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BAKU, YEREVAN QUIETLY BUILDING MILITARY STRENGTH INSTEAD OF HOLDING KARABAKH PEACE TALKS
By Emil Danielyan
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Oct 16 2007
The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have finally dashed hopes for
a near-term settlement of the Karabakh conflict with their failure to
hold yet another, potentially decisive round of negotiations. Armenian
President Robert Kocharian publicly declared on October 11 that
contrary to the international community's expectations, the bitter
dispute will not be resolved before presidential elections due in
both South Caucasus states next year.
With Kocharian completing his second and final term in office, at
least one of them will have a new president.
"My assessment of the current state of negotiating process is that
we are unlikely to reach an agreement on the principles [of Karabakh
peace] before the presidential elections," the outgoing Armenian
leader said during a visit to Brussels (Armenian Public Television,
October 11).
This became evident when Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev pointedly declined to meet each other on the sidelines of the
latest Commonwealth of Independent States summit held in Dushanbe
on October 6. The French, Russian, and U.S. mediators acting under
the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group pushed hard for such an encounter,
viewing it as their last chance to broker an Armenian-Azerbaijani
framework peace accord this year. They visited the conflict zone in
mid-September and held separate follow-up meetings with the Armenian
and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in New York in early October for that
purpose. But as Aliyev's chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov,
said on October 4, those last-ditch diplomatic efforts "did not create
the need" for a fresh Armenian-Azerbaijani summit (Day.az, October 5).
The most recent Aliyev-Kocharian meeting, held in St. Petersburg in
June, failed to yield a breakthrough despite indications that the
conflicting parties have agreed on most of the basic principles of a
Karabakh settlement put forward by the Minsk Group co-chairs. Those
call for the conflict's gradual resolution that would start with the
liberation of virtually all Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani districts
surrounding Karabakh and end in a referendum of self-determination in
the disputed territory. The mediators had expected Aliyev and Kocharian
to agree on this formula in early 2006. However, the two presidents
failed to reach any agreements during face-to-face negotiations held
in February and June 2006. They reportedly disagreed on the timetable
for Armenian troop withdrawal and the timing of the proposed referendum
on Karabakh's status.
The mediators have since come up with a number of new, unpublicized
proposals aimed at breaking the impasse. Washington's chief Karabakh
negotiator, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, said
in Yerevan on September 17 that the parties are "close" to cutting
a framework peace deal and simply need to sort out "the last couple
of issues" (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 17). Kocharian likewise
noted in Brussels that Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks have made
substantial progress that can be built upon after the 2008 elections.
His foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian, insisted in an October 3
speech at the UN General Assembly that the parties are "inching
towards resolution" (Azg, October 5).
What precisely keeps them from making the final step toward peace
remains unclear. Bryza warned that Aliyev's and Kocharian's failure
to meet each other again this year would raise questions about their
commitment to mutual compromise. He said, "If they don't say yes,
then you'll wonder, 'What are they thinking in the back of their
mind? What are their plans? Are they really fully committed to reaching
an agreement'?" (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 17).
Even though official Yerevan has repeatedly praised the Minsk
Group's peace plan, Kocharian clearly wants to leave it to his likely
successor, Prime Minister Serge Sarkisian, to shoulder responsibility
for accepting a deal denounced as a sellout by Armenian nationalist
circles. The Azerbaijani government's position is even more
ambiguous. While agreeing to the proposed settlement in principle,
Aliyev and other Azerbaijani leaders have repeatedly made it clear
that they will never accept Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan.
However, the Minsk Group plan does allow for international
recognition of that secession. It is extremely unlikely that
Karabakh's predominantly Armenian population would vote to return
under Azerbaijani rule in the would-be referendum.
What the prospects for Karabakh peace will be after the Armenian
and Azerbaijani elections is far from clear. The sense of urgency to
eliminate the number one obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus
may well diminish on both sides. Azerbaijan, for one thing, feels that
time is working against the Armenian side. The Azerbaijani government
has pledged to spend its soaring oil revenues on a massive military
build-up that it hopes will change the balance of forces and enable
it to win back Karabakh.
While Armenia can no longer keep pace with Azerbaijan in terms
of defense spending, it can capitalize on close military ties
with Russia, which is hardly interested in any change in the
Karabakh status quo. Sarkisian, for example, declared last year
that the Armenian military received in 2006 a "considerable amount"
of Russian weapons that give it "superiority over any adversary in
some specific areas." He expressed hope that Russia will deliver more
"state-of-the-art weaponry" Armenia's armed forces (Arminfo, December
27, 2006).
Also, the Armenian leadership and much of the country's broader
political elite do not regard Karabakh peace as a necessary condition
for economic development. Armenia's economic growth has averaged 13%
since 2001 and looks set to remain strong in the coming years. The
macroeconomic performance regularly draws praise from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund.
All of which suggests that the Karabakh conflict may well remain
unresolved in the foreseeable future without more forceful and
high-level international mediation. The intensifying arms race between
Armenia and Azerbaijan could further complicate the search for peace
and increase chances of another Armenian-Azerbaijani war, which are
slim at the moment.
By Emil Danielyan
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Oct 16 2007
The presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have finally dashed hopes for
a near-term settlement of the Karabakh conflict with their failure to
hold yet another, potentially decisive round of negotiations. Armenian
President Robert Kocharian publicly declared on October 11 that
contrary to the international community's expectations, the bitter
dispute will not be resolved before presidential elections due in
both South Caucasus states next year.
With Kocharian completing his second and final term in office, at
least one of them will have a new president.
"My assessment of the current state of negotiating process is that
we are unlikely to reach an agreement on the principles [of Karabakh
peace] before the presidential elections," the outgoing Armenian
leader said during a visit to Brussels (Armenian Public Television,
October 11).
This became evident when Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev pointedly declined to meet each other on the sidelines of the
latest Commonwealth of Independent States summit held in Dushanbe
on October 6. The French, Russian, and U.S. mediators acting under
the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group pushed hard for such an encounter,
viewing it as their last chance to broker an Armenian-Azerbaijani
framework peace accord this year. They visited the conflict zone in
mid-September and held separate follow-up meetings with the Armenian
and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in New York in early October for that
purpose. But as Aliyev's chief foreign policy aide, Novruz Mammadov,
said on October 4, those last-ditch diplomatic efforts "did not create
the need" for a fresh Armenian-Azerbaijani summit (Day.az, October 5).
The most recent Aliyev-Kocharian meeting, held in St. Petersburg in
June, failed to yield a breakthrough despite indications that the
conflicting parties have agreed on most of the basic principles of a
Karabakh settlement put forward by the Minsk Group co-chairs. Those
call for the conflict's gradual resolution that would start with the
liberation of virtually all Armenian-controlled Azerbaijani districts
surrounding Karabakh and end in a referendum of self-determination in
the disputed territory. The mediators had expected Aliyev and Kocharian
to agree on this formula in early 2006. However, the two presidents
failed to reach any agreements during face-to-face negotiations held
in February and June 2006. They reportedly disagreed on the timetable
for Armenian troop withdrawal and the timing of the proposed referendum
on Karabakh's status.
The mediators have since come up with a number of new, unpublicized
proposals aimed at breaking the impasse. Washington's chief Karabakh
negotiator, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, said
in Yerevan on September 17 that the parties are "close" to cutting
a framework peace deal and simply need to sort out "the last couple
of issues" (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 17). Kocharian likewise
noted in Brussels that Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks have made
substantial progress that can be built upon after the 2008 elections.
His foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian, insisted in an October 3
speech at the UN General Assembly that the parties are "inching
towards resolution" (Azg, October 5).
What precisely keeps them from making the final step toward peace
remains unclear. Bryza warned that Aliyev's and Kocharian's failure
to meet each other again this year would raise questions about their
commitment to mutual compromise. He said, "If they don't say yes,
then you'll wonder, 'What are they thinking in the back of their
mind? What are their plans? Are they really fully committed to reaching
an agreement'?" (RFE/RL Armenia Report, September 17).
Even though official Yerevan has repeatedly praised the Minsk
Group's peace plan, Kocharian clearly wants to leave it to his likely
successor, Prime Minister Serge Sarkisian, to shoulder responsibility
for accepting a deal denounced as a sellout by Armenian nationalist
circles. The Azerbaijani government's position is even more
ambiguous. While agreeing to the proposed settlement in principle,
Aliyev and other Azerbaijani leaders have repeatedly made it clear
that they will never accept Karabakh's secession from Azerbaijan.
However, the Minsk Group plan does allow for international
recognition of that secession. It is extremely unlikely that
Karabakh's predominantly Armenian population would vote to return
under Azerbaijani rule in the would-be referendum.
What the prospects for Karabakh peace will be after the Armenian
and Azerbaijani elections is far from clear. The sense of urgency to
eliminate the number one obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus
may well diminish on both sides. Azerbaijan, for one thing, feels that
time is working against the Armenian side. The Azerbaijani government
has pledged to spend its soaring oil revenues on a massive military
build-up that it hopes will change the balance of forces and enable
it to win back Karabakh.
While Armenia can no longer keep pace with Azerbaijan in terms
of defense spending, it can capitalize on close military ties
with Russia, which is hardly interested in any change in the
Karabakh status quo. Sarkisian, for example, declared last year
that the Armenian military received in 2006 a "considerable amount"
of Russian weapons that give it "superiority over any adversary in
some specific areas." He expressed hope that Russia will deliver more
"state-of-the-art weaponry" Armenia's armed forces (Arminfo, December
27, 2006).
Also, the Armenian leadership and much of the country's broader
political elite do not regard Karabakh peace as a necessary condition
for economic development. Armenia's economic growth has averaged 13%
since 2001 and looks set to remain strong in the coming years. The
macroeconomic performance regularly draws praise from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund.
All of which suggests that the Karabakh conflict may well remain
unresolved in the foreseeable future without more forceful and
high-level international mediation. The intensifying arms race between
Armenia and Azerbaijan could further complicate the search for peace
and increase chances of another Armenian-Azerbaijani war, which are
slim at the moment.