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DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 19, 2007 Friday
AMERICA'S CAUCASUS BRIDGEHEAD;
Why Washington is determined to elbow Russia out
Fyodor Yermakov
HIGHLIGHT: THE UNITED STATES CHALLENGES RUSSIA'S POSITIONS IN THE
CAUCASUS; Analysis of Washington's efforts to strengthen its
positions in the Caucasus.
It is clear that Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are in the focus of
the United States and NATO's attention because of Caspian oil and
gas, new hypothetical export routes, and their closeness to Russia
and Iran. Russian military-political interests in the Caucasus are
governed by the necessity to ensure the security of the country from
the problematic southern direction. There is one other nuance that
enhances the importance of this (southern) part of the Caucasus.
Control over the region will enable the United States to cut Russia
off the transport corridor connecting Asia and Europe via the
Caucasus, one where Azerbaijan and Georgia are playing such an
important role.
Georgia is singled out for a special role in NATO designs aimed to
boost its clout with the countries of the region. Like other
countries, Georgia is being used to put Russia under
military-political pressure and secure for NATO the territory of
untold military-strategic and economic value.
Georgian corridor
The border with Russia is what makes Georgia so special from the
geopolitical standpoint. Some parts of the Georgian-Russian state
border harbor extended ethnic conflicts (Georgian-Ossetian and
-Abkhazian ones). On the one hand, these conflicts generate friction
in the relations between the two neighbors. On the other, they offer
the Alliance at least a hypothetical opportunity to boost the discord
existing in the region to international proportions. Economically
speaking, the territory of Georgia is simply a corridor for oil
transportation from the Caspian region to Turkey and on to Europe and
America.
NATO leadership views Georgia as the country of the Caucasus
critically important for the plans of the Alliance, one that may
contribute a lot to the war on terrorism once it has modernized its
Armed Forces. Brussels regularly accentuates the respect it has for
the "territorial integrity of Georgia and the necessity of its
defense." From Russia's standpoint, however, Georgia is an important
buffer state on the southern flank of the Alliance.
There is more to the current deterioration of relations between
Tbilisi and the "runaway territories" than preparations for an
attempt to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia by sheer
strength of arms. The same deterioration offers a perfect excuse for
the activization of contacts with NATO. The Alliance in its turn
never abandons attempts to use the territorial discord as a
smoke-screen for its own efforts to stiffen control over the Caucasus
and Central Asia. The establishment of the office of NATO's special
representatives in the Caucasus and Central Asia and the ultimatum
demand to Russia to pull out its military bases from Georgia and the
Trans-Dniester region are elements of this particular campaign.
Tbilisi views the restoration of territorial integrity as the first
priority. President Mikhail Saakashvili wouldn't mind seeing
conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia resolved by sheer strength
of arms. The odds are, however, that this turn of events will result
in an international scandal and force Tbilisi to seek military
assistance in the Alliance. On the other hand, Iran issued a warning
in the middle of 2003 that the deployment of American troops and
troops of their allies in Azerbaijan and Georgia would compel it to
deliver preemptive strikes at the infrastructures and military sites
on the territories of these two countries. Iran serves as a kind of
equalizer nowadays, something preventing the unchecked proliferation
of NATO's clout with the southern parts of the former Soviet Union.
It is clear as well that this is (among other things, of course) is
what makes Iran the target for all sorts of destructive efforts on
the part of the United States and its allies.
Stoking the fires of the latent conflicts in Georgia, Saakashvili's
government foments regional destabilization. The idea is to establish
a conflict zone on the Russian border. Coupled with the problem of
Chechnya and friction between different peoples of the Caucasus, all
of that leaves the impression that the Alliance may even undertake to
disrupt the situation in Russia itself.
Base for NATO
The geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan in the eyes of the United
States and NATO stems from its oil fields and its location on the
Caspian shore. Its territory is perfect for improvement of the
Alliance's positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and for
addressing all sorts of military-strategic tasks in the region. All
of that makes Azerbaijan a convenient bridgehead where the United
States and NATO may stage aircraft involved in the operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, a bridgehead from which Washington and Brussels may
keep Iran under constant military-political pressure. Also
importantly, it provides a convenient staging area for protection of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. From Baku's standpoint meanwhile,
the presence of NATO troops on the territory of Azerbaijan may
solidify its international standing.
Some reports indicate that the Pentagon intends to use airfields in
Azerbaijan to keep an eye on the airspace of Iran, Iraq, and even
China. There are lots of suitably located airfields in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan itself on the other hand views the presence of US and NATO
contingents on its territory as a blessing because it may help it
with Karabakh conflict settlement and facilitate modernization and
reorganization of the regular army of Azerbaijan which official Baku
claims has already made a transition to NATO standards.
Azerbaijani and NATO leaders discussed prospects of mutually
beneficial cooperation on many occasions throughout the 1990s. The
threat posed by Afghanistan that eventually led to the international
counter-terrorism operation in this country nevertheless persuaded
Washington and Brussels to concentrate on Central Asian countries
then. Georgia's turn came soon after that. The situation is different
now, of course. Actions of the counter-terrorism coalition in Iran
and Washington's threats to Tehran call for a deeper and more
energetic involvement of Azerbaijan in the US and NATO's plans.
Azerbaijan is an ideal area of deploying the attack aviation needed
for the still hypothetical military operation against Iran.
Kyurda-mir and Nasosnaya, former bases of the Soviet AF, are
particularly convenient from this standpoint. Capable of housing 90
to 100 aircraft, these airfields are quite close to Iranian sites the
Americans will certainly want to take out. Along with everything
else, the United States needs Azerbaijan as its ally from the
standpoint of securing commercial and transportation routes. The
safety of the transport corridor connecting the East and the West and
detouring Russia (which is what makes it so valuable) is not to be
endangered.
Relations with Turkey are the closest and warmest Azerbaijan has in
all of the Alliance. Turkish military instructors have been training
the Azerbaijani regular army for years now. It was in September 2000
that Azerbaijan first suggested the establishment of a NATO base on
the Apsheron Peninsula and its own participation in Turkey's
framework of defense. Alekperov, chairman of the national parliament,
said two years later that Azerbaijan was prepared to host Turkish
military bases on its territory and to make the Turkish army
eventually privy to data from the Gabala radar monitoring all of the
Southern Hemisphere for ICBM launches. The statement was made barely
a month after the Gabala radar status treaty signed by the presidents
of Azerbaijan and Russia (one that proclaimed the radar itself
property of the Republic of Azerbaijan leased to the Russian
Federation for $7 million per annum for the following ten years).
Rapidly advancing US-Azerbaijani military cooperation enters a wholly
new level nowadays. Priorities of this bilateral cooperation include
the complete transition of the regular army of Azerbaijan to NATO
standards, betterment of the Azerbaijani Navy and its capacity to
secure the national borders, and standardization of the national
airspace systems. According to Baku, the United States is willing to
promote military cooperation with Azerbaijan in the following
spheres: the exchange of experience; provisional deployment of mobile
formations of the US Army in Azerbaijan; and personnel training.
Among other considerations, Baku's interest in close cooperation and
interaction with Washington is fuelled by expectations of support in
the Karabakh conflict settlement.
The safety and security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is what
the potential US military presence in Azerbaijan will be mostly
centered around. On the other hand, whatever American troops may be
deployed in this country will also be supposed to keep Russia and
Iran wary. The establishment of US military bases in Azerbaijan will
open the way to the industrially developed Ural region of Russia for
the Pentagon.
Rear area
Small in terms of territory, Armenia is vastly important as a
geopolitical factor. It is a country whose importance for the
Caucasus and Middle East is way above its weight in international
affairs.
Armenia is Russia's least problematic partner, both in bilateral
relations and at the international level. Moreover, it is essentially
Russia's rear area on the southern strategic frontiers of the
Commonwealth. Moscow and Yerevan are allies, whose partnership is
centered around military-strategic cooperation that ensures both
their security and collective security within the framework of the
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Russian military
base in Gyumri is playing a mayor part in this cooperation.
Armenia has always been suspicious of Turkey and regarded it as a
source of external threat. The lack of diplomatic relations between
Armenia and Turkey makes economic problems for other countries
involved in joint projects with either Yerevan or Ankara. It has a
particularly negative effect on the realization of major transport
and energy projects. Armenia's distrust of Turkey originated in what
it calls the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
As for Washington, it is doing what it can to establish military
cooperation with Armenia.
* * *
Russia is instrumental in the maintenance of peace, stability, and
mutually beneficial cooperation in the Caucasus. Peacekeeping
missions under way in Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitute major
elements of this policy. Advancing relations with countries of the
region and with the Caucasus in general, Russia should be aware of
the fact that its role there is going to become even more important
in the future. Economic aspects of Russia's activity play a
particularly important part. It is necessary to convince the general
public, first and foremost in Georgia and Azerbaijan, that Russia is
a successful economically advanced state. It is probably the only
thing that may persuade these countries to revise the strategic and
geopolitical priorities of their foreign policies.
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 39, October 10 - 16, 2007, p.
3
October 19, 2007 Friday
AMERICA'S CAUCASUS BRIDGEHEAD;
Why Washington is determined to elbow Russia out
Fyodor Yermakov
HIGHLIGHT: THE UNITED STATES CHALLENGES RUSSIA'S POSITIONS IN THE
CAUCASUS; Analysis of Washington's efforts to strengthen its
positions in the Caucasus.
It is clear that Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are in the focus of
the United States and NATO's attention because of Caspian oil and
gas, new hypothetical export routes, and their closeness to Russia
and Iran. Russian military-political interests in the Caucasus are
governed by the necessity to ensure the security of the country from
the problematic southern direction. There is one other nuance that
enhances the importance of this (southern) part of the Caucasus.
Control over the region will enable the United States to cut Russia
off the transport corridor connecting Asia and Europe via the
Caucasus, one where Azerbaijan and Georgia are playing such an
important role.
Georgia is singled out for a special role in NATO designs aimed to
boost its clout with the countries of the region. Like other
countries, Georgia is being used to put Russia under
military-political pressure and secure for NATO the territory of
untold military-strategic and economic value.
Georgian corridor
The border with Russia is what makes Georgia so special from the
geopolitical standpoint. Some parts of the Georgian-Russian state
border harbor extended ethnic conflicts (Georgian-Ossetian and
-Abkhazian ones). On the one hand, these conflicts generate friction
in the relations between the two neighbors. On the other, they offer
the Alliance at least a hypothetical opportunity to boost the discord
existing in the region to international proportions. Economically
speaking, the territory of Georgia is simply a corridor for oil
transportation from the Caspian region to Turkey and on to Europe and
America.
NATO leadership views Georgia as the country of the Caucasus
critically important for the plans of the Alliance, one that may
contribute a lot to the war on terrorism once it has modernized its
Armed Forces. Brussels regularly accentuates the respect it has for
the "territorial integrity of Georgia and the necessity of its
defense." From Russia's standpoint, however, Georgia is an important
buffer state on the southern flank of the Alliance.
There is more to the current deterioration of relations between
Tbilisi and the "runaway territories" than preparations for an
attempt to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia by sheer
strength of arms. The same deterioration offers a perfect excuse for
the activization of contacts with NATO. The Alliance in its turn
never abandons attempts to use the territorial discord as a
smoke-screen for its own efforts to stiffen control over the Caucasus
and Central Asia. The establishment of the office of NATO's special
representatives in the Caucasus and Central Asia and the ultimatum
demand to Russia to pull out its military bases from Georgia and the
Trans-Dniester region are elements of this particular campaign.
Tbilisi views the restoration of territorial integrity as the first
priority. President Mikhail Saakashvili wouldn't mind seeing
conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia resolved by sheer strength
of arms. The odds are, however, that this turn of events will result
in an international scandal and force Tbilisi to seek military
assistance in the Alliance. On the other hand, Iran issued a warning
in the middle of 2003 that the deployment of American troops and
troops of their allies in Azerbaijan and Georgia would compel it to
deliver preemptive strikes at the infrastructures and military sites
on the territories of these two countries. Iran serves as a kind of
equalizer nowadays, something preventing the unchecked proliferation
of NATO's clout with the southern parts of the former Soviet Union.
It is clear as well that this is (among other things, of course) is
what makes Iran the target for all sorts of destructive efforts on
the part of the United States and its allies.
Stoking the fires of the latent conflicts in Georgia, Saakashvili's
government foments regional destabilization. The idea is to establish
a conflict zone on the Russian border. Coupled with the problem of
Chechnya and friction between different peoples of the Caucasus, all
of that leaves the impression that the Alliance may even undertake to
disrupt the situation in Russia itself.
Base for NATO
The geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan in the eyes of the United
States and NATO stems from its oil fields and its location on the
Caspian shore. Its territory is perfect for improvement of the
Alliance's positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and for
addressing all sorts of military-strategic tasks in the region. All
of that makes Azerbaijan a convenient bridgehead where the United
States and NATO may stage aircraft involved in the operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, a bridgehead from which Washington and Brussels may
keep Iran under constant military-political pressure. Also
importantly, it provides a convenient staging area for protection of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. From Baku's standpoint meanwhile,
the presence of NATO troops on the territory of Azerbaijan may
solidify its international standing.
Some reports indicate that the Pentagon intends to use airfields in
Azerbaijan to keep an eye on the airspace of Iran, Iraq, and even
China. There are lots of suitably located airfields in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan itself on the other hand views the presence of US and NATO
contingents on its territory as a blessing because it may help it
with Karabakh conflict settlement and facilitate modernization and
reorganization of the regular army of Azerbaijan which official Baku
claims has already made a transition to NATO standards.
Azerbaijani and NATO leaders discussed prospects of mutually
beneficial cooperation on many occasions throughout the 1990s. The
threat posed by Afghanistan that eventually led to the international
counter-terrorism operation in this country nevertheless persuaded
Washington and Brussels to concentrate on Central Asian countries
then. Georgia's turn came soon after that. The situation is different
now, of course. Actions of the counter-terrorism coalition in Iran
and Washington's threats to Tehran call for a deeper and more
energetic involvement of Azerbaijan in the US and NATO's plans.
Azerbaijan is an ideal area of deploying the attack aviation needed
for the still hypothetical military operation against Iran.
Kyurda-mir and Nasosnaya, former bases of the Soviet AF, are
particularly convenient from this standpoint. Capable of housing 90
to 100 aircraft, these airfields are quite close to Iranian sites the
Americans will certainly want to take out. Along with everything
else, the United States needs Azerbaijan as its ally from the
standpoint of securing commercial and transportation routes. The
safety of the transport corridor connecting the East and the West and
detouring Russia (which is what makes it so valuable) is not to be
endangered.
Relations with Turkey are the closest and warmest Azerbaijan has in
all of the Alliance. Turkish military instructors have been training
the Azerbaijani regular army for years now. It was in September 2000
that Azerbaijan first suggested the establishment of a NATO base on
the Apsheron Peninsula and its own participation in Turkey's
framework of defense. Alekperov, chairman of the national parliament,
said two years later that Azerbaijan was prepared to host Turkish
military bases on its territory and to make the Turkish army
eventually privy to data from the Gabala radar monitoring all of the
Southern Hemisphere for ICBM launches. The statement was made barely
a month after the Gabala radar status treaty signed by the presidents
of Azerbaijan and Russia (one that proclaimed the radar itself
property of the Republic of Azerbaijan leased to the Russian
Federation for $7 million per annum for the following ten years).
Rapidly advancing US-Azerbaijani military cooperation enters a wholly
new level nowadays. Priorities of this bilateral cooperation include
the complete transition of the regular army of Azerbaijan to NATO
standards, betterment of the Azerbaijani Navy and its capacity to
secure the national borders, and standardization of the national
airspace systems. According to Baku, the United States is willing to
promote military cooperation with Azerbaijan in the following
spheres: the exchange of experience; provisional deployment of mobile
formations of the US Army in Azerbaijan; and personnel training.
Among other considerations, Baku's interest in close cooperation and
interaction with Washington is fuelled by expectations of support in
the Karabakh conflict settlement.
The safety and security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is what
the potential US military presence in Azerbaijan will be mostly
centered around. On the other hand, whatever American troops may be
deployed in this country will also be supposed to keep Russia and
Iran wary. The establishment of US military bases in Azerbaijan will
open the way to the industrially developed Ural region of Russia for
the Pentagon.
Rear area
Small in terms of territory, Armenia is vastly important as a
geopolitical factor. It is a country whose importance for the
Caucasus and Middle East is way above its weight in international
affairs.
Armenia is Russia's least problematic partner, both in bilateral
relations and at the international level. Moreover, it is essentially
Russia's rear area on the southern strategic frontiers of the
Commonwealth. Moscow and Yerevan are allies, whose partnership is
centered around military-strategic cooperation that ensures both
their security and collective security within the framework of the
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Russian military
base in Gyumri is playing a mayor part in this cooperation.
Armenia has always been suspicious of Turkey and regarded it as a
source of external threat. The lack of diplomatic relations between
Armenia and Turkey makes economic problems for other countries
involved in joint projects with either Yerevan or Ankara. It has a
particularly negative effect on the realization of major transport
and energy projects. Armenia's distrust of Turkey originated in what
it calls the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
As for Washington, it is doing what it can to establish military
cooperation with Armenia.
* * *
Russia is instrumental in the maintenance of peace, stability, and
mutually beneficial cooperation in the Caucasus. Peacekeeping
missions under way in Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitute major
elements of this policy. Advancing relations with countries of the
region and with the Caucasus in general, Russia should be aware of
the fact that its role there is going to become even more important
in the future. Economic aspects of Russia's activity play a
particularly important part. It is necessary to convince the general
public, first and foremost in Georgia and Azerbaijan, that Russia is
a successful economically advanced state. It is probably the only
thing that may persuade these countries to revise the strategic and
geopolitical priorities of their foreign policies.
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 39, October 10 - 16, 2007, p.
3