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Mideast Mirror
October 19, 2007 Friday
Turkey gets what it wants
Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment's warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq - that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil - has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations - Faryad
Rawanzi in Iraqi al-Ittihad
Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences - 'Abdelbari 'Atwan in pan-Arab
al-Quds al-Arabi
Now that the Turkish parliament has authorized the government to
enter Northern Iraq in response to any future Kurdish Workers' Party
[PKK] attacks, the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish
provincial government in Arbil must convince the PKK to end its
attacks on Turkey, maintains an Iraqi Kurdish commentator. Otherwise,
Arbil will have to take action against the PKK. But, in addition to
steps already underway against the PKK in Northern Iraq, the crisis
has brought the Turkish political and military establishments closer
together, argues the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab daily.
REFRAIN FROM THE MILITARY OPTION: "After the Turkish government
decided to attack the PKK's positions in the rugged mountain range
between Iraq and Turkey, voices were raised demanding that [Turkish
PM] Recep Tayyip Erdogan should resort to political and diplomatic
means, and refrain from any military action," writes Faryad Rawanzi
in the Iraqi daily organ of the Kurdish Patriotic Union, al-Ittihad.
Action of this nature could undermine the stable security situation
in Iraqi Kurdistan. It may anger the U.S., Ankara's traditional ally.
And it may make it more difficult for the EU to open the door for
negotiations with Turkey to join the Union.
Erdogan is known for his great pragmatism. The PM who is 'Bush's
partner in the Greater Middle East project,' as he described himself
in 2006, has changed his tune to a military march that differs little
from that of his chief of staff or retired military commanders,
demanding that the government change its strategy and join a
coalition with Iran, Syria, and Moscow against NATO and the U.S.
policies in the region - despite the fact that Turkish forces rely on
U.S. weapons and equipment for 80% of their needs.
Erdogan's patience seems to have run out. He no longer cares for the
dire consequences for Turkey's EU future, or for its relations with
Iraq - which has been the weaker of the two states ever since it was
founded in 1921.
Despite the voices clamoring against any military action on Iraqi
territory, Turkey's decision seems final. Erdogan will lead his
military campaign and infiltrate Iraqi soil. But he may not
infiltrate too deeply. Instead, he is expected to try to compensate
for this by striking at some strategic and vital sites belonging to
the government of Iraq's Kurdistan Province, in a manner similar to
that followed by NATO in its preemptive strikes in Kosovo, or by
Israel in its preemptive strikes against Syrian sites, or by the U.S.
in its preemptive strikes against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
The U.S., which is opposed to Turkish incursions across the Iraqi
borders, may not be too angered by this. Its reactions will not be
too harsh if Ankara confines itself to a limited incursion in the
border area, and if it uses its air force to bomb PKK sites. This is
something that officials in Baghdad and Arbil should expect.
Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment's warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq - that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil - has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations.
Baghdad and Arbil must also move on another front and adopt another
position that stops the Turkish decision in its tracks, and prevents
it from being implemented, by putting an end to the PKK nuisance.
This nuisance is no longer acceptable for the security, economic, and
political future of the Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan which
cannot withstand any painful Turkish strikes.
Iraq and Turkey have sufficient time to discuss this crisis. The PKK
also has sufficient time to review its positions and its policies,
even its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. If, however, the bomb goes off
and burns the Kurdish fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, everyone will bear
responsibility.
"Rather than bear responsibility for such destruction, we must all
act to avoid it, even if this is to be achieved at the cost of harsh
and painful concessions on the part of the PKK, or harsh and painful
decisions made by the Iraqi Kurdistan government should the PKK fail
to respond to its patriotic and national call," concludes Rawanzi.
BIGGEST WINNER: "If the current standoff between Turkey and the
Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq is seen from a viewpoint
of winners and losers, then it could be said that the Turkish
government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be the biggest winner
whatever the outcome," writes 'Abdelbari 'Atwan editor-in-chief of
the pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.
The United States and its Iraqi allies (Arabs and Kurds alike) will
come out the losers.
Erdogan displayed admirable statesmanship in dealing with the current
crisis. He dealt with it with great intelligence, casting the ball
into the American court while sitting back waiting to reap the
benefits.
American confusion was obvious in the way the Bush administration
repeatedly called on the Turks to show restraint and not carry out
their threat to invade Northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases there.
Iraqi officials (the latest was vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi)
hurried to Ankara seeking a diplomatic solution.
Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences.
For the first time since Erdogan's AKP won its first election, the
party finds the army backing it. Turkey's generals have always been
skeptical of the Islamist oriented AKP, seeing it as a threat to the
secular ideals of the republic founded by Kemal Ataturk.
Most importantly, the Turks proved yet again that their own interests
are more important to them than their relations with the United
States, and that they would not hesitate for one second to assert
their independence and sovereignty if those interests came into
conflict with their superpower ally. They already did this once when
they prevented U.S. forces from using Turkish territory to attack
Iraq in 2003 - in sharp contrast to the many Arab states that allowed
the Americans to use their bases and airspace to invade a supposedly
sisterly Arab nation.
America is the biggest loser in this crisis. The shortsighted U.S.
policy in Iraq has unified the Turkish people behind their
government; it has also unified two erstwhile enemies - Sunni Turkey
and Shiite Iran - against the U.S. and its occupation of Iraq. This
was inconceivable only a few months ago. Should this rapprochement
prove durable, it would complicate any American effort to take out
Tehran's nuclear installations.
Should the Turkish army decide to invade Northern Iraq, America would
be put in a very delicate situation. The U.S. would have to make some
very hard choices, of which it would not have many anyway.
Confronting a Turkish invasion would spell the end of a fifty-year
old alliance and would cause the Turks to join the anti-American
camp. If, on the other hand, the U.S. allows the Turks to do their
will, that would destroy the American-Kurdish alliance and cause the
U.S. to look feeble in the eyes of all peoples in the region.
The Kurds' biggest achievement has been ensuring relative security
and stability in their region while the rest of Iraq burns. However,
this stability has caused the Kurdish leaderships to behave as if
they already have an independent state. Indeed, they have been
building airports, flying their own flag, refusing to teach Arabic in
their schools, and signing oil deals with international companies
without even consulting with the central government in Baghdad. A
Turkish invasion would end all that. There would be no more Kurdish
'sovereignty.'
The Turkish government has managed this crisis very wisely by making
sure that any military involvement would be carried out legally and
constitutionally. It also ensured that its two important neighbors,
Syria and Iran, were on board. In fact, it was only yesterday that
Syria's Bashar al-Assad - on a visit to Ankara - expressed his
country's support for Turkey's right to invade Northern Iraq. Assad's
words implied a new strategic partnership in the making, which could
conceivably expand to include Iran as well. Two 'evil' states and a
regional superpower under one roof!
It is the West's fault that Turkey is turning Eastwards and taking
refuge in its Islamic imperial past. By slamming the door of EU
membership in Ankara's face for purely racist and religious reasons,
and by insulting its patriotic feelings by raising the Armenian
'genocide' issue, the West has deliberately provoked the Turks.
Ironically, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, which now finds itself in a
precarious situation, has failed to find a single Arab or Moslem
ally. This reflects remarkable foolishness and shortsightedness on
the part of the Kurdish leadership.
In fact, the only regional leader who has come to the rescue of the
Kurds was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who two weeks ago
promised Erdogan that he would eradicate all PKK bases in Northern
Iraq. But no one believes that the Turkish PM will take Maliki's
promise seriously, since he knows that the Iraqi leader has no army
to speak of, cannot speak for the Kurds, and cannot even protect
himself.
Turkey has been rapidly regaining its role as a regional Islamic
superpower. It has been turning its back to the West (particularly
the U.S.) in a measured and considered manner. In fact, Turkey, with
its wisdom, independence, sovereignty, economic progress, and
military prowess, has been giving other Moslem peoples lessons in
democracy. Turkey has become a rare example of an Islamic democracy
in the midst of petty dictatorships and failed American wars.
Not too long ago, Turkey threatened Syria with military action if
Damascus did not curb the PKK, which had its bases in Syria at the
time. The late [Syrian president] Hafez al-Assad understood the
message immediately and sent PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan packing to
Nairobi, whence he was picked up by Turkish intelligence and flown
back to Ankara.
"Now Turkey is threatening Jalal Talabani and Mas'ud Barzani with the
same fate. But are these two Kurdish leaders as wise as Hafez
al-Assad was? Would they raise the white flag and turn against their
own Kurdish brethren? I do not believe they have much of a choice,"
concludes 'Atwan.
October 19, 2007 Friday
Turkey gets what it wants
Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment's warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq - that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil - has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations - Faryad
Rawanzi in Iraqi al-Ittihad
Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences - 'Abdelbari 'Atwan in pan-Arab
al-Quds al-Arabi
Now that the Turkish parliament has authorized the government to
enter Northern Iraq in response to any future Kurdish Workers' Party
[PKK] attacks, the central Iraqi government and the Kurdish
provincial government in Arbil must convince the PKK to end its
attacks on Turkey, maintains an Iraqi Kurdish commentator. Otherwise,
Arbil will have to take action against the PKK. But, in addition to
steps already underway against the PKK in Northern Iraq, the crisis
has brought the Turkish political and military establishments closer
together, argues the editor-in-chief of a pan-Arab daily.
REFRAIN FROM THE MILITARY OPTION: "After the Turkish government
decided to attack the PKK's positions in the rugged mountain range
between Iraq and Turkey, voices were raised demanding that [Turkish
PM] Recep Tayyip Erdogan should resort to political and diplomatic
means, and refrain from any military action," writes Faryad Rawanzi
in the Iraqi daily organ of the Kurdish Patriotic Union, al-Ittihad.
Action of this nature could undermine the stable security situation
in Iraqi Kurdistan. It may anger the U.S., Ankara's traditional ally.
And it may make it more difficult for the EU to open the door for
negotiations with Turkey to join the Union.
Erdogan is known for his great pragmatism. The PM who is 'Bush's
partner in the Greater Middle East project,' as he described himself
in 2006, has changed his tune to a military march that differs little
from that of his chief of staff or retired military commanders,
demanding that the government change its strategy and join a
coalition with Iran, Syria, and Moscow against NATO and the U.S.
policies in the region - despite the fact that Turkish forces rely on
U.S. weapons and equipment for 80% of their needs.
Erdogan's patience seems to have run out. He no longer cares for the
dire consequences for Turkey's EU future, or for its relations with
Iraq - which has been the weaker of the two states ever since it was
founded in 1921.
Despite the voices clamoring against any military action on Iraqi
territory, Turkey's decision seems final. Erdogan will lead his
military campaign and infiltrate Iraqi soil. But he may not
infiltrate too deeply. Instead, he is expected to try to compensate
for this by striking at some strategic and vital sites belonging to
the government of Iraq's Kurdistan Province, in a manner similar to
that followed by NATO in its preemptive strikes in Kosovo, or by
Israel in its preemptive strikes against Syrian sites, or by the U.S.
in its preemptive strikes against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
The U.S., which is opposed to Turkish incursions across the Iraqi
borders, may not be too angered by this. Its reactions will not be
too harsh if Ankara confines itself to a limited incursion in the
border area, and if it uses its air force to bomb PKK sites. This is
something that officials in Baghdad and Arbil should expect.
Now that the Turkish government and parliament have made a decision,
and after the Turkish military establishment's warm embrace of a
strike against PKK positions, Iraq - that is, the governments in both
Baghdad and Arbil - has no alternative but to act quickly, and by all
means to convince the PKK to end its military operations.
Baghdad and Arbil must also move on another front and adopt another
position that stops the Turkish decision in its tracks, and prevents
it from being implemented, by putting an end to the PKK nuisance.
This nuisance is no longer acceptable for the security, economic, and
political future of the Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan which
cannot withstand any painful Turkish strikes.
Iraq and Turkey have sufficient time to discuss this crisis. The PKK
also has sufficient time to review its positions and its policies,
even its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. If, however, the bomb goes off
and burns the Kurdish fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, everyone will bear
responsibility.
"Rather than bear responsibility for such destruction, we must all
act to avoid it, even if this is to be achieved at the cost of harsh
and painful concessions on the part of the PKK, or harsh and painful
decisions made by the Iraqi Kurdistan government should the PKK fail
to respond to its patriotic and national call," concludes Rawanzi.
BIGGEST WINNER: "If the current standoff between Turkey and the
Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq is seen from a viewpoint
of winners and losers, then it could be said that the Turkish
government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be the biggest winner
whatever the outcome," writes 'Abdelbari 'Atwan editor-in-chief of
the pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.
The United States and its Iraqi allies (Arabs and Kurds alike) will
come out the losers.
Erdogan displayed admirable statesmanship in dealing with the current
crisis. He dealt with it with great intelligence, casting the ball
into the American court while sitting back waiting to reap the
benefits.
American confusion was obvious in the way the Bush administration
repeatedly called on the Turks to show restraint and not carry out
their threat to invade Northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases there.
Iraqi officials (the latest was vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi)
hurried to Ankara seeking a diplomatic solution.
Turkey will (eventually, if not already) get what it wants. Even
before a single Turkish soldier is deployed, steps are already being
taken to curb the PKK. More importantly, this crisis has brought the
Turkish political and military establishments closer together,
despite their obvious differences.
For the first time since Erdogan's AKP won its first election, the
party finds the army backing it. Turkey's generals have always been
skeptical of the Islamist oriented AKP, seeing it as a threat to the
secular ideals of the republic founded by Kemal Ataturk.
Most importantly, the Turks proved yet again that their own interests
are more important to them than their relations with the United
States, and that they would not hesitate for one second to assert
their independence and sovereignty if those interests came into
conflict with their superpower ally. They already did this once when
they prevented U.S. forces from using Turkish territory to attack
Iraq in 2003 - in sharp contrast to the many Arab states that allowed
the Americans to use their bases and airspace to invade a supposedly
sisterly Arab nation.
America is the biggest loser in this crisis. The shortsighted U.S.
policy in Iraq has unified the Turkish people behind their
government; it has also unified two erstwhile enemies - Sunni Turkey
and Shiite Iran - against the U.S. and its occupation of Iraq. This
was inconceivable only a few months ago. Should this rapprochement
prove durable, it would complicate any American effort to take out
Tehran's nuclear installations.
Should the Turkish army decide to invade Northern Iraq, America would
be put in a very delicate situation. The U.S. would have to make some
very hard choices, of which it would not have many anyway.
Confronting a Turkish invasion would spell the end of a fifty-year
old alliance and would cause the Turks to join the anti-American
camp. If, on the other hand, the U.S. allows the Turks to do their
will, that would destroy the American-Kurdish alliance and cause the
U.S. to look feeble in the eyes of all peoples in the region.
The Kurds' biggest achievement has been ensuring relative security
and stability in their region while the rest of Iraq burns. However,
this stability has caused the Kurdish leaderships to behave as if
they already have an independent state. Indeed, they have been
building airports, flying their own flag, refusing to teach Arabic in
their schools, and signing oil deals with international companies
without even consulting with the central government in Baghdad. A
Turkish invasion would end all that. There would be no more Kurdish
'sovereignty.'
The Turkish government has managed this crisis very wisely by making
sure that any military involvement would be carried out legally and
constitutionally. It also ensured that its two important neighbors,
Syria and Iran, were on board. In fact, it was only yesterday that
Syria's Bashar al-Assad - on a visit to Ankara - expressed his
country's support for Turkey's right to invade Northern Iraq. Assad's
words implied a new strategic partnership in the making, which could
conceivably expand to include Iran as well. Two 'evil' states and a
regional superpower under one roof!
It is the West's fault that Turkey is turning Eastwards and taking
refuge in its Islamic imperial past. By slamming the door of EU
membership in Ankara's face for purely racist and religious reasons,
and by insulting its patriotic feelings by raising the Armenian
'genocide' issue, the West has deliberately provoked the Turks.
Ironically, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, which now finds itself in a
precarious situation, has failed to find a single Arab or Moslem
ally. This reflects remarkable foolishness and shortsightedness on
the part of the Kurdish leadership.
In fact, the only regional leader who has come to the rescue of the
Kurds was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who two weeks ago
promised Erdogan that he would eradicate all PKK bases in Northern
Iraq. But no one believes that the Turkish PM will take Maliki's
promise seriously, since he knows that the Iraqi leader has no army
to speak of, cannot speak for the Kurds, and cannot even protect
himself.
Turkey has been rapidly regaining its role as a regional Islamic
superpower. It has been turning its back to the West (particularly
the U.S.) in a measured and considered manner. In fact, Turkey, with
its wisdom, independence, sovereignty, economic progress, and
military prowess, has been giving other Moslem peoples lessons in
democracy. Turkey has become a rare example of an Islamic democracy
in the midst of petty dictatorships and failed American wars.
Not too long ago, Turkey threatened Syria with military action if
Damascus did not curb the PKK, which had its bases in Syria at the
time. The late [Syrian president] Hafez al-Assad understood the
message immediately and sent PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan packing to
Nairobi, whence he was picked up by Turkish intelligence and flown
back to Ankara.
"Now Turkey is threatening Jalal Talabani and Mas'ud Barzani with the
same fate. But are these two Kurdish leaders as wise as Hafez
al-Assad was? Would they raise the white flag and turn against their
own Kurdish brethren? I do not believe they have much of a choice,"
concludes 'Atwan.