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TURKEY: IRAN BECOMES THE TRADE-OFF FOR NORTHERN IRAQ
Analysis by Jacques N. Couvas
IPS
Nov 7, 2007
ANKARA, Nov 7 (IPS) - Triumphalism, which generally prevails in
official communiqués and the Turkish media following Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visits abroad, was dimmed Monday night at the
end of the meeting between him and U.S. President George W. Bush.
The meeting was called to discuss the crisis in northern Iraq. The
expectation of editorialists and the masses in Turkey was that the
United States would either commit to an iron-fist crackdown against
the militias of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) operating in Iraqi
Kurdistan jointly with the Turkish armed forces (TSK), or give their
blessing to Ankara to launch a large-scale offensive on Iraqi soil.
But at the end of the 90-minute encounter, all Erdogan appears to have
received is George Bush's assurances of friendship and his declaration
of the PKK as an enemy common to both countries. Not much for the
PM to write home about, as the presidential pitch was identical to
the one delivered last Friday in Ankara by U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice.
President Bush, trying to avert an invasion of Iraq by TSK, announced
a new three-way military partnership grouping the United States,
Turkey and Iraq to improve the sharing of intelligence, and said
Washington was considering additional steps.
"We understand there's transit issues at airports," Bush said. "We
understand that there's issues with money. We're taking some steps
along those lines.
"Step one is to make sure that our intelligence sharing is good,"
Bush added. "Faulty intelligence means that we can't solve the
problem. Good, sound intelligence, delivered on a real-time basis,
using modern technology, will make it much easier to deal effectively
(with the PKK"," he said.
Erdogan, talking to reporters before departing for Washington, had
insisted that his objective was to return from the visit with concrete
measures committed to by his ally. "The Turkish people are tired and
impatient," he had said, alluding to the lukewarm position of the
U.S. administration in the face of escalating violence by the PKK.
Bush's pledges can be interpreted as tangible, but lack the boldness
the public had hoped for.
Although no emphasis was given officially to the military alternatives
by Turkey, these were certainly discussed during the meeting, as
Erdogan had brought with him to the White House defence minister
Vecdi Gonul and deputy chief of general staff General Ergin Saygun,
in addition to foreign minister Ali Babacan. At the press conference
that followed the meeting, he reiterated that an incursion into Iraq
remained an option, having been approved by the Turkish parliament
in early October.
This crisis is unwelcome by, and potentially risky, for both heads
of state.
Erdogan is under strong pressure by the population in general, and TSK
and the opposition parties in particular, to send troops to northern
Iraq and crush the PKK. His preference, however, has throughout his
tenure as PM been to find a negotiated solution.
Paradoxically, his followers, including influential members of the
Justice and Development (AK) Party, which he chairs, favour a show
of might, regardless of its possible length and cost.
Bush is also in an unenviable position on this. As occupation of
Iraq becomes a long term endeavour, he cannot forego the support
of Kurds, who are influential in Iraqi politics -- the country's
President, Jalal Talibani is a Kurd -- and control about a third
of the country's territory, including rich oil fields. His strategy
is, therefore, likely to maintain their loyalty while accommodating
Turkish nationalism by letting Erdogan save face with his people.
The first moves in this direction became visible just hours before
the Turkish PM's visit to the Oval Office. During the weekend,
Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki solemnly declared that his
government will take all necessary steps to stop PKK activities in
Turkish border areas.
His intent was shortly thereafter confirmed by the closing of a
number of the organisation's offices, and tighter control of the
crossing points between the two countries in order to limit guerrilla
movements. Then, miraculously, eight Turkish soldiers, abducted in
October by PKK, were released.
The suspicion for the sudden change of Iraqi attitude naturally falls
on Washington. Erdogan was deprived from arguments which would have
given him a stronger negotiating position in his talks with Bush. He
had, therefore, to leave the initiative for resolution of the crisis
to Washington and its Iraqi friends, letting a threat of incursion
float, for the principle.
Carpet selling, however, is not yet over. Each one of the allies,
Turkey and the United States, possesses something the other party
wants.
Ankara needs to secure stability on its south-eastern flank at a time
of unprecedented economic growth and growing demand for energy. In
addition, it is betting on the Bush administration's support to scrap
the U.S. House of Representatives' plan to declare as genocide the
1915-1916 massacres of 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman Turkey.
Washington, on the other hand, wants to keep its supply routes to
Iraq open, and also convince Turkey to abstain from developing a
close relationship with Iran. So, some bargaining has already started.
The meeting on Sunday probably marked its kick-off. For the moment,
however, the most likely U.S. course of action seems to be to tolerate
a few rounds to be fired by TSK at the borderline mountains, already
vacated by PKK, and persuading Erdogan's government and Massoud
Barzani's northern Iraqi autonomous authority to put aside bitterness
and find a creative compromise.
There are other factors that neither Bush nor Erdogan can overlook. For
instance, the Arab states are becoming increasingly suspicious of
Turkey's real motives to attack northern Iraq, whose ownership of
oil fields it has claimed in the past.
The Arabs, who endured a 500-year long Ottoman rule until the end of
World War I, see the development of Turkey into a regional military
and economic power as a bad sign, and even fear a Turkish permanent
occupation of other Iraqi provinces. Only the U.S. can convince both
camps to abstain from any initiatives that might be detrimental to
the regional balance of power.
But right now, Iran is at the centre of interest, both for Ankara
and Washington. The former has in recent months set the stage for a
rapprochement with the Shia state. This looks part of a larger plan
by Turkey to become a significant player in the Muslim world and
particularly in the Middle East.
As negotiations with the European Union for membership are stalling,
common citizens and think-tanks alike are pleading for a change
of direction as a suitable alternative to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's
doctrine of looking towards the West. Ataturk was the founder of the
Turkish republic.
In July, Turkey and Iran signed, against protests by the U.S., a
memorandum of understanding that would pave the way to 3.5 billion
dollars of Turkish investment in Iran's South Pars gas field.
Iran, in return, has given proof of its friendship by clamping down
on PKK separatists living in the country, and by offering mediation
in the northern Iraqi crisis. This proposal was politely turned down
by Ankara on Saturday, after a quick visit there by Iranian foreign
minister Manouchehr Mottaki.
Mottaki has on occasion accused the U.S. and Israel of conspiring to
form an independent Kurdistan, uniting around 25 to 30 million ethnic
Kurds living in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
Although the plans of the United States on this are difficult for the
moment to fathom, friendly relations with Iranian Kurds are part of
the U.S. State Department's strategy to keep Tehran in check.
In spite of the Bush administration's classification of PKK as a
terrorist group and its promotion on Monday to "common enemy for the
U.S. and Turkey", Washington has stopped short of outlawing the Party
for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an extension of the PKK based
in Iran. Turkish Kurds fleeing northern Iraq will, in the minds of
U.S. strategists, gross up PJAK's ranks and give a hard time to the
Iranian regime. (END/2007)
--Boundary_(ID_eOh9Pk9mzjmFB294iRxVJQ) --
Analysis by Jacques N. Couvas
IPS
Nov 7, 2007
ANKARA, Nov 7 (IPS) - Triumphalism, which generally prevails in
official communiqués and the Turkish media following Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visits abroad, was dimmed Monday night at the
end of the meeting between him and U.S. President George W. Bush.
The meeting was called to discuss the crisis in northern Iraq. The
expectation of editorialists and the masses in Turkey was that the
United States would either commit to an iron-fist crackdown against
the militias of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) operating in Iraqi
Kurdistan jointly with the Turkish armed forces (TSK), or give their
blessing to Ankara to launch a large-scale offensive on Iraqi soil.
But at the end of the 90-minute encounter, all Erdogan appears to have
received is George Bush's assurances of friendship and his declaration
of the PKK as an enemy common to both countries. Not much for the
PM to write home about, as the presidential pitch was identical to
the one delivered last Friday in Ankara by U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice.
President Bush, trying to avert an invasion of Iraq by TSK, announced
a new three-way military partnership grouping the United States,
Turkey and Iraq to improve the sharing of intelligence, and said
Washington was considering additional steps.
"We understand there's transit issues at airports," Bush said. "We
understand that there's issues with money. We're taking some steps
along those lines.
"Step one is to make sure that our intelligence sharing is good,"
Bush added. "Faulty intelligence means that we can't solve the
problem. Good, sound intelligence, delivered on a real-time basis,
using modern technology, will make it much easier to deal effectively
(with the PKK"," he said.
Erdogan, talking to reporters before departing for Washington, had
insisted that his objective was to return from the visit with concrete
measures committed to by his ally. "The Turkish people are tired and
impatient," he had said, alluding to the lukewarm position of the
U.S. administration in the face of escalating violence by the PKK.
Bush's pledges can be interpreted as tangible, but lack the boldness
the public had hoped for.
Although no emphasis was given officially to the military alternatives
by Turkey, these were certainly discussed during the meeting, as
Erdogan had brought with him to the White House defence minister
Vecdi Gonul and deputy chief of general staff General Ergin Saygun,
in addition to foreign minister Ali Babacan. At the press conference
that followed the meeting, he reiterated that an incursion into Iraq
remained an option, having been approved by the Turkish parliament
in early October.
This crisis is unwelcome by, and potentially risky, for both heads
of state.
Erdogan is under strong pressure by the population in general, and TSK
and the opposition parties in particular, to send troops to northern
Iraq and crush the PKK. His preference, however, has throughout his
tenure as PM been to find a negotiated solution.
Paradoxically, his followers, including influential members of the
Justice and Development (AK) Party, which he chairs, favour a show
of might, regardless of its possible length and cost.
Bush is also in an unenviable position on this. As occupation of
Iraq becomes a long term endeavour, he cannot forego the support
of Kurds, who are influential in Iraqi politics -- the country's
President, Jalal Talibani is a Kurd -- and control about a third
of the country's territory, including rich oil fields. His strategy
is, therefore, likely to maintain their loyalty while accommodating
Turkish nationalism by letting Erdogan save face with his people.
The first moves in this direction became visible just hours before
the Turkish PM's visit to the Oval Office. During the weekend,
Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki solemnly declared that his
government will take all necessary steps to stop PKK activities in
Turkish border areas.
His intent was shortly thereafter confirmed by the closing of a
number of the organisation's offices, and tighter control of the
crossing points between the two countries in order to limit guerrilla
movements. Then, miraculously, eight Turkish soldiers, abducted in
October by PKK, were released.
The suspicion for the sudden change of Iraqi attitude naturally falls
on Washington. Erdogan was deprived from arguments which would have
given him a stronger negotiating position in his talks with Bush. He
had, therefore, to leave the initiative for resolution of the crisis
to Washington and its Iraqi friends, letting a threat of incursion
float, for the principle.
Carpet selling, however, is not yet over. Each one of the allies,
Turkey and the United States, possesses something the other party
wants.
Ankara needs to secure stability on its south-eastern flank at a time
of unprecedented economic growth and growing demand for energy. In
addition, it is betting on the Bush administration's support to scrap
the U.S. House of Representatives' plan to declare as genocide the
1915-1916 massacres of 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman Turkey.
Washington, on the other hand, wants to keep its supply routes to
Iraq open, and also convince Turkey to abstain from developing a
close relationship with Iran. So, some bargaining has already started.
The meeting on Sunday probably marked its kick-off. For the moment,
however, the most likely U.S. course of action seems to be to tolerate
a few rounds to be fired by TSK at the borderline mountains, already
vacated by PKK, and persuading Erdogan's government and Massoud
Barzani's northern Iraqi autonomous authority to put aside bitterness
and find a creative compromise.
There are other factors that neither Bush nor Erdogan can overlook. For
instance, the Arab states are becoming increasingly suspicious of
Turkey's real motives to attack northern Iraq, whose ownership of
oil fields it has claimed in the past.
The Arabs, who endured a 500-year long Ottoman rule until the end of
World War I, see the development of Turkey into a regional military
and economic power as a bad sign, and even fear a Turkish permanent
occupation of other Iraqi provinces. Only the U.S. can convince both
camps to abstain from any initiatives that might be detrimental to
the regional balance of power.
But right now, Iran is at the centre of interest, both for Ankara
and Washington. The former has in recent months set the stage for a
rapprochement with the Shia state. This looks part of a larger plan
by Turkey to become a significant player in the Muslim world and
particularly in the Middle East.
As negotiations with the European Union for membership are stalling,
common citizens and think-tanks alike are pleading for a change
of direction as a suitable alternative to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's
doctrine of looking towards the West. Ataturk was the founder of the
Turkish republic.
In July, Turkey and Iran signed, against protests by the U.S., a
memorandum of understanding that would pave the way to 3.5 billion
dollars of Turkish investment in Iran's South Pars gas field.
Iran, in return, has given proof of its friendship by clamping down
on PKK separatists living in the country, and by offering mediation
in the northern Iraqi crisis. This proposal was politely turned down
by Ankara on Saturday, after a quick visit there by Iranian foreign
minister Manouchehr Mottaki.
Mottaki has on occasion accused the U.S. and Israel of conspiring to
form an independent Kurdistan, uniting around 25 to 30 million ethnic
Kurds living in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.
Although the plans of the United States on this are difficult for the
moment to fathom, friendly relations with Iranian Kurds are part of
the U.S. State Department's strategy to keep Tehran in check.
In spite of the Bush administration's classification of PKK as a
terrorist group and its promotion on Monday to "common enemy for the
U.S. and Turkey", Washington has stopped short of outlawing the Party
for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), an extension of the PKK based
in Iran. Turkish Kurds fleeing northern Iraq will, in the minds of
U.S. strategists, gross up PJAK's ranks and give a hard time to the
Iranian regime. (END/2007)
--Boundary_(ID_eOh9Pk9mzjmFB294iRxVJQ) --