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MORE DETAILS REVEALED ON SCANDALOUS MEETING
AlÝ H. Aslan Washington
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 18 2007
A workshop organized on Turkey by a Washington-based think tank last
week turned out to have an invitation text for participants that was
no less scandalous than the meeting itself.
While the workshop included discussions on strange and terrifying
scenarios in Turkey as part of a brainstorming exercise, the invitation
text listed terrorist attacks and assassinations as possible Turkish
case scenarios to inform the participants about the exact topics
beforehand.
The Hudson Institute's meeting behind closed doors was leaked to the
press at the end of last week, evoking alarmed responses from Turkish
politicians and opinion leaders. The possible cases mulled over by
participants included such horrifying scenarios as the assassination
of Tulay Tuðcu, the retired head of the Constitutional Court, and
the deaths of at least 50 Ýstanbul residents in a terrorist bombing
on the busiest street in the city.
The invitation text for the meeting, obtained later than the
information on the meeting itself, included headlines outlining the
Hudson Institute's several unrealistic, yet horrifying, postulations
on how events in Turkey might unfold in the near future.
As more details came in on the secret meeting dubbed the "Turkey
Workshop," organized by the pro-Bush administration Hudson Institute,
an invitation text emerged that briefly covering the recent
developments in Turkey and specifying exact topics to be discussed.
This verified that the participants had information about the
workshop's content prior to the meeting.
Sources confirm that various Turkish military officials and civilian
experts, the Hudson Institute's Turkey expert Zeyno Baran, Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani's son Kubat Talabani, as well as Brig. Gen.
Suha Tanyeri and military attache Brig. Gen. Bertan Nogaylaroðlu
participated in the meeting.
The invitation outlines the meeting sessions with headlines translated
into Turkish as "Introduction," "The Scenario," "Questions" and
"Wildcard."
The text of the scenario briefly envisions chaotic days for Turkey
beginning with a suicide bomber killing 50 people, including tourists,
on the pedestrian Beyoðlu Street in Ýstanbul. Most assume that the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) staged the act. The next day, the
Interior Ministry states that the bomber had been trained in northern
Iraq. The Chief of the General Staff expresses his forecast that
the PKK will continue to stage more terrorist attacks in big cities
while the US State Department calls for calm. Around the same time,
the head of the Constitutional Court, Tulay Tuðcu, is assassinated in
another suicide attack. Soon, millions attend protest rallies in the
cities of Ankara, Ýstanbul and Samsun. The Turkish military enters
northern Iraq with a force of about 50,000 troops.
The Iraqi government's response is fierce.
Beneath this scenario, the invitation text lists brainstorming
questions such as: "How would the military operation change if it turns
out that the two attacks were not the work of the PKK, but al-Qaeda?"
Scenario: Into northern Iraq
June 18: A suicide bomber crashes his explosives-laden pick-up
truck into the police station in Beyoðlu, a crowded shopping and
cultural district of Istanbul frequently visited by tourists. The
resulting detonation collapses the front of the police station and
severely damages several nearby buildings. The attack claims the
lives of at least 50 police officers, shoppers and tourists, while
critically wounding over 200. Within hours, rumors spread that the
PKK was behind the horrific attack, although no organization has yet
claimed responsibility.
June 19: Interior ministry officials announce that the attacker was
trained at a PKK camp in northern Iraq. The Turkish General Staff
concurs with the interior ministry's findings. General Buyukanýt warns
that PKK terrorists will continue their attacks in major cities as long
as the Turkish-Iraqi border is left unprotected and the command and
control structure of the terrorist organization is still intact. He
maintains that the border can only be protected from both sides, and
therefore, a military incursion should be enacted immediately. The
US State Department releases a statement urging Turkish authorities
to remain calm despite the severity of the attack.
June 23: Iranian officials announce that an Iranian truck convoy
carrying ammunition to Damascus has been attacked by PKK operatives
in Iran. They claim that the Americans instructed the PKK to attack
the train in order to stop the supplies from reaching Syria. Iran,
angered by this attack, offers to provide logistic and military
support for any Turkish operation against the PKK in northern Iraq.
June 24: Another suicide attack occurs outside the Constitutional Court
in Ankara. This attack is timed so as to coincide with the departure
of President of the Court Tulay Tuðcu. She is mortally wounded and
dies later that day at a nearby hospital. Investigators confirm that
the explosives used in this attack were the same kind as those used
in the Beyoðlu bombing.
June 25: Dual statements from the interior ministry and the General
Staff point to the PKK's involvement in the attack. Millions of Turks
take to the streets in Ankara, Istanbul, Samsun and Izmir to denounce
this violence and call for the military to deal the PKK a mortal blow.
June 25-28: In an effort to acquire political capital in the
pre-election period by appealing to the ultranationalists, Prime
Minister Erdoðan successfully lobbies Parliament and acquires
authorization for a cross-border operation. The General Staff
identifies the following objectives for such an operation: 1) to
undertake precision assaults against designated regions; and 2)
to halt the flow of weapons and militants into Turkey.
June 29: At dawn, 50,000 Turkish troops cross into Iraq, establishing
several checkpoints along the Iraqi side of the border and engaging
in minor skirmishes with PKK fighters. The Iraqi government strongly
condemns the actions of the Turkish military, demanding that it leave
immediately. The US State Department's response to the incursion
is similar, asserting that Turkey's actions will only serve "to
destabilize the region and could very well end up decreasing Turkish
security in the long run." However, late in the afternoon, the White
House releases a statement saying that Turkey has "the right to defend
itself against terrorism, just as all sovereign countries do."
June 30: Massoud Barzani denounces the Turkish "invasion," and vows
that the Peshmerga will defend Iraqi Kurdistan.
-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------
Key questions for discussion Are the responses of the various actors
(White House, State Department, etc.) to the Turkish operation
realistic?
How would Iraq's neighbors respond? How would Israel respond? How
would the Arab League respond?
How would the EU respond? Would this effectively spell the end of
Turkey's accession talks?
How would Russia respond? Would it seek to exacerbate tensions between
the US and Turkey? How?
Given the treacherous terrain and difficulties of guerilla warfare,
can the Turkish army conduct a successful operation against the PKK
camps located in northern Iraq?
What would be the consequences of a clash between a small band of
Peshmerga and Turkish Special Forces, resulting in multiple casualties
from each side?
Would the Turkish Armed Forces welcome the Iranian proposal to conduct
a joint operation against the PKK in northern Iraq? How would this
cooperation impact US-Turkish relations? How would it affect NATO
solidarity?
How would Baghdad react to this operation? Would it throw its full
support behind Barzani and the Kurds? Or would it side with Turkey?
Would the US Congress move to threaten sanctions against Turkey,
as it did during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974?
How would new evidence that the June 24 bombing of the Constitutional
Court was actually perpetrated by al-Qaeda affect the Turkish campaign?
Potential Wildcards A new set of clues indicates that the suicide
terrorist who attacked the police station in Beyoðlu was trained by
Hezbollah in a Syrian camp.
In a raid near Kandil Mountain, Turkish security forces confiscate
two-year-old MOSSAD training manuals and videos showing Israeli agents
side by side with the PKK militants.
A Peshmerga unit on patrol in northern Iraq panics and attacks a
group of Turkish Special Forces. After the battle, it is revealed
that one of the gunned-down Peshmerga is, in fact, an American soldier
who was training the Kurdish militia. This soldier, however, was not
authorized to be on patrol with the Peshmerga.
-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------
Army members should have left if the allegations are true The Justice
and Development Party's (AK Party) Ýstanbul deputy Egemen Baðýþ, who
also heads the Turkey-US Friendship Group in Parliament, expressed his
opinion that, if there were truly Turkish military officials present
at the meeting at the Hudson Institute, they should not have simply
"remained as mere spectators" to the discussion.
Baðýþ, who arrived in the US on Saturday to discuss issues such as
Armenian genocide claims, PKK terrorism and Cyprus, briefed journalists
on his contact held at the Turkish Consulate in New York.
In response to a question about military officers being present at
the meeting at the Hudson Institute, he said: "Had there been such a
meeting as is being claimed, I am sure that our soldiers in Washington
if present would have shown the necessary reaction and put them in
their place. This is why I don't believe that such a meeting took
place. If in fact it did happen, the relevant authorities should
start the necessary procedures [concerning the Turkish participants].
I am sure that is what they would do."
Baðýþ recalled that Turkish officers had once walked out of a NATO
meeting in Rome where Turkey's Eastern Anatolia was shown on a map as
"Kurdistan."
--Boundary_(ID_ZB6kGoLP 829bH419MngtIQ)--
AlÝ H. Aslan Washington
Today's Zaman, Turkey
June 18 2007
A workshop organized on Turkey by a Washington-based think tank last
week turned out to have an invitation text for participants that was
no less scandalous than the meeting itself.
While the workshop included discussions on strange and terrifying
scenarios in Turkey as part of a brainstorming exercise, the invitation
text listed terrorist attacks and assassinations as possible Turkish
case scenarios to inform the participants about the exact topics
beforehand.
The Hudson Institute's meeting behind closed doors was leaked to the
press at the end of last week, evoking alarmed responses from Turkish
politicians and opinion leaders. The possible cases mulled over by
participants included such horrifying scenarios as the assassination
of Tulay Tuðcu, the retired head of the Constitutional Court, and
the deaths of at least 50 Ýstanbul residents in a terrorist bombing
on the busiest street in the city.
The invitation text for the meeting, obtained later than the
information on the meeting itself, included headlines outlining the
Hudson Institute's several unrealistic, yet horrifying, postulations
on how events in Turkey might unfold in the near future.
As more details came in on the secret meeting dubbed the "Turkey
Workshop," organized by the pro-Bush administration Hudson Institute,
an invitation text emerged that briefly covering the recent
developments in Turkey and specifying exact topics to be discussed.
This verified that the participants had information about the
workshop's content prior to the meeting.
Sources confirm that various Turkish military officials and civilian
experts, the Hudson Institute's Turkey expert Zeyno Baran, Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani's son Kubat Talabani, as well as Brig. Gen.
Suha Tanyeri and military attache Brig. Gen. Bertan Nogaylaroðlu
participated in the meeting.
The invitation outlines the meeting sessions with headlines translated
into Turkish as "Introduction," "The Scenario," "Questions" and
"Wildcard."
The text of the scenario briefly envisions chaotic days for Turkey
beginning with a suicide bomber killing 50 people, including tourists,
on the pedestrian Beyoðlu Street in Ýstanbul. Most assume that the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) staged the act. The next day, the
Interior Ministry states that the bomber had been trained in northern
Iraq. The Chief of the General Staff expresses his forecast that
the PKK will continue to stage more terrorist attacks in big cities
while the US State Department calls for calm. Around the same time,
the head of the Constitutional Court, Tulay Tuðcu, is assassinated in
another suicide attack. Soon, millions attend protest rallies in the
cities of Ankara, Ýstanbul and Samsun. The Turkish military enters
northern Iraq with a force of about 50,000 troops.
The Iraqi government's response is fierce.
Beneath this scenario, the invitation text lists brainstorming
questions such as: "How would the military operation change if it turns
out that the two attacks were not the work of the PKK, but al-Qaeda?"
Scenario: Into northern Iraq
June 18: A suicide bomber crashes his explosives-laden pick-up
truck into the police station in Beyoðlu, a crowded shopping and
cultural district of Istanbul frequently visited by tourists. The
resulting detonation collapses the front of the police station and
severely damages several nearby buildings. The attack claims the
lives of at least 50 police officers, shoppers and tourists, while
critically wounding over 200. Within hours, rumors spread that the
PKK was behind the horrific attack, although no organization has yet
claimed responsibility.
June 19: Interior ministry officials announce that the attacker was
trained at a PKK camp in northern Iraq. The Turkish General Staff
concurs with the interior ministry's findings. General Buyukanýt warns
that PKK terrorists will continue their attacks in major cities as long
as the Turkish-Iraqi border is left unprotected and the command and
control structure of the terrorist organization is still intact. He
maintains that the border can only be protected from both sides, and
therefore, a military incursion should be enacted immediately. The
US State Department releases a statement urging Turkish authorities
to remain calm despite the severity of the attack.
June 23: Iranian officials announce that an Iranian truck convoy
carrying ammunition to Damascus has been attacked by PKK operatives
in Iran. They claim that the Americans instructed the PKK to attack
the train in order to stop the supplies from reaching Syria. Iran,
angered by this attack, offers to provide logistic and military
support for any Turkish operation against the PKK in northern Iraq.
June 24: Another suicide attack occurs outside the Constitutional Court
in Ankara. This attack is timed so as to coincide with the departure
of President of the Court Tulay Tuðcu. She is mortally wounded and
dies later that day at a nearby hospital. Investigators confirm that
the explosives used in this attack were the same kind as those used
in the Beyoðlu bombing.
June 25: Dual statements from the interior ministry and the General
Staff point to the PKK's involvement in the attack. Millions of Turks
take to the streets in Ankara, Istanbul, Samsun and Izmir to denounce
this violence and call for the military to deal the PKK a mortal blow.
June 25-28: In an effort to acquire political capital in the
pre-election period by appealing to the ultranationalists, Prime
Minister Erdoðan successfully lobbies Parliament and acquires
authorization for a cross-border operation. The General Staff
identifies the following objectives for such an operation: 1) to
undertake precision assaults against designated regions; and 2)
to halt the flow of weapons and militants into Turkey.
June 29: At dawn, 50,000 Turkish troops cross into Iraq, establishing
several checkpoints along the Iraqi side of the border and engaging
in minor skirmishes with PKK fighters. The Iraqi government strongly
condemns the actions of the Turkish military, demanding that it leave
immediately. The US State Department's response to the incursion
is similar, asserting that Turkey's actions will only serve "to
destabilize the region and could very well end up decreasing Turkish
security in the long run." However, late in the afternoon, the White
House releases a statement saying that Turkey has "the right to defend
itself against terrorism, just as all sovereign countries do."
June 30: Massoud Barzani denounces the Turkish "invasion," and vows
that the Peshmerga will defend Iraqi Kurdistan.
-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------
Key questions for discussion Are the responses of the various actors
(White House, State Department, etc.) to the Turkish operation
realistic?
How would Iraq's neighbors respond? How would Israel respond? How
would the Arab League respond?
How would the EU respond? Would this effectively spell the end of
Turkey's accession talks?
How would Russia respond? Would it seek to exacerbate tensions between
the US and Turkey? How?
Given the treacherous terrain and difficulties of guerilla warfare,
can the Turkish army conduct a successful operation against the PKK
camps located in northern Iraq?
What would be the consequences of a clash between a small band of
Peshmerga and Turkish Special Forces, resulting in multiple casualties
from each side?
Would the Turkish Armed Forces welcome the Iranian proposal to conduct
a joint operation against the PKK in northern Iraq? How would this
cooperation impact US-Turkish relations? How would it affect NATO
solidarity?
How would Baghdad react to this operation? Would it throw its full
support behind Barzani and the Kurds? Or would it side with Turkey?
Would the US Congress move to threaten sanctions against Turkey,
as it did during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974?
How would new evidence that the June 24 bombing of the Constitutional
Court was actually perpetrated by al-Qaeda affect the Turkish campaign?
Potential Wildcards A new set of clues indicates that the suicide
terrorist who attacked the police station in Beyoðlu was trained by
Hezbollah in a Syrian camp.
In a raid near Kandil Mountain, Turkish security forces confiscate
two-year-old MOSSAD training manuals and videos showing Israeli agents
side by side with the PKK militants.
A Peshmerga unit on patrol in northern Iraq panics and attacks a
group of Turkish Special Forces. After the battle, it is revealed
that one of the gunned-down Peshmerga is, in fact, an American soldier
who was training the Kurdish militia. This soldier, however, was not
authorized to be on patrol with the Peshmerga.
-------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------
Army members should have left if the allegations are true The Justice
and Development Party's (AK Party) Ýstanbul deputy Egemen Baðýþ, who
also heads the Turkey-US Friendship Group in Parliament, expressed his
opinion that, if there were truly Turkish military officials present
at the meeting at the Hudson Institute, they should not have simply
"remained as mere spectators" to the discussion.
Baðýþ, who arrived in the US on Saturday to discuss issues such as
Armenian genocide claims, PKK terrorism and Cyprus, briefed journalists
on his contact held at the Turkish Consulate in New York.
In response to a question about military officers being present at
the meeting at the Hudson Institute, he said: "Had there been such a
meeting as is being claimed, I am sure that our soldiers in Washington
if present would have shown the necessary reaction and put them in
their place. This is why I don't believe that such a meeting took
place. If in fact it did happen, the relevant authorities should
start the necessary procedures [concerning the Turkish participants].
I am sure that is what they would do."
Baðýþ recalled that Turkish officers had once walked out of a NATO
meeting in Rome where Turkey's Eastern Anatolia was shown on a map as
"Kurdistan."
--Boundary_(ID_ZB6kGoLP 829bH419MngtIQ)--