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Daily Times, Pakistan
Friday, September 21, 2007
VIEW: Russia and the Kosovo card - Charles Tannock
The biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
Russia may recognise breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, - and
back them more strongly than it does now
Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it
is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to
leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally
viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with
British backing probable) is now preparing to recognise Kosovo's
independence unilaterally - irrespective of the consequences for
Europe and the world.
Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission
guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of
Serbia. But, with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority demanding its own
state, and with Russia refusing to recognise UN mediator Martti
Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence, the US is preparing to
go it alone. Instead of thinking what Ahtisaari deemed unthinkable, a
partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north going to Serbia and
the rest linked to the Kosovars ethnic brethren in Albania or a
separate state, the US plans to act without the UN's blessing, arguing
that only an independent Kosovo will bring stability to the Western
Balkans.
That argument is debatable - and the record of the Kosovar government
suggests that it is wrong. But the US position is unambiguously
misguided in not foreseeing that the `Kosovo precedent' will incite
instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.
Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes have
gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered since
1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974, and
Israel's occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is
suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential
flashpoints.
Nevertheless, the US - and most European Union members - argue that
Kosovo's situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding
international precedent. But Russia sees things very
differently. Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to re-establish
its authority over the nations and territories that were once part of
the Soviet Union.
Spain and Cyprus with their worries over secessionist-minded regions,
are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the fallout from
Kosovo's unilaterally gaining independence on neighbouring
Moldova. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognise the
breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian troops
and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years.
Ukraine - the great prize in Russia's bid to recapture its former
sphere of influence - is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia
will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic
Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine by
Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954). Russia may decide to abuse the Kosovo
precedent further to divide Ukraine's population between Russian
speakers and Ukrainian speakers.
But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
Russia may recognise breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, - and
back them more strongly than it does now.
Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, the Kremlin was
making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens of
Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into its
economy. Russia's supposed `peacekeeping troops' in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Georgia's other secession-minded region, have in fact
protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing a
complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the resolve
of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili.
Should Russia recognise Abkhazia's independence, Saakashvili might be
tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from
unraveling. Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk
of open warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as
there are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the
breakaway government.
Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian
support) will recognise Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed
independence from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian,
endured a bloody secessionist war between1988 and 1994, with 30,000
killed and 14% of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Russian-backed
Armenian forces.
Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the
government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare
than it was in the 1990's. Moreover, it has neighbouring Turkey on
its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on
Armenia, including closure of its border.
Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that
Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased
equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug
in and have received a significant boost from Russia's diversion of
heavy weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military
bases.
Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a
strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border
in Armenia, partly as a security measure in case of a US attack and
partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains eager
to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri minority
in northern Iran.
The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually
called `frozen conflicts,' because not much has happened since they
began in the early 1990's. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its
independence is likely to unfreeze them - fast and bloodily. And such
potential bloodshed on Russia's border may give Vladimir Putin the
pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally
mandated end next March. - DT-PS
Charles Tannock is a member of the European Parliament, where he is
spokesman on foreign affairs for the British Conservative Party
Friday, September 21, 2007
VIEW: Russia and the Kosovo card - Charles Tannock
The biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
Russia may recognise breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, - and
back them more strongly than it does now
Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it
is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to
leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally
viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with
British backing probable) is now preparing to recognise Kosovo's
independence unilaterally - irrespective of the consequences for
Europe and the world.
Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission
guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of
Serbia. But, with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority demanding its own
state, and with Russia refusing to recognise UN mediator Martti
Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence, the US is preparing to
go it alone. Instead of thinking what Ahtisaari deemed unthinkable, a
partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north going to Serbia and
the rest linked to the Kosovars ethnic brethren in Albania or a
separate state, the US plans to act without the UN's blessing, arguing
that only an independent Kosovo will bring stability to the Western
Balkans.
That argument is debatable - and the record of the Kosovar government
suggests that it is wrong. But the US position is unambiguously
misguided in not foreseeing that the `Kosovo precedent' will incite
instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.
Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes have
gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered since
1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974, and
Israel's occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is
suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential
flashpoints.
Nevertheless, the US - and most European Union members - argue that
Kosovo's situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding
international precedent. But Russia sees things very
differently. Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to re-establish
its authority over the nations and territories that were once part of
the Soviet Union.
Spain and Cyprus with their worries over secessionist-minded regions,
are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the fallout from
Kosovo's unilaterally gaining independence on neighbouring
Moldova. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognise the
breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian troops
and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years.
Ukraine - the great prize in Russia's bid to recapture its former
sphere of influence - is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia
will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic
Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine by
Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954). Russia may decide to abuse the Kosovo
precedent further to divide Ukraine's population between Russian
speakers and Ukrainian speakers.
But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's
independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
Russia may recognise breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, - and
back them more strongly than it does now.
Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, the Kremlin was
making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens of
Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into its
economy. Russia's supposed `peacekeeping troops' in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Georgia's other secession-minded region, have in fact
protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing a
complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the resolve
of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili.
Should Russia recognise Abkhazia's independence, Saakashvili might be
tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from
unraveling. Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk
of open warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as
there are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the
breakaway government.
Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian
support) will recognise Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed
independence from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian,
endured a bloody secessionist war between1988 and 1994, with 30,000
killed and 14% of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Russian-backed
Armenian forces.
Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the
government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare
than it was in the 1990's. Moreover, it has neighbouring Turkey on
its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on
Armenia, including closure of its border.
Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that
Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased
equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug
in and have received a significant boost from Russia's diversion of
heavy weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military
bases.
Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a
strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border
in Armenia, partly as a security measure in case of a US attack and
partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains eager
to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri minority
in northern Iran.
The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually
called `frozen conflicts,' because not much has happened since they
began in the early 1990's. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its
independence is likely to unfreeze them - fast and bloodily. And such
potential bloodshed on Russia's border may give Vladimir Putin the
pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally
mandated end next March. - DT-PS
Charles Tannock is a member of the European Parliament, where he is
spokesman on foreign affairs for the British Conservative Party