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Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
May 25 2007
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN MOLDOVA -- MAIN REMAINING OBSTACLE TO CFE TREATY
RATIFICATION
By Vladimir Socor
Friday, May 25, 2007
With Russian troops on their way out from two bases in Georgia, the
international politics of CFE Treaty ratification focuses
increasingly on Moldova. The OSCE's Permanent Council-Forum for
Security Cooperation special joint meeting on May 23, with Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov's participation, reflected
this development. As Russian officials from President Vladimir Putin
on down threaten to scuttle the treaty unless Western countries
ratify it, Moldova may come under growing pressures from now on.
The continuing presence of Russian forces in Moldova remains the
single biggest obstacle to Russia's push for ratification of the
1999-adapted CFE treaty. Russia can now be expected to grow bolder in
demanding ratification of the CFE Treaty even as Russia keeps its
troops on Moldova's territory. Russian diplomats also rely on some
European counterparts to agree that Russia's military presence in
Moldova should not hinder the broader goal of bringing the CFE Treaty
into force as part of the European arms-control agenda. For some
Europeans, that kind of sentiment can more easily lead to concessions
to Russia when only Moldova is involved, once the Russian troops are
out of Batumi and Akhalkalaki in Georgia (albeit retaining the
Gudauta base there).
Russian arguments and rhetorical devices include:
1) Russia undertook no `obligation' or `commitment' in 1999 regarding
its forces in Moldova (although the 1999 documents show that it did);
2) Russian forces are stationed `in Transnistria' (implying a
separate status for Transnistria, outside Moldova);
3) Russia is willing to remove its massive arms and ammunition
stockpiles `from Transnistria,' but Tiraspol's authorities presumably
`do not permit' this;
4) Russian troops must stay on to guard those dangerous stockpiles;
and
5) Russian troops there `keep the peace' and would not withdraw until
a political settlement is in place (which Russia in the meantime
stonewalls).
Western officials sometimes call vaguely for withdrawal of `Russian
ammunition' (omitting troops); or troop withdrawal `from
Transnistria' (implying some change of status; particularly
counterproductive when phrased as `from Georgia and Transnistria); or
withdrawal linked to political settlement of the conflict (the 1999
Istanbul agreement actually eliminated such a linkage, which Moscow
had previously introduced). Such remarks sometimes reflect
imprecision of language, sometimes political signals. In either case,
Russia can well interpret such remarks as an encouragement to keep
the troops in Moldova while pressing for CFE treaty ratification
regardless.
Moscow hopes to exploit the weak position of Germany's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in this regard. That ministry, along with a few other
European chancelleries, is prepared to exempt Russian `peacekeeping'
troops from the obligation to withdraw. As Ottfried Nassauer, head of
the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, sums up
that position, `Germany accepts that parts of Russia's troops in
Moldova and Georgia can be regarded as peacekeepers on the basis of
agreements with Russia. Consequently, Russia has basically fulfilled
its [Istanbul 1999] pledges' (Der Tagesspiegel, April 30).
Furthermore, Germany informally leads a group of four or five West
European countries that want to see a political settlement of the
Transnistria conflict before the Russian troops withdraw from
Moldova. However, this approach only reinforces the intransigence of
Tiraspol's authorities, who stonewall the negotiations in their
capacity as `party to the conflict' with Moldova (whereas Russia is
the real party to the conflict with Moldova). Negotiations in the
shadow of Russian troops could lead either nowhere (which has been
the case for 15 years) or to terms of settlement distorted in Russia
favor (as almost happened several times in recent years). Moreover,
Berlin's position gives Russia an incentive to block a political
settlement indefinitely, citing the settlement's absence as an excuse
for keeping Russian troops in place.
In the OSCE's May 23 special meeting, Moldova's delegation responded
to Lavrov in more explicit and forthright terms, compared with the
collective statements of the EU (with which Moldova aligned itself as
a partner country) and NATO. It said, `The Moldovan authorities
firmly insist on the complete and unconditional fulfillment of
commitments undertaken at Istanbul concerning the early and complete
withdrawal of Russia's troops and armaments from the territory of
Moldova.'
In Chisinau's view, `complete' means no exemption for Russian
`peacekeeping' troops; `unconditional' means not linked to a
political settlement or to Tiraspol's consent; and `early' means not
sequenced with some other, hypothetical developments on the ground.
The United States comes close to supporting this position, as in
Ambassador Julie Finley's response to Lavrov in the May 23 Permanent
Council session at the OSCE.
Moldova calls for an international mission of civilian and military
observers to replace the Russian `peacekeeping' troops and open the
way to the country's reunification. Chisinau has not wavered in this
two-fold goal since adopting it in 2004-2005. However, Chisinau has
recently miscalculated by seeking Moscow's consent to those goals in
return for far-reaching Moldovan political concessions to Tiraspol
and Moscow. Furthermore, Chisinau negotiated with Moscow bilaterally,
under the pressure of Russia's year-long economic embargo, venturing
outside the 5+2 international format from a position of unprecedented
weakness (see EDM, April 13).
While its May 23 statement at the OSCE indicates that Chisinau has
(again) dropped its illusions about Moscow, a somewhat different
message emerges from President Vladimir Voronin's long interview with
RIA-Novosti, published that same day. There, Voronin invests his full
hopes in Putin personally while blaming Russian officialdom and other
factors for not letting Putin deliver a good settlement in
Transnistria.
Russia will likely act on two fronts in parallel: Pressuring or
cajoling Moldova to consent to the stationing of Russian troops while
suggesting to West Europeans that Moldova is worth sacrificing for
the sake of arms control and relations with Russia. If Moldova
succumbs and accepts the stationing of Russian troops under some
formula, many European countries would be ready to ratify the adapted
CFE Treaty and bring the three Baltic states under its purview.
Developments could take a different course, however, if a
preponderance of European countries along with the United States
consistently demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova's
territory, internationally certified closure of the Gudauta base in
Georgia, and the identification and removal of unaccounted-for
treaty-limited equipment accumulated in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
Armenian-controlled territory of Azerbaijan.
(Interfax, Itar-Tass, May 23; OSCE Permanent Council session
documents, May 23)
May 25 2007
RUSSIAN TROOPS IN MOLDOVA -- MAIN REMAINING OBSTACLE TO CFE TREATY
RATIFICATION
By Vladimir Socor
Friday, May 25, 2007
With Russian troops on their way out from two bases in Georgia, the
international politics of CFE Treaty ratification focuses
increasingly on Moldova. The OSCE's Permanent Council-Forum for
Security Cooperation special joint meeting on May 23, with Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov's participation, reflected
this development. As Russian officials from President Vladimir Putin
on down threaten to scuttle the treaty unless Western countries
ratify it, Moldova may come under growing pressures from now on.
The continuing presence of Russian forces in Moldova remains the
single biggest obstacle to Russia's push for ratification of the
1999-adapted CFE treaty. Russia can now be expected to grow bolder in
demanding ratification of the CFE Treaty even as Russia keeps its
troops on Moldova's territory. Russian diplomats also rely on some
European counterparts to agree that Russia's military presence in
Moldova should not hinder the broader goal of bringing the CFE Treaty
into force as part of the European arms-control agenda. For some
Europeans, that kind of sentiment can more easily lead to concessions
to Russia when only Moldova is involved, once the Russian troops are
out of Batumi and Akhalkalaki in Georgia (albeit retaining the
Gudauta base there).
Russian arguments and rhetorical devices include:
1) Russia undertook no `obligation' or `commitment' in 1999 regarding
its forces in Moldova (although the 1999 documents show that it did);
2) Russian forces are stationed `in Transnistria' (implying a
separate status for Transnistria, outside Moldova);
3) Russia is willing to remove its massive arms and ammunition
stockpiles `from Transnistria,' but Tiraspol's authorities presumably
`do not permit' this;
4) Russian troops must stay on to guard those dangerous stockpiles;
and
5) Russian troops there `keep the peace' and would not withdraw until
a political settlement is in place (which Russia in the meantime
stonewalls).
Western officials sometimes call vaguely for withdrawal of `Russian
ammunition' (omitting troops); or troop withdrawal `from
Transnistria' (implying some change of status; particularly
counterproductive when phrased as `from Georgia and Transnistria); or
withdrawal linked to political settlement of the conflict (the 1999
Istanbul agreement actually eliminated such a linkage, which Moscow
had previously introduced). Such remarks sometimes reflect
imprecision of language, sometimes political signals. In either case,
Russia can well interpret such remarks as an encouragement to keep
the troops in Moldova while pressing for CFE treaty ratification
regardless.
Moscow hopes to exploit the weak position of Germany's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in this regard. That ministry, along with a few other
European chancelleries, is prepared to exempt Russian `peacekeeping'
troops from the obligation to withdraw. As Ottfried Nassauer, head of
the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, sums up
that position, `Germany accepts that parts of Russia's troops in
Moldova and Georgia can be regarded as peacekeepers on the basis of
agreements with Russia. Consequently, Russia has basically fulfilled
its [Istanbul 1999] pledges' (Der Tagesspiegel, April 30).
Furthermore, Germany informally leads a group of four or five West
European countries that want to see a political settlement of the
Transnistria conflict before the Russian troops withdraw from
Moldova. However, this approach only reinforces the intransigence of
Tiraspol's authorities, who stonewall the negotiations in their
capacity as `party to the conflict' with Moldova (whereas Russia is
the real party to the conflict with Moldova). Negotiations in the
shadow of Russian troops could lead either nowhere (which has been
the case for 15 years) or to terms of settlement distorted in Russia
favor (as almost happened several times in recent years). Moreover,
Berlin's position gives Russia an incentive to block a political
settlement indefinitely, citing the settlement's absence as an excuse
for keeping Russian troops in place.
In the OSCE's May 23 special meeting, Moldova's delegation responded
to Lavrov in more explicit and forthright terms, compared with the
collective statements of the EU (with which Moldova aligned itself as
a partner country) and NATO. It said, `The Moldovan authorities
firmly insist on the complete and unconditional fulfillment of
commitments undertaken at Istanbul concerning the early and complete
withdrawal of Russia's troops and armaments from the territory of
Moldova.'
In Chisinau's view, `complete' means no exemption for Russian
`peacekeeping' troops; `unconditional' means not linked to a
political settlement or to Tiraspol's consent; and `early' means not
sequenced with some other, hypothetical developments on the ground.
The United States comes close to supporting this position, as in
Ambassador Julie Finley's response to Lavrov in the May 23 Permanent
Council session at the OSCE.
Moldova calls for an international mission of civilian and military
observers to replace the Russian `peacekeeping' troops and open the
way to the country's reunification. Chisinau has not wavered in this
two-fold goal since adopting it in 2004-2005. However, Chisinau has
recently miscalculated by seeking Moscow's consent to those goals in
return for far-reaching Moldovan political concessions to Tiraspol
and Moscow. Furthermore, Chisinau negotiated with Moscow bilaterally,
under the pressure of Russia's year-long economic embargo, venturing
outside the 5+2 international format from a position of unprecedented
weakness (see EDM, April 13).
While its May 23 statement at the OSCE indicates that Chisinau has
(again) dropped its illusions about Moscow, a somewhat different
message emerges from President Vladimir Voronin's long interview with
RIA-Novosti, published that same day. There, Voronin invests his full
hopes in Putin personally while blaming Russian officialdom and other
factors for not letting Putin deliver a good settlement in
Transnistria.
Russia will likely act on two fronts in parallel: Pressuring or
cajoling Moldova to consent to the stationing of Russian troops while
suggesting to West Europeans that Moldova is worth sacrificing for
the sake of arms control and relations with Russia. If Moldova
succumbs and accepts the stationing of Russian troops under some
formula, many European countries would be ready to ratify the adapted
CFE Treaty and bring the three Baltic states under its purview.
Developments could take a different course, however, if a
preponderance of European countries along with the United States
consistently demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova's
territory, internationally certified closure of the Gudauta base in
Georgia, and the identification and removal of unaccounted-for
treaty-limited equipment accumulated in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
Armenian-controlled territory of Azerbaijan.
(Interfax, Itar-Tass, May 23; OSCE Permanent Council session
documents, May 23)