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Vladimir Kazimirov:
AzatArtsakh
PanARMENIAN.Net.
20-09-200 7
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is gradually transforming into 'an
eternal issue'. The efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group have not produced
effect yet and Azerbaijan's statements on change of format are heard
more and more frequently. Although, there is no guarantee that
transfer of the issue in UN can introduce changes in the process.
PanARMENIAN.Net requested former Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group,
Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov to comment on the situation. The Azeri
Foreign Ministry's statements on skirmishes and casualties at the
NKR-Azeri frontline have become more frequent recently. The Armenian
side often refutes the statements. Would you comment on the difference
of the parties' assessments of the situation? Divergence of the kind
is not a novelty. There are plenty of mutually excluding statements.
It's not hard to clarify their essence. How do skirmishes influence on
the situation? First of all, it's a cynical means to aggravate tension
and incite hatred toward the adversary, to test the positions and
efficiency. Incidents emerge by another reason as well. Refusing to
move away the frontline, Baku preserved the previous distance between
the armed forces (several hundreds meters, as it used to be during the
war) and even tried to shorten it lately. Not only soldiers and
officers but also civilians die. Here a question arouses: what is more
important - people's life or maintenance of tension? Which side is
interested in strained atmosphere at the contact line? Isn't it the
one threatening with revenge? There is one more aspect. On Russia's
initiative, February 4, 1995 all three parties to the conflict signed
a ceasefire agreement under the aegis of the OSCE. They undertook to
communicate in order to localize and settle the conflict as well as
prevent development of enemy propaganda. The document was signed by
the Defense Ministers with the approval of Heydar Aliyev, Levon
Ter-Petrosian and Robert Kocharian. However, the sides fail to obey
the agreement. When I pointed out to the anomaly, Armenia's Serge
Sargsyan and NK's Seyran Ohanyan over 2 years ago publicly announced
they are ready to fulfill the provisions of the agreement if Baku does
the same. However, Safar Abiyev was not capable to utter anything,
except for threats. Even tactful Elmar Mammadyarov drags out the
problem until final resolution of the conflict. Baku doesn't seem to
need either Karabakh's participation in the agreement or close
contacts between the sides. And finally, it seems quite uninterested
in settling the incidents. You said the agreement was concluded under
the OSCE aegis. Why doesn't the organization insist on its fulfillment
by the sides? That's a reasonable question. It proves inaccuracy and
feebleness of those who pressed for MG's leading role in the Karabakh
settlement. By the way, this agreement signed by the parties is the
OSCE's only asset. Even Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, who has conducted
monitoring of the frontline twice a month for 10 years, came to know
about it in 2003, thanks to an article of mine. The Co-chairs
mentioned about the agreement in their London statement in 2005 but
failed to urge its implementation. Political will is needed for it.
But is it directed correctly? If Baku rates it as imperfect, so it
could be amended. At worst, a new one could be developed. The problem
is pressing: people die, tension generates. Informing of incidents
almost every day, Baku pretends to be badly concerned about the issue.
But where is the logic? Where are proposals? Or must it just be so?
GUAM is aspired to raise the issue of frozen conflicts at the 62nd
session of the UN General Assembly. It's an attempt to attract states
which have no idea about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. How can this
factor influence on the settlement process? The less they are informed
the better is for the initiators. However, Azerbaijan will not derive
clear profit from this move. Azeris will mount their hobby-horse and
urge implementation of the UN Security Council's resolution on
Karabakh. But how are they going to conceal that they failed to
fulfill all UN demand except for ceasefire. It's worth mentioning that
this provision was observed partially, for hostilities have been
suspended but incidents are still provoked. It was Baku that upset 4
agreements in 1993-94. Documents are available. It's not accidental
that after Baku's violating the ceasefire in 1993, the UN Security
Council stopped to issue resolutions on Karabakh. What is a year of
war? How many people died? How many people left their homes? The
Azerbaijani population suffered from non-fulfillment of the
resolutions most of all. Not the resolutions but the fear of complete
collapse made Baku agree to ceasefire. Other facts can also come to
light in the UN General Assembly. So, GUAM member states will not have
an easy deal in New York. How can the conflict be settled if
Azerbaijan isn't ready to compromise and doesn't observe agreements
even after singing them? As a matter of fact, ability of the parties
to the Karabakh conflict to make agreements and fulfill commitments is
questioned. Threats to resume hostilities run counter to the
commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully, as urged by the Council
of Europe entry condition. Verbal threats are transformed into real
deeds through armament race and incitement of hatred towards the
neighbor nation. Two out of three parties cannot agree on settlement
'principles'. However, to sign an agreement does not mean to implement
it. That is why the OSCE should take it into account and refrain from
superfluous 'tolerance' in the Karabakh issue. Presently, Armenians
make use of Azerbaijan's obvious irresponsibility as regard the UN
resolutions. But democracy is not the only point for competition. The
state's consistency is also an important factor at the international
arena.
AzatArtsakh
PanARMENIAN.Net.
20-09-200 7
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict is gradually transforming into 'an
eternal issue'. The efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group have not produced
effect yet and Azerbaijan's statements on change of format are heard
more and more frequently. Although, there is no guarantee that
transfer of the issue in UN can introduce changes in the process.
PanARMENIAN.Net requested former Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group,
Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov to comment on the situation. The Azeri
Foreign Ministry's statements on skirmishes and casualties at the
NKR-Azeri frontline have become more frequent recently. The Armenian
side often refutes the statements. Would you comment on the difference
of the parties' assessments of the situation? Divergence of the kind
is not a novelty. There are plenty of mutually excluding statements.
It's not hard to clarify their essence. How do skirmishes influence on
the situation? First of all, it's a cynical means to aggravate tension
and incite hatred toward the adversary, to test the positions and
efficiency. Incidents emerge by another reason as well. Refusing to
move away the frontline, Baku preserved the previous distance between
the armed forces (several hundreds meters, as it used to be during the
war) and even tried to shorten it lately. Not only soldiers and
officers but also civilians die. Here a question arouses: what is more
important - people's life or maintenance of tension? Which side is
interested in strained atmosphere at the contact line? Isn't it the
one threatening with revenge? There is one more aspect. On Russia's
initiative, February 4, 1995 all three parties to the conflict signed
a ceasefire agreement under the aegis of the OSCE. They undertook to
communicate in order to localize and settle the conflict as well as
prevent development of enemy propaganda. The document was signed by
the Defense Ministers with the approval of Heydar Aliyev, Levon
Ter-Petrosian and Robert Kocharian. However, the sides fail to obey
the agreement. When I pointed out to the anomaly, Armenia's Serge
Sargsyan and NK's Seyran Ohanyan over 2 years ago publicly announced
they are ready to fulfill the provisions of the agreement if Baku does
the same. However, Safar Abiyev was not capable to utter anything,
except for threats. Even tactful Elmar Mammadyarov drags out the
problem until final resolution of the conflict. Baku doesn't seem to
need either Karabakh's participation in the agreement or close
contacts between the sides. And finally, it seems quite uninterested
in settling the incidents. You said the agreement was concluded under
the OSCE aegis. Why doesn't the organization insist on its fulfillment
by the sides? That's a reasonable question. It proves inaccuracy and
feebleness of those who pressed for MG's leading role in the Karabakh
settlement. By the way, this agreement signed by the parties is the
OSCE's only asset. Even Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, who has conducted
monitoring of the frontline twice a month for 10 years, came to know
about it in 2003, thanks to an article of mine. The Co-chairs
mentioned about the agreement in their London statement in 2005 but
failed to urge its implementation. Political will is needed for it.
But is it directed correctly? If Baku rates it as imperfect, so it
could be amended. At worst, a new one could be developed. The problem
is pressing: people die, tension generates. Informing of incidents
almost every day, Baku pretends to be badly concerned about the issue.
But where is the logic? Where are proposals? Or must it just be so?
GUAM is aspired to raise the issue of frozen conflicts at the 62nd
session of the UN General Assembly. It's an attempt to attract states
which have no idea about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. How can this
factor influence on the settlement process? The less they are informed
the better is for the initiators. However, Azerbaijan will not derive
clear profit from this move. Azeris will mount their hobby-horse and
urge implementation of the UN Security Council's resolution on
Karabakh. But how are they going to conceal that they failed to
fulfill all UN demand except for ceasefire. It's worth mentioning that
this provision was observed partially, for hostilities have been
suspended but incidents are still provoked. It was Baku that upset 4
agreements in 1993-94. Documents are available. It's not accidental
that after Baku's violating the ceasefire in 1993, the UN Security
Council stopped to issue resolutions on Karabakh. What is a year of
war? How many people died? How many people left their homes? The
Azerbaijani population suffered from non-fulfillment of the
resolutions most of all. Not the resolutions but the fear of complete
collapse made Baku agree to ceasefire. Other facts can also come to
light in the UN General Assembly. So, GUAM member states will not have
an easy deal in New York. How can the conflict be settled if
Azerbaijan isn't ready to compromise and doesn't observe agreements
even after singing them? As a matter of fact, ability of the parties
to the Karabakh conflict to make agreements and fulfill commitments is
questioned. Threats to resume hostilities run counter to the
commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully, as urged by the Council
of Europe entry condition. Verbal threats are transformed into real
deeds through armament race and incitement of hatred towards the
neighbor nation. Two out of three parties cannot agree on settlement
'principles'. However, to sign an agreement does not mean to implement
it. That is why the OSCE should take it into account and refrain from
superfluous 'tolerance' in the Karabakh issue. Presently, Armenians
make use of Azerbaijan's obvious irresponsibility as regard the UN
resolutions. But democracy is not the only point for competition. The
state's consistency is also an important factor at the international
arena.