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IF KOSOVO GOES FREE
Economist, UK
Nov 29 2007
Why Georgia's enclaves would love to follow, but will probably fail
KOSOVO Albanians and Serbs met in Austria this week for last-chance
talks before a United Nations deadline of December 10th, after which
Kosovo is likely to declare independence unilaterally. Serbia's old
ally, Russia, blocks any UN resolution. But plenty are watching south
of Russia in the enclaves of Georgia. As Maxim Gunjia, the cheery young
deputy foreign minister of Abkhazia, says, "because Russia does not
want Kosovo to be recognised, it does not mean that we do not want it."
When the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart, sovereignty passed
to their constituent republics. But Kosovo was a province of Serbia.
Its independence, argues those worried by precedents, will be seized on
by separatists from Catalonia to Chechnya (to say nothing, nearer home,
of the Bosnian Serb republic). As Russia's Vladimir Putin once asked,
"If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence,
why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?"
Why indeed, ask people in these two enclaves, which are among the four
"frozen conflicts" left from the wreckage of the Soviet Union.
The enclaves broke away from Georgia in nasty wars in the early
1990s, but no country recognises their independence. Two other
frozen conflicts are in Transdniestria, which split from Moldova,
and Nagorno-Karabakh (see article). Recently the presidents of three
of these Russian-backed places met in Sukhumi, Abkhazia's capital.
Abkhazia is a backwater, much of it in ruins. In contrast to the
Balkans, it has received no international largesse. This would change,
argues Mr Gunjia, if the world would only recognise Abkhazia.
That is unlikely. Western countries are wedded to the territorial
integrity of Georgia; so, despite its support for the secessionists,
is Russia. Leyla Taniya, an analyst, sighs that Russia cares for
Abkhazia only "as a card that can be played" directly against Georgia
or in the great game with the West over the region's future.
"Those rules which work for Kosovo will work for South Ossetia,"
insists Alan Pliev, South Ossetia's deputy foreign minister,
in Tskhinvali, the capital. But the situation in each place is
different. Kosovo has 2m people, 90% of them ethnic Albanians, who
have long been in the majority. Only 200,000 people live in Abkhazia.
Before the war in the early 1990s only 18% of them were Abkhaz;
even today they make up no more than 45% of the people, the rest
being Armenians, Russians and Georgians. More than 200,000 Georgians
from Abkhazia are refugees in Georgia who are unlikely to be allowed
to return.
Georgians accuse the Abkhaz of ethnic cleansing. The Abkhaz say they
have reclaimed what was lost by deportations to Turkey in the 19th
century and to Siberia in the 20th century, as well as through later
Georgian settlement (Stalin was Georgian). Today Russia supports the
Abkhaz and South Ossetians with money, troops and passports. Both
places use the rouble; Russian money is flowing in, especially to
Abkhazia. The Russian passports let locals travel, but may also allow
Russia to claim its citizens have been attacked if Georgia tries to
retake the enclaves.
Yet even if Kosovo declares independence, Russian recognition is
unlikely. It might, says Inal Pliev, a journalist in Tskhinvali,
be Russia's "holy duty", but reality intrudes. South Ossetia is
a tiny patchwork with perhaps as few as 50,000 inhabitants in
the Ossetian-controlled part. Much of the land is controlled by
Georgians. It is linked to Russia by a tunnel through the mountains;
on the other side is the autonomous Russian republic of North Ossetia.
"Our aim is unification with North Ossetia," says Alan Pliev. "We
don't know if that would be as part of Russia or as a separate united
Ossetian state." The deputy speaker of parliament, Juri Dzittsojty,
is cautious. "I would prefer there to be an independent and united
Ossetia, but today it is not possible. It is safer to be with Russia.
The main aim of the struggle is to be independent of Georgia."
http://www.economist.com/world/eur ope/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10225052
Economist, UK
Nov 29 2007
Why Georgia's enclaves would love to follow, but will probably fail
KOSOVO Albanians and Serbs met in Austria this week for last-chance
talks before a United Nations deadline of December 10th, after which
Kosovo is likely to declare independence unilaterally. Serbia's old
ally, Russia, blocks any UN resolution. But plenty are watching south
of Russia in the enclaves of Georgia. As Maxim Gunjia, the cheery young
deputy foreign minister of Abkhazia, says, "because Russia does not
want Kosovo to be recognised, it does not mean that we do not want it."
When the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart, sovereignty passed
to their constituent republics. But Kosovo was a province of Serbia.
Its independence, argues those worried by precedents, will be seized on
by separatists from Catalonia to Chechnya (to say nothing, nearer home,
of the Bosnian Serb republic). As Russia's Vladimir Putin once asked,
"If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence,
why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?"
Why indeed, ask people in these two enclaves, which are among the four
"frozen conflicts" left from the wreckage of the Soviet Union.
The enclaves broke away from Georgia in nasty wars in the early
1990s, but no country recognises their independence. Two other
frozen conflicts are in Transdniestria, which split from Moldova,
and Nagorno-Karabakh (see article). Recently the presidents of three
of these Russian-backed places met in Sukhumi, Abkhazia's capital.
Abkhazia is a backwater, much of it in ruins. In contrast to the
Balkans, it has received no international largesse. This would change,
argues Mr Gunjia, if the world would only recognise Abkhazia.
That is unlikely. Western countries are wedded to the territorial
integrity of Georgia; so, despite its support for the secessionists,
is Russia. Leyla Taniya, an analyst, sighs that Russia cares for
Abkhazia only "as a card that can be played" directly against Georgia
or in the great game with the West over the region's future.
"Those rules which work for Kosovo will work for South Ossetia,"
insists Alan Pliev, South Ossetia's deputy foreign minister,
in Tskhinvali, the capital. But the situation in each place is
different. Kosovo has 2m people, 90% of them ethnic Albanians, who
have long been in the majority. Only 200,000 people live in Abkhazia.
Before the war in the early 1990s only 18% of them were Abkhaz;
even today they make up no more than 45% of the people, the rest
being Armenians, Russians and Georgians. More than 200,000 Georgians
from Abkhazia are refugees in Georgia who are unlikely to be allowed
to return.
Georgians accuse the Abkhaz of ethnic cleansing. The Abkhaz say they
have reclaimed what was lost by deportations to Turkey in the 19th
century and to Siberia in the 20th century, as well as through later
Georgian settlement (Stalin was Georgian). Today Russia supports the
Abkhaz and South Ossetians with money, troops and passports. Both
places use the rouble; Russian money is flowing in, especially to
Abkhazia. The Russian passports let locals travel, but may also allow
Russia to claim its citizens have been attacked if Georgia tries to
retake the enclaves.
Yet even if Kosovo declares independence, Russian recognition is
unlikely. It might, says Inal Pliev, a journalist in Tskhinvali,
be Russia's "holy duty", but reality intrudes. South Ossetia is
a tiny patchwork with perhaps as few as 50,000 inhabitants in
the Ossetian-controlled part. Much of the land is controlled by
Georgians. It is linked to Russia by a tunnel through the mountains;
on the other side is the autonomous Russian republic of North Ossetia.
"Our aim is unification with North Ossetia," says Alan Pliev. "We
don't know if that would be as part of Russia or as a separate united
Ossetian state." The deputy speaker of parliament, Juri Dzittsojty,
is cautious. "I would prefer there to be an independent and united
Ossetia, but today it is not possible. It is safer to be with Russia.
The main aim of the struggle is to be independent of Georgia."
http://www.economist.com/world/eur ope/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10225052