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Government Technology, CA
March 2 2007
Nuclear Terrorism: Technology May Be Thwarted by Human Element
Mar 02, 2007 By Alex Rodriguez
YEREVAN, Armenia -- Jobless for two years, Gagik Tovmasyan believed
escape from poverty lay in a cardboard box on his kitchen floor.
Inside the box, a blue, lead-lined vessel held the right type and
amount of radioactive cesium to make a "dirty bomb." The material was
given to him by an unemployed Armenian Catholic priest who promised a
cut if Tovmasyan could find a buyer.
He found one in 2004, but the man turned out to be an undercover
agent. Tovmasyan spent a year behind bars on a charge of illegally
storing and trying to sell 4 grams of cesium-137.
Today the chain-smoking Armenian cabdriver says his actions amounted
to simple survival. "That's just the way it was back then," said
Tovmasyan, 48, who insisted he had no idea of the danger the material
presented. "I was selling all my belongings just to get by."
At a time when the U.S. is grappling with the specter of nuclear
weapons in North Korea and Iran, security experts warn that a vast
supply of radioactive materials -- enough to make hundreds of
so-called dirty bombs -- lies virtually unprotected in former Soviet
military bases and ruined factories.
Desperately poor scavengers looking for scrap metal already have
raided many of those sites, fueling an ever-growing concern in the
war on terrorism.
There were 662 confirmed cases of radioactive materials smuggling
around the world from 1993 to 2004, according to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. More than 400 involved substances that could be
used to make a dirty bomb, a weapon that would spew radioactivity
across a broad area. Experts say even these alarming numbers do not
reflect the magnitude of the smuggling.
The risk has grown despite tens of millions of dollars spent by the
United States to provide radiation detection equipment and security
training in former Soviet republics. Tracking how the money is spent
by opaque, often-corrupt governments has proved especially difficult.
The problem is wider in scope than often acknowledged, and the stakes
are enormous: It takes only a few grams of a deadly radioactive
substance such as cesium-137 or strontium-90 to make a dirty bomb.
Along Russia's barren, jagged coastline on the Barents Sea, enough
strontium-90 to make hundreds of dirty bombs can be found in dozens
of unguarded lighthouses and navigational beacons. In Semipalatinsk
in eastern Kazakhstan, once the site of Soviet nuclear weapons
testing, scavengers routinely slip through breaches in tunnels where
poorly secured strontium-90, cesium-137, plutonium and uranium waste
is stored alongside scrap metal, the site's director says.
In the small mountainous republic of Georgia, the director of a
former Soviet laboratory in the breakaway province of Abkhazia says
separatist leaders have prevented IAEA inspectors from adequately
surveying the institute, where stockpiles of uranium, cesium-137,
strontium-90 and other radioactive materials cannot be accounted for.
Many former Soviet republics do a poor job of maintaining reliable
inventories of radioactive material, according to Lyudmila Zaitseva,
a radioactive materials trafficking researcher at the University of
Salzburg in Austria. Former Soviet borders are porous, and corruption
is rife at border guard posts.
When it comes to protecting radioactive materials, the countries that
once made up the Soviet Union are "the weakest and most dangerous
link in the whole chain," said Igor Khripunov, a U.S.-based expert in
nuclear and radioactive materials security at the University of
Georgia.
Zaitseva and her research colleague Friedrich Steinhausler, who log
radioactive materials trafficking cases into a database at the
University of Salzburg, estimate that roughly 3 of every 5 cases of
radioactive materials smuggling go undetected. "I am far more
concerned with what we don't see than with what we see," Steinhausler
said.
The U.S. government has been slow to gird its ports and border
checkpoints with enough detection capability to prevent smuggled
radioactive materials from entering the country. In December 2005,
congressional investigators smuggled enough cesium-137 across U.S.
checkpoints on the Canadian and Mexican borders to produce two dirty
bombs, according to a 2006 Government Accountability Office report.
Testifying before a Senate homeland security subcommittee in March,
GAO officials said they doubted that the Department of Homeland
Security could hit its deadline of placing more than 3,000 radiation
detectors at border crossings, seaports and mail facilities by 2009.
It was likelier, said the GAO's Eugene Aloise, that the department
would not finish until 2014.
"Four and a half years after Sept. 11, and less than 40 percent of
our seaports have basic radiation equipment," said Sen. Norm Coleman,
R-Minn., the subcommittee chairman at the time during a congressional
hearing last March. "This is a massive blind spot."
No one has ever detonated a dirty bomb, but terrorists have made it
clear they have the means and desire to do so.
In November 1995, Chechen separatists buried a canister of cesium-137
under the snow in Moscow's Izmailovo Park and told a Russian
television network where to find it. Last year, a British court
sentenced Dhiren Barot, a London resident linked to al-Qaida, to 40
years in prison for planning a series of terrorist attacks in London
and the U.S. that would have included a dirty bomb.
In the dense stands of birch and pine in Russia's far north, special
generators used to power lighthouses represent one of the most
vulnerable sources of material. Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators create electricity through the decay of strontium-90. A
single RTG can house enough strontium-90 for 40 dirty bombs.
Russia has more than 600 RTGs scattered across its 11 time zones.
Lighthouses and navigational beacons equipped with them are largely
unguarded, at times lacking even a chain-link fence for protection.
In the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions along the Barents coastline,
scrap metal hunters have broken into six RTGs in recent years, said
Vladimir Kozlovsky, a local official involved in a Russian-Norwegian
project to replace the aging RTGs with safer technology.
In March, scrap metal hunters broke into a deserted military base
above the Arctic Circle and ripped apart four RTGs, according to
Bellona, a Norwegian environmental watchdog organization.
While there are no reports of strontium being taken from an RTG, the
scavenging highlights the risks.
Radioactive materials transported in Russia by rail are also
alarmingly vulnerable.
Last year Greenpeace activists staked out a train depot in a village
near St. Petersburg, Russia, to monitor trainloads of uranium from
Western Europe that had been stopping on their way to Siberia for
disposal.
"There were no police, no guards, no armed personnel around," said
Greenpeace activist Georgy Timofeyev. "The first time we noticed this
in May, we called authorities. They said, `If there aren't any
guards, then there's no danger.'
"But anyone can walk up and open them because there are no serious
locks on the containers," Timofeyev said.
Greenpeace activists say Russian authorities confirmed that the
shipments were being handled by Izotop, a state-owned nuclear
materials transport company. The firm handles roughly 50,000 tons of
nuclear material shipped through St. Petersburg each year, according
to Bellona. Izotop officials declined to comment.
In Kazakhstan, once a hub for Soviet nuclear production and research
because of its remoteness in the steppes of Central Asia, vast
networks of tunnels and boreholes used for nuclear weapons testing
pose a unique problem.
For four decades, the treeless stretches of scrub outside
Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakhstan served as the Soviet Union's
ground zero. The Soviet military machine conducted 458 nuclear
weapons tests at the 7,200-square mile site. Most of the blasts
occurred in 181 iron-lined tunnels a half-mile below the ground, or
in the site's 60 boreholes.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan
relinquished its entire nuclear arsenal and sealed Semipalatinsk's
tunnels and boreholes with concrete.
Those seals have failed to deter impoverished Kazakhs, who fashion
propane tanks into makeshift bombs to blast their way into the
tunnels. Their quarry is scrap metal, but local authorities worry
that the vast amounts of strontium, cesium, plutonium and uranium
waste still inside the tunnels could attract those intent on building
a dirty bomb.
"Anyone who wants to make a dirty bomb can target by-products of the
blasts," said Kayrat Kadyrzhanov, director general of the Kazakhstan
National Nuclear Center, which oversees the site. "When test blasts
were done, not all of the particles burned out. Even taking soil
samples would be of value to a terrorist or rogue state.
"When people get into the tunnels, we assume it's for iron. But
that's our assumption," Kadyrzhanov said.
The U.S. government has given Kazakhstan more than $20 million to
seal up tunnel and borehole entrances, Kadyrzhanov said, "but the
problem is still there." Kazakh authorities deploy only four patrol
teams -- made up of a local police officer, a radiation detector
specialist and a driver -- to cover 181 tunnels and a tract of steppe
the size of New Jersey.
"The scrap hunters are well-equipped," Kadyrzhanov said. "They've got
cell phones and warn each other about approaching patrols."
Radioactive flotsam left behind by the Soviets in Georgia is just as
worrisome. Canisters of cesium-137 and other radioactive materials
have been routinely found at abandoned military bases, research
laboratories -- even in farmhouses, according to nuclear safety
specialists with the Georgian government.
Last summer, inspectors found cesium-137 amid a pile of nuts and
bolts in a soap container at a farmer's house in the village of
Likhauri.
"We came across many cases where radioactive material was found in
the street, in a forest, or in fields," said Grigol Basilia, a
scientist with Georgia's Nuclear Radiation Safety Service.
Georgia's biggest worry is the rebellious province of Abkhazia on the
Black Sea coast, where a separatist government defies Tbilisi with
the political and military backing of Russia.
Abkhazia is home to the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology,
or SIPT, founded in 1945 as a cog in the effort to build the Soviet
Union's first atomic bomb. In 1992, civil war broke out in Abkhazia.
Abkhaz separatists drove out Georgian troops in a year of fighting
that claimed 17,000 lives. Georgian scientists at the institute fled,
leaving the laboratory and its storehouse of uranium, plutonium and
other radioactive materials in the hands of Abkhaz separatists.
Today, those Georgian scientists have no control over the fate of
SIPT's deadly array of radioactive substances. Guram Bokuchava, the
institute's director, operates out of a small office in downtown
Tbilisi, not knowing how those materials are guarded or even how much
are left.
In 2002, when IAEA inspectors flew to Sukhumi to check on uranium
stored at the institute, Abkhaz authorities would not let them
inspect the storage site, Bokuchava said.
"It's not known how much uranium is there," Bokuchava said. "And it's
not known how much cesium-137 and strontium-90 is there. Of course,
we're concerned about what happened to these materials ... but the
Abkhaz side is not giving any information about this."
Georgia also continues to be a major transit nation for radioactive
materials smugglers. In the most recent case, Oleg Khinsagov, a
50-year-old Russian trader, was caught trying to smuggle 100 grams of
highly enriched uranium through Georgia last year. He was convicted
of nuclear materials trafficking and sentenced to 8 { years in
prison. Georgian authorities believe the uranium originated in
Russia.
Khinsagov fits the profile of the opportunistic radioactive materials
smuggler working the Caucasus region: He was a simple trader, with no
criminal background and no known connections to organized crime or
terrorists.
Tovmasyan, the Armenian cabdriver, and the other men arrested with
him fit the same profile.
The man who gave Tovmasyan the cesium, Asokhik Aristakesyan, was a
priest and also unemployed, said Vahe Papoyan, an investigator with
the Armenian National Security Service. So was another man who tried
to sell the cesium, Sarkis Mikaelyan, a jobless economist. They each
were convicted and also sentenced to a year in jail
"Especially in countries with low standards of living," Khripunov
said, "people can be very enterprising."
The U.S. has aggressively tried to shore up border checkpoints in
Georgia and other former Soviet republics to stem the flow of
radioactive materials smuggling. From 1994 to 2005, Washington spent
$178 million to provide radiation detection equipment for border
posts in 36 countries, many of them former Soviet nations.
A March 2006 GAO report acknowledged that the new equipment helps,
but the bigger challenge is corruption.
"Border guards often don't know what they're dealing with," Zaitseva
said. "They're bribed to switch off their detection equipment. They
don't know what's being smuggled, and they really don't care."
------
(c) 2007, Chicago Tribune. Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune
Information Services via Newscom.
http://www.govtech.net/digitalcommunities/story. php?id=104206
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
March 2 2007
Nuclear Terrorism: Technology May Be Thwarted by Human Element
Mar 02, 2007 By Alex Rodriguez
YEREVAN, Armenia -- Jobless for two years, Gagik Tovmasyan believed
escape from poverty lay in a cardboard box on his kitchen floor.
Inside the box, a blue, lead-lined vessel held the right type and
amount of radioactive cesium to make a "dirty bomb." The material was
given to him by an unemployed Armenian Catholic priest who promised a
cut if Tovmasyan could find a buyer.
He found one in 2004, but the man turned out to be an undercover
agent. Tovmasyan spent a year behind bars on a charge of illegally
storing and trying to sell 4 grams of cesium-137.
Today the chain-smoking Armenian cabdriver says his actions amounted
to simple survival. "That's just the way it was back then," said
Tovmasyan, 48, who insisted he had no idea of the danger the material
presented. "I was selling all my belongings just to get by."
At a time when the U.S. is grappling with the specter of nuclear
weapons in North Korea and Iran, security experts warn that a vast
supply of radioactive materials -- enough to make hundreds of
so-called dirty bombs -- lies virtually unprotected in former Soviet
military bases and ruined factories.
Desperately poor scavengers looking for scrap metal already have
raided many of those sites, fueling an ever-growing concern in the
war on terrorism.
There were 662 confirmed cases of radioactive materials smuggling
around the world from 1993 to 2004, according to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. More than 400 involved substances that could be
used to make a dirty bomb, a weapon that would spew radioactivity
across a broad area. Experts say even these alarming numbers do not
reflect the magnitude of the smuggling.
The risk has grown despite tens of millions of dollars spent by the
United States to provide radiation detection equipment and security
training in former Soviet republics. Tracking how the money is spent
by opaque, often-corrupt governments has proved especially difficult.
The problem is wider in scope than often acknowledged, and the stakes
are enormous: It takes only a few grams of a deadly radioactive
substance such as cesium-137 or strontium-90 to make a dirty bomb.
Along Russia's barren, jagged coastline on the Barents Sea, enough
strontium-90 to make hundreds of dirty bombs can be found in dozens
of unguarded lighthouses and navigational beacons. In Semipalatinsk
in eastern Kazakhstan, once the site of Soviet nuclear weapons
testing, scavengers routinely slip through breaches in tunnels where
poorly secured strontium-90, cesium-137, plutonium and uranium waste
is stored alongside scrap metal, the site's director says.
In the small mountainous republic of Georgia, the director of a
former Soviet laboratory in the breakaway province of Abkhazia says
separatist leaders have prevented IAEA inspectors from adequately
surveying the institute, where stockpiles of uranium, cesium-137,
strontium-90 and other radioactive materials cannot be accounted for.
Many former Soviet republics do a poor job of maintaining reliable
inventories of radioactive material, according to Lyudmila Zaitseva,
a radioactive materials trafficking researcher at the University of
Salzburg in Austria. Former Soviet borders are porous, and corruption
is rife at border guard posts.
When it comes to protecting radioactive materials, the countries that
once made up the Soviet Union are "the weakest and most dangerous
link in the whole chain," said Igor Khripunov, a U.S.-based expert in
nuclear and radioactive materials security at the University of
Georgia.
Zaitseva and her research colleague Friedrich Steinhausler, who log
radioactive materials trafficking cases into a database at the
University of Salzburg, estimate that roughly 3 of every 5 cases of
radioactive materials smuggling go undetected. "I am far more
concerned with what we don't see than with what we see," Steinhausler
said.
The U.S. government has been slow to gird its ports and border
checkpoints with enough detection capability to prevent smuggled
radioactive materials from entering the country. In December 2005,
congressional investigators smuggled enough cesium-137 across U.S.
checkpoints on the Canadian and Mexican borders to produce two dirty
bombs, according to a 2006 Government Accountability Office report.
Testifying before a Senate homeland security subcommittee in March,
GAO officials said they doubted that the Department of Homeland
Security could hit its deadline of placing more than 3,000 radiation
detectors at border crossings, seaports and mail facilities by 2009.
It was likelier, said the GAO's Eugene Aloise, that the department
would not finish until 2014.
"Four and a half years after Sept. 11, and less than 40 percent of
our seaports have basic radiation equipment," said Sen. Norm Coleman,
R-Minn., the subcommittee chairman at the time during a congressional
hearing last March. "This is a massive blind spot."
No one has ever detonated a dirty bomb, but terrorists have made it
clear they have the means and desire to do so.
In November 1995, Chechen separatists buried a canister of cesium-137
under the snow in Moscow's Izmailovo Park and told a Russian
television network where to find it. Last year, a British court
sentenced Dhiren Barot, a London resident linked to al-Qaida, to 40
years in prison for planning a series of terrorist attacks in London
and the U.S. that would have included a dirty bomb.
In the dense stands of birch and pine in Russia's far north, special
generators used to power lighthouses represent one of the most
vulnerable sources of material. Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators create electricity through the decay of strontium-90. A
single RTG can house enough strontium-90 for 40 dirty bombs.
Russia has more than 600 RTGs scattered across its 11 time zones.
Lighthouses and navigational beacons equipped with them are largely
unguarded, at times lacking even a chain-link fence for protection.
In the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions along the Barents coastline,
scrap metal hunters have broken into six RTGs in recent years, said
Vladimir Kozlovsky, a local official involved in a Russian-Norwegian
project to replace the aging RTGs with safer technology.
In March, scrap metal hunters broke into a deserted military base
above the Arctic Circle and ripped apart four RTGs, according to
Bellona, a Norwegian environmental watchdog organization.
While there are no reports of strontium being taken from an RTG, the
scavenging highlights the risks.
Radioactive materials transported in Russia by rail are also
alarmingly vulnerable.
Last year Greenpeace activists staked out a train depot in a village
near St. Petersburg, Russia, to monitor trainloads of uranium from
Western Europe that had been stopping on their way to Siberia for
disposal.
"There were no police, no guards, no armed personnel around," said
Greenpeace activist Georgy Timofeyev. "The first time we noticed this
in May, we called authorities. They said, `If there aren't any
guards, then there's no danger.'
"But anyone can walk up and open them because there are no serious
locks on the containers," Timofeyev said.
Greenpeace activists say Russian authorities confirmed that the
shipments were being handled by Izotop, a state-owned nuclear
materials transport company. The firm handles roughly 50,000 tons of
nuclear material shipped through St. Petersburg each year, according
to Bellona. Izotop officials declined to comment.
In Kazakhstan, once a hub for Soviet nuclear production and research
because of its remoteness in the steppes of Central Asia, vast
networks of tunnels and boreholes used for nuclear weapons testing
pose a unique problem.
For four decades, the treeless stretches of scrub outside
Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakhstan served as the Soviet Union's
ground zero. The Soviet military machine conducted 458 nuclear
weapons tests at the 7,200-square mile site. Most of the blasts
occurred in 181 iron-lined tunnels a half-mile below the ground, or
in the site's 60 boreholes.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan
relinquished its entire nuclear arsenal and sealed Semipalatinsk's
tunnels and boreholes with concrete.
Those seals have failed to deter impoverished Kazakhs, who fashion
propane tanks into makeshift bombs to blast their way into the
tunnels. Their quarry is scrap metal, but local authorities worry
that the vast amounts of strontium, cesium, plutonium and uranium
waste still inside the tunnels could attract those intent on building
a dirty bomb.
"Anyone who wants to make a dirty bomb can target by-products of the
blasts," said Kayrat Kadyrzhanov, director general of the Kazakhstan
National Nuclear Center, which oversees the site. "When test blasts
were done, not all of the particles burned out. Even taking soil
samples would be of value to a terrorist or rogue state.
"When people get into the tunnels, we assume it's for iron. But
that's our assumption," Kadyrzhanov said.
The U.S. government has given Kazakhstan more than $20 million to
seal up tunnel and borehole entrances, Kadyrzhanov said, "but the
problem is still there." Kazakh authorities deploy only four patrol
teams -- made up of a local police officer, a radiation detector
specialist and a driver -- to cover 181 tunnels and a tract of steppe
the size of New Jersey.
"The scrap hunters are well-equipped," Kadyrzhanov said. "They've got
cell phones and warn each other about approaching patrols."
Radioactive flotsam left behind by the Soviets in Georgia is just as
worrisome. Canisters of cesium-137 and other radioactive materials
have been routinely found at abandoned military bases, research
laboratories -- even in farmhouses, according to nuclear safety
specialists with the Georgian government.
Last summer, inspectors found cesium-137 amid a pile of nuts and
bolts in a soap container at a farmer's house in the village of
Likhauri.
"We came across many cases where radioactive material was found in
the street, in a forest, or in fields," said Grigol Basilia, a
scientist with Georgia's Nuclear Radiation Safety Service.
Georgia's biggest worry is the rebellious province of Abkhazia on the
Black Sea coast, where a separatist government defies Tbilisi with
the political and military backing of Russia.
Abkhazia is home to the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology,
or SIPT, founded in 1945 as a cog in the effort to build the Soviet
Union's first atomic bomb. In 1992, civil war broke out in Abkhazia.
Abkhaz separatists drove out Georgian troops in a year of fighting
that claimed 17,000 lives. Georgian scientists at the institute fled,
leaving the laboratory and its storehouse of uranium, plutonium and
other radioactive materials in the hands of Abkhaz separatists.
Today, those Georgian scientists have no control over the fate of
SIPT's deadly array of radioactive substances. Guram Bokuchava, the
institute's director, operates out of a small office in downtown
Tbilisi, not knowing how those materials are guarded or even how much
are left.
In 2002, when IAEA inspectors flew to Sukhumi to check on uranium
stored at the institute, Abkhaz authorities would not let them
inspect the storage site, Bokuchava said.
"It's not known how much uranium is there," Bokuchava said. "And it's
not known how much cesium-137 and strontium-90 is there. Of course,
we're concerned about what happened to these materials ... but the
Abkhaz side is not giving any information about this."
Georgia also continues to be a major transit nation for radioactive
materials smugglers. In the most recent case, Oleg Khinsagov, a
50-year-old Russian trader, was caught trying to smuggle 100 grams of
highly enriched uranium through Georgia last year. He was convicted
of nuclear materials trafficking and sentenced to 8 { years in
prison. Georgian authorities believe the uranium originated in
Russia.
Khinsagov fits the profile of the opportunistic radioactive materials
smuggler working the Caucasus region: He was a simple trader, with no
criminal background and no known connections to organized crime or
terrorists.
Tovmasyan, the Armenian cabdriver, and the other men arrested with
him fit the same profile.
The man who gave Tovmasyan the cesium, Asokhik Aristakesyan, was a
priest and also unemployed, said Vahe Papoyan, an investigator with
the Armenian National Security Service. So was another man who tried
to sell the cesium, Sarkis Mikaelyan, a jobless economist. They each
were convicted and also sentenced to a year in jail
"Especially in countries with low standards of living," Khripunov
said, "people can be very enterprising."
The U.S. has aggressively tried to shore up border checkpoints in
Georgia and other former Soviet republics to stem the flow of
radioactive materials smuggling. From 1994 to 2005, Washington spent
$178 million to provide radiation detection equipment for border
posts in 36 countries, many of them former Soviet nations.
A March 2006 GAO report acknowledged that the new equipment helps,
but the bigger challenge is corruption.
"Border guards often don't know what they're dealing with," Zaitseva
said. "They're bribed to switch off their detection equipment. They
don't know what's being smuggled, and they really don't care."
------
(c) 2007, Chicago Tribune. Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune
Information Services via Newscom.
http://www.govtech.net/digitalcommunities/story. php?id=104206
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress