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Los Angeles Times, CA
Oct 19 2007
Our fraying alliance with Turkey
Ankara's animosity toward the U.S. has its roots in much more than a
genocide bill.
By Graham E. Fuller
October 19, 2007
Turkish-American relations are in crisis. But the House resolution
declaring the World War I-era killings of Armenians a genocide is
only one cause -- and that's just a sideshow. Turkish-American
relations have been deteriorating for years, and the root explanation
is simple and harsh: Washington's policies are broadly and
fundamentally incompatible with Turkish foreign policy interests in
multiple arenas. No amount of diplomat-speak can conceal or change
that reality. Count the ways:
* Kurds. U.S. policies toward Iraq over the last 16 years have been a
disaster for Turkey. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurds have
gained ever-greater autonomy and are now on the brink of de facto
independence. Such a Kurdish entity in Iraq stimulates Kurdish
separatism inside Turkey. Furthermore, Washington supports Kurdish
terrorists against Iran.
* Terrorism: Turkey has fought domestic political violence and
terrorism for more than 30 years -- Marxist, socialist, right-wing
nationalist, Kurdish, Islamist. U.S. policies in the Middle East have
greatly stimulated violence and radicalism across the region and
brought Al Qaeda to Turkey's doorstep.
* Iran: Iran is Turkey's most powerful neighbor and a vital source of
oil and gas -- second only to Russia -- in meeting Turkey's energy
needs. Washington heavy-handedly pressures Turkey to end its
extensive and deepening relations with Iran in order to press a U.S.
sanctions regime there. Though there is little affection between
Turkey and Iran, there has been virtually no serious armed conflict
between the two nations for centuries. Ankara sees U.S. policies as
radicalizing and isolating Tehran further, which is undesirable for
Turkey.
* Syria: Ankara's relations with Syria have done a 180-degree turn in
the last decade, and relations are flourishing. Syrians -- as well as
many other Arabs -- are impressed with Turkey's ability to
simultaneously be a member of NATO, seek entry into the European
Union, say no to Washington on using Turkish soil to invade Iraq,
restore respect for its own Islamic heritage, develop new relations
with the Arab world and adopt a genuinely balanced position on the
Palestinian conflict. Ankara resists Washington's pressures to
marginalize and stifle Damascus.
* Armenia: Ankara and Yerevan, Armenia's capital, are actually in
productive unofficial contact with one another, such as via "gray"
trade and air links, and both would like to effect a reconciliation.
It is the Armenian diaspora, with its intense nationalist rhetoric,
that is one of the key factors in inflaming the atmosphere against
potential rapprochement.
* Russia: There has been a revolution in Ankara's relations with
Moscow after 500 years of hostility. Moscow is today the
second-largest importer of Turkish goods after Germany, and Turkey
has invested up to $12 billion in Russia in the construction field.
Russia is Turkey's primary source of energy, and Ankara increasingly
looks to Eurasia as a key part of its economic future.
Turkish generals, angry with Washington, even mutter about a Russian
strategic "alternative" if it is stiff-armed by the West. Although
there is some rivalry over the routing of Central Asian energy
pipelines to the West -- whether via Russia or Iran and Turkey --
Ankara values its ties with Moscow and opposes U.S. efforts to bait
the Russian bear in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe on NATO expansion
and missile issues.
* Palestine: Turks care a lot about Palestine -- which they had
jurisdiction over in Ottoman times. They sympathize with Palestinian
suffering under 40 years of Israeli occupation. Ankara views Hamas as
a legitimate and important element on the Palestinian political
spectrum and seeks to mediate with it. Washington says no. Ankara has
good working ties with Israel but does not shrink from sharp public
criticism of what it perceives as Israeli excesses.
Overall, a "new Turkey" actively seeks good-neighbor relations with
all regional states and players. It seeks to be a major player and
mediator in the Middle East -- to bring radicals into the mainstream
via patient diplomacy against what it perceives as Washington's
complicating belligerence.
Turkey has deep interests in Central Asia. If the
Chinese-Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization bids to
be the dominant geopolitical grouping in Eurasia, then Turkey, like
Afghanistan, Iran and India, would like an association with it.
Washington opposes that.
One may quarrel with the specifics of Turkish policies, but there is
broad belief across the Turkish political spectrum that these
policies serve the country's core needs. While the State Department
may soothingly speak of "vital shared interests" in democracy,
stability and counter-terrorism, all of that is mere motherhood and
apple pie -- empty phrases -- when compared with conflicting concrete
policies in so many key spheres. We had better get used to the fact
that Turkey, strengthened by its popular democracy, is going to
pursue its own national interests, regardless of Washington's
pressure. Few Turks want it any other way.
Graham E. Fuller is a former vice chairman of the National
Intelligence Council at the CIA. His latest book, "The New Turkish
Republic," is forthcoming in December.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printeditio n/opinion/la-oe-fuller19oct19,1,7212763.story?coll =la-news-comment
Oct 19 2007
Our fraying alliance with Turkey
Ankara's animosity toward the U.S. has its roots in much more than a
genocide bill.
By Graham E. Fuller
October 19, 2007
Turkish-American relations are in crisis. But the House resolution
declaring the World War I-era killings of Armenians a genocide is
only one cause -- and that's just a sideshow. Turkish-American
relations have been deteriorating for years, and the root explanation
is simple and harsh: Washington's policies are broadly and
fundamentally incompatible with Turkish foreign policy interests in
multiple arenas. No amount of diplomat-speak can conceal or change
that reality. Count the ways:
* Kurds. U.S. policies toward Iraq over the last 16 years have been a
disaster for Turkey. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurds have
gained ever-greater autonomy and are now on the brink of de facto
independence. Such a Kurdish entity in Iraq stimulates Kurdish
separatism inside Turkey. Furthermore, Washington supports Kurdish
terrorists against Iran.
* Terrorism: Turkey has fought domestic political violence and
terrorism for more than 30 years -- Marxist, socialist, right-wing
nationalist, Kurdish, Islamist. U.S. policies in the Middle East have
greatly stimulated violence and radicalism across the region and
brought Al Qaeda to Turkey's doorstep.
* Iran: Iran is Turkey's most powerful neighbor and a vital source of
oil and gas -- second only to Russia -- in meeting Turkey's energy
needs. Washington heavy-handedly pressures Turkey to end its
extensive and deepening relations with Iran in order to press a U.S.
sanctions regime there. Though there is little affection between
Turkey and Iran, there has been virtually no serious armed conflict
between the two nations for centuries. Ankara sees U.S. policies as
radicalizing and isolating Tehran further, which is undesirable for
Turkey.
* Syria: Ankara's relations with Syria have done a 180-degree turn in
the last decade, and relations are flourishing. Syrians -- as well as
many other Arabs -- are impressed with Turkey's ability to
simultaneously be a member of NATO, seek entry into the European
Union, say no to Washington on using Turkish soil to invade Iraq,
restore respect for its own Islamic heritage, develop new relations
with the Arab world and adopt a genuinely balanced position on the
Palestinian conflict. Ankara resists Washington's pressures to
marginalize and stifle Damascus.
* Armenia: Ankara and Yerevan, Armenia's capital, are actually in
productive unofficial contact with one another, such as via "gray"
trade and air links, and both would like to effect a reconciliation.
It is the Armenian diaspora, with its intense nationalist rhetoric,
that is one of the key factors in inflaming the atmosphere against
potential rapprochement.
* Russia: There has been a revolution in Ankara's relations with
Moscow after 500 years of hostility. Moscow is today the
second-largest importer of Turkish goods after Germany, and Turkey
has invested up to $12 billion in Russia in the construction field.
Russia is Turkey's primary source of energy, and Ankara increasingly
looks to Eurasia as a key part of its economic future.
Turkish generals, angry with Washington, even mutter about a Russian
strategic "alternative" if it is stiff-armed by the West. Although
there is some rivalry over the routing of Central Asian energy
pipelines to the West -- whether via Russia or Iran and Turkey --
Ankara values its ties with Moscow and opposes U.S. efforts to bait
the Russian bear in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe on NATO expansion
and missile issues.
* Palestine: Turks care a lot about Palestine -- which they had
jurisdiction over in Ottoman times. They sympathize with Palestinian
suffering under 40 years of Israeli occupation. Ankara views Hamas as
a legitimate and important element on the Palestinian political
spectrum and seeks to mediate with it. Washington says no. Ankara has
good working ties with Israel but does not shrink from sharp public
criticism of what it perceives as Israeli excesses.
Overall, a "new Turkey" actively seeks good-neighbor relations with
all regional states and players. It seeks to be a major player and
mediator in the Middle East -- to bring radicals into the mainstream
via patient diplomacy against what it perceives as Washington's
complicating belligerence.
Turkey has deep interests in Central Asia. If the
Chinese-Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization bids to
be the dominant geopolitical grouping in Eurasia, then Turkey, like
Afghanistan, Iran and India, would like an association with it.
Washington opposes that.
One may quarrel with the specifics of Turkish policies, but there is
broad belief across the Turkish political spectrum that these
policies serve the country's core needs. While the State Department
may soothingly speak of "vital shared interests" in democracy,
stability and counter-terrorism, all of that is mere motherhood and
apple pie -- empty phrases -- when compared with conflicting concrete
policies in so many key spheres. We had better get used to the fact
that Turkey, strengthened by its popular democracy, is going to
pursue its own national interests, regardless of Washington's
pressure. Few Turks want it any other way.
Graham E. Fuller is a former vice chairman of the National
Intelligence Council at the CIA. His latest book, "The New Turkish
Republic," is forthcoming in December.
http://www.latimes.com/news/printeditio n/opinion/la-oe-fuller19oct19,1,7212763.story?coll =la-news-comment