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ARAS: 'ISRAEL LIKELY TO LOSE TURKEY IF ARMENIAN RESOLUTION PASSES'
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Oct 22 2007
Expert on Turkish foreign policy Bulent Aras said Israel might be
further isolated in the Middle East if abandoned by Turkey following
a possible passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US
Congress.
"Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but
Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still, Israel doesn't
have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls
around itself," said Aras, who currently teaches at Iþýk University
in Ýstanbul.
With Turkish Parliament granting permission last week to the government
to send the military into northern Iraq to crush the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish foreign policy debate has grown
heated, and foreign policy questions like Turkey's response to PKK
terrorism and its relation to the Armenian genocide resolution have
come to the table again.
"The situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction,
and a new crisis such as the genocide resolution hasn't been helpful.
Turkish people don't believe that the United States supports Turkey in
Iraq, plus the United States confronts Turkey regarding the Armenian
resolution," Aras said.
For Monday Talk, he explained how these different areas of concern,
although not linked at first glance, are actually interconnected.
Should we expect an incursion into northern Iraq any time soon?
The authorization of Parliament means that the government is
politically ready for an incursion and the legal ground has been
established. However, there is still need for the operation decision
by the political leadership and preparations on the military side.
When considering an operation, there are other factors such as
weather conditions, the readiness and the number of troops, etc.,
[to take into consideration]. There are also different types of
cross-border operations. It may involve only air strikes or ground
forces or both. Depending on how it's going to be conducted, it will
lead to different results. In addition, there is a picture of Turkey
as a threatening country and the opposite view at the same time.
What kind of contradictions do you mean?
When you look at Turkey from Iraq, you see two different images. One
is Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to confront with
Iraqi forces or even American forces in the region. The other is
the Turkey that is providing 70 percent of the logistical support
for American troops in Iraq, supporting the building up of Iraq in
regards to the many construction projects going on, and a Turkey in
relationships with many different ethnic groups in Iraq, trying to
help their inclusion in the political system. For example, a Sunni
leader, Tareq al-Hashemi, has become Iraqi vice president with the
help of Turkey. He has been integrated into the system even though
he had a potential to become a powerful resistance figure. Turkey
also helped a lot in the writing of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005.
Turkey also brought together the neighboring countries to prevent
any destabilizing factors.
Which image of Turkey do you think is going to prevail?
Maybe we'll see that in the next period, especially after the
authorization of Parliament for an incursion.
How would the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US
Congress play into all that?
We see that Turkish foreign and domestic policies have been interacting
greatly in recent years. Foreign policy issues have been discussed
as domestic policy matters. And foreign policy has been hostage
to domestic policy matters. There has been almost no distinction
between foreign and domestic policy. And Turkey shows a weakness
of relating some domestic policy issues to foreign policy matters,
like we relate the Kirkuk problem to the PKK problem, and northern
Iraq with the Armenian resolution problem in the US. This attitude
weakens Turkey's arguments in the foreign policy arena.
So do you think Turkey is overemphasizing the problems related to
the Armenian genocide resolution in the US?
It's the first time that such a resolution has approached being
passed. That's an important factor for Turkey that gives the issue
more emphasis. Another factor is the present tension in US-Turkish
relations. I think the basis of Turkish-American relations, which
had been a strategic partnership since the years of the Cold War, has
to be changed according to the new challenges in the region and the
world. In this process of establishing a new base, we'll have some ups
and downs in relations. The situation in northern Iraq has already
been an area of friction, and a new crisis, such as the genocide
resolution, hasn't been helpful. Turkish people don't believe that
the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus the United States is
confronting Turkey with regards the Armenian resolution.
Is Turkey's reaction to be expected then?
It's to be expected but the reaction has been doubled since other
problems in relations wait to be resolved.
Do you expect the resolution to pass?
Although there are some setbacks in the House, there is still a high
probability that it may pass.
Did the US-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) support for the
resolution help it?
Two diaspora have collaborated.
Is the ADL's support related to the policies of Israel?
There is a perception of such in Turkey, but I don't agree with it.
Israel's official policy is not to support the passage of the
resolution. Plus the Jewish diaspora can act independently of Israel.
In that specific case, do you think the Jewish diaspora has been
acting independently of Israel?
The perception is that Turkey has been punished by the resolution
because of its policies regarding Israel. I don't have facts to support
relations between the ADL's actions and Israel's policies in that case,
but we have to evaluate them separately. There are different types
of Jewish diaspora in the US including the ones supporting Turkey.
But the ADL is an important one.
The ADL did not support Turkey in that case.
Right or wrong, since there is a perception by the Turks that Israel
might be behind the ADL's support for the resolution, how do you think
Turkish-Israeli relations would be influenced if the resolution passes
in the US Congress?
In the 1990s, when Turkish-Israel relations were being fostered,
the idea behind their relations was that the Jewish lobby would
support Turkey in the US. Plus the Jewish lobby's help was seen
as important in arming the Turkish military. Apparently, the lobby
doesn't side with Turkey on the resolution issue, which is a most
emotional one for Turkey. So the reason behind their relations has
been disappearing. The relations have been questioned already.
Do you expect a breaking up?
The level of the relations has still been balanced. Turkey has been
in a position to constructively criticize Israel's policies. And a
lot of Turkey's criticisms of Israel have been heard there. At the
end the two countries neither break up nor come closer.
Could Israel be further isolated in the region?
Israel has already been isolated in the region. Israel forms tactical,
diplomatic relations in the region not based on peace. It's been
trying to develop relations with non-Arab Muslim states to break its
isolation. Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria
and Iran, but Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still,
Israel doesn't have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state
builds walls around itself.
And Turkey has been following a 'zero problems with neighbors'
policy. Would it be able to follow that policy with an incursion into
northern Iraq?
The idea behind the no problems with neighbors policy is to have
a European-like approach toward countries around Turkey so you
can continue with the democratic reform process and concentrate
on increasing standards of living. If your agenda is dominated
by security concerns and ethnic nationalism, you cannot deal with
concerns related to democracy. If you've watched the discussions in
Parliament during the meeting for the authorization of an incursion
into northern Iraq, you'd have seen that parliamentarians have
become either doves or hawks, and the debate had nothing to do with
the country's problems. Plus, the Turkish military presence in the
Middle East has always been problematic.
You mean the Middle Eastern states don't like to see Turkish troops
in their territory?
Even Turkey's peace corps in Lebanon hasn't been well received by
some Lebanese groups. Since the Middle Eastern region was dominated
by the Ottoman Empire, there is a historical reason they don't want
to see the Turkish military in the region. Now Turkey has a respected
civilian and economic presence in the region. You can see Turkish
products all around. You can shop using Turkish lira in Syria,
Egypt and even in northern Iraq. Turkey's image has been further
strengthened in the Middle East when Turkey did not authorize the
transit of the US troops into Iraq on March 1, 2003.
Do you think the PKK might be trying to drag the Turkish military
into the region?
The image of Turkey that the PKK wants to portray is a Turkey
that is aggressive and willing to use military power at the first
opportunity. The PKK doesn't like Turkey's economic and civilian
presence in the region.
Does Turkey rightly perceive a threat if an independent Kurdish state
is formed in northern Iraq?
Iraq's territorial integrity is important for Turkey and other
countries that have an interest in the region. Iraq's disintegration
is neither good for Turkey, nor the other Middle Eastern countries,
the US or the European Union. The EU does not want a threatening
state close to its borders. Iraq's disintegration would automatically
threaten the American soldiers in the country. Syria, Iran and Turkey
wouldn't like rising pan-Kurdish nationalism. Iraq's reconciliation
process should be supported by all. Still, Turkey cannot ignore that
there is an ongoing process in northern Iraq, which is the building
up of a Kurdish nation.
How in that case can Massoud Barzani (the head of the regional Kurdish
authority) support Turkey against the PKK?
Nobody, especially Barzani, would want to be in a position to
mistreat the people in that region. In the short run, Barzani
wouldn't take Turkey's side against the PKK, at least not by his own
will. Additionally, Kurds want to have an independent state even though
the present situation doesn't allow it. So Barzani would like to act
as the leader of emerging Kurdish nation. He considers the PKK to be
part of the Kurdish nation and would not want to be in the position
of punishing his relatives in this sensitive process.
However, Barzani is important to any effort that targets the PKK.
There is an urgent need for a two-track policy and there should be a
win-win situation for the both sides. First Ankara needs to increase
its leverage in Iraqi politics in a way that central administration
can limit the Kurdish groups not vice versa. Second, Ankara should
engage with Barzani in a constructive manner, which would help him to
understand the meaning of a responsible politician in this sensitive
region. Both carrot and stick may work here.
Would talking to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani help?
In that regard Abdullah Gul's presidency is a positive development
because he would probably have a meeting with Talabani. Communication
channels should be open to other secular groups in Iraq including
Sunni groups other than already engaged and Shia groups, in particular
secular ones like Iyad Allawi, etc.
[PROFILE]
Bulent Aras
A professor at the International Relations Department of Iþýk
University in Ýstanbul, Bulent Aras was a visiting scholar in 1998
at the University of Indiana's Department of Central Eurasian Studies.
He was a guest researcher in 2003 at Oxford University's St. Antony's
College and a senior researcher in 2004 at the European Union
Institute of Security Studies in Paris. Among his 13 books are
"Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and Turkey" (1998), "New Geopolitics
of Eurasia and Turkey's Position" (2002) and "Turkey and the Greater
Middle East" (2004). His academic articles, which have been translated
into Persian, Arabic and Russian, have been published in periodicals
such as Middle East Policy, the Journal of Third World Studies,
the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Futures, the
Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans, Mediterranean Quarterly and
East European Quarterly.
--Boundary_(ID_y0Ezlgio6m5f/II3RM7dmQ) --
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Oct 22 2007
Expert on Turkish foreign policy Bulent Aras said Israel might be
further isolated in the Middle East if abandoned by Turkey following
a possible passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US
Congress.
"Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but
Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still, Israel doesn't
have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls
around itself," said Aras, who currently teaches at Iþýk University
in Ýstanbul.
With Turkish Parliament granting permission last week to the government
to send the military into northern Iraq to crush the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish foreign policy debate has grown
heated, and foreign policy questions like Turkey's response to PKK
terrorism and its relation to the Armenian genocide resolution have
come to the table again.
"The situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction,
and a new crisis such as the genocide resolution hasn't been helpful.
Turkish people don't believe that the United States supports Turkey in
Iraq, plus the United States confronts Turkey regarding the Armenian
resolution," Aras said.
For Monday Talk, he explained how these different areas of concern,
although not linked at first glance, are actually interconnected.
Should we expect an incursion into northern Iraq any time soon?
The authorization of Parliament means that the government is
politically ready for an incursion and the legal ground has been
established. However, there is still need for the operation decision
by the political leadership and preparations on the military side.
When considering an operation, there are other factors such as
weather conditions, the readiness and the number of troops, etc.,
[to take into consideration]. There are also different types of
cross-border operations. It may involve only air strikes or ground
forces or both. Depending on how it's going to be conducted, it will
lead to different results. In addition, there is a picture of Turkey
as a threatening country and the opposite view at the same time.
What kind of contradictions do you mean?
When you look at Turkey from Iraq, you see two different images. One
is Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to confront with
Iraqi forces or even American forces in the region. The other is
the Turkey that is providing 70 percent of the logistical support
for American troops in Iraq, supporting the building up of Iraq in
regards to the many construction projects going on, and a Turkey in
relationships with many different ethnic groups in Iraq, trying to
help their inclusion in the political system. For example, a Sunni
leader, Tareq al-Hashemi, has become Iraqi vice president with the
help of Turkey. He has been integrated into the system even though
he had a potential to become a powerful resistance figure. Turkey
also helped a lot in the writing of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005.
Turkey also brought together the neighboring countries to prevent
any destabilizing factors.
Which image of Turkey do you think is going to prevail?
Maybe we'll see that in the next period, especially after the
authorization of Parliament for an incursion.
How would the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US
Congress play into all that?
We see that Turkish foreign and domestic policies have been interacting
greatly in recent years. Foreign policy issues have been discussed
as domestic policy matters. And foreign policy has been hostage
to domestic policy matters. There has been almost no distinction
between foreign and domestic policy. And Turkey shows a weakness
of relating some domestic policy issues to foreign policy matters,
like we relate the Kirkuk problem to the PKK problem, and northern
Iraq with the Armenian resolution problem in the US. This attitude
weakens Turkey's arguments in the foreign policy arena.
So do you think Turkey is overemphasizing the problems related to
the Armenian genocide resolution in the US?
It's the first time that such a resolution has approached being
passed. That's an important factor for Turkey that gives the issue
more emphasis. Another factor is the present tension in US-Turkish
relations. I think the basis of Turkish-American relations, which
had been a strategic partnership since the years of the Cold War, has
to be changed according to the new challenges in the region and the
world. In this process of establishing a new base, we'll have some ups
and downs in relations. The situation in northern Iraq has already
been an area of friction, and a new crisis, such as the genocide
resolution, hasn't been helpful. Turkish people don't believe that
the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus the United States is
confronting Turkey with regards the Armenian resolution.
Is Turkey's reaction to be expected then?
It's to be expected but the reaction has been doubled since other
problems in relations wait to be resolved.
Do you expect the resolution to pass?
Although there are some setbacks in the House, there is still a high
probability that it may pass.
Did the US-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) support for the
resolution help it?
Two diaspora have collaborated.
Is the ADL's support related to the policies of Israel?
There is a perception of such in Turkey, but I don't agree with it.
Israel's official policy is not to support the passage of the
resolution. Plus the Jewish diaspora can act independently of Israel.
In that specific case, do you think the Jewish diaspora has been
acting independently of Israel?
The perception is that Turkey has been punished by the resolution
because of its policies regarding Israel. I don't have facts to support
relations between the ADL's actions and Israel's policies in that case,
but we have to evaluate them separately. There are different types
of Jewish diaspora in the US including the ones supporting Turkey.
But the ADL is an important one.
The ADL did not support Turkey in that case.
Right or wrong, since there is a perception by the Turks that Israel
might be behind the ADL's support for the resolution, how do you think
Turkish-Israeli relations would be influenced if the resolution passes
in the US Congress?
In the 1990s, when Turkish-Israel relations were being fostered,
the idea behind their relations was that the Jewish lobby would
support Turkey in the US. Plus the Jewish lobby's help was seen
as important in arming the Turkish military. Apparently, the lobby
doesn't side with Turkey on the resolution issue, which is a most
emotional one for Turkey. So the reason behind their relations has
been disappearing. The relations have been questioned already.
Do you expect a breaking up?
The level of the relations has still been balanced. Turkey has been
in a position to constructively criticize Israel's policies. And a
lot of Turkey's criticisms of Israel have been heard there. At the
end the two countries neither break up nor come closer.
Could Israel be further isolated in the region?
Israel has already been isolated in the region. Israel forms tactical,
diplomatic relations in the region not based on peace. It's been
trying to develop relations with non-Arab Muslim states to break its
isolation. Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria
and Iran, but Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still,
Israel doesn't have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state
builds walls around itself.
And Turkey has been following a 'zero problems with neighbors'
policy. Would it be able to follow that policy with an incursion into
northern Iraq?
The idea behind the no problems with neighbors policy is to have
a European-like approach toward countries around Turkey so you
can continue with the democratic reform process and concentrate
on increasing standards of living. If your agenda is dominated
by security concerns and ethnic nationalism, you cannot deal with
concerns related to democracy. If you've watched the discussions in
Parliament during the meeting for the authorization of an incursion
into northern Iraq, you'd have seen that parliamentarians have
become either doves or hawks, and the debate had nothing to do with
the country's problems. Plus, the Turkish military presence in the
Middle East has always been problematic.
You mean the Middle Eastern states don't like to see Turkish troops
in their territory?
Even Turkey's peace corps in Lebanon hasn't been well received by
some Lebanese groups. Since the Middle Eastern region was dominated
by the Ottoman Empire, there is a historical reason they don't want
to see the Turkish military in the region. Now Turkey has a respected
civilian and economic presence in the region. You can see Turkish
products all around. You can shop using Turkish lira in Syria,
Egypt and even in northern Iraq. Turkey's image has been further
strengthened in the Middle East when Turkey did not authorize the
transit of the US troops into Iraq on March 1, 2003.
Do you think the PKK might be trying to drag the Turkish military
into the region?
The image of Turkey that the PKK wants to portray is a Turkey
that is aggressive and willing to use military power at the first
opportunity. The PKK doesn't like Turkey's economic and civilian
presence in the region.
Does Turkey rightly perceive a threat if an independent Kurdish state
is formed in northern Iraq?
Iraq's territorial integrity is important for Turkey and other
countries that have an interest in the region. Iraq's disintegration
is neither good for Turkey, nor the other Middle Eastern countries,
the US or the European Union. The EU does not want a threatening
state close to its borders. Iraq's disintegration would automatically
threaten the American soldiers in the country. Syria, Iran and Turkey
wouldn't like rising pan-Kurdish nationalism. Iraq's reconciliation
process should be supported by all. Still, Turkey cannot ignore that
there is an ongoing process in northern Iraq, which is the building
up of a Kurdish nation.
How in that case can Massoud Barzani (the head of the regional Kurdish
authority) support Turkey against the PKK?
Nobody, especially Barzani, would want to be in a position to
mistreat the people in that region. In the short run, Barzani
wouldn't take Turkey's side against the PKK, at least not by his own
will. Additionally, Kurds want to have an independent state even though
the present situation doesn't allow it. So Barzani would like to act
as the leader of emerging Kurdish nation. He considers the PKK to be
part of the Kurdish nation and would not want to be in the position
of punishing his relatives in this sensitive process.
However, Barzani is important to any effort that targets the PKK.
There is an urgent need for a two-track policy and there should be a
win-win situation for the both sides. First Ankara needs to increase
its leverage in Iraqi politics in a way that central administration
can limit the Kurdish groups not vice versa. Second, Ankara should
engage with Barzani in a constructive manner, which would help him to
understand the meaning of a responsible politician in this sensitive
region. Both carrot and stick may work here.
Would talking to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani help?
In that regard Abdullah Gul's presidency is a positive development
because he would probably have a meeting with Talabani. Communication
channels should be open to other secular groups in Iraq including
Sunni groups other than already engaged and Shia groups, in particular
secular ones like Iyad Allawi, etc.
[PROFILE]
Bulent Aras
A professor at the International Relations Department of Iþýk
University in Ýstanbul, Bulent Aras was a visiting scholar in 1998
at the University of Indiana's Department of Central Eurasian Studies.
He was a guest researcher in 2003 at Oxford University's St. Antony's
College and a senior researcher in 2004 at the European Union
Institute of Security Studies in Paris. Among his 13 books are
"Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and Turkey" (1998), "New Geopolitics
of Eurasia and Turkey's Position" (2002) and "Turkey and the Greater
Middle East" (2004). His academic articles, which have been translated
into Persian, Arabic and Russian, have been published in periodicals
such as Middle East Policy, the Journal of Third World Studies,
the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Futures, the
Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans, Mediterranean Quarterly and
East European Quarterly.
--Boundary_(ID_y0Ezlgio6m5f/II3RM7dmQ) --