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PROBLEMS OF SELF-ORGANISATION OF ARMENIANS IN THE MODERN PHASE OF THE
ARMENIAN QUESTION
By Armen Ayvazyan
Earlier versions of this article were published in Russian (Delovoy
Express weekly, Yerevan, No. 62 (708) 19 January 2007), Armenian
(Yerkir weekly, Yerevan, 2 February 2007) and French (5 March 2007,
Stéphane/armenews, Paris).
Following Armenia's independence, the Armenian Question entered into a
new, complex and extremely volatile phase, which has required mobilizing
and activating the potential of all Armenians. Some attempts are being
made to find answers and propose solutions to the current most complex
challenges. One such attempt has been a recent initiative to establish
abroad (not on RoA territory) a Western Armenian authority in exile -
representative bodies of Western Armenians (a National Assembly and a
Government - `a National Council'.) Similar initiatives are known
to have taken place in the United States and France as well. The latest
of them was the `Appeal to the Descendants of the Armenians Who
Survived the Genocide in Western Armenia, for Establishment of Their Own
Representations in Exile', published in the `Hayastani Hanrapetutyun'
official daily of 25 October and `Golos Armenii' Russian-language
newspaper of 31 October 2006 (both Yerevan-based publications), which
was signed by a number of well known representatives of the
intelligentsia and social-political personalities, including Ara
Abrahamyan, Narek Abrahamyan, Armen Jigarkhanyan, Sos Sargsyan, Vahagn
Dadrian, and even by some state and military officials, such as the
NKR Prime Minister and the Advisor to RoA Defense Minister. Despite
the fact that the latter have underscored that they signed `in
individual capacity', ostensibly they could not have done so without
the consent of their superiors - which actually bestows an altogether
serious tone to this initiative.
The first consultations on founding a Western Armenian plenipotentiary
Authority in exile were held in Paris (Sevres) on 11 and 12 December
2006. (For information on this see `Zartonk' of 5 January 2007,
`Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' of 06 January 2007 and `Golos Armenii'
of 20 January 2007.) The initiative has come mainly from some Diasporan
Armenians.
What is at issue?
Indisputably, the Armenian Diaspora is disorganized and, as a result, in
a weak condition. The political activists, including traditional
political parties, engage but only a small fraction of the Armenians.
The organising of the Diaspora, including the electing of representative
bodies, and formulation of a well thought-out programme and unified
budget have long been an imperative. But organizing and strengthening
the Diaspora in this way is one thing, and creating a Western Armenian
authority in exile an altogether different one, and, we are convinced,
an undertaking fraught with problems.
There are a few particularly unacceptable stipulations in the
`Appeal'. One of them says (as quoted from the English version of
the `Appeal'): `a distinct distribution of duties and roles
between the segments of the whole Armenianhood could contribute to a
successful solution of the national tasks, enable normalizing of the
relations between the Republic of Armenia and its neighboring states,
which, in its turn, will reduce its dependence on possible consequences
of the international political confrontation.' On this basis, one may
presume that if the Western Armenian would-be Government in Paris,
Moscow or Washington D.C. were to summon a session and, according to
shared tasks and responsibilities (i.e., `a distinct distribution of
duties and roles'), were to raise the issue of the return of the
territories of Western Armenia or that of material compensation, then
Turkey would not have grounds to accuse the Republic of Armenia of
anything, since it could be asserted: `What does Armenia have to do
with this? After all it is not Armenia which has raised this issue!'
Following this interpretation, the RoA Government would deal only with
Artsakh and the other `local' issues, etc.
This idealization is simply naive. When France adopted a resolution on
the Armenian Genocide in 2001, Turkey retaliated against Armenia with
the tightening of the visa regime for RoA citizens, blocking air traffic
and making new threats. The Turks fully realize that at this juncture it
is the Republic of Armenia that is of paramount importance - an
actually existing state on an actual territory. Such sleights of hand
wouldn't succeed in deceiving anyone. Turkey is also aware that as long
as there exists the Republic of Armenia and there exists people living
on that land, any serious threats (if not militarily, then at least
diplomatic, informational and other fronts) to it will emanate just from
there! Our compatriots living in the United States, France, Russia or
elsewhere are only secondary, if not tertiary threats to Turkey. If
Turkey and Azerbaijan succeed to jointly destroy the republics of
Armenia and Nagorno-Kharabagh, they will recognize the Armenian Genocide
the very next day, because this recognition will be of no consequence to
Turkey any longer. The Armenians in the USA, Europe or Australia may
organize demonstrations and rallies all they want - these will be of
no significance. Nothing that the Armenians may do then will matter any
longer since there won't be a body, a state, to which the Turks would
have to account to - literally or metaphorically.
Another point of the `Appeal' stipulates (as quoted from the English
version of the Appeal): `the present Republic of Armenia which was
established after the second collapse of the Soviet-turned Russia and on
a part of the territory of Eastern Armenia, on the territory of Soviet
Armenia, twice as little as the first Armenian Republic, is de jure not
an assignee of the first Armenian Republic and has no authority from the
representative bodies of the Western Armenians to represent their
interests and what is more is not able of undertaking the solution of
the specific issues related to the fortune of the descendents of the
Western Armenians and Western Armenia.'
We must observe that the statement that the RoA `is de jure not an
assignee (i.e., successor) of the first Armenian Republic', is a very
dangerous one, and the entire paragraph above is completely inaccurate.
Why is it that the RoA cannot have jurisdiction to represent the
interests of Western Armenians? If we follow the logic of that assertion
of the `Appeal', we will arrive at the conclusion that Artsakh
should be defended only by the Artsakhtsis, Syunik only by the Syunetsis
and Western Armenia only by the descendents of those who lived on that
land. But the Homeland - Armenia - is one: Western Armenia, Eastern
Armenia, Artsakh, Javakhk and Nakhijevan each one and all together
constitute Armenia. This applies to the RoA and NKR also in the
political sense, and to Javakhk at least demographically, and to all
other cases historically. The Gyumretsi, Vanadzortsi, Yerevantsi or an
Armenian living abroad have as many - no more and no less - national
rights and moral responsibilities, say, for Artsakh, as does the
Artsakhtsi himself, because Artsakh is a homeland of the Armenians, part
of the land of Armenia. By the same token, the Artsakhtsi, for example,
is morally responsible for the native land in Yerevan, Gyumri, Vanadzor
or Van. However, the political situation and objective conditions may
give different shapes and forms to the fulfillment of these rights and
responsibilities.
Let us suppose for a moment that a Western Armenian authority in exile
did get established after all; then it is imperative to clarify: will it
be capable of playing a role, or how seriously will it be treated?
First, the Armenians do not need several governments, one is fully
sufficient for us. Evidently, an artificially created authority cannot
play a serious role, because it will not have the status or the other
state jurisdictions (attributes) of an internationally recognized
sovereign state. It is a different matter that, unfortunately, today the
RoA does not take up the mission and responsibility of dealing with the
question of Western Armenia. In fact, some of the postulates of the
`Appeal' correspond to the RoA national security strategy adopted
recently (February 2007) by the RoA Government. Therefore it is possible
to assume that our government is somewhat agreeable to these sort of
initiatives. The fact that the `Appeal' was signed by the
aforementioned high ranking officials, and its publication in
`Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' official newspaper testifies to this.
The concept of `Western Armenia' is completely missing from the RoA
national security strategy, which is a serious mistake. It goes without
saying that the Artsakh issue is a constituent part of the Armenian
Question, so why should not the issue of Western Armenia be stated along
with it? Forced separation of Artsakh from Armenia and its forced
annexation to Azerbaijan were the direct consequences of the Armenian
Genocide, as was the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nakhijevan.
Accordingly, if the fact of genocide is recognized so must be the
necessity for overcoming the consequences of it.
The Armenian government too has its share of fault in this; it failed or
did not want to present the issue comprehensively and in a complete
manner. What was the purpose of the Armenian Genocide? It was not so
much for the physical extermination of the Armenian ethnos as it was for
the elimination of Armenia - a country, which had all demographic,
ideological, political and cultural capacities and potential to
re-establish an independent statehood. The bottom line is that the
Genocide of Armenians was aimed against the possibility of restoring
Armenian Statehood. Essentially, Armenians got exterminated for being
the very bearers of that probability and capability. The annihilation of
Armenians in the parts of Ottoman Empire lying outside Western Armenia
and Cilicia, aimed likewise to nullify any possible future claims by the
Armenians to their ancestral land. Thus, the objective was the
destruction of Armenia and the means - annihilation of Armenians,
first and foremost, on their own land in Armenia. Exterminated were the
elite of the Armenian people, the social structure, the old and
well-ramified structures of the church, education and community life -
the entire Armenian culture having had evolved on that land. Most
importantly, the consequence of the Genocide was the loss of a territory
of land which had been home Armenians for five thousand uninterrupted
years. Consequently, the Armenian Question, in essence, is a territorial
issue, a land issue altogether. And the Artsakh issue, after all, is a
territorial issue. By presenting the Artsakh problem merely as the right
to self-determination of the people inhabiting it, we weaken our stand
on the negotiations front in particular and in the overall Armenian
Question in general.
It is important that we understand the essence of the Armenian Question
accurately - it has been and remains in the creation of viable
political and territorial conditions for the Armenian people to live
freely and independently on its native soil of the Armenian Highland.
There is only one solution to the Armenian Question - to restore the
Armenian statehood if not in entire Armenia (350,000 sq/km), then at
least on a substantial piece of it, such that safe and long term
existence and development of Armenian civilization can be secured. In
other words, the Armenian Question is about the security of the
Armenians, and it requires the provision of two prerequisites: The first
is the creation of a comprehensive and strong statehood, and the second
is the territorial guarantees fortifying the security and viability of
that statehood.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian Question became
reanimated and started to proceed in a somewhat haphazard manner. The
transformations of the Armenian Question were vividly reflected and
continue to be reflected in the following four directions:
a) In the fundamental issue of Artsakh, including the three-year large
scale war for the liberation of that vitally important part of Armenia;
b) In the fundamental issue of Javakhk, which is in no respect of less
importance and lately has visibly grown in tension;
c) In the international recognitions, denials and abuses of the Armenian
genocide;
d) In Armenian-Turkish relations, including the issues of overcoming the
consequences of the genocide carried out against Armenians in Western
Armenia and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.
Indeed, in 1988 the Armenian Question was in one condition, in
1991, in a different, in 1994, in another and now still another, and one
which is significantly unlike the previous ones.
These four directions are very much interrelated; each containing great
dangers, and a defeat in any one of them could potentially devastate all
Armenians.
Thus, the Armenian homeland is one and indivisible. This cannot be
subject to argument. The issue is in the political and legal expediency
of the following: whether or not to establish a Western Armenian
government, which will regard itself as a body legally commensurate with
RoA and which will try to represent issues concerning Armenians from the
perspective of its own strategy and assessment of the reality, or to
create empowered representative bodies of Armenians living abroad -
bodies ostensibly better able to support progress on issues facing the
Armenian nation.
In our opinion, it is preferable not to set up such a `second'
parallel governmental structure.
>From the perspective of legal expediency, we must note the following:
1. At least half of RoA citizens are the descendents of Western
Armenians; therefore RoA needs no additional authority or legitimacy to
represent the cause of Western Armenia.
2. The would-be representative bodies of Western Armenians can never
have such high legal status as has the Republic of Armenia as an
independent and internationally recognized sovereign state. As such, RoA
has exclusive rights and responsibilities to present these issues in the
international arena, including at the United Nation's International
Court of Justice in The Hague. These are rights and capacities, which no
Armenian organization of lower status has or may ever have, regardless
of it being granted parliamentary or governmental status. Particularly,
as a signatory to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (23 June 1993), RoA has exclusive
rights to invoke Article VIII of the Convention against Turkey (a
signatory since 31 July 1950), which provides that any contracting party
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action as they consider appropriate for the `suppression' of
genocide. A number of prominent experts in international law contend
that:
`suppression' must mean more than just retributive justice. In order
to suppress the crime, it is necessary to suppress, as far as possible,
its consequences. This entails, besides punishing the guilty, providing
restitution and compensation to the surviving generations1.
That is, these measures could include also compensations in the form of
territorial concessions.
RoA can apply also Article IX of the Convention, which declares:
`Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of
the parties to the dispute.' As de Zayas notes, `An objection on
the part of Turkey about the standing of Armenia to represent the rights
of the descendants of the survivors of the genocide is countered by the
fact that many descendants are citizens of Armenia; reference to the
`protective principle' enunciated by the Disctrict Court of Israel
in the Eichmann case can also be made in this context. Moreover, Armenia
could offer Armenian citizenship to all Armenians in the diaspora, as
Russia has done with respect to former citizens of the Soviet Union
residing in the Baltic States and other former republics of the Soviet
Union.'
3. How should the Diaspora Armenians from Eastern Armenia - immigrants
from the Republic of Armenia, Artsakh, Nakhijevan, Georgia and
Azerbaijan, who today perhaps equal in numbers to Western Armenian -
participate in the creation of the Western Armenian representative
bodies? This question remains unaddressed and can therefore cause new
disagreements and divisions. It is still an open question whether the
declaration of Artsakh as an independent state which took place under
the extraordinary circumstances was the optimal decision. Or, should we
have instead declared Artsakh's reunification with Armenia? How
suitable is it to create new Armenian governments - and those - abroad,
cut off from the actual homeland - when there already exists an
independent state, at least de jure, recognized by all?
>From the perspective of political expediency:
1. How suitable is it to separate the integral parts of the Armenian
question from each other and conduct a form of `separation of labor'
on this issue? Are we not weakening ourselves on the issues of Arstakh,
Javakhk and Nakhijevan? It is pointless to recognize and condemn the
genocide on one hand, and recognize Azerbaijan's `territorial
integrity' on the other (as some states have done in recent years),
while concurrently refusing to accept the right of Artsakh Armenians to
self-determination as well as the right of Armenia to have secure and
natural borders.
2. Another point of concern is that even if RoA, with all its state
structures, were to fall under nearly complete dependency upon foreign
powers, couldn't the would-be Western Armenian government in exile
possibly fall into the same trap? What should be done to avoid this
scenario? I believe this question must be tackled very early on before
it is too late.
Finally, the psychological suitability aspect considered as well. On
the example of Artsakh, we know better now that the declaration of
independence and creation of state bodies in one part of Armenia, done
on tactical considerations, have resulted in certain transformations in
our national identity, manifested particularly in the
`Gharabaghtsi-Hayastantsi' tensions. Such undesirable phenomena
will be much more destructive to the collective psyche of our
compatriots living far away from the homeland - on foreign lands and
in foreign environments - not to mention its concomitant manifestation
in Armenia proper.
While the physical security of Soviet Armenia was guaranteed until
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the international efforts of
Diaspora Armenians could focus on the recognition and condemnation of
the Armenian genocide, the reality of the post-Soviet era calls for
different approaches and actions, which, unfortunately, are long
overdue. In particular, one of the urgent necessary actions is to
organize a repatriation of Armenians to the Republic of Armenia- the
only territory where exists an Armenian political authority and armed
forces. Unfortunately, the second statement by the initiative group
repeats the same mistakes - Western Armenia is called the homeland of
Western Armenians and the just resolution of the Armenian question is
divided between `Eastern Armenia and Western Armenia perspectives'
(see `Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' of 16 January 2007). The authors also
speak about an issue that is just infeasible and imaginary: `Western
Armenians and their descendents wish to return to their homeland -
Western Armenia - safely and unimpeded.' This formulation suggests
an ill-posed definition of homeland, because, to repeat, Western Armenia
is as much the homeland of Eastern Armenians as Eastern Armenia is the
homeland of Western Armenians.
Nevertheless, the issues configured in the `Appeal' are
important. The main subject of the `Appeal' is particularly crucial
- to unify Diaspora Armenians and create representative bodies.
However, this should not be done based on political claims on any part
of Armenia (in this case - for Western Armenia), as the authors of the
`Appeal' intend to do, but by creating such a representative body of
Armenians that will be capable of uniting the entire Diaspora - all
immigrants from all parts of Armenia - aiming to help find solutions
to the current pan-national issues.
Armen Ayvazyan, PhD in Political Science
Director, `Ararat' Center for Strategic Research
1 Alfred de Zayas, J.D. (Harvard), Dr. Phil. (Göttingen), Memorandum
on the Genocide against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Application of
the 1948 Genocide Convention, Brussels: EAFJD, 2003.
ARMENIAN QUESTION
By Armen Ayvazyan
Earlier versions of this article were published in Russian (Delovoy
Express weekly, Yerevan, No. 62 (708) 19 January 2007), Armenian
(Yerkir weekly, Yerevan, 2 February 2007) and French (5 March 2007,
Stéphane/armenews, Paris).
Following Armenia's independence, the Armenian Question entered into a
new, complex and extremely volatile phase, which has required mobilizing
and activating the potential of all Armenians. Some attempts are being
made to find answers and propose solutions to the current most complex
challenges. One such attempt has been a recent initiative to establish
abroad (not on RoA territory) a Western Armenian authority in exile -
representative bodies of Western Armenians (a National Assembly and a
Government - `a National Council'.) Similar initiatives are known
to have taken place in the United States and France as well. The latest
of them was the `Appeal to the Descendants of the Armenians Who
Survived the Genocide in Western Armenia, for Establishment of Their Own
Representations in Exile', published in the `Hayastani Hanrapetutyun'
official daily of 25 October and `Golos Armenii' Russian-language
newspaper of 31 October 2006 (both Yerevan-based publications), which
was signed by a number of well known representatives of the
intelligentsia and social-political personalities, including Ara
Abrahamyan, Narek Abrahamyan, Armen Jigarkhanyan, Sos Sargsyan, Vahagn
Dadrian, and even by some state and military officials, such as the
NKR Prime Minister and the Advisor to RoA Defense Minister. Despite
the fact that the latter have underscored that they signed `in
individual capacity', ostensibly they could not have done so without
the consent of their superiors - which actually bestows an altogether
serious tone to this initiative.
The first consultations on founding a Western Armenian plenipotentiary
Authority in exile were held in Paris (Sevres) on 11 and 12 December
2006. (For information on this see `Zartonk' of 5 January 2007,
`Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' of 06 January 2007 and `Golos Armenii'
of 20 January 2007.) The initiative has come mainly from some Diasporan
Armenians.
What is at issue?
Indisputably, the Armenian Diaspora is disorganized and, as a result, in
a weak condition. The political activists, including traditional
political parties, engage but only a small fraction of the Armenians.
The organising of the Diaspora, including the electing of representative
bodies, and formulation of a well thought-out programme and unified
budget have long been an imperative. But organizing and strengthening
the Diaspora in this way is one thing, and creating a Western Armenian
authority in exile an altogether different one, and, we are convinced,
an undertaking fraught with problems.
There are a few particularly unacceptable stipulations in the
`Appeal'. One of them says (as quoted from the English version of
the `Appeal'): `a distinct distribution of duties and roles
between the segments of the whole Armenianhood could contribute to a
successful solution of the national tasks, enable normalizing of the
relations between the Republic of Armenia and its neighboring states,
which, in its turn, will reduce its dependence on possible consequences
of the international political confrontation.' On this basis, one may
presume that if the Western Armenian would-be Government in Paris,
Moscow or Washington D.C. were to summon a session and, according to
shared tasks and responsibilities (i.e., `a distinct distribution of
duties and roles'), were to raise the issue of the return of the
territories of Western Armenia or that of material compensation, then
Turkey would not have grounds to accuse the Republic of Armenia of
anything, since it could be asserted: `What does Armenia have to do
with this? After all it is not Armenia which has raised this issue!'
Following this interpretation, the RoA Government would deal only with
Artsakh and the other `local' issues, etc.
This idealization is simply naive. When France adopted a resolution on
the Armenian Genocide in 2001, Turkey retaliated against Armenia with
the tightening of the visa regime for RoA citizens, blocking air traffic
and making new threats. The Turks fully realize that at this juncture it
is the Republic of Armenia that is of paramount importance - an
actually existing state on an actual territory. Such sleights of hand
wouldn't succeed in deceiving anyone. Turkey is also aware that as long
as there exists the Republic of Armenia and there exists people living
on that land, any serious threats (if not militarily, then at least
diplomatic, informational and other fronts) to it will emanate just from
there! Our compatriots living in the United States, France, Russia or
elsewhere are only secondary, if not tertiary threats to Turkey. If
Turkey and Azerbaijan succeed to jointly destroy the republics of
Armenia and Nagorno-Kharabagh, they will recognize the Armenian Genocide
the very next day, because this recognition will be of no consequence to
Turkey any longer. The Armenians in the USA, Europe or Australia may
organize demonstrations and rallies all they want - these will be of
no significance. Nothing that the Armenians may do then will matter any
longer since there won't be a body, a state, to which the Turks would
have to account to - literally or metaphorically.
Another point of the `Appeal' stipulates (as quoted from the English
version of the Appeal): `the present Republic of Armenia which was
established after the second collapse of the Soviet-turned Russia and on
a part of the territory of Eastern Armenia, on the territory of Soviet
Armenia, twice as little as the first Armenian Republic, is de jure not
an assignee of the first Armenian Republic and has no authority from the
representative bodies of the Western Armenians to represent their
interests and what is more is not able of undertaking the solution of
the specific issues related to the fortune of the descendents of the
Western Armenians and Western Armenia.'
We must observe that the statement that the RoA `is de jure not an
assignee (i.e., successor) of the first Armenian Republic', is a very
dangerous one, and the entire paragraph above is completely inaccurate.
Why is it that the RoA cannot have jurisdiction to represent the
interests of Western Armenians? If we follow the logic of that assertion
of the `Appeal', we will arrive at the conclusion that Artsakh
should be defended only by the Artsakhtsis, Syunik only by the Syunetsis
and Western Armenia only by the descendents of those who lived on that
land. But the Homeland - Armenia - is one: Western Armenia, Eastern
Armenia, Artsakh, Javakhk and Nakhijevan each one and all together
constitute Armenia. This applies to the RoA and NKR also in the
political sense, and to Javakhk at least demographically, and to all
other cases historically. The Gyumretsi, Vanadzortsi, Yerevantsi or an
Armenian living abroad have as many - no more and no less - national
rights and moral responsibilities, say, for Artsakh, as does the
Artsakhtsi himself, because Artsakh is a homeland of the Armenians, part
of the land of Armenia. By the same token, the Artsakhtsi, for example,
is morally responsible for the native land in Yerevan, Gyumri, Vanadzor
or Van. However, the political situation and objective conditions may
give different shapes and forms to the fulfillment of these rights and
responsibilities.
Let us suppose for a moment that a Western Armenian authority in exile
did get established after all; then it is imperative to clarify: will it
be capable of playing a role, or how seriously will it be treated?
First, the Armenians do not need several governments, one is fully
sufficient for us. Evidently, an artificially created authority cannot
play a serious role, because it will not have the status or the other
state jurisdictions (attributes) of an internationally recognized
sovereign state. It is a different matter that, unfortunately, today the
RoA does not take up the mission and responsibility of dealing with the
question of Western Armenia. In fact, some of the postulates of the
`Appeal' correspond to the RoA national security strategy adopted
recently (February 2007) by the RoA Government. Therefore it is possible
to assume that our government is somewhat agreeable to these sort of
initiatives. The fact that the `Appeal' was signed by the
aforementioned high ranking officials, and its publication in
`Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' official newspaper testifies to this.
The concept of `Western Armenia' is completely missing from the RoA
national security strategy, which is a serious mistake. It goes without
saying that the Artsakh issue is a constituent part of the Armenian
Question, so why should not the issue of Western Armenia be stated along
with it? Forced separation of Artsakh from Armenia and its forced
annexation to Azerbaijan were the direct consequences of the Armenian
Genocide, as was the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nakhijevan.
Accordingly, if the fact of genocide is recognized so must be the
necessity for overcoming the consequences of it.
The Armenian government too has its share of fault in this; it failed or
did not want to present the issue comprehensively and in a complete
manner. What was the purpose of the Armenian Genocide? It was not so
much for the physical extermination of the Armenian ethnos as it was for
the elimination of Armenia - a country, which had all demographic,
ideological, political and cultural capacities and potential to
re-establish an independent statehood. The bottom line is that the
Genocide of Armenians was aimed against the possibility of restoring
Armenian Statehood. Essentially, Armenians got exterminated for being
the very bearers of that probability and capability. The annihilation of
Armenians in the parts of Ottoman Empire lying outside Western Armenia
and Cilicia, aimed likewise to nullify any possible future claims by the
Armenians to their ancestral land. Thus, the objective was the
destruction of Armenia and the means - annihilation of Armenians,
first and foremost, on their own land in Armenia. Exterminated were the
elite of the Armenian people, the social structure, the old and
well-ramified structures of the church, education and community life -
the entire Armenian culture having had evolved on that land. Most
importantly, the consequence of the Genocide was the loss of a territory
of land which had been home Armenians for five thousand uninterrupted
years. Consequently, the Armenian Question, in essence, is a territorial
issue, a land issue altogether. And the Artsakh issue, after all, is a
territorial issue. By presenting the Artsakh problem merely as the right
to self-determination of the people inhabiting it, we weaken our stand
on the negotiations front in particular and in the overall Armenian
Question in general.
It is important that we understand the essence of the Armenian Question
accurately - it has been and remains in the creation of viable
political and territorial conditions for the Armenian people to live
freely and independently on its native soil of the Armenian Highland.
There is only one solution to the Armenian Question - to restore the
Armenian statehood if not in entire Armenia (350,000 sq/km), then at
least on a substantial piece of it, such that safe and long term
existence and development of Armenian civilization can be secured. In
other words, the Armenian Question is about the security of the
Armenians, and it requires the provision of two prerequisites: The first
is the creation of a comprehensive and strong statehood, and the second
is the territorial guarantees fortifying the security and viability of
that statehood.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian Question became
reanimated and started to proceed in a somewhat haphazard manner. The
transformations of the Armenian Question were vividly reflected and
continue to be reflected in the following four directions:
a) In the fundamental issue of Artsakh, including the three-year large
scale war for the liberation of that vitally important part of Armenia;
b) In the fundamental issue of Javakhk, which is in no respect of less
importance and lately has visibly grown in tension;
c) In the international recognitions, denials and abuses of the Armenian
genocide;
d) In Armenian-Turkish relations, including the issues of overcoming the
consequences of the genocide carried out against Armenians in Western
Armenia and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.
Indeed, in 1988 the Armenian Question was in one condition, in
1991, in a different, in 1994, in another and now still another, and one
which is significantly unlike the previous ones.
These four directions are very much interrelated; each containing great
dangers, and a defeat in any one of them could potentially devastate all
Armenians.
Thus, the Armenian homeland is one and indivisible. This cannot be
subject to argument. The issue is in the political and legal expediency
of the following: whether or not to establish a Western Armenian
government, which will regard itself as a body legally commensurate with
RoA and which will try to represent issues concerning Armenians from the
perspective of its own strategy and assessment of the reality, or to
create empowered representative bodies of Armenians living abroad -
bodies ostensibly better able to support progress on issues facing the
Armenian nation.
In our opinion, it is preferable not to set up such a `second'
parallel governmental structure.
>From the perspective of legal expediency, we must note the following:
1. At least half of RoA citizens are the descendents of Western
Armenians; therefore RoA needs no additional authority or legitimacy to
represent the cause of Western Armenia.
2. The would-be representative bodies of Western Armenians can never
have such high legal status as has the Republic of Armenia as an
independent and internationally recognized sovereign state. As such, RoA
has exclusive rights and responsibilities to present these issues in the
international arena, including at the United Nation's International
Court of Justice in The Hague. These are rights and capacities, which no
Armenian organization of lower status has or may ever have, regardless
of it being granted parliamentary or governmental status. Particularly,
as a signatory to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (23 June 1993), RoA has exclusive
rights to invoke Article VIII of the Convention against Turkey (a
signatory since 31 July 1950), which provides that any contracting party
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action as they consider appropriate for the `suppression' of
genocide. A number of prominent experts in international law contend
that:
`suppression' must mean more than just retributive justice. In order
to suppress the crime, it is necessary to suppress, as far as possible,
its consequences. This entails, besides punishing the guilty, providing
restitution and compensation to the surviving generations1.
That is, these measures could include also compensations in the form of
territorial concessions.
RoA can apply also Article IX of the Convention, which declares:
`Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide
or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of
the parties to the dispute.' As de Zayas notes, `An objection on
the part of Turkey about the standing of Armenia to represent the rights
of the descendants of the survivors of the genocide is countered by the
fact that many descendants are citizens of Armenia; reference to the
`protective principle' enunciated by the Disctrict Court of Israel
in the Eichmann case can also be made in this context. Moreover, Armenia
could offer Armenian citizenship to all Armenians in the diaspora, as
Russia has done with respect to former citizens of the Soviet Union
residing in the Baltic States and other former republics of the Soviet
Union.'
3. How should the Diaspora Armenians from Eastern Armenia - immigrants
from the Republic of Armenia, Artsakh, Nakhijevan, Georgia and
Azerbaijan, who today perhaps equal in numbers to Western Armenian -
participate in the creation of the Western Armenian representative
bodies? This question remains unaddressed and can therefore cause new
disagreements and divisions. It is still an open question whether the
declaration of Artsakh as an independent state which took place under
the extraordinary circumstances was the optimal decision. Or, should we
have instead declared Artsakh's reunification with Armenia? How
suitable is it to create new Armenian governments - and those - abroad,
cut off from the actual homeland - when there already exists an
independent state, at least de jure, recognized by all?
>From the perspective of political expediency:
1. How suitable is it to separate the integral parts of the Armenian
question from each other and conduct a form of `separation of labor'
on this issue? Are we not weakening ourselves on the issues of Arstakh,
Javakhk and Nakhijevan? It is pointless to recognize and condemn the
genocide on one hand, and recognize Azerbaijan's `territorial
integrity' on the other (as some states have done in recent years),
while concurrently refusing to accept the right of Artsakh Armenians to
self-determination as well as the right of Armenia to have secure and
natural borders.
2. Another point of concern is that even if RoA, with all its state
structures, were to fall under nearly complete dependency upon foreign
powers, couldn't the would-be Western Armenian government in exile
possibly fall into the same trap? What should be done to avoid this
scenario? I believe this question must be tackled very early on before
it is too late.
Finally, the psychological suitability aspect considered as well. On
the example of Artsakh, we know better now that the declaration of
independence and creation of state bodies in one part of Armenia, done
on tactical considerations, have resulted in certain transformations in
our national identity, manifested particularly in the
`Gharabaghtsi-Hayastantsi' tensions. Such undesirable phenomena
will be much more destructive to the collective psyche of our
compatriots living far away from the homeland - on foreign lands and
in foreign environments - not to mention its concomitant manifestation
in Armenia proper.
While the physical security of Soviet Armenia was guaranteed until
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the international efforts of
Diaspora Armenians could focus on the recognition and condemnation of
the Armenian genocide, the reality of the post-Soviet era calls for
different approaches and actions, which, unfortunately, are long
overdue. In particular, one of the urgent necessary actions is to
organize a repatriation of Armenians to the Republic of Armenia- the
only territory where exists an Armenian political authority and armed
forces. Unfortunately, the second statement by the initiative group
repeats the same mistakes - Western Armenia is called the homeland of
Western Armenians and the just resolution of the Armenian question is
divided between `Eastern Armenia and Western Armenia perspectives'
(see `Hayastani Hanrapetutyun' of 16 January 2007). The authors also
speak about an issue that is just infeasible and imaginary: `Western
Armenians and their descendents wish to return to their homeland -
Western Armenia - safely and unimpeded.' This formulation suggests
an ill-posed definition of homeland, because, to repeat, Western Armenia
is as much the homeland of Eastern Armenians as Eastern Armenia is the
homeland of Western Armenians.
Nevertheless, the issues configured in the `Appeal' are
important. The main subject of the `Appeal' is particularly crucial
- to unify Diaspora Armenians and create representative bodies.
However, this should not be done based on political claims on any part
of Armenia (in this case - for Western Armenia), as the authors of the
`Appeal' intend to do, but by creating such a representative body of
Armenians that will be capable of uniting the entire Diaspora - all
immigrants from all parts of Armenia - aiming to help find solutions
to the current pan-national issues.
Armen Ayvazyan, PhD in Political Science
Director, `Ararat' Center for Strategic Research
1 Alfred de Zayas, J.D. (Harvard), Dr. Phil. (Göttingen), Memorandum
on the Genocide against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Application of
the 1948 Genocide Convention, Brussels: EAFJD, 2003.