultural and political hub in the South
Caucasus. Prime Minister of Armenia Khatisov-who once had even served
as Tbilisi Mayor-was based in Tbilisi and running Armenia from Georgia,
as his wife did not want to live in "remote" Yerevan.
Smith, who was born into a family of Americans residing somewhere
in the South Caucasus (perhaps even in Tbilisi), adapted to his new
position perfectly. He was well versed in the ethnic structure of the
South Caucasus and knew many political figures personally. Smith was
the ideal person to implement US policy in the South Caucasus as the
Russian empire was about to crumble.
In 1917, 1918 and in the first half 1919, the Atlantic States and
the US had two major issues on the agenda: to prevent Bolshevism from
taking over South Caucasus, and bring this region within the spheres
of its influence in the aftermath of World War I. These interests
even caused a latent diplomatic clash at Paris peace conference. The
documents giving evidence to this confrontation is widely covered in
American historic editions and the activity of the American consul
to Tbilisi W. Smith is granted its due place on these pages.
Reading the correspondence of Smith with high-ranking American
officials, one is astonished by his energetic and rather bold proposals
to the US Administration. Smith requested millions of dollars to fund
the South Caucasus commissariat (a federal government of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1917-1918), tried to create a joint
Georgian-Armenian army of 150 000 soldiers, and worked on many other
initiatives in order to try and save the region, including Georgia,
from the Bolshevik invasion.
Q: Smith was recalled in summer 1919, when Charles Moser replaced
him. Moser's memoirs are full of strong impressions about his personal
life, but he left almost no official document that would shed light
on his diplomatic work - something of more interest to us.
A: That is because he managed to concoct his memoirs to smartly avoid
talking about his diplomatic work. As for his correspondence, his
letters to the US State Department and other business communications
have never been published. Moreover, these were written in a code
that other consulates were using.
We can only speculate about why the documents related to Moser's
political activity were not decoded and published. At the Paris peace
conference in 1919, the US and England made a deal and divided the
South Caucasus into discrete spheres of influence. The UK took over
Georgia, while giving Armenia's mandate to the US. Following the
deal, the status of the American consulate in Tbilisi underwent a
major change. On July 5 of 1919, the Supreme Council of the allies
in Paris appointed American colonel Haskel as the High Commissioner
for Armenia, and the US Department delegated the management of the
US consulate in Tbilisi to Haskel.
The American colonel settled in Yerevan. Political changes have
somewhat bleached the importance of the US consulate and the US consul
in Tbilisi. Perhaps Moser's documents also reflected the Smith-style
independent and bold consul policies. This still remains mystery.
The only document that has been unsealed is Moser's answer to Armenia
which was kept in Georgia's archives. Armenians expected that the
US would protect them from Turkey, and applied to the US consul with
this request. Replying to the request, Moser wrote: "Although the US
recognized the republic of Armenia and helped it as it could, the US
administration never assumed an obligation to protect the Armenian
people or to provide military support. Therefore, it cannot take
responsibility [for dealing with] the current crisis." The letter
shows the restrained position of the US in implementing the mandate
of Armenia. On the other hand, the letter suggests that the US consul
took a low-key position in his diplomacy work in the South Caucasus.
Q: Moser's memoirs show that he knew and liked Georgia and Georgians
but there was no love lost between him and Georgian authorities. What
was the cause of disagreement?
A: Before arriving in Georgia as a professional diplomat Charles
Moser-who had experience of diplomatic work in Central and Far
East-tried to become familiar with the nation with which he was to
live and work for some time. He was not satisfied by reading books
and travel guides, and began to obtain information from live sources.
With this purpose to mind, he met with former ambassador of Russia,
King Maklakov. "[Maklakov] described Georgians as attractive people,
people who loved merry-making," Moser recalled. "[As people] who
reveal big talent whenever they need it, but will never get to business
which they do not like."
"Georgians are a beautiful nation, both women and men (which I would
certainly discover myself). They are proud and sensitive. It is easy
to offend them but they would never delay their response, even using
arms. Georgians wear long swords just for appearance but they become
dangerous... I was always to bear in my mind that Georgians love wine,
women and song, dance and even quarrel."
Moser arrived one nice day in January 1920 with these impressions.
But soon after his arrival, a misunderstanding dampened his excitement
over Georgia. At a presentation given by the consulate, Georgia's
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Gegechkori gave the US consul the cold
shoulder. Historians do not know the reason for the cold reception
that reversed Moser's course.
Following that fateful meeting, the new consul reduced his contacts
with the Georgian government, and began to support foreigners in
their diplomatic disputes with the government of Georgia. Sometimes
he would even encourage a hostile attitude towards the government of
Georgia from the diplomatic corp.
Distrust of the social-democratic government of Georgia grew dangerous
in character. In official documentation Moser used to describe Georgia
as a 'socialist republic,' which was a gross mischaracterization.
The deeply disappointed consul withdrew into his private life. Moser
then married the daughter of Georgian noble Sidamon Eristavi. The
only good thing that he did for Georgians was to evacuate Sidamon
Eristavi and his relatives when the Bolsheviks lay siege to Georgia.
Nonetheless, we think that Moser's devotion to private life was not
the whole story. He closely followed the dramatic developments in
the South Caucasus. Working on his secret heritage may fill the gaps
in the history of Georgian-American relations with many interesting
and important facts, and who knows? They may even change our present
opinion on the activity of the US consul in Tbilisi.
Ramaz Kartvelishvili
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
June 4 2007
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, and the emergence of the
Soviet Union on the ruins of the Russian Empire prompted the United
States' appearance on the geopolitical arena. The US had it has its
own agenda for the future of the region, and in 1919, the US State
Department developed a strategy of how to deal with the former Russian
Empire. The US wanted to see the South Caucasian republics-Ukraine,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Crimea, Karelia, Murmansky-districted as
separate territorial units independent of Russia. To carry out this
strategy, the US needed a foothold in the territory of the former
Russian Empire. It chose the South Caucasus as its plaform.
Aleksi Chokheli, a candidate of sciences of history, has been looking
at the geopolitical games of this period. Chokheli says that accepting
former colonies of the Turkish (Ottoman) and Russian Empire, and
also those of Germany (which was defeated in World War I) under the
status of the so-called 'interim mandates' was an expression of the
"common democratic spirit of the world."
In South Caucasus, the allies of the World War I offered an interim
mandate to Armenia. The mandate was intended to secure the Armenian
state. At the time, Georgian authorities were trying to have the US
mandate extended to Georgia as well.
The Georgian Times interviewed Chokheli about this period of history.
Q: History shows what a fiasco Europe and the US experienced in their
attempts to protect the South Caucasian states from Russian invasion.
They were left all alone in the face of Russia. The US even failed
to implement its mandate over Armenia.
A: A number of objective reasons can be cited to explain why this
happened. But I will now dwell on the role of the US consulate in
Georgia, which was spearheading the US policy in the South Caucasus.
More specifically, I will talk about its last boss, consul Charles
Moser. He witnessed the political turmoil that wracked Georgia in
those two years of crisis. I would say that that his performance,
and even his personality, shows the moderate course of the US that
proved so fatal for South Caucasus, including Georgia.
It is hard to say whether it was due to his political intuition or
pragmatic far-sighted policy, but history shows that the US established
its own consulate in Batumi even before World War I started, and when
the US joined the war, the consulate moved to Tbilisi.
The consulate served as a department of the General Consulate based in
Moscow, and after the demise of the Russian Empire, it was subordinated
directly to the US State Department. Following the invasion of Georgia
by the Tsarist Russian Empire the US consulate officially moved to
Constantinople, but in fact it stopped functioning.
Q: Did the US consulate serve as embassy as well, or was it strictly
limited to consulate duties?
A: It is rather obvious that when there is no embassy in a country,
the consulate assumes embassy status. The activity of the first
consul of the US to Georgia W. Smith is evidence of this. He served
in Georgia until June of 1919.
At that time, Tbilisi was a cultural and political hub in the South
Caucasus. Prime Minister of Armenia Khatisov-who once had even served
as Tbilisi Mayor-was based in Tbilisi and running Armenia from Georgia,
as his wife did not want to live in "remote" Yerevan.
Smith, who was born into a family of Americans residing somewhere
in the South Caucasus (perhaps even in Tbilisi), adapted to his new
position perfectly. He was well versed in the ethnic structure of the
South Caucasus and knew many political figures personally. Smith was
the ideal person to implement US policy in the South Caucasus as the
Russian empire was about to crumble.
In 1917, 1918 and in the first half 1919, the Atlantic States and
the US had two major issues on the agenda: to prevent Bolshevism from
taking over South Caucasus, and bring this region within the spheres
of its influence in the aftermath of World War I. These interests
even caused a latent diplomatic clash at Paris peace conference. The
documents giving evidence to this confrontation is widely covered in
American historic editions and the activity of the American consul
to Tbilisi W. Smith is granted its due place on these pages.
Reading the correspondence of Smith with high-ranking American
officials, one is astonished by his energetic and rather bold proposals
to the US Administration. Smith requested millions of dollars to fund
the South Caucasus commissariat (a federal government of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1917-1918), tried to create a joint
Georgian-Armenian army of 150 000 soldiers, and worked on many other
initiatives in order to try and save the region, including Georgia,
from the Bolshevik invasion.
Q: Smith was recalled in summer 1919, when Charles Moser replaced
him. Moser's memoirs are full of strong impressions about his personal
life, but he left almost no official document that would shed light
on his diplomatic work - something of more interest to us.
A: That is because he managed to concoct his memoirs to smartly avoid
talking about his diplomatic work. As for his correspondence, his
letters to the US State Department and other business communications
have never been published. Moreover, these were written in a code
that other consulates were using.
We can only speculate about why the documents related to Moser's
political activity were not decoded and published. At the Paris peace
conference in 1919, the US and England made a deal and divided the
South Caucasus into discrete spheres of influence. The UK took over
Georgia, while giving Armenia's mandate to the US. Following the
deal, the status of the American consulate in Tbilisi underwent a
major change. On July 5 of 1919, the Supreme Council of the allies
in Paris appointed American colonel Haskel as the High Commissioner
for Armenia, and the US Department delegated the management of the
US consulate in Tbilisi to Haskel.
The American colonel settled in Yerevan. Political changes have
somewhat bleached the importance of the US consulate and the US consul
in Tbilisi. Perhaps Moser's documents also reflected the Smith-style
independent and bold consul policies. This still remains mystery.
The only document that has been unsealed is Moser's answer to Armenia
which was kept in Georgia's archives. Armenians expected that the
US would protect them from Turkey, and applied to the US consul with
this request. Replying to the request, Moser wrote: "Although the US
recognized the republic of Armenia and helped it as it could, the US
administration never assumed an obligation to protect the Armenian
people or to provide military support. Therefore, it cannot take
responsibility [for dealing with] the current crisis." The letter
shows the restrained position of the US in implementing the mandate
of Armenia. On the other hand, the letter suggests that the US consul
took a low-key position in his diplomacy work in the South Caucasus.
Q: Moser's memoirs show that he knew and liked Georgia and Georgians
but there was no love lost between him and Georgian authorities. What
was the cause of disagreement?
A: Before arriving in Georgia as a professional diplomat Charles
Moser-who had experience of diplomatic work in Central and Far
East-tried to become familiar with the nation with which he was to
live and work for some time. He was not satisfied by reading books
and travel guides, and began to obtain information from live sources.
With this purpose to mind, he met with former ambassador of Russia,
King Maklakov. "[Maklakov] described Georgians as attractive people,
people who loved merry-making," Moser recalled. "[As people] who
reveal big talent whenever they need it, but will never get to business
which they do not like."
"Georgians are a beautiful nation, both women and men (which I would
certainly discover myself). They are proud and sensitive. It is easy
to offend them but they would never delay their response, even using
arms. Georgians wear long swords just for appearance but they become
dangerous... I was always to bear in my mind that Georgians love wine,
women and song, dance and even quarrel."
Moser arrived one nice day in January 1920 with these impressions.
But soon after his arrival, a misunderstanding dampened his excitement
over Georgia. At a presentation given by the consulate, Georgia's
Foreign Minister Yevgeni Gegechkori gave the US consul the cold
shoulder. Historians do not know the reason for the cold reception
that reversed Moser's course.
Following that fateful meeting, the new consul reduced his contacts
with the Georgian government, and began to support foreigners in
their diplomatic disputes with the government of Georgia. Sometimes
he would even encourage a hostile attitude towards the government of
Georgia from the diplomatic corp.
Distrust of the social-democratic government of Georgia grew dangerous
in character. In official documentation Moser used to describe Georgia
as a 'socialist republic,' which was a gross mischaracterization.
The deeply disappointed consul withdrew into his private life. Moser
then married the daughter of Georgian noble Sidamon Eristavi. The
only good thing that he did for Georgians was to evacuate Sidamon
Eristavi and his relatives when the Bolsheviks lay siege to Georgia.
Nonetheless, we think that Moser's devotion to private life was not
the whole story. He closely followed the dramatic developments in
the South Caucasus. Working on his secret heritage may fill the gaps
in the history of Georgian-American relations with many interesting
and important facts, and who knows? They may even change our present
opinion on the activity of the US consul in Tbilisi.