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TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS: TO BE FAIR AND RESPONSIBLE
RIA Novosti
17:1927/04/2010
By Huseyin Bagci, Professor of International Relations at Middle East
Technical University, Ankara; TV and Radio Commentator in Turkey and
а columnist for The New Anatolian
Turkish-Armenian relations entered a new stage last October. The main
question now is how far these two countries can go hand in hand under
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davudoglu's foreign policy principle
of "zero problems with the neighboring countries." Of the total ten
neighbors that Turkey has, the Armenian border is the only one that
has remained closed since the early 1990s. Previously, the border
was open, until Turkey decided it had enough reason to close it,
thus reacting to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian troops
and the ensuing exodus of thousands of Azerbaijani nationals from the
region. From the very first moments of the conflict Turkey adopted a
pro-Azerbaijani stance, which remains unchanged at present. However,
there is a question: what Turkey intends to do in the context of its
"zero problems with the neighboring countries" policy?
Turkey is undoubtedly facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it has assumed
international commitments when on October 10, 2009 it signed the
Armenia-Turkey Protocols in front of not only the world's major powers
but also the entire international community. Also, the reality is that
that the international community has been following with great interest
Turkey's policy and strategy, particularly in the last 8 years.
Turkey has a government that holds an absolute majority in the
parliament, a president who kick-started the process in his personal
diplomatic effort two years ago, and a prime minister who has been
surprising both friends and "enemies" with his statements. There is a
"new Turkey," as some experts claim, and it is crucial to dispel the
fear of Turkey held by the neighboring countries. We can already see
that our relations with Bulgaria, Greece, Iran and Syria have turned
from enmity to friendship within a decade.
But why is it so difficult for Turkish politicians to sign and ratify
the protocols that are a real milestone in Turkish-Armenian relations,
both diplomatically and politically?
As it stands, the answer lies in Baku, not in Ankara. The widely
accepted view in Turkey is that it should support Azerbaijan under
any circumstances. This has been the case since Azerbaijan gained
independence, and it is Turkey's state policy. But the Tayyip Erdogan
government claims to be different from the previous governments in
many areas. Is it really true? In theory, yes. But there are also
some critics among Turkish experts who say that Turkish foreign
policy has become hostage to Azerbaijan and has lost the freedom it
has in other cases. There is a new policy in both countries because
the main players have changed. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev
is an experienced politician, who plays on Turkey's neighbor status
to use the muscle that Turkey has as a regional power to carry out
its policy towards Armenia. The problem is, therefore, that Turkey is
not a directly involved party in this conflict and President Aliyev
knows this. Turkey also knows that it doesn't play the main role
in this conflict. Given this, why does Turkey feel obliged to side
with Azerbaijan? Is it the "two states - one nation" approach that
is forcing Turkey to remain a hostage of Azerbaijani politics?
The fact is that Armenia today needs Turkey more than ever before and
Turkey needs Armenia just as much. Opening the border would not mean
that Turkey has changed sides and has turned "against Azerbaijan." On
the contrary, opening the border would expand horizons and bring
a new vision to both countries. It is impossible to explain to the
international community and other neighboring countries why the border
remains closed. Opening the border would bring thousands of people
together, the regional economy would flourish and Armenia would be
able to open itself to the world much faster via Turkey. It was late
president Turgut Ozal in the 1980s who proposed closer relations
with Armenia and was instrumental to opening the border. He invited
Armenia to participate in Black Sea Cooperation with Azerbaijan in 1992
to create a forum for both countries. In the wake of a devastating
earthquake that Armenia suffered in late 1980s, it was his decision
for Turkey to send trains with food and other aid to Armenia.
In fact, Turkey has been interested for decades in having close
relations with Armenia. Now Turkey has asked Armenia to be patient
with the process. The recent visits of Foreign Undersecretary Feridun
Sinirlioglu to Yerevan and Baku and last week's visit by Turkish
foreign minister to Baku could be viewed as "political therapy"
towards Azerbaijan, explaining why Turkey should open the Armenian
border. It seems that Turkey is trying to convince the Azerbaijani
president, but he is not moving one inch from his position. The
response could be, "Why should he?" He is aware of Turkey's major
weakness and the strength of Turkish nationalism in matters of domestic
politics. However, in the face of history he appears to be the obstacle
to Davudoglu's "zero problem policy."
What should be expected next? Not the genocide debate popping up
randomly these days. President Obama is not going to touch upon the
genocide issue, although this is what the Armenian diaspora expects.
Too much is at stake between Turkey and the United States. However,
time is also running out for the Turkish government. In one year,
Turkey will hold general elections. It is not certain whether the
Justice and Development Party will remain in power, which means the
protocols should be ratified by the Turkish parliament as soon as
possible, if the "zero problem policy" is to be implemented under
this government.
Turkey's foreign policy has changed without losing track of the main
principle, which is to stay in the West and with the West. In order
to achieve this Turkey should deliver on the promise it made last year.
To blame Armenia would not help Turkey. Turkey took the lead in
this effort and should bring it to conclusion. Whether Azerbaijan
is unhappy with this is a different problem. But history is forcing
Turkey to take action in this process despite the opposition of
Azerbaijan. Turkey cannot fail to open its borders, as it will take
the relations between the two countries to a new social, political,
diplomatic and even psychological (the genocide debate) stage. In
short, Turkey is expected to open the borders because it has promised
to the world to do so. Turkey does not have the luxury to be "unfair"
to its small neighboring country while being "fair" to all its other
neighbors. The visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey in
two weeks' time could prove helpful in resolving this issue. From the
historical point of view, Turkey is obliged to open the borders and
to be fair at home and abroad, including in its relations with Armenia.
RIA Novosti
17:1927/04/2010
By Huseyin Bagci, Professor of International Relations at Middle East
Technical University, Ankara; TV and Radio Commentator in Turkey and
а columnist for The New Anatolian
Turkish-Armenian relations entered a new stage last October. The main
question now is how far these two countries can go hand in hand under
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davudoglu's foreign policy principle
of "zero problems with the neighboring countries." Of the total ten
neighbors that Turkey has, the Armenian border is the only one that
has remained closed since the early 1990s. Previously, the border
was open, until Turkey decided it had enough reason to close it,
thus reacting to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian troops
and the ensuing exodus of thousands of Azerbaijani nationals from the
region. From the very first moments of the conflict Turkey adopted a
pro-Azerbaijani stance, which remains unchanged at present. However,
there is a question: what Turkey intends to do in the context of its
"zero problems with the neighboring countries" policy?
Turkey is undoubtedly facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it has assumed
international commitments when on October 10, 2009 it signed the
Armenia-Turkey Protocols in front of not only the world's major powers
but also the entire international community. Also, the reality is that
that the international community has been following with great interest
Turkey's policy and strategy, particularly in the last 8 years.
Turkey has a government that holds an absolute majority in the
parliament, a president who kick-started the process in his personal
diplomatic effort two years ago, and a prime minister who has been
surprising both friends and "enemies" with his statements. There is a
"new Turkey," as some experts claim, and it is crucial to dispel the
fear of Turkey held by the neighboring countries. We can already see
that our relations with Bulgaria, Greece, Iran and Syria have turned
from enmity to friendship within a decade.
But why is it so difficult for Turkish politicians to sign and ratify
the protocols that are a real milestone in Turkish-Armenian relations,
both diplomatically and politically?
As it stands, the answer lies in Baku, not in Ankara. The widely
accepted view in Turkey is that it should support Azerbaijan under
any circumstances. This has been the case since Azerbaijan gained
independence, and it is Turkey's state policy. But the Tayyip Erdogan
government claims to be different from the previous governments in
many areas. Is it really true? In theory, yes. But there are also
some critics among Turkish experts who say that Turkish foreign
policy has become hostage to Azerbaijan and has lost the freedom it
has in other cases. There is a new policy in both countries because
the main players have changed. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev
is an experienced politician, who plays on Turkey's neighbor status
to use the muscle that Turkey has as a regional power to carry out
its policy towards Armenia. The problem is, therefore, that Turkey is
not a directly involved party in this conflict and President Aliyev
knows this. Turkey also knows that it doesn't play the main role
in this conflict. Given this, why does Turkey feel obliged to side
with Azerbaijan? Is it the "two states - one nation" approach that
is forcing Turkey to remain a hostage of Azerbaijani politics?
The fact is that Armenia today needs Turkey more than ever before and
Turkey needs Armenia just as much. Opening the border would not mean
that Turkey has changed sides and has turned "against Azerbaijan." On
the contrary, opening the border would expand horizons and bring
a new vision to both countries. It is impossible to explain to the
international community and other neighboring countries why the border
remains closed. Opening the border would bring thousands of people
together, the regional economy would flourish and Armenia would be
able to open itself to the world much faster via Turkey. It was late
president Turgut Ozal in the 1980s who proposed closer relations
with Armenia and was instrumental to opening the border. He invited
Armenia to participate in Black Sea Cooperation with Azerbaijan in 1992
to create a forum for both countries. In the wake of a devastating
earthquake that Armenia suffered in late 1980s, it was his decision
for Turkey to send trains with food and other aid to Armenia.
In fact, Turkey has been interested for decades in having close
relations with Armenia. Now Turkey has asked Armenia to be patient
with the process. The recent visits of Foreign Undersecretary Feridun
Sinirlioglu to Yerevan and Baku and last week's visit by Turkish
foreign minister to Baku could be viewed as "political therapy"
towards Azerbaijan, explaining why Turkey should open the Armenian
border. It seems that Turkey is trying to convince the Azerbaijani
president, but he is not moving one inch from his position. The
response could be, "Why should he?" He is aware of Turkey's major
weakness and the strength of Turkish nationalism in matters of domestic
politics. However, in the face of history he appears to be the obstacle
to Davudoglu's "zero problem policy."
What should be expected next? Not the genocide debate popping up
randomly these days. President Obama is not going to touch upon the
genocide issue, although this is what the Armenian diaspora expects.
Too much is at stake between Turkey and the United States. However,
time is also running out for the Turkish government. In one year,
Turkey will hold general elections. It is not certain whether the
Justice and Development Party will remain in power, which means the
protocols should be ratified by the Turkish parliament as soon as
possible, if the "zero problem policy" is to be implemented under
this government.
Turkey's foreign policy has changed without losing track of the main
principle, which is to stay in the West and with the West. In order
to achieve this Turkey should deliver on the promise it made last year.
To blame Armenia would not help Turkey. Turkey took the lead in
this effort and should bring it to conclusion. Whether Azerbaijan
is unhappy with this is a different problem. But history is forcing
Turkey to take action in this process despite the opposition of
Azerbaijan. Turkey cannot fail to open its borders, as it will take
the relations between the two countries to a new social, political,
diplomatic and even psychological (the genocide debate) stage. In
short, Turkey is expected to open the borders because it has promised
to the world to do so. Turkey does not have the luxury to be "unfair"
to its small neighboring country while being "fair" to all its other
neighbors. The visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey in
two weeks' time could prove helpful in resolving this issue. From the
historical point of view, Turkey is obliged to open the borders and
to be fair at home and abroad, including in its relations with Armenia.