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CAUCASUS BLIND ALLEY: NO POINT IN WAITING FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE ABKHAZIAN, SOUTH OSSETIAN, AND KARABAKH CONFLICTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE
by Yuri Simonjan
DEFENSE and SECURITY
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta
October 24, 2007 Wednesday
Russia
Knot of conflicts in the Caucasus: is there light at the end of the
tunnel? People's right to self-determination is incompatible with
the principle of territorial integrity.
Different as they are, three conflicts in the southern part of the
Caucasus have only one thing in common - their unsolvable nature.
Every conflict (Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian,
Azerbaijani-Armenian) have plenty of causes. What unites them and
makes the alley truly blind comes down to the main principle of the
process of settlement, one that proclaims the "people's right to
self-determination within the framework of territorial integrity of
the state."
In the era of the collapse of the colonial world system, people's right
to self-determination legalized by the UN Resolution dated December
14, 1960, stands in violation of the "territorial integrity of states"
last legalized at the international level in the OSCE Helsinki Final
Act dated August 1, 1975. As a matter of fact, it is even possible
to discover a collision between the mentioned UN resolution and the
UN principle that recognizes every person's right to fight for its
rights even to the degree of uprising.
All attempts to apply both postulates at once become inevitably
frustrated. How can the principle of territorial integrity be made
compatible with the Abkhazians' right to self-determination? How can
it be applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh region made mono-ethnic by the
war? Or to South Ossetia where one half of the population wants one
thing and the other insists on something diametrically different?
Self-proclaimed countries denied international recognition would not
even hear of any other option. Intermediaries suggest referendums
with refugees' participation, but how can the Georgians be returned
to Abkhazia or Azerbaijanis to Nagorno-Karabakh? What consequences
may their return have? Barring the deployment of a commando unit
or paratroops in every street, that is. Will refugees - the people
who barely escaped death once - have the courage to go back? And,
what really counts, will the warring sides accept and abide by the
outcome of the referendum whatever it is?
All these questions are of course rhetorical. All referendums that
could be organized were duly organized and no more are possible. The
matter concerns referendums on sovereignty, ones that ended with the
nearly unanimous support of independence in all three self-proclaimed
republics of the Caucasus. Needless to say, the international
community refuses to accept their legitimacy. Driven from Abkhazia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgians and Azerbaijanis never participated
in the referendums. As for South Ossetia, the international community
suspects the use of the administrative resource. The authorities of
the self-proclaimed republics were warned that neither referendums nor
elections would be recognized as valid... but Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and
Stepanakert keep referring to the people's right to self-determination.
Paata Zakareishvili of the Center for Development and Cooperation
in Tbilisi refuses to believe that everything is lost for Georgia in
connection with the runaway provinces. "The South Ossetian Autonomous
Region is an enclave. It is the geographical heart of Georgia.
Contacts with Russia are only possible via the Rok Tunnel. Abkhazia
has a border with Russia and access to the Black Sea through it. It
even has infrastructure. It means the components that create the
illusion of sovereignty and the authorities in Sukhumi are going
to make use of this illusion as long as they can and probably even
longer than that. The former South Ossetian Autonomous Region lacks
it all, that's what makes it different and that is why its population
sees itself as part of Georgia. People there know that being part
of Georgia is better than trying to join Russia across the Caucasus
Range. Tskhinvali is waiting for serious offers from Georgia, offers
that will show that South Ossetia has Georgia's respect.
Unfortunately, Georgia wouldn't condescend to it. It prefers the use
of demands and an illusion of its own - that of dual power in the
region. These parallel power structures established in the former
South Ossetian Autonomous Republic or in the Kodor Gorge serve to
deteriorate the situation and demonstrate inadequacy, shortsightedness,
and unstable nature of Tbilisi's policy," Zakareishvili said.
It's more complicated with Nagorno-Karabakh. It demands sovereignty
in order to join Armenia afterwards. Needless to say, Baku wouldn't
hear of it. Unlike in the matter of the conflicts in Georgia, however,
negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue.
Unfortunately, the frequency of the meetings is probably the only
thing to be shown for the process since no progress at all has been
made. Differences in the foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan do
not make the negotiations any easier. Azerbaijan is clearly drifting
to the West while Armenia is thoroughly pro-Russian. Baku views
NATO membership as an objective, and Armenia is a member of the CIS
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Opinion polls among the population of Georgia and in its expert
community show that citizens of this country lean toward membership
in NATO as a guarantee of national security. The same trends in
Azerbaijan are less noticeable but nevertheless present. The population
of Armenia, on the other hand, counts on Russia while experts mostly
support closer contacts with NATO as much more promising and rewarding.
Different capitals in the region uphold different views on Turkey.
Baku perceives it as a powerful NATO member and - even more
importantly - a sisterly nation. Tbilisi sees in it a friendly regional
power and an invaluable partner in the modernization of its Armed
Forces. Armenia, on the other hand, views Georgia through the prism
of its tragic past and sees in it a force that interferes with its
plans to detach Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan.
The opinions of Russia are wholly different, of course. Armenia views
Moscow as a strategic ally and traditional protector. Azerbaijan is
clearly apprehensive and distrustful of Russia but knows better than
to enrage it. Georgia, on the other hand, openly accuses Russia as a
sponsor of separatism that does not allow Tbilisi to solve territorial
conflicts.
Zakareishvili: The policy of integration into NATO meanwhile is of
paramount importance for Azerbaijan and Armenia from the standpoint of
their national security, and all the more so within the context of the
Karabakh conflict settlement. This choice stipulates the implementation
of a specific program of actions that involves a dramatic reduction
of armies and their rearrangement in line with NATO standards. It is
also necessary to have Russia withdraw its troops from the countries
in question, close the military objects they used, neutralize Russian
agents (GRU or army intelligence, Federal Security Service, and so on)
whose extremely negative role inflammation of conflicts in the region
is undeniable.
"Fully fledged integration into NATO is impossible for our countries
without settlement of the Karabakh conflict," Zakareishvili
continued. "It follows that this particular task is a factor
stimulating efforts to settle the problem peacefully. Sure, membership
in the Alliance is not the universal cure that automatically settles
conflicts. NATO does include Turkey and Greece, Ireland and Great
Britain that have been opponents for decades. All the same, these
conflicts are restrained within political margins and armed conflicts
are inevitably prevented from taking place."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Yuri Simonjan
DEFENSE and SECURITY
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta
October 24, 2007 Wednesday
Russia
Knot of conflicts in the Caucasus: is there light at the end of the
tunnel? People's right to self-determination is incompatible with
the principle of territorial integrity.
Different as they are, three conflicts in the southern part of the
Caucasus have only one thing in common - their unsolvable nature.
Every conflict (Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian,
Azerbaijani-Armenian) have plenty of causes. What unites them and
makes the alley truly blind comes down to the main principle of the
process of settlement, one that proclaims the "people's right to
self-determination within the framework of territorial integrity of
the state."
In the era of the collapse of the colonial world system, people's right
to self-determination legalized by the UN Resolution dated December
14, 1960, stands in violation of the "territorial integrity of states"
last legalized at the international level in the OSCE Helsinki Final
Act dated August 1, 1975. As a matter of fact, it is even possible
to discover a collision between the mentioned UN resolution and the
UN principle that recognizes every person's right to fight for its
rights even to the degree of uprising.
All attempts to apply both postulates at once become inevitably
frustrated. How can the principle of territorial integrity be made
compatible with the Abkhazians' right to self-determination? How can
it be applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh region made mono-ethnic by the
war? Or to South Ossetia where one half of the population wants one
thing and the other insists on something diametrically different?
Self-proclaimed countries denied international recognition would not
even hear of any other option. Intermediaries suggest referendums
with refugees' participation, but how can the Georgians be returned
to Abkhazia or Azerbaijanis to Nagorno-Karabakh? What consequences
may their return have? Barring the deployment of a commando unit
or paratroops in every street, that is. Will refugees - the people
who barely escaped death once - have the courage to go back? And,
what really counts, will the warring sides accept and abide by the
outcome of the referendum whatever it is?
All these questions are of course rhetorical. All referendums that
could be organized were duly organized and no more are possible. The
matter concerns referendums on sovereignty, ones that ended with the
nearly unanimous support of independence in all three self-proclaimed
republics of the Caucasus. Needless to say, the international
community refuses to accept their legitimacy. Driven from Abkhazia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgians and Azerbaijanis never participated
in the referendums. As for South Ossetia, the international community
suspects the use of the administrative resource. The authorities of
the self-proclaimed republics were warned that neither referendums nor
elections would be recognized as valid... but Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and
Stepanakert keep referring to the people's right to self-determination.
Paata Zakareishvili of the Center for Development and Cooperation
in Tbilisi refuses to believe that everything is lost for Georgia in
connection with the runaway provinces. "The South Ossetian Autonomous
Region is an enclave. It is the geographical heart of Georgia.
Contacts with Russia are only possible via the Rok Tunnel. Abkhazia
has a border with Russia and access to the Black Sea through it. It
even has infrastructure. It means the components that create the
illusion of sovereignty and the authorities in Sukhumi are going
to make use of this illusion as long as they can and probably even
longer than that. The former South Ossetian Autonomous Region lacks
it all, that's what makes it different and that is why its population
sees itself as part of Georgia. People there know that being part
of Georgia is better than trying to join Russia across the Caucasus
Range. Tskhinvali is waiting for serious offers from Georgia, offers
that will show that South Ossetia has Georgia's respect.
Unfortunately, Georgia wouldn't condescend to it. It prefers the use
of demands and an illusion of its own - that of dual power in the
region. These parallel power structures established in the former
South Ossetian Autonomous Republic or in the Kodor Gorge serve to
deteriorate the situation and demonstrate inadequacy, shortsightedness,
and unstable nature of Tbilisi's policy," Zakareishvili said.
It's more complicated with Nagorno-Karabakh. It demands sovereignty
in order to join Armenia afterwards. Needless to say, Baku wouldn't
hear of it. Unlike in the matter of the conflicts in Georgia, however,
negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue.
Unfortunately, the frequency of the meetings is probably the only
thing to be shown for the process since no progress at all has been
made. Differences in the foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan do
not make the negotiations any easier. Azerbaijan is clearly drifting
to the West while Armenia is thoroughly pro-Russian. Baku views
NATO membership as an objective, and Armenia is a member of the CIS
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Opinion polls among the population of Georgia and in its expert
community show that citizens of this country lean toward membership
in NATO as a guarantee of national security. The same trends in
Azerbaijan are less noticeable but nevertheless present. The population
of Armenia, on the other hand, counts on Russia while experts mostly
support closer contacts with NATO as much more promising and rewarding.
Different capitals in the region uphold different views on Turkey.
Baku perceives it as a powerful NATO member and - even more
importantly - a sisterly nation. Tbilisi sees in it a friendly regional
power and an invaluable partner in the modernization of its Armed
Forces. Armenia, on the other hand, views Georgia through the prism
of its tragic past and sees in it a force that interferes with its
plans to detach Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan.
The opinions of Russia are wholly different, of course. Armenia views
Moscow as a strategic ally and traditional protector. Azerbaijan is
clearly apprehensive and distrustful of Russia but knows better than
to enrage it. Georgia, on the other hand, openly accuses Russia as a
sponsor of separatism that does not allow Tbilisi to solve territorial
conflicts.
Zakareishvili: The policy of integration into NATO meanwhile is of
paramount importance for Azerbaijan and Armenia from the standpoint of
their national security, and all the more so within the context of the
Karabakh conflict settlement. This choice stipulates the implementation
of a specific program of actions that involves a dramatic reduction
of armies and their rearrangement in line with NATO standards. It is
also necessary to have Russia withdraw its troops from the countries
in question, close the military objects they used, neutralize Russian
agents (GRU or army intelligence, Federal Security Service, and so on)
whose extremely negative role inflammation of conflicts in the region
is undeniable.
"Fully fledged integration into NATO is impossible for our countries
without settlement of the Karabakh conflict," Zakareishvili
continued. "It follows that this particular task is a factor
stimulating efforts to settle the problem peacefully. Sure, membership
in the Alliance is not the universal cure that automatically settles
conflicts. NATO does include Turkey and Greece, Ireland and Great
Britain that have been opponents for decades. All the same, these
conflicts are restrained within political margins and armed conflicts
are inevitably prevented from taking place."
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress