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Russian Pundit Sees Signs Of Moscow's Wariness On CIS Separatist Reg

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  • Russian Pundit Sees Signs Of Moscow's Wariness On CIS Separatist Reg

    RUSSIAN PUNDIT SEES SIGNS OF MOSCOW'S WARINESS ON CIS SEPARATIST REGIONS

    Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow
    15 Jun 07

    [Commentary by Valeriy Vyzhutovich, Rossiyakaya Gazeta political
    observer: "Without Looking Back at Kosovo" - taken from html version
    of source provided by ISP.]

    Without looking back at Kosovo

    Moscow and Tbilisi are renewing their dialogue. At the Economic Forum
    in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin and Mikhail Saakashvili agreed to
    assign the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries joint work
    aimed at stabilizing bilateral relations. Then, as was stated, this
    would be followed also by removal of limitations on development of
    trade-economic relations.

    The Georgian leader was pleased with the meeting and announced that
    Georgia is always "not only ready, but is obligated to conduct fruitful
    dialogue with Russia."

    Perhaps, it would be premature to call all of this a warming
    of relations, but an easing of tensions is certainly being
    observed. And the main thing is that the condition for rapprochement
    has appeared. This is a basic condition, unconditionally adopted
    by both parties. It was outlined by Saakashvili when he said that,
    aside from consideration of mutual interests, friendly relations
    must also be built on adherence to the principle of territorial
    integrity. Putin immediately agreed with his Georgian colleague:
    "We have always proceeded from the need to adhere to the fundamental
    principle of territorial integrity of the state. Unfortunately,
    attempts are being made to erode these fundamental principles. And
    this, of course, creates problems for us on the post-Soviet area."

    The words spoken by the Russian president should be understood not only
    as a sign of diplomatic solidarity with Georgia, which is burdened
    by the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was
    practically the first time that Vladimir Putin announced the need for
    adhering to territorial integrity of states on the entire territory
    of the CIS.

    Although, it would seem, what is new about that? Even before, Moscow
    had not cast doubt upon the territorial integrity of Georgia and
    Moldova in those boundaries, which they had prior to the disintegration
    of the USSR. But for 15 years now, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the
    Dniester region, having proclaimed themselves sovereign states,
    are flaunting their independence in every way. And all this time,
    they have been asking Russia to recognize them.

    South Ossetia has already sent more than 20 documents to Moscow, asking
    for recognition. The leadership of that republic is being impatient,
    not wanting to wait at least for a decision on Kosovo, which is capable
    of setting an international precedent. "We do not believe that South
    Ossetia depends on the resolution of the problem of that region (Kosovo
    - editor)," says Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Ossetia Murat
    Dzhioyev. "The situations here and there are different. South Ossetia
    declared itself in the course of disintegration of the USSR. It did not
    withdraw from the complement of the already independent Georgia... The
    South Ossetians want to be independent.

    Ninety-nine per cent of the region's residents have spoken out in
    favour of this."

    The aspirations of Abkhazia extend even farther. It is asking to
    be accepted into the complement of the Russian Federation as an
    associated member. This means a customs and defence union, a single
    currency, and single citizenship, but at the same time - independence
    in domestic and foreign policy. We may recall that, at one time,
    Aleksandr Lukashenka had tried to incline Moscow towards a community
    reminiscent of this, and received the response: "Let us separate the
    flies from the hamburger." But, through the words of its Minister of
    Foreign Affairs Sergey Shamba, Abkhazia continues to insist: "We want
    our state, which possesses all of the necessary state institutions,
    to be recognized by the world community. First and foremost, we are
    awaiting recognition on the part of Russia."

    In this rhetoric, the authorities of the self-proclaimed states are
    reminiscent of each other. Especially when they refer to the results
    of the referenda held there. Well, and why not?! The number of votes
    cast for independence is simply overwhelming. Although, the very
    directionality of the questions, which contain a prompting in and
    of themselves, ruled out a different expression of will. And the
    Dniester, Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities could pose such
    questions without the slightest risk: The mass sentiments are well
    known to them. Ultimately, this is the fundamental property of a direct
    democracy, practiced by the post-Soviet regimes: A referendum may be
    held only in one case - if it is initiated by the authorities. And
    only with guaranteed provision of the answers necessary to it. This
    was the case in 1993, with the fateful slogan, which has now become
    an anecdote: "yes, yes, no, yes." That is what happened also on 17
    March 1991, when the fate of the Union was put up for a popular vote
    - which, we might add, very soon did not keep this fate from being
    decided by the well-known means and without looking back at the will
    of the fraternal peoples of the "single and inviolable." There is
    also nothing to keep the world community from treating the results of
    referenda in the unrecognized post-Soviet republics in exactly the
    same way as the "Belovezhskiy" threesome treated the results of the
    Gorbachev plebiscite. References to Montenegro, which ceded from Serbia
    after an analogous referendum and received international recognition,
    nods at Kosovo, whose course towards independence is being approved
    by the European Union and the USA, accusation of the West as holding
    double standards - all this is not unfounded, but does not change the
    matter. Neither the Dniester region, nor Abkhazia, nor South Ossetia
    will receive the status of an independent state in the nearest time.

    But what about Moscow? Despite its obvious predisposition to these new
    formations, it is exhibiting restraint in its official statements. For
    example, the reaction to the Dniester referendum proved to be exactly
    like its result. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov
    called this result predictable - and that is all. We should not have
    expected anything more definite from the head of the MFA [Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs]. "We must treat the referendum in the Dniester
    region without emotions," said Lavrov, "so that [these emotions]
    do not overshadow the essence of what is going on. And the essence
    consists of the need to return to the negotiating table." Yes, the
    most that Russia can do for the Dniester region is to protect its
    interests in the negotiation process with Moldova.

    But will Moscow have to hold its pause for long? Or will the Kosovo
    precedent (and it will happen anytime now) give it more decisiveness,
    at least in the formulation of the question of international
    recognition of the separatist regimes on the post-Soviet area? No,
    I believe that, in that case too, Russia would have to refrain from
    active moves. And not only because, in striving to achieve official
    state status for its unrecognized neighbours, it will encounter
    the European Union and the USA, the limit of clashes with which has
    practically already been exhausted. The matter lies also - and this
    is the most important thing - in what will begin near our borders if
    Moscow were to recognize the independence of at least one of these
    rebellious republics. After all, the Kosovo precedent for the CIS
    countries is not the same thing that, say, the Dniester precedent
    may prove to be. The chain reaction would be such, that no one would
    think it little.

    Abkhazia and South Ossetia would also immediately demand
    recognition. That means that they too would have to be
    recognized. Watching this parade, Armenia would then have the right
    to strive for recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic. And then,
    who knows, Crimea might also catch the separatist fever. Ultimately,
    it may come to the situation where Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
    and Ukraine, with whom our relations today are not unclouded, would
    finally become our enemies and, in a rush of response, would demand
    that Russia recognize the independence of Chechnya.

    It was evidently the understanding of these consequences that dictated
    the agreement of the presidents of Russia and Georgia to adhere to
    the principle of territorial integrity of states. And if Abkhazia,
    South Ossetia and the Dniester region are hoping to get official
    recognition from Moscow in the nearest time, then they are most likely
    in for a disappointment.
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