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Ha'aretz, Israel
Dec 31 2009
Why lobbies don't matter
By Yossi Shain and Neil Rogachevsky
The signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Turkey in October
was a little-noticed milestone. Since the Ottomans deported and
murdered Armenians in World War I in what Armenians and much of the
world call the Armenian Genocide, Armenians have not been fond of
Turkey. For its part, Turkey has long disputed both the genocide and
the Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan, a
close Turkish ally. Though signed pledges do not guarantee peace, the
U.S.-brokered pledges to reestablish ties and open borders could well
prove to be the beginning of the end of this intractable conflict.
The pledges were made in the face of some resistance in both
countries, but particularly among the Armenian diaspora and its
leaders. The so-called "Armenian lobby," which was thought in the
1990s to determine both U.S. and Armenian government policy in the
Caspian Sea, staunchly opposed the deal and mobilized the community
against it. In Los Angeles the week before the signing, Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan was confronted by around 12,000 protesters.
One prominent Armenian-American declared the agreement "the latest
entry in the ledger of crimes committed, and covered up, against the
Armenian nation." Nevertheless, opposition from the Armenian Diaspora
did not stop Turkey and Armenia from coming to terms.
The Armenian lobby's failure to block the treaty is instructive when
one considers that other mythically powerful diaspora group known as
the "Israel lobby." The Israel lobby has long been thought to exert
vast influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East. In the extreme
version of this view, it is only the foot-dragging of hawkish
pro-Israel groups like AIPAC that has stymied American efforts to
improve the prospects for peace in the Middle East.
Many believers in the power of lobbying have expressed hope that new
dynamics in the American Jewish community could shift U.S. policy in
the Middle East. Finally, there is a president who has pledged a more
"evenhanded" policy between Israelis and Palestinians, and the
American Jewish community remains firmly in his camp. Furthermore, a
new dovish Israel lobby called J Street, which held its inaugural
conference in November to great fanfare, was formed with the explicit
task of supporting U.S. President Barack Obama's Middle East policy -
or in the words of J Street founder Jeremy Ben-Ami, "to be the
president's blocking back."
In short, if ever there were a time in which America could "change
course" in the Middle East, it would seem to be now. Obama, supported
by J Street and the American Jewish community at large, can lean on
Israel with no domestic political cost, so American policy in the
Middle East can finally become more rational and effective.
But so far, there has not been much progress. A year into Obama's
term, the situation in the Middle East - particularly on the
Israeli-Palestinian front - looks as intractable as before. The
parties remain as far from each other as ever on the so-called "core
issues" such as the future of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of
return. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah
faction has said he will not run for a new term. Without him, Fatah's
control over the West Bank, tenuous at the best of times, could become
still weaker.
Over in Gaza, Hamas is deepening its control and does not seem to be
moderating its position with the necessities of governing, as some
experts had hoped. Meanwhile, Israel's settlements in the West Bank,
thought by some to be an obstacle to peace, continue their "natural
growth." If there is progress on Israel-Palestine any time soon, it
doesn't seem that it will come by way of U.S. diplomacy.
Both the successful signing of an Armenian-Turkish accord and the
inability of Israelis and Palestinians to achieve one indicates that
the power of lobbies to influence events, and even U.S. policy, has
been highly exaggerated. The Armenian diaspora could not stop the
Armenian government from concluding a deal. Despite its alleged power
on Capitol Hill, the Armenian lobby could not dent American enthusiasm
for blessing this new opening in the Caucasus. Earlier, it had been
thought that the Armenian lobby was hindering an accord. But it turns
out the moment for such an accord was just not right. Now, with
Turkey's serious push for European Union membership and Armenia's
desire to benefit from the end of the Turkish blockade, conditions
have become favorable for a deal.
Similarly, the Obama administration faces no politically relevant
opposition from American Jews on its Middle East policy. But no
progress has been made, despite this administration's new orientation,
because the sides aren't ready. The situation, to use the old phrase,
is not ripe. Ignorance of those conditions could lead one to believe
that a little bit of lobbying can make all the difference - and to a
vast over-estimation of the power of ethnic lobbying over U.S. policy.
But, happily or unhappily, reality has other ideas.
With all the attention on lobbying, shuttle diplomacy and the like,
genuine small achievements in Israel-Palestine have gone unnoticed.
Checkpoints have been removed in the West Bank, the Palestinian
economy in the West Bank has grown steadily, and robust civil society,
slowly but surely, continues to grow in the West Bank. These
encouraging signs may one day make the situation ripe for agreement.
Should that materialize, let's not allow any lobbying organizations to
take much credit for it.
Prof. Yossi Shain heads Tel Aviv University's Hartog School of
Government. Neil Rogachevsky is a doctoral student at Georgetown
University. The two are writing a book on American foreign policy and
the myth of the Jewish lobby.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/113892 5.html
Dec 31 2009
Why lobbies don't matter
By Yossi Shain and Neil Rogachevsky
The signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Turkey in October
was a little-noticed milestone. Since the Ottomans deported and
murdered Armenians in World War I in what Armenians and much of the
world call the Armenian Genocide, Armenians have not been fond of
Turkey. For its part, Turkey has long disputed both the genocide and
the Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in Azerbaijan, a
close Turkish ally. Though signed pledges do not guarantee peace, the
U.S.-brokered pledges to reestablish ties and open borders could well
prove to be the beginning of the end of this intractable conflict.
The pledges were made in the face of some resistance in both
countries, but particularly among the Armenian diaspora and its
leaders. The so-called "Armenian lobby," which was thought in the
1990s to determine both U.S. and Armenian government policy in the
Caspian Sea, staunchly opposed the deal and mobilized the community
against it. In Los Angeles the week before the signing, Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan was confronted by around 12,000 protesters.
One prominent Armenian-American declared the agreement "the latest
entry in the ledger of crimes committed, and covered up, against the
Armenian nation." Nevertheless, opposition from the Armenian Diaspora
did not stop Turkey and Armenia from coming to terms.
The Armenian lobby's failure to block the treaty is instructive when
one considers that other mythically powerful diaspora group known as
the "Israel lobby." The Israel lobby has long been thought to exert
vast influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East. In the extreme
version of this view, it is only the foot-dragging of hawkish
pro-Israel groups like AIPAC that has stymied American efforts to
improve the prospects for peace in the Middle East.
Many believers in the power of lobbying have expressed hope that new
dynamics in the American Jewish community could shift U.S. policy in
the Middle East. Finally, there is a president who has pledged a more
"evenhanded" policy between Israelis and Palestinians, and the
American Jewish community remains firmly in his camp. Furthermore, a
new dovish Israel lobby called J Street, which held its inaugural
conference in November to great fanfare, was formed with the explicit
task of supporting U.S. President Barack Obama's Middle East policy -
or in the words of J Street founder Jeremy Ben-Ami, "to be the
president's blocking back."
In short, if ever there were a time in which America could "change
course" in the Middle East, it would seem to be now. Obama, supported
by J Street and the American Jewish community at large, can lean on
Israel with no domestic political cost, so American policy in the
Middle East can finally become more rational and effective.
But so far, there has not been much progress. A year into Obama's
term, the situation in the Middle East - particularly on the
Israeli-Palestinian front - looks as intractable as before. The
parties remain as far from each other as ever on the so-called "core
issues" such as the future of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of
return. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah
faction has said he will not run for a new term. Without him, Fatah's
control over the West Bank, tenuous at the best of times, could become
still weaker.
Over in Gaza, Hamas is deepening its control and does not seem to be
moderating its position with the necessities of governing, as some
experts had hoped. Meanwhile, Israel's settlements in the West Bank,
thought by some to be an obstacle to peace, continue their "natural
growth." If there is progress on Israel-Palestine any time soon, it
doesn't seem that it will come by way of U.S. diplomacy.
Both the successful signing of an Armenian-Turkish accord and the
inability of Israelis and Palestinians to achieve one indicates that
the power of lobbies to influence events, and even U.S. policy, has
been highly exaggerated. The Armenian diaspora could not stop the
Armenian government from concluding a deal. Despite its alleged power
on Capitol Hill, the Armenian lobby could not dent American enthusiasm
for blessing this new opening in the Caucasus. Earlier, it had been
thought that the Armenian lobby was hindering an accord. But it turns
out the moment for such an accord was just not right. Now, with
Turkey's serious push for European Union membership and Armenia's
desire to benefit from the end of the Turkish blockade, conditions
have become favorable for a deal.
Similarly, the Obama administration faces no politically relevant
opposition from American Jews on its Middle East policy. But no
progress has been made, despite this administration's new orientation,
because the sides aren't ready. The situation, to use the old phrase,
is not ripe. Ignorance of those conditions could lead one to believe
that a little bit of lobbying can make all the difference - and to a
vast over-estimation of the power of ethnic lobbying over U.S. policy.
But, happily or unhappily, reality has other ideas.
With all the attention on lobbying, shuttle diplomacy and the like,
genuine small achievements in Israel-Palestine have gone unnoticed.
Checkpoints have been removed in the West Bank, the Palestinian
economy in the West Bank has grown steadily, and robust civil society,
slowly but surely, continues to grow in the West Bank. These
encouraging signs may one day make the situation ripe for agreement.
Should that materialize, let's not allow any lobbying organizations to
take much credit for it.
Prof. Yossi Shain heads Tel Aviv University's Hartog School of
Government. Neil Rogachevsky is a doctoral student at Georgetown
University. The two are writing a book on American foreign policy and
the myth of the Jewish lobby.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/113892 5.html