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Eurasia Daily Monitor
Friday, May 25, 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 103
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN MOLDOVA -- MAIN REMAINING OBSTACLE TO CFE TREATY
RATIFICATION
by Vladimir Socor
With Russian troops on their way out from two bases in Georgia, the
international politics of CFE Treaty ratification focuses increasingly on
Moldova. The OSCE's Permanent Council-Forum for Security Cooperation special
joint meeting on May 23, with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov's participation, reflected this development. As Russian officials
from President Vladimir Putin on down threaten to scuttle the treaty unless
Western countries ratify it, Moldova may come under growing pressures from
now on.
The continuing presence of Russian forces in Moldova remains the
single biggest obstacle to Russia's push for ratification of the
1999-adapted CFE treaty. Russia can now be expected to grow bolder in
demanding ratification of the CFE Treaty even as Russia keeps its troops on
Moldova's territory. Russian diplomats also rely on some European
counterparts to agree that Russia's military presence in Moldova should not
hinder the broader goal of bringing the CFE Treaty into force as part of the
European arms-control agenda. For some Europeans, that kind of sentiment can
more easily lead to concessions to Russia when only Moldova is involved,
once the Russian troops are out of Batumi and Akhalkalaki in Georgia (albeit
retaining the Gudauta base there).
Russian arguments and rhetorical devices include:
1) Russia undertook no `obligation' or `commitment' in 1999 regarding
its forces in Moldova (although the 1999 documents show that it did);
2) Russian forces are stationed `in Transnistria' (implying a separate
status for Transnistria, outside Moldova);
3) Russia is willing to remove its massive arms and ammunition
stockpiles `from Transnistria,' but Tiraspol's authorities presumably `do
not permit' this;
4) Russian troops must stay on to guard those dangerous stockpiles;
and
5) Russian troops there `keep the peace' and would not withdraw until
a political settlement is in place (which Russia in the meantime
stonewalls).
Western officials sometimes call vaguely for withdrawal of `Russian
ammunition' (omitting troops); or troop withdrawal `from Transnistria'
(implying some change of status; particularly counterproductive when phrased
as `from Georgia and Transnistria); or withdrawal linked to political
settlement of the conflict (the 1999 Istanbul agreement actually eliminated
such a linkage, which Moscow had previously introduced). Such remarks
sometimes reflect imprecision of language, sometimes political signals. In
either case, Russia can well interpret such remarks as an encouragement to
keep the troops in Moldova while pressing for CFE treaty ratification
regardless.
Moscow hopes to exploit the weak position of Germany's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in this regard. That ministry, along with a few other
European chancelleries, is prepared to exempt Russian `peacekeeping' troops
from the obligation to withdraw. As Ottfried Nassauer, head of the Berlin
Information Center for Transatlantic Security, sums up that position,
`Germany accepts that parts of Russia's troops in Moldova and Georgia can be
regarded as peacekeepers on the basis of agreements with Russia.
Consequently, Russia has basically fulfilled its [Istanbul 1999] pledges'
(Der Tagesspiegel, April 30).
Furthermore, Germany informally leads a group of four or five West
European countries that want to see a political settlement of the
Transnistria conflict before the Russian troops withdraw from Moldova.
However, this approach only reinforces the intransigence of Tiraspol's
authorities, who stonewall the negotiations in their capacity as `party to
the conflict' with Moldova (whereas Russia is the real party to the conflict
with Moldova). Negotiations in the shadow of Russian troops could lead
either nowhere (which has been the case for 15 years) or to terms of
settlement distorted in Russia favor (as almost happened several times in
recent years). Moreover, Berlin's position gives Russia an incentive to
block a political settlement indefinitely, citing the settlement's absence
as an excuse for keeping Russian troops in place.
In the OSCE's May 23 special meeting, Moldova's delegation responded
to Lavrov in more explicit and forthright terms, compared with the
collective statements of the EU (with which Moldova aligned itself as a
partner country) and NATO. It said, `The Moldovan authorities firmly insist
on the complete and unconditional fulfillment of commitments undertaken at
Istanbul concerning the early and complete withdrawal of Russia's troops and
armaments from the territory of Moldova.'
In Chisinau's view, `complete' means no exemption for Russian
`peacekeeping' troops; `unconditional' means not linked to a political
settlement or to Tiraspol's consent; and `early' means not sequenced with
some other, hypothetical developments on the ground. The United States comes
close to supporting this position, as in Ambassador Julie Finley's response
to Lavrov in the May 23 Permanent Council session at the OSCE.
Moldova calls for an international mission of civilian and military
observers to replace the Russian `peacekeeping' troops and open the way to
the country's reunification. Chisinau has not wavered in this two-fold goal
since adopting it in 2004-2005. However, Chisinau has recently miscalculated
by seeking Moscow's consent to those goals in return for far-reaching
Moldovan political concessions to Tiraspol and Moscow. Furthermore, Chisinau
negotiated with Moscow bilaterally, under the pressure of Russia's year-long
economic embargo, venturing outside the 5+2 international format from a
position of unprecedented weakness (see EDM, April 13).
While its May 23 statement at the OSCE indicates that Chisinau has
(again) dropped its illusions about Moscow, a somewhat different message
emerges from President Vladimir Voronin's long interview with RIA-Novosti,
published that same day. There, Voronin invests his full hopes in Putin
personally while blaming Russian officialdom and other factors for not
letting Putin deliver a good settlement in Transnistria.
Russia will likely act on two fronts in parallel: Pressuring or
cajoling Moldova to consent to the stationing of Russian troops while
suggesting to West Europeans that Moldova is worth sacrificing for the sake
of arms control and relations with Russia. If Moldova succumbs and accepts
the stationing of Russian troops under some formula, many European countries
would be ready to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty and bring the three Baltic
states under its purview. Developments could take a different course,
however, if a preponderance of European countries along with the United
States consistently demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova's
territory, internationally certified closure of the Gudauta base in Georgia,
and the identification and removal of unaccounted-for treaty-limited
equipment accumulated in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Armenian-controlled
territory of Azerbaijan.
(Interfax, Itar-Tass, May 23; OSCE Permanent Council session
documents, May 23)
--Vladimir Socor
Friday, May 25, 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 103
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN MOLDOVA -- MAIN REMAINING OBSTACLE TO CFE TREATY
RATIFICATION
by Vladimir Socor
With Russian troops on their way out from two bases in Georgia, the
international politics of CFE Treaty ratification focuses increasingly on
Moldova. The OSCE's Permanent Council-Forum for Security Cooperation special
joint meeting on May 23, with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov's participation, reflected this development. As Russian officials
from President Vladimir Putin on down threaten to scuttle the treaty unless
Western countries ratify it, Moldova may come under growing pressures from
now on.
The continuing presence of Russian forces in Moldova remains the
single biggest obstacle to Russia's push for ratification of the
1999-adapted CFE treaty. Russia can now be expected to grow bolder in
demanding ratification of the CFE Treaty even as Russia keeps its troops on
Moldova's territory. Russian diplomats also rely on some European
counterparts to agree that Russia's military presence in Moldova should not
hinder the broader goal of bringing the CFE Treaty into force as part of the
European arms-control agenda. For some Europeans, that kind of sentiment can
more easily lead to concessions to Russia when only Moldova is involved,
once the Russian troops are out of Batumi and Akhalkalaki in Georgia (albeit
retaining the Gudauta base there).
Russian arguments and rhetorical devices include:
1) Russia undertook no `obligation' or `commitment' in 1999 regarding
its forces in Moldova (although the 1999 documents show that it did);
2) Russian forces are stationed `in Transnistria' (implying a separate
status for Transnistria, outside Moldova);
3) Russia is willing to remove its massive arms and ammunition
stockpiles `from Transnistria,' but Tiraspol's authorities presumably `do
not permit' this;
4) Russian troops must stay on to guard those dangerous stockpiles;
and
5) Russian troops there `keep the peace' and would not withdraw until
a political settlement is in place (which Russia in the meantime
stonewalls).
Western officials sometimes call vaguely for withdrawal of `Russian
ammunition' (omitting troops); or troop withdrawal `from Transnistria'
(implying some change of status; particularly counterproductive when phrased
as `from Georgia and Transnistria); or withdrawal linked to political
settlement of the conflict (the 1999 Istanbul agreement actually eliminated
such a linkage, which Moscow had previously introduced). Such remarks
sometimes reflect imprecision of language, sometimes political signals. In
either case, Russia can well interpret such remarks as an encouragement to
keep the troops in Moldova while pressing for CFE treaty ratification
regardless.
Moscow hopes to exploit the weak position of Germany's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in this regard. That ministry, along with a few other
European chancelleries, is prepared to exempt Russian `peacekeeping' troops
from the obligation to withdraw. As Ottfried Nassauer, head of the Berlin
Information Center for Transatlantic Security, sums up that position,
`Germany accepts that parts of Russia's troops in Moldova and Georgia can be
regarded as peacekeepers on the basis of agreements with Russia.
Consequently, Russia has basically fulfilled its [Istanbul 1999] pledges'
(Der Tagesspiegel, April 30).
Furthermore, Germany informally leads a group of four or five West
European countries that want to see a political settlement of the
Transnistria conflict before the Russian troops withdraw from Moldova.
However, this approach only reinforces the intransigence of Tiraspol's
authorities, who stonewall the negotiations in their capacity as `party to
the conflict' with Moldova (whereas Russia is the real party to the conflict
with Moldova). Negotiations in the shadow of Russian troops could lead
either nowhere (which has been the case for 15 years) or to terms of
settlement distorted in Russia favor (as almost happened several times in
recent years). Moreover, Berlin's position gives Russia an incentive to
block a political settlement indefinitely, citing the settlement's absence
as an excuse for keeping Russian troops in place.
In the OSCE's May 23 special meeting, Moldova's delegation responded
to Lavrov in more explicit and forthright terms, compared with the
collective statements of the EU (with which Moldova aligned itself as a
partner country) and NATO. It said, `The Moldovan authorities firmly insist
on the complete and unconditional fulfillment of commitments undertaken at
Istanbul concerning the early and complete withdrawal of Russia's troops and
armaments from the territory of Moldova.'
In Chisinau's view, `complete' means no exemption for Russian
`peacekeeping' troops; `unconditional' means not linked to a political
settlement or to Tiraspol's consent; and `early' means not sequenced with
some other, hypothetical developments on the ground. The United States comes
close to supporting this position, as in Ambassador Julie Finley's response
to Lavrov in the May 23 Permanent Council session at the OSCE.
Moldova calls for an international mission of civilian and military
observers to replace the Russian `peacekeeping' troops and open the way to
the country's reunification. Chisinau has not wavered in this two-fold goal
since adopting it in 2004-2005. However, Chisinau has recently miscalculated
by seeking Moscow's consent to those goals in return for far-reaching
Moldovan political concessions to Tiraspol and Moscow. Furthermore, Chisinau
negotiated with Moscow bilaterally, under the pressure of Russia's year-long
economic embargo, venturing outside the 5+2 international format from a
position of unprecedented weakness (see EDM, April 13).
While its May 23 statement at the OSCE indicates that Chisinau has
(again) dropped its illusions about Moscow, a somewhat different message
emerges from President Vladimir Voronin's long interview with RIA-Novosti,
published that same day. There, Voronin invests his full hopes in Putin
personally while blaming Russian officialdom and other factors for not
letting Putin deliver a good settlement in Transnistria.
Russia will likely act on two fronts in parallel: Pressuring or
cajoling Moldova to consent to the stationing of Russian troops while
suggesting to West Europeans that Moldova is worth sacrificing for the sake
of arms control and relations with Russia. If Moldova succumbs and accepts
the stationing of Russian troops under some formula, many European countries
would be ready to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty and bring the three Baltic
states under its purview. Developments could take a different course,
however, if a preponderance of European countries along with the United
States consistently demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova's
territory, internationally certified closure of the Gudauta base in Georgia,
and the identification and removal of unaccounted-for treaty-limited
equipment accumulated in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Armenian-controlled
territory of Azerbaijan.
(Interfax, Itar-Tass, May 23; OSCE Permanent Council session
documents, May 23)
--Vladimir Socor