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http://www.salon.com/opinion/kamiya/2007/10/16/arm enian_genocide/print.html
Genocide: An inconvenient truth
The Armenian genocide bill has been attacked by both the right and the
left -- and it may make matters worse. But it's necessary.
By Gary Kamiya
Oct. 16, 2007
It was the first holocaust, one of the worst crimes of the 20th
century. In 1915, during World War I, the ruling political party under
the Ottoman regime ordered the extermination of its Armenian
subjects. At least 800,000 and as many as 1.5 million men, women and
children were murdered or died of disease, starvation and exposure.
The details of the genocide, as laid out in books like Robert Fisk's
_"The Great War for Civilization"_
(http://archive.salon.com/book s/review/2005/12/16/fisk/index.html) and
Peter Balakian's _"The Burning Tigris,"_
(http://www.arlindo-correia.com/bur ning_tigris.html) are
harrowing. Lines of men, women and children were roped together by the
edge of a river, so that shooting the first person caused all the rest
to drown. Women were routinely raped, killed and genitally
mutilated. Some were crucified. Children were taken on boats into
rivers and thrown off.
The genocide was not carried out by the Republic of Turkey, which did
not exist yet, but by the ruling party in the final years of the
collapsing Ottoman regime. To this day the Turkish government has
never acknowledged that what transpired was a monstrous and
intentional crime against humanity. Instead, it claims that the
Armenians were simply unfortunate victims of a chaotic civil war, that
only 300,000 to 600,000 died, that Turks actually died in greater
numbers, and that the Armenians brought their fate on themselves by
collaborating with the Russians.
Most historians reject these arguments. The definitive case that what
took place was a genocide has been made by Turkish historian Taner
Akcam, who in the 1970s was sentenced to 10 years in prison in Turkey
for producing a student journal that deviated from the official
line. He sought asylum in Germany, and now is a visiting professor at
the University of Minnesota. In his 2006 book, _"A Shameful Act: The
Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility,"_
(http://www.newyorker.com/a rchive/2006/11/06/061106crbo_books2) Akcam
offers overwhelming evidence that leaders of the ruling political
party, the Committee of Union and Progress, planned the Armenian
holocaust. There was no military justification for the genocide: Some
Armenians did fight against the Ottomans, but relatively few. In fact,
Akcam argues, the genocide was driven by the Ottoman thirst for
revenge after devastating military defeats, the desire to end foreign
interference by the great powers, and above all by the strategic
purpose of emptying the Turkish heartland of Christians to ensure the
survival of a Muslim-Turkish state. Akcam argues that had the
Armenians not been exterminated, Anatolia, the heart of what is now
Turkey, would probably have been partitioned after the war by the
victorious (and rapacious) great powers. The modern state of Turkey
was thus built in large part on the intentional destruction of an
entire people -- a moral horror that combines elements of America's
destruction of Indians and Germany's extermination of Jews.
The International Association of Genocide Scholars, the leading body
of genocide researchers, accepts that the destruction of the Armenians
fits the definition of genocide and _has called on Turkey_
(http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_ releases.php?prid=747) to
accept responsibility. Leading U.S. newspapers, including the New
York Times, accept the genocide description.
Twenty-three nations, including Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Russia and Uruguay, have also formally recognized that what
transpired was genocide. For decades, Armenian-Americans and human
rights advocates have tried to persuade the U.S. government to
officially recognize that the mass killings constituted a
genocide. But strategic and national security considerations have
always stopped Washington from doing so. For decades, Turkey has been
one of America's most important strategic allies -- first as a bulwark
against the USSR during the Cold War, then as a key partner in George
W. Bush's "war on terror." The only officially secular state in the
Muslim world, it is the most politically moderate, economically
advanced nation in the region. A NATO member, with close ties to
Israel, home to a U.S. base through which most of the supplies to
American forces in central Iraq are flown, it is an indispensable
U.S. strategic asset.
For these reasons, Washington has never wanted to offend Ankara -- and
if there is one sure way to do that, it's by bringing up the Armenian
genocide.
Although there has been some progress in opening up the subject, it
remains explosive in Turkey. Those who assert that the genocide took
place can be arrested under a notorious law (still on the books) that
makes "insulting Turkishness" a crime. (Nobel Prize-winning novelist
Orhan Pamuk was convicted of violating this law.) In January 2007, the
leading Turkish-Armenian journalist, _Hrant Dink,_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrant_Dink) was murdered because of his
outspokenness on the issue, and state security officials were clearly
involved. The genocide denial is not confined to official discourse:
Most ordinary Turks, who have been taught a whitewashed official
version of the slaughter, also deny it. Akcam and other historians say
that because many of the Young Turks who founded the modern state were
involved in the campaign, and the state was constructed on a mythical
foundation of national unity and innocence, to bring up the Armenian
horror is to threaten Turkey's very identity.
No American administration has ever dared to cross Turkey on this
subject. But that may finally change. Last week, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, defying pleas from the Bush administration and a
letter signed by all living secretaries of state, _voted 27-21_
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071011/ap_on_ go_co/us_armenia_genocide)
for a resolution that would make it official U.S. policy to recognize
that the slaughter of the Armenians was an act of genocide. The
resolution is nonbinding, but after years of bitter lobbying, it is
the closest the U.S. government has yet come to acknowledging the
genocide.
Speaker Nancy Pelosi has indicated that she will bring it to a vote
before the House, which is expected to pass it; the bill's fate in the
Senate is less certain.
The mere fact that the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed it,
however, was taken by the Turks as a gratuitous insult. As it has done
every other time this subject has come up, Ankara -- and the country
at large -- reacted with fury. Furious demonstrators took to the
streets, shouting invective against the United States. Just-elected
President Abdullah Gul said, "Unfortunately, some politicians in the
United States have once more dismissed calls for common sense, and
made an attempt to sacrifice big issues for minor domestic political
games ... This unacceptable decision of the committee, like similar
ones in the past, has no validity and is not worthy of the respect of
the Turkish people." Turkey's ambassador to the United States warned
that the resolution's passage would be a "very injurious move to the
psyche of the Turkish people"; he was immediately recalled after the
vote to show Ankara's extreme displeasure. Turkish officials warned
that if the full House voted for the resolution, U.S.-Turkish
relations would be gravely damaged, perhaps for decades.
Considering that in a _Pew global poll_
(http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/arti cles/brmiddleeastnafricara/393.php?lb=brme&pnt =393&nid=&id=)
taken in June, a staggering 83 percent of Turks said they had a
negative view of America, and an even more staggering 77 percent said
they viewed the American people unfavorably, any further deterioration
in relations would indeed be grave. The _head of Turkey's military
warned_
(http://www.usatoday.com/news/mil itary/2007-10-14-turkey_N.htm) that
if the House passed the bill, "our military ties with the U.S. will
never be the same again."
There is no doubt that the controversy comes at a delicate time,
because of both internal Turkish politics and the situation in
Iraq. The vote could trigger a Turkish response that would be highly
injurious to American interests, not just in Iraq but throughout the
Middle East. Turkey could close Incirlik Air Base, through which 70
percent of air cargo for U.S. troops in Iraq passes, and refuse to
cooperate with Washington on the war.
But the most dangerous consequence would be a Turkish attack on
northern Iraq. In a piece of exquisitely bad timing, the committee
vote took place against the background of a mounting drumbeat of war
talk from the Gul administration, which is under heavy domestic
pressure to smash Kurdish militant group the PKK. Just days before the
vote, Kurdish militants_ killed 13 Turkish soldiers_
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/70330 75.stm) near the Iraq border,
one of Turkey's heaviest recent losses in the decades-long
war. Turkish anger at the U.S. is largely based on Turks' correct
belief that the U.S., desperate to preserve good ties with the Kurds,
is unwilling to confront the Kurdish guerrillas. A major Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq could destabilize the only calm part of the
country, pit two U.S. allies against each other, threaten the American
project in Iraq and destabilize the entire region. The U.S. has been
leaning heavily on Ankara not to invade; the genocide vote could tip
Gul over the edge.
Given these geopolitical concerns, heightened by the fact that the
U.S. is at war, it's not surprising that some Republicans have accused
Democrats, who have taken the lead on the bill, of endangering
national security. (Some right-wing bloggers have accused Democrats of
using the bill as an underhanded way to sabotage the war.) But
opposition to the bill has come not only from the right but from the
left. Writing in the Nation, Nicholas von Hoffman _mockingly asked,_
(http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071029/how l) "What's next? A
resolution condemning Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the slaughter
visited on the Egyptians at the Battle of the Pyramids?" Von Hoffman
attacked the bill's sponsors for self-righteous hypocrisy. British
commentator Simon Tisdall _made a similar charge_
(http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/simon _tisdall/2007/10/righteousness_before_realism.html )
in the Guardian, writing, "Imperial delusions die hard -- and once
again the U.S. Congress is trying to legislate for the world."
Most Turkish academics toe the official line on the horrific events of
1915. But even some of those who accept that a genocide took place
believe that passing the bill now is a bad idea. _Yektan Turkyilmaz,_
(http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/duk emag/issues/111205/yektan1.html)
a graduate student at Duke University, has the distinction of having
been arrested by the Armenian KGB because his research led them to
assume he was a Turkish spy. In fact, he is part of a new generation
of Turkish scholars who reject their country's propaganda about what
happened to the Armenians. In a phone interview from Duke, Turkyilmaz
said, "This bill strengthens the hand of the extremists in Turkey, the
xenophobes, the extreme nationalists. Yes, Turkish society has to face
its past, to prevent any sort of repetition in the future. If I
believed that this bill would force the Turkish government to
acknowledge the truth, I would support it. But it won't."
For his part, "A Shameful Act" author Taner Akcam acknowledges the
force of these pragmatic arguments -- but rejects them.
"Look, we can make a list of reasons why this resolution will make
matters worse," Akcam said in a phone interview from his office at the
University of Minnesota. "First, it explicitly politicizes the
problem. Second, it makes a historic problem a diplomatic fight
between the United States and Turkey.
Third, it increases the aggressive attacks of the Turkish government
against those inside and outside the country. Fourth, it increases the
animosity and hatred against Armenians generally in Turkey. Fifth, it
can never solve the problem. It aggravates the problem.
"OK, so we've made this list," Akcam went on. "But what is the answer?
Whoever is against the resolution must show an alternative to the
Armenian people.
Unless you give an alternative policy, saying 'Shut up and stop' is
not a policy. The Armenians don't have any options. As long Turkey
criminalizes the past, as long as Turkey kills journalists, as long as
Turkey drags its intellectuals from court to court, as long as Turkey
punishes the people who use the G-word, as long as Turkey doesn't have
any diplomatic relations with Armenia, as long as Turkey threatens
everybody in the world who opens the topic of historical wrongdoing,
it is the legitimate right of a victim group to make its voice heard."
Akcam dismisses the argument that the time was not yet ripe for the
resolution. "You can use the timing argument forever and ever. Who
will decide when the timing is right?"
But Akcam argues that a long-term solution requires much more than a
U.S. resolution. He says two steps are necessary: Turkey and Armenia
must establish normal relations, and Turks must learn that confronting
their history does not threaten their Turkish identity, but
strengthens it. This means that Turks should look at the conflict not
as a zero-sum game in which any Armenian gain is a Turkish loss, but
as a necessary part of the process of becoming a democratic
nation. It's an approach to resolving bitter historical grievances
called _"transitional justice,"_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tran sitional_Justice) and it has been
effective in helping resolve historical grievances between Germany and
the Czech Republic, within South Africa and in other places.
The Armenians, too, need to rethink their approach, Akcam said. In the
new paradigm, the Armenian diaspora would present its policy not as
being totally against Turkey, but for a new democratic Turkey. "Until
now this was a conventional war between Turkey and Armenian diaspora,
and congressional resolutions were the effective weapon in this
conventional war," Akcam said. "What I'm saying is we should stop
thinking in these conventional ways."
The U.S. could play an important role in helping both parties break
the impasse, Akcam said, but it is hampered by its lack of credibility
in the Middle East. He points to what he calls a "stupid distinction
between national security and morality. If you follow the whole
discussion in Congress, on the one side you have the moralists, who
say that Turkey should face what it did. This doesn't convince most of
the people in the Middle East because we know that these are the guys
torturing the people in Iraq, these are the guys killing the Iraqi
civilians there, these are the guys who haven't signed the
_International Criminal Court_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International _Criminal_Court) agreement.
"On the other side are the realpolitikers," Akcam went on, referring
to the Bush administration and the foreign-policy establishment, like
the secretaries of state who signed the letter opposing the
resolution. "They say the bill jeopardizes the national interests of
the United States, Turkish-U.S. relations, interests of U.S. soldiers
in Iraq."
Akcam argues that both elements must be present to have an effective
foreign policy. "The fact is that realpolitik, the U.S. national
interest in the Middle East, necessitates making morality, facing
history, a part of national security. The basic problem between Turks
and Armenians is that they don't trust each other because of their
history." Akcam's point is that unless the U.S. is willing to look
unflinchingly at the region's history, and try to broker deals that
address legitimate grievances, it will not be able to achieve its
realpolitik goals.
"If America really has a strong interest in its national security and
the security of the region, it should stop following a national
security concept that accepts human rights abusers," Akcam said. "It
doesn't work, it makes things worse in the region. And it supports
perpetrators who have committed crimes in the past and are committing
crimes today."
In the end, the debate over the Armenian genocide bill boils down to
two questions: Is it justified, and is it wise? The answer to the
first question is an unambiguous "yes." It is both justified and long
overdue. The Armenian genocide is a clear-cut case of genocide, and
the fact that the U.S. has avoided calling it by its rightful name for
decades is shameful. Crimes against humanity must be
acknowledged. Hitler infamously said, with reference to the Poles,
"Who, after all, is today speaking of the destruction of the
Armenians?" Historical memory must not be sold away for a few pieces
of silver. No one would countenance allowing Germany to deny its guilt
for killing 6 million Jews. Why should Turkey be let off the hook for
a slightly earlier holocaust that took the lives of as many as 1.5
million Armenians?
The second question is trickier. As opponents argue, and even
supporters like Akcam acknowledge, the bill may backfire in the short
run. That outcome could be acceptable, as long as it doesn't backfire
in the long run. Which raises the central question: What policies
should the U.S. adopt to prevent the resolution from having long-term
negative consequences?
It comes down to a question of moral credibility, something the
U.S. is in notably short supply of in the Middle East. One of the
stranger reversals wrought by Bush's neoconservative foreign policy
has been the rejection by much of the left of a morality-based foreign
policy. Angry at the failure of the neocons' grand, idealistic
schemes, some on the left have embraced a realism that formerly was
associated with the America-first right. But by throwing out morality
in foreign policy because of the neocon debacle in Iraq, these
leftists are in danger of throwing out the baby with the
bathwater. The problem with Bush's Middle East policy hasn't been that
it's too moralistic -- it's that its morality has been flawed and
incoherent.
As Akcam argues, what is really needed are not just moral
congressional proclamations, but actions that back them up. Of course
the U.S. cannot and should not resolve all the problems of the
world. But like it or not, we are the world's superpower, and we have
the ability to use that power for good as well as ill. What is needed
is active U.S. engagement to broker fair resolutions to the festering
conflicts in the region -- between Turks and Armenians, Turks and
Kurds, and Israelis and Palestinians. If the resolution was part of a
new U.S. approach to the Middle East, one in which we acknowledged
and acted to redress the historical injustices suffered by all the
region's peoples, not just by our allies, the Armenian genocide bill
could stand as an example not of American grandstanding but of
American courage.
-- By Gary Kamiya
Genocide: An inconvenient truth
The Armenian genocide bill has been attacked by both the right and the
left -- and it may make matters worse. But it's necessary.
By Gary Kamiya
Oct. 16, 2007
It was the first holocaust, one of the worst crimes of the 20th
century. In 1915, during World War I, the ruling political party under
the Ottoman regime ordered the extermination of its Armenian
subjects. At least 800,000 and as many as 1.5 million men, women and
children were murdered or died of disease, starvation and exposure.
The details of the genocide, as laid out in books like Robert Fisk's
_"The Great War for Civilization"_
(http://archive.salon.com/book s/review/2005/12/16/fisk/index.html) and
Peter Balakian's _"The Burning Tigris,"_
(http://www.arlindo-correia.com/bur ning_tigris.html) are
harrowing. Lines of men, women and children were roped together by the
edge of a river, so that shooting the first person caused all the rest
to drown. Women were routinely raped, killed and genitally
mutilated. Some were crucified. Children were taken on boats into
rivers and thrown off.
The genocide was not carried out by the Republic of Turkey, which did
not exist yet, but by the ruling party in the final years of the
collapsing Ottoman regime. To this day the Turkish government has
never acknowledged that what transpired was a monstrous and
intentional crime against humanity. Instead, it claims that the
Armenians were simply unfortunate victims of a chaotic civil war, that
only 300,000 to 600,000 died, that Turks actually died in greater
numbers, and that the Armenians brought their fate on themselves by
collaborating with the Russians.
Most historians reject these arguments. The definitive case that what
took place was a genocide has been made by Turkish historian Taner
Akcam, who in the 1970s was sentenced to 10 years in prison in Turkey
for producing a student journal that deviated from the official
line. He sought asylum in Germany, and now is a visiting professor at
the University of Minnesota. In his 2006 book, _"A Shameful Act: The
Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility,"_
(http://www.newyorker.com/a rchive/2006/11/06/061106crbo_books2) Akcam
offers overwhelming evidence that leaders of the ruling political
party, the Committee of Union and Progress, planned the Armenian
holocaust. There was no military justification for the genocide: Some
Armenians did fight against the Ottomans, but relatively few. In fact,
Akcam argues, the genocide was driven by the Ottoman thirst for
revenge after devastating military defeats, the desire to end foreign
interference by the great powers, and above all by the strategic
purpose of emptying the Turkish heartland of Christians to ensure the
survival of a Muslim-Turkish state. Akcam argues that had the
Armenians not been exterminated, Anatolia, the heart of what is now
Turkey, would probably have been partitioned after the war by the
victorious (and rapacious) great powers. The modern state of Turkey
was thus built in large part on the intentional destruction of an
entire people -- a moral horror that combines elements of America's
destruction of Indians and Germany's extermination of Jews.
The International Association of Genocide Scholars, the leading body
of genocide researchers, accepts that the destruction of the Armenians
fits the definition of genocide and _has called on Turkey_
(http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_ releases.php?prid=747) to
accept responsibility. Leading U.S. newspapers, including the New
York Times, accept the genocide description.
Twenty-three nations, including Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France,
Italy, Russia and Uruguay, have also formally recognized that what
transpired was genocide. For decades, Armenian-Americans and human
rights advocates have tried to persuade the U.S. government to
officially recognize that the mass killings constituted a
genocide. But strategic and national security considerations have
always stopped Washington from doing so. For decades, Turkey has been
one of America's most important strategic allies -- first as a bulwark
against the USSR during the Cold War, then as a key partner in George
W. Bush's "war on terror." The only officially secular state in the
Muslim world, it is the most politically moderate, economically
advanced nation in the region. A NATO member, with close ties to
Israel, home to a U.S. base through which most of the supplies to
American forces in central Iraq are flown, it is an indispensable
U.S. strategic asset.
For these reasons, Washington has never wanted to offend Ankara -- and
if there is one sure way to do that, it's by bringing up the Armenian
genocide.
Although there has been some progress in opening up the subject, it
remains explosive in Turkey. Those who assert that the genocide took
place can be arrested under a notorious law (still on the books) that
makes "insulting Turkishness" a crime. (Nobel Prize-winning novelist
Orhan Pamuk was convicted of violating this law.) In January 2007, the
leading Turkish-Armenian journalist, _Hrant Dink,_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrant_Dink) was murdered because of his
outspokenness on the issue, and state security officials were clearly
involved. The genocide denial is not confined to official discourse:
Most ordinary Turks, who have been taught a whitewashed official
version of the slaughter, also deny it. Akcam and other historians say
that because many of the Young Turks who founded the modern state were
involved in the campaign, and the state was constructed on a mythical
foundation of national unity and innocence, to bring up the Armenian
horror is to threaten Turkey's very identity.
No American administration has ever dared to cross Turkey on this
subject. But that may finally change. Last week, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, defying pleas from the Bush administration and a
letter signed by all living secretaries of state, _voted 27-21_
(http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071011/ap_on_ go_co/us_armenia_genocide)
for a resolution that would make it official U.S. policy to recognize
that the slaughter of the Armenians was an act of genocide. The
resolution is nonbinding, but after years of bitter lobbying, it is
the closest the U.S. government has yet come to acknowledging the
genocide.
Speaker Nancy Pelosi has indicated that she will bring it to a vote
before the House, which is expected to pass it; the bill's fate in the
Senate is less certain.
The mere fact that the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed it,
however, was taken by the Turks as a gratuitous insult. As it has done
every other time this subject has come up, Ankara -- and the country
at large -- reacted with fury. Furious demonstrators took to the
streets, shouting invective against the United States. Just-elected
President Abdullah Gul said, "Unfortunately, some politicians in the
United States have once more dismissed calls for common sense, and
made an attempt to sacrifice big issues for minor domestic political
games ... This unacceptable decision of the committee, like similar
ones in the past, has no validity and is not worthy of the respect of
the Turkish people." Turkey's ambassador to the United States warned
that the resolution's passage would be a "very injurious move to the
psyche of the Turkish people"; he was immediately recalled after the
vote to show Ankara's extreme displeasure. Turkish officials warned
that if the full House voted for the resolution, U.S.-Turkish
relations would be gravely damaged, perhaps for decades.
Considering that in a _Pew global poll_
(http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/arti cles/brmiddleeastnafricara/393.php?lb=brme&pnt =393&nid=&id=)
taken in June, a staggering 83 percent of Turks said they had a
negative view of America, and an even more staggering 77 percent said
they viewed the American people unfavorably, any further deterioration
in relations would indeed be grave. The _head of Turkey's military
warned_
(http://www.usatoday.com/news/mil itary/2007-10-14-turkey_N.htm) that
if the House passed the bill, "our military ties with the U.S. will
never be the same again."
There is no doubt that the controversy comes at a delicate time,
because of both internal Turkish politics and the situation in
Iraq. The vote could trigger a Turkish response that would be highly
injurious to American interests, not just in Iraq but throughout the
Middle East. Turkey could close Incirlik Air Base, through which 70
percent of air cargo for U.S. troops in Iraq passes, and refuse to
cooperate with Washington on the war.
But the most dangerous consequence would be a Turkish attack on
northern Iraq. In a piece of exquisitely bad timing, the committee
vote took place against the background of a mounting drumbeat of war
talk from the Gul administration, which is under heavy domestic
pressure to smash Kurdish militant group the PKK. Just days before the
vote, Kurdish militants_ killed 13 Turkish soldiers_
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/70330 75.stm) near the Iraq border,
one of Turkey's heaviest recent losses in the decades-long
war. Turkish anger at the U.S. is largely based on Turks' correct
belief that the U.S., desperate to preserve good ties with the Kurds,
is unwilling to confront the Kurdish guerrillas. A major Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq could destabilize the only calm part of the
country, pit two U.S. allies against each other, threaten the American
project in Iraq and destabilize the entire region. The U.S. has been
leaning heavily on Ankara not to invade; the genocide vote could tip
Gul over the edge.
Given these geopolitical concerns, heightened by the fact that the
U.S. is at war, it's not surprising that some Republicans have accused
Democrats, who have taken the lead on the bill, of endangering
national security. (Some right-wing bloggers have accused Democrats of
using the bill as an underhanded way to sabotage the war.) But
opposition to the bill has come not only from the right but from the
left. Writing in the Nation, Nicholas von Hoffman _mockingly asked,_
(http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071029/how l) "What's next? A
resolution condemning Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the slaughter
visited on the Egyptians at the Battle of the Pyramids?" Von Hoffman
attacked the bill's sponsors for self-righteous hypocrisy. British
commentator Simon Tisdall _made a similar charge_
(http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/simon _tisdall/2007/10/righteousness_before_realism.html )
in the Guardian, writing, "Imperial delusions die hard -- and once
again the U.S. Congress is trying to legislate for the world."
Most Turkish academics toe the official line on the horrific events of
1915. But even some of those who accept that a genocide took place
believe that passing the bill now is a bad idea. _Yektan Turkyilmaz,_
(http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/duk emag/issues/111205/yektan1.html)
a graduate student at Duke University, has the distinction of having
been arrested by the Armenian KGB because his research led them to
assume he was a Turkish spy. In fact, he is part of a new generation
of Turkish scholars who reject their country's propaganda about what
happened to the Armenians. In a phone interview from Duke, Turkyilmaz
said, "This bill strengthens the hand of the extremists in Turkey, the
xenophobes, the extreme nationalists. Yes, Turkish society has to face
its past, to prevent any sort of repetition in the future. If I
believed that this bill would force the Turkish government to
acknowledge the truth, I would support it. But it won't."
For his part, "A Shameful Act" author Taner Akcam acknowledges the
force of these pragmatic arguments -- but rejects them.
"Look, we can make a list of reasons why this resolution will make
matters worse," Akcam said in a phone interview from his office at the
University of Minnesota. "First, it explicitly politicizes the
problem. Second, it makes a historic problem a diplomatic fight
between the United States and Turkey.
Third, it increases the aggressive attacks of the Turkish government
against those inside and outside the country. Fourth, it increases the
animosity and hatred against Armenians generally in Turkey. Fifth, it
can never solve the problem. It aggravates the problem.
"OK, so we've made this list," Akcam went on. "But what is the answer?
Whoever is against the resolution must show an alternative to the
Armenian people.
Unless you give an alternative policy, saying 'Shut up and stop' is
not a policy. The Armenians don't have any options. As long Turkey
criminalizes the past, as long as Turkey kills journalists, as long as
Turkey drags its intellectuals from court to court, as long as Turkey
punishes the people who use the G-word, as long as Turkey doesn't have
any diplomatic relations with Armenia, as long as Turkey threatens
everybody in the world who opens the topic of historical wrongdoing,
it is the legitimate right of a victim group to make its voice heard."
Akcam dismisses the argument that the time was not yet ripe for the
resolution. "You can use the timing argument forever and ever. Who
will decide when the timing is right?"
But Akcam argues that a long-term solution requires much more than a
U.S. resolution. He says two steps are necessary: Turkey and Armenia
must establish normal relations, and Turks must learn that confronting
their history does not threaten their Turkish identity, but
strengthens it. This means that Turks should look at the conflict not
as a zero-sum game in which any Armenian gain is a Turkish loss, but
as a necessary part of the process of becoming a democratic
nation. It's an approach to resolving bitter historical grievances
called _"transitional justice,"_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tran sitional_Justice) and it has been
effective in helping resolve historical grievances between Germany and
the Czech Republic, within South Africa and in other places.
The Armenians, too, need to rethink their approach, Akcam said. In the
new paradigm, the Armenian diaspora would present its policy not as
being totally against Turkey, but for a new democratic Turkey. "Until
now this was a conventional war between Turkey and Armenian diaspora,
and congressional resolutions were the effective weapon in this
conventional war," Akcam said. "What I'm saying is we should stop
thinking in these conventional ways."
The U.S. could play an important role in helping both parties break
the impasse, Akcam said, but it is hampered by its lack of credibility
in the Middle East. He points to what he calls a "stupid distinction
between national security and morality. If you follow the whole
discussion in Congress, on the one side you have the moralists, who
say that Turkey should face what it did. This doesn't convince most of
the people in the Middle East because we know that these are the guys
torturing the people in Iraq, these are the guys killing the Iraqi
civilians there, these are the guys who haven't signed the
_International Criminal Court_
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International _Criminal_Court) agreement.
"On the other side are the realpolitikers," Akcam went on, referring
to the Bush administration and the foreign-policy establishment, like
the secretaries of state who signed the letter opposing the
resolution. "They say the bill jeopardizes the national interests of
the United States, Turkish-U.S. relations, interests of U.S. soldiers
in Iraq."
Akcam argues that both elements must be present to have an effective
foreign policy. "The fact is that realpolitik, the U.S. national
interest in the Middle East, necessitates making morality, facing
history, a part of national security. The basic problem between Turks
and Armenians is that they don't trust each other because of their
history." Akcam's point is that unless the U.S. is willing to look
unflinchingly at the region's history, and try to broker deals that
address legitimate grievances, it will not be able to achieve its
realpolitik goals.
"If America really has a strong interest in its national security and
the security of the region, it should stop following a national
security concept that accepts human rights abusers," Akcam said. "It
doesn't work, it makes things worse in the region. And it supports
perpetrators who have committed crimes in the past and are committing
crimes today."
In the end, the debate over the Armenian genocide bill boils down to
two questions: Is it justified, and is it wise? The answer to the
first question is an unambiguous "yes." It is both justified and long
overdue. The Armenian genocide is a clear-cut case of genocide, and
the fact that the U.S. has avoided calling it by its rightful name for
decades is shameful. Crimes against humanity must be
acknowledged. Hitler infamously said, with reference to the Poles,
"Who, after all, is today speaking of the destruction of the
Armenians?" Historical memory must not be sold away for a few pieces
of silver. No one would countenance allowing Germany to deny its guilt
for killing 6 million Jews. Why should Turkey be let off the hook for
a slightly earlier holocaust that took the lives of as many as 1.5
million Armenians?
The second question is trickier. As opponents argue, and even
supporters like Akcam acknowledge, the bill may backfire in the short
run. That outcome could be acceptable, as long as it doesn't backfire
in the long run. Which raises the central question: What policies
should the U.S. adopt to prevent the resolution from having long-term
negative consequences?
It comes down to a question of moral credibility, something the
U.S. is in notably short supply of in the Middle East. One of the
stranger reversals wrought by Bush's neoconservative foreign policy
has been the rejection by much of the left of a morality-based foreign
policy. Angry at the failure of the neocons' grand, idealistic
schemes, some on the left have embraced a realism that formerly was
associated with the America-first right. But by throwing out morality
in foreign policy because of the neocon debacle in Iraq, these
leftists are in danger of throwing out the baby with the
bathwater. The problem with Bush's Middle East policy hasn't been that
it's too moralistic -- it's that its morality has been flawed and
incoherent.
As Akcam argues, what is really needed are not just moral
congressional proclamations, but actions that back them up. Of course
the U.S. cannot and should not resolve all the problems of the
world. But like it or not, we are the world's superpower, and we have
the ability to use that power for good as well as ill. What is needed
is active U.S. engagement to broker fair resolutions to the festering
conflicts in the region -- between Turks and Armenians, Turks and
Kurds, and Israelis and Palestinians. If the resolution was part of a
new U.S. approach to the Middle East, one in which we acknowledged
and acted to redress the historical injustices suffered by all the
region's peoples, not just by our allies, the Armenian genocide bill
could stand as an example not of American grandstanding but of
American courage.
-- By Gary Kamiya