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ANKARA: Turkey And Israel: Windows Opening To Harmony Or A Chaos?

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  • ANKARA: Turkey And Israel: Windows Opening To Harmony Or A Chaos?

    TURKEY AND ISRAEL: WINDOWS OPENING TO HARMONY OR A CHAOS?
    Senay Yegin

    Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
    March 5 2007

    1. Introduction:

    As globalization is fueled up, the Westphalia Treaty is forgotten
    which also mean the decline of nation-states' importance. Borders are
    also like the states but they change meaning. They are protections
    but at the same time circles of mine. They are the security but also
    the Bermuda triangle. They are lines that bring together but also
    separate. Borders are hopeful; borders are disappointments. Borders
    are reasons for peace since they are the causes of wars. Turkey having
    seven borders, it acts as a country of the Balkans, the Europe, the
    Eurasia, the Turkic world and a more conflictual region; the Middle
    East. As a Middle Eastern country the harsh job of Turkey got more
    essential, since in the Middle East, there is a rising but never
    declining turmoil especially after the invasion of Iraq. That's
    why today, in the Middle East, any conflict can have influences
    immediately on other parties, like Israel and Turkey. In this paper,
    I will recommend policies for Turkey to the main problems of Turkey
    and Israel Palestine conflict, Iraq and Kurdish issue and to improve
    Turkish-Israeli relations.

    They are the two rare countries which are separated from the other
    Middle Eastern countries in terms of having political legitimacy,
    warm relations with the US and western-oriented lifestyles. Since they
    are the allies of the US in Middle East, they both share some threats
    from Al-Qaeda like Turkey witnessed Istanbul Synagogue bombings, and
    Egypt witnessed Sharm al-Seyh bombings where the target was mainly the
    Jewish. On the one hand Turkey and Israel have military cooperation
    agreement, Aegean Commerce Agreement, and allied operations such
    as capturing of Ocalan. However, on the other hand the alliance is
    facing some conflictual problems, too.

    2. Problems in Israeli and Turkish Relations:

    a. Palestine Conflict: Besides the strategic alliance of Turkey and
    Israel, they face some problems, too. Indeed, according to the Israeli
    ambassador in Turkey named Maurice Fisher, Turkey's relations with
    Israel are based on fragile grounds. He emphasized in 1953 that,

    "Our relations with Turkey have been extremely good of late... (but)
    these good relations could deteriorate overnight, and we should learn
    from the bitter experience of others [...] For them, there exists one
    sole principle: in any conflict with a foreigner, whether a private
    individual, a company or a state, the Turk is always right."[1]

    One of the most prominent problems of Turkey and Israel relations
    is the division between the attitudes of both parties towards
    the Palestine conflict. Turkey's attitude towards the Palestine
    and Israeli conflict was changed according to the external powers
    and pressures. For instance, Turkey's short-lived support of the
    Palestinians started in 1947, when it voted against the division of
    Palestine at UN. However in 1949, while Turkey's foreign policy was
    to preserve its neutrality, it recognized Israel.[2]

    After the 6 days war in 1967, Turkey's attitude towards Israel
    policies changed. One of the reasons for this change was the Cyprus
    issue. Turkey couldn't find what it expected from the West. But there
    was a more important reason that would affect its relations with
    Israel for a long time. The reason was not to frustrate the Arabs,
    whom it had economic relations with, mainly in the oil sector. The
    Saudi government was supporting Islamists activities in Turkey not to
    support Israel. [3] This policy showed itself in the Israeli-Palestine
    conflict, too. Turkey's policy in this issue is a strategy of pleasing
    the both parties. [4]

    In an interview in Cumhuriyet on the 17th of February 1974, the Foreign
    Minister Turan Guneþ emphasized that "Turkey would conduct its policy
    vis-a-vis Israel in the light of international law and UN resolutions
    rather than fluctuating economic and political circumstances." At
    last, Turkey recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the
    representative of Palestine.[5] Turkey got closer to the Arabs mainly
    the Palestinians because of Israel's declaration of Jerusalem Law in
    1980, which was emphasizing that Jerusalem was a united, indivisible
    and eternal capital of Israel. [6] After the declaration of the
    law, Turkish PM Demirel said that Israel's move was "unwise, wrong,
    and contrary to international law and fundamental justice."[7] This
    law irritated not only the government but also the Turkish people,
    for instance on the 27th of July, in Cumhuriyet it was written that
    "no relations with it whatsoever". Although Turkey recalled its charge
    from Tel Aviv, after the Jerusalem Law became a Basic Law of Israel,
    Turkey was traumatized by the attitude of Iraq which attempted to
    stop oil shipments and loans to Turkey, unless Turkey changed its
    attitude towards Israel. [8] During the Iraq-Iran War in 1980, Turkey
    recalled its diplomatic staff from Israel, and Turkey received $250
    million loan from Saudi Arabia.[9]

    Another situation that downgraded the relations with Israel was
    Israel's decision to occupy the Golan Heights in 1981.Moreover the
    fire in Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, the Lebanon War and the massacre in
    Palestinian refugee camps near Sidon in 1982, Israel Turkish relations
    were at a lower point. However in 1984 four MPs from the opposition
    party visited Israel but this visit resulted with the Interior Minister
    Yýlmaz's critique of them that they harmed Turkey's political goals
    by visiting Israel. In 1987, with the Palestinian upsurge; Intifada
    Turkey's support to Palestinians increased [10] and in 1988, Turkey
    recognized the state of Palestine. Although Israel emphasized its
    disappointments in the attempt of Turkey, Turkey mentioned that the
    states in the Middle East have the right to exist as a state with
    certain borders peacefully. Moreover, Turkey also accepted the Israeli
    former PM Shamir's peace plan in 1989 which was suggesting elections
    in the occupied regions of Palestine.[11] During the visit of Tansu
    Ciller to Israel, she made an official visit to the autonomous region
    of Palestine and to the Eastern Jerusalem to meet with the officials
    of Palestine and examined the problems of Palestine people.[12]

    Today, Turkey's attitude is almost the same; supporting both
    Palestine and Israel. On the 8th of May in 2005, during the Sharm
    el-Seyh Summit Israeli PM Ariel Sharon and Palestine PM Mahmud Abbas
    declared a truce. According to the office of PM directorate general
    press and information, after the summit, Erdoðan's speech is showing
    his support; Turkey was pleased with both the efforts of Israel
    and Palestine which put an end to the fighting. Turkey's support
    to Palestine was refreshed by the visit of Erdoðan to Palestine on
    the 1-2 May. Erdoðan opened the Turkish Cooperation and Development
    Agency's Program Coordination Office in Ramallah.

    Moreover, the Turkish PM attended a meeting of Turkish Palestinian
    businessmen.[13] Furthermore, according to Barry Rubin's article
    "Turkey-Israel Relations", today the potential problem can arise
    from Turkey's closeness to the Labor Party of Israel, not to the
    PM Netanyahu. Rubin emphasizes that Turkey supports the UN Security
    Council Resolutions that benefit both Israel and Palestine. However,
    Israel is not in favor of a Resolution that benefits Palestine,
    too.[14]

    b. Iraq and Kurdish Problem: c.

    The second prominent problem between Turkey and Israel is their
    differing attitudes towards Iraq's unity. Turkey is supporting a
    loose Iraq for a long time, since by the end of the Gulf War in 1991
    the autonomous Kurdish entity was giving its signals to be founded.

    So that in 1996; the former PM Tansu Ciller emphasized that "We shall
    not allow an independent Kurdish enclave in Northern Iraq. Iraq's
    sovereignty and territorial integrity are important to Turkey."

    [15]Turkey's policy of Iraq after 2003 did not change. For Turkey,
    Iraq should be a centralized and strong country which protects its
    territorial integrity. In contrast, Israel is in favor of a loose
    and decentralized Iraq.

    The world was informed by the BBC News that Israel was alleged that
    it was training Kurds in the Northern Iraq. Although the claim is
    not accepted by the Israeli government not to injure the relations
    with Turkey, the pleaded news is supported by Turkish and American
    experts that Israel is training the PKK in Northern Iraq. For
    instance according to Seymour Hersh's article called "Plan B-The
    Kurdish Gambit", a former official from Israel's intelligence said
    that Israel has been training the Kurdish commandos with the same
    effectiveness as the Israel's most secretive commando units, the
    Mastaravim. Moreover, he added that this was a more efficient way to
    make an insurgency. An American official from the intelligence said
    that the Israeli's tie to Kurds "would be of greater value than their
    growing alliance with Turkey."[16]

    Turkish side's response to the claim was that; on the 26th of May, in a
    news conference in Ankara, Abdullah Gul said that "presenting us with a
    choice, that is not a real choice, between survival and alliance."[17]

    However, Turkey and Israel was hand in hand in combating terrorism.

    According to the 1996 Agreement of Military Cooperation, the first
    principle was; "Cooperation against terrorism requires both parties
    to exchange information and experience." [18] Moreover, according to
    Mustafa Kibaroðlu's article called "Turkey and Israel Strategize";
    each country can deploy or temporarily station its land, air and
    naval force units in the other country's territory. For that purpose,
    they can use one another's air space, airports and naval ports. [19]
    In addition to that, on the 22nd of May in 1996, according to the
    Cumhuriyet Newspaper, Israel was going to supply an electronic
    fencebordering the Southeastern part of Turkey; Iran, Syria and Iraq.

    This would perceive the sound waves to capture the PKK terrorists.

    [20] The extent to which the allegations are true is discussed by
    many experts.

    Taking these into consideration, Turkey does not support what Israel
    seeks for, a united Iraq, mainly because of the possibility of
    increasing terrorist attacks of Kurds, since a federation in Northern
    Iraq means a strong Kurdish population. However, the result of a
    loose Iraq can be a threat to Israel, too. In an interview made by
    the International Crisis Group, on the 27th of October in 2004, with a
    Turkish official; he stated that "If Iraq falls apart, the Kurds will
    fight for power, causing instability in the north, while in the south,
    the Shiites will then set up a theocratic state that, by osmosis, will
    move closer to Iran; this, in turn, will resurrect Iranian rhetoric
    about spreading revolution among Shiite populations in the Gulf. This
    would be a problem for Israel, and all of this will lead to chaos. For
    both Israel and Turkey, it is better to keep Iraq whole".[21] To find
    a logical solution to Israel's strategy over Northern Iraq can be,
    according to Ephraim Inbar's book Turkish-Israeli Strategic Alliance,
    allying with non-Arabs that include the Turks and the Kurds.

    3. Policy Recommendations

    Middle East where there are catastrophic wars and conflicts for
    centuries. That's why everyone living in the Middle East needs a
    miracle to stabilize the region. However, at least foreign policies
    can help to take a step towards the miracle to occur; to stabilize
    the region. In this respect Turkey can imply policies which generally
    benefit both parties using its lobbying and campaigning tactics and
    make diplomacy through its cultural activities, trading opportunities.

    a. For the Israel-Palestine Conflict:

    -Water Routes: A policy recommendation for the conflict that could not
    solve but help to reduce the problem is water supply from Manavgat
    to Palestine and Israel. This project was suggested by many Middle
    Eastern experts for instance, Military of Turkey suggested a water
    route from Turkey to Israel and Palestine. [22] Today, the water
    project is being negotiated, but it could be accelerated. Water routes
    project is important since there is a scarcity of water in Israel. By
    supplying water to Israel and Palestine, one of the problems of the
    two countries can be solved.

    -Turkish Investment in Palestine:

    Another policy recommendation for the conflict between Israel and
    Palestine is Turkish investment in Palestine. Since unemployment
    raises conflicts and since the financial well-being is less in
    Palestine than it is in Israel, investment in Palestine could reduce
    unemployment. Turkey can make investments in Palestine in sectors
    such as electronics, since Israel imports most of its electronics
    from Turkey. Another area for investment can be food. Since Turkey
    exports high amounts of food products to Israel, a food company can
    operate in Palestine.

    -Conflict Solution Contest:

    Another policy recommendation can be a Conflict Solution Contest which
    has a money prize of $100,000 for the winner. The foreign ministry of
    Turkey can initiate this project with sponsors from all around the
    world; including states, business groups; to find solutions to the
    unsolved problems of the world. Everyone who seeks for peace can join
    the contest. This is so, to embrace all kinds of ideas. The prize can
    be increased according to the number of states who join the project
    for sponsoring. The amount of the prize can be increased since this is
    a difficult contest that the participant should come up with an idea
    that could persuade the three parties; the USA, Israel and Palestine.

    b. For the Kurdish Problem:

    -Turkish intelligence and freezing of some agreements: As a
    policy recommendation for Israel's training program of Kurds in
    Northern Iraq Turkey can freeze some of its military agreements with
    Israel. According to the Agreement of Military Cooperation signed in
    1996, the first principle was; "Cooperation against terrorism requires
    both parties to exchange information and experience."[23] However,
    because of Israel's actions in Northern Iraq, Turkey can stop sharing
    information and experience; because for Turkey, Kurdish terror is the
    most prominent area to solve. Turkey could freeze economic agreements
    and cooperation with Israel; but then it could be disadvantageous
    for Turkey, too. So that blocking the information and experience flow
    from Turkey would be a better option to choose.

    However, before freezing the agreements, Turkey should be certain that
    Israel is training the Kurds. If the CIA knew Israel's activities in
    Northern Iraq, Turkish secret service should know it, too.[24] But if
    not, Turkey can implement a policy such as; it can integrate its own
    officials from the intelligence to the Northern Iraq as Kurds. It
    can train the selected group of officials, teach them Kurdish and
    make them learn if Israelis really train the Kurds, there.

    - Resemblance to Jewish of Kurds' activities: Another policy
    recommendation to implement against Israel's training operations of
    Kurds is that Turkey can resemble the bad memories of the Jewish and
    Kurds to rather the Jewish lobby or through media to the world. After
    the capture of Ocalan, Israel was one of the states that Kurds blamed
    for helping Turkey to capture him. To protest Israel, Kurds tried to
    enter the consulate of Israel in Berlin in 1999, but three of them were
    shot by Israeli security guards and the upsurge was suppressed.[25]
    Moreover, Turkey can argue that how can the Jewish support PKK which
    is also supported by the Syrian government. Since Syria is one of the
    countries which does not get along with Israel. Since the Jewish lobby
    and Turkey have good relations, Jewish lobby could be effective through
    the American government or through the Israeli to impede the support
    of Israel to Kurds. Moreover, Jewish lobby can be a good option to
    resemble these memories, because there is an active Kurdish lobby in
    the US that can influence the Jewish lobby easily. To suppress that,
    Turkey or Turkish lobby could facilitate this policy. Moreover, Turkey
    can spread these memories of Jewish and Kurds through media, to blame
    the Kurds. Through media, Israel can be criticized for helping the
    Kurds or at least Israeli people can question the actions of Israel.

    -Investment in Southeast of Turkey: The last policy recommendation
    for Israel's training operations of Kurds, Turkey can implement
    financial policies in the Southeast Turkey. Since, investment
    increases welfare and brings high living standards; Turkey can make
    profitable investments in the Southeast of Turkey such as building
    dams, outlet centers, hotels and casinos in cooperation with Israel
    government or offer these investments to the Jewish lobby to build
    them together. Building dams is a need for the Southeast to solve
    the water problem. An outlet center can also be profitable since it
    can attract customers from Syria, Iraq, Iran and other Middle Eastern
    countries. Hotels and casinos can be built together in only one city
    to make that city headquarter of entertainment in the Middle East. It
    could attract many oil-rich customers since there is a small number
    of such cities in the Middle East. These investments can help the
    Southeast region to develop and the Kurdish residents to get richer;
    but never richer than the owners of these investments; Turkey and
    Israel. This investment policy should only target the low-income
    Kurds to make them feel pleasant of living inside the borders of
    Turkey. Since the city will be a touristy place the economy of the
    Southeast region would develop.

    Alternatives to improve Turkish-Israeli Relations: -Establishment of
    an NGO: A policy recommendation for Turkey to improve Turkish-Israeli
    relations can be to establish an NGO that uses media, art and sports
    to lobby and influence the countries and also its own citizens. The
    NGO can work with various agencies; such as the Ministry of Culture
    and Tourism get policy recommendations; the business groups to
    get financial support and the universities to get ideas from the
    academicians. This would be separate from the state because it
    should work faster and more efficiently than the state. When there
    is a problem that the NGO can handle, it should find solutions and
    implement them. It should deal with some problems which are at state
    level and target the public to change their opinion. For instance the
    NGO can produce films to correct the ill-informed sources by showing
    the realities about the so-called Armenian Genocide and to develop
    relations with Jewish. It can give the message of Jewish and Turkish
    friendship; or it can arrange concerts of Jewish-Turkish-Arabic
    music to give the message that "We are together and we get along
    peacefully." It may also arrange a peace cup in the field of sports
    such as football. Football can be an attractive activity since
    Israeli people know Turkish football well. This NGO can make the
    same activities for other countries who are seeking for its own
    advertisement for instance Palestine and also Israel. In this way,
    it can earn money and use it for the lobbying and the process of
    advertisement of Turkey.

    -Exchange Programs: Besides the media policy, Israel and Turkey can
    operate exchange programs between the two countries. The universities
    in Turkey can add Israel option for their exchange programs,
    specifically targeting the business and international relations
    students. The exchange program should include only the universities
    which are mostly in the Western part of Israel, because the students
    should not abstain from living in Israel. Moreover, the students should
    have the option of staying with a host family to know the Jewish
    culture. For business students, Israel can be an attracting choice
    since Jewish are famous with the image of genius businessmen. Moreover,
    for international relations, who basically want to study the Middle
    Eastern policies, Israel would be a great opportunity. Since Turkey,
    Israel and Middle East are related conflictual issues, a Turk studying
    in Israel or an Israeli studying in Turkey could be a good experience.

    4. Conclusion: Taking all these into consideration, Turkey and
    Israel is in between the windows which are opened to a harmonious
    and a chaotic environment. Since the timeline that the Middle East
    witnessed a peaceful atmosphere is quite short, the policy makers are
    more experienced. So, they can come up with better solutions. However,
    like Israel's so-called secret trainings for the Kurds, there can be
    curtains which impede the policymakers to know the real situation.

    That's why, Turkish intelligence should be developed and the policy
    makers should be persuasive to implement the strategies that benefit
    the all parties. To get close to the peaceful environment, Turkey
    can play a big role.

    ------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------

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    [14]Rubin, Barry. "Turkey-Israel Relations", (17 December 2006)
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    London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.233) [16] Hersh,
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    <http://www.meforum.org/article/128> [20] Oðan,
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    London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. (p.237)

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