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DIPLOMATIC EXTREME OR THE ERA OF LIBERATED TERRITORIES
Davit Babayan
Azat Artsakh Daily, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh [NKR]
13-06-2007
Recently the liberated territories have sparked heated debates. In
particular, the Armenian government is said to have agreed to return
these territories to Azerbaijan. The issue of territories is, in fact,
a highly important national issue, therefore it should be viewed in
the context of foreign and internal policies, different components of
which are interwoven, and certain external and internal factors should
combine to have the issue settled. First, the internal policies. It is
necessary to discuss the expediency of returning the territories. The
return of territories to Azerbaijan, which has an overt anti-Armenian
attitude and where the anti-Armenian attitude has been raised to the
level of a national ideology, means to put an end to the Armenian
statehood in both Armenia and Karabakh.
For instance, 85 percent of the water resources of Nagorno-Karabakh
(borders of 1991) start from the region of Karvachar, as well as
the rivers Arpa and Vorotan which nourish Lake Sevan which contains
80 percent of water resources of the Republic of Armenia. Are there
guarantees that Azerbaijan will not poison these arteries, especially
that Azerbaijan has considerable experience of water terror? At least
between 1970 and 1992 the water resources of the Armenian areas of
Karabakh and Stepanakert were poisoned, due to which Nagorno-Karabakh,
which used to be the first country in the Soviet Union by longevity,
is now the first in the South Caucasus by the rate of cancer. It is
clear that the national interests of Armenia do not involve change of
the present status of these territories. In this context, the Armenian
government should be viewed as the main stakeholder, and therefore
it cannot agree to return these territories. Let us assume that
the Armenian government holds another opinion, i.e. placed personal
interests above national interests. Although it is highly hypothetical,
nevertheless, how will the Armenian government benefit from the return
of these territories? And what will it be rely on later? The answer
is clear - no way, and there is nothing it can rely on later. The
president of Armenia leaves office in 2008, and he will hardly take
this move. And those who aspire to the post of president will not take
such a move either, because it will reduce to zero their chance to
win, and no force, including from the outside, will help them. As to
the outside forces, in other words, the second component, the common
approach of the great powers to this issue is less likely. Today the
relations between the United States and Russia are tense, and this
state of things will hardly change in the visible future.
The rules of the game of great powers changes, and their relations
greatly resemble the stance of the conflict sides on the Karabakh
settlement. And the change of the correlation of forces in the area
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gives rise to an unpredictable and
dangerous situation. Hence, if the Karabakh force is pulled out of the
territories, what force will be deployed? It is proposed to deploy
peacekeepers. If it is Russian or Western force, the corresponding
party will be interested. On the other hand, the other side will
not be interested. Deployment of joint force is unfavorable for both
parties, because it is unacceptable. It is clear that the status quo
remains the best option. At the same time, Azerbaijan will hardly
agree to return only the territories surrounding Karabakh. It wants
the whole pie, i.e. it wants Karabakh as well. The main reason is
that the formation of the Azerbaijani nation is not over yet. And
the independence and sovereignty of Karabakh may become a precedent
for similar processes among the Lezgi and Talish people, jeopardizing
the Azerbaijani state. Therefore, Azerbaijan needs Karabakh without
Armenians. It is clear that this scenario is not acceptable for
Armenia, Karabakh as well as the great powers.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Davit Babayan
Azat Artsakh Daily, Republic of Nagorno Karabakh [NKR]
13-06-2007
Recently the liberated territories have sparked heated debates. In
particular, the Armenian government is said to have agreed to return
these territories to Azerbaijan. The issue of territories is, in fact,
a highly important national issue, therefore it should be viewed in
the context of foreign and internal policies, different components of
which are interwoven, and certain external and internal factors should
combine to have the issue settled. First, the internal policies. It is
necessary to discuss the expediency of returning the territories. The
return of territories to Azerbaijan, which has an overt anti-Armenian
attitude and where the anti-Armenian attitude has been raised to the
level of a national ideology, means to put an end to the Armenian
statehood in both Armenia and Karabakh.
For instance, 85 percent of the water resources of Nagorno-Karabakh
(borders of 1991) start from the region of Karvachar, as well as
the rivers Arpa and Vorotan which nourish Lake Sevan which contains
80 percent of water resources of the Republic of Armenia. Are there
guarantees that Azerbaijan will not poison these arteries, especially
that Azerbaijan has considerable experience of water terror? At least
between 1970 and 1992 the water resources of the Armenian areas of
Karabakh and Stepanakert were poisoned, due to which Nagorno-Karabakh,
which used to be the first country in the Soviet Union by longevity,
is now the first in the South Caucasus by the rate of cancer. It is
clear that the national interests of Armenia do not involve change of
the present status of these territories. In this context, the Armenian
government should be viewed as the main stakeholder, and therefore
it cannot agree to return these territories. Let us assume that
the Armenian government holds another opinion, i.e. placed personal
interests above national interests. Although it is highly hypothetical,
nevertheless, how will the Armenian government benefit from the return
of these territories? And what will it be rely on later? The answer
is clear - no way, and there is nothing it can rely on later. The
president of Armenia leaves office in 2008, and he will hardly take
this move. And those who aspire to the post of president will not take
such a move either, because it will reduce to zero their chance to
win, and no force, including from the outside, will help them. As to
the outside forces, in other words, the second component, the common
approach of the great powers to this issue is less likely. Today the
relations between the United States and Russia are tense, and this
state of things will hardly change in the visible future.
The rules of the game of great powers changes, and their relations
greatly resemble the stance of the conflict sides on the Karabakh
settlement. And the change of the correlation of forces in the area
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gives rise to an unpredictable and
dangerous situation. Hence, if the Karabakh force is pulled out of the
territories, what force will be deployed? It is proposed to deploy
peacekeepers. If it is Russian or Western force, the corresponding
party will be interested. On the other hand, the other side will
not be interested. Deployment of joint force is unfavorable for both
parties, because it is unacceptable. It is clear that the status quo
remains the best option. At the same time, Azerbaijan will hardly
agree to return only the territories surrounding Karabakh. It wants
the whole pie, i.e. it wants Karabakh as well. The main reason is
that the formation of the Azerbaijani nation is not over yet. And
the independence and sovereignty of Karabakh may become a precedent
for similar processes among the Lezgi and Talish people, jeopardizing
the Azerbaijani state. Therefore, Azerbaijan needs Karabakh without
Armenians. It is clear that this scenario is not acceptable for
Armenia, Karabakh as well as the great powers.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress