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Grandmaster of dissidence, Garry Kasparov

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  • Grandmaster of dissidence, Garry Kasparov

    Jerusalem Post
    May 15 2010

    Grandmaster of dissidence, Garry Kasparov
    By DAVID HOROVITZ
    14/05/2010 19:06


    "To stop Iran, you must bring down Putin."

    Garry Kasparov is ` what else? ` playing chess when I arrive at his
    Tel Aviv hotel suite. He drags himself away from the laptop and phone
    in the bedroom just long enough to let me in, says a quick hello while
    waving me vaguely toward a couch, and then disappears again.

    I know he doesn't have much time to talk ` he'll shortly be leaving
    for Tel Aviv University, where he is scheduled to play one of his
    famed simultaneous exhibition matches, against 30 greater and lesser
    local talents (all of whom he will defeat, of course). As the minutes
    slowly pass, and I overhear him discussing sophisticated variations
    for pawns and knights with whoever it is on the other end of the phone
    line, I start to assume that the former world champion has quite
    forgotten that I'm waiting.

    RELATED:
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    Brilliance in chess, after all, requires absolute focus. The tuning
    out of all distraction. And Kasparov, who held the world's top ranking
    for 255 months in succession ` three times longer than any rival ` is
    considerably more than brilliant. He is widely regarded as the
    greatest ever exponent of this most cerebral of pursuits.

    Recently turned 47, the black locks now graying, Kasparov formally
    retired from chess five years ago. But plainly the obsession remains
    overwhelming.

    He has been coaching the 19-year-old player Magnus Carlsen, helping
    the Norwegian prodigy establish himself as the youngest ever World No.
    1. And even now, on what should be a short holiday break in sunny Tel
    Aviv, with that 30-game contest ahead of him, the Russian maestro
    evidently remains deep in the thrall of chess's endless permutations.

    As the burble of moves adopted and rejected continues from the
    bedroom, I look out from his window to the Tel Aviv beachfront and
    ruefully wonder whether, had I arrived here 10 or 15 minutes earlier,
    I might have beaten the phone call and got the interview.

    But Kasparov has developed a second obsession in recent years. Raised
    in Azerbaijan, he was born Garry Weinstein to a Jewish father, who
    died of leukemia when he was seven, and an Armenian mother whose
    surname he later adopted. And he spent his formative years in the
    paranoid world of competitive chess in the Soviet Union, where it was
    often the players, no matter how gifted, who were the pawns, and where
    success on the board of play was deemed vital to the nation's global
    prestige.

    Having grown up with the weight of Communist expectations on his frail
    shoulders, in the fevered climate of nationalism, manipulation and
    defection that culminated in the collapse of the USSR, it is no great
    surprise that, from competitive chess, the adult Kasparov turned his
    focus to political activism. And that, here too, his commitment is
    absolute.

    And so it is, after I have waited perhaps a quarter of an hour, that
    Kasparov the chess nonpareil reluctantly surrenders to Kasparov the
    political activist. He emerges from the bedroom, warmly shakes my
    hand, and sits down to discuss that other white-black strategic
    adversary, his nemesis Vladimir Putin.

    PUTIN, THE former president of Russia and now the prime ministerial
    power behind his handpicked successor Dmitry Medvedev, is, in
    Kasparov's emphatic conception, a terrifying creature of ruthless
    avarice - the personification of Russia's woes and an acute danger to
    much of the international community besides. Kasparov's post-chess
    cause, his post-chess obsession, is to bring Putin down and thus
    `restore democracy' to his country.

    To that end, Kasparov has set up social movements for change,
    organized a series of anti-Putin rallies and demonstrations, mounted a
    short-lived presidential bid of his own, and found himself
    intermittently threatened, arrested and even briefly jailed.

    Inevitably, therefore, Putin quickly makes an entrance into our
    conversation, when I ask Kasparov how, applying a grandmaster's
    strategic thought processes to some of our difficulties, he would
    advise Israel to handle the looming threat of a nuclear Iran. And once
    on stage, the baby-faced ex-KGB chief proves a lasting presence.

    `Look,' Kasparov begins with a world-weary sigh, `Israel is in some
    kind of political trouble because there is no political will in the
    West to do anything with the Iranian crisis. Europe is too busy with
    their own agenda now. They are busy printing more money to save Greece
    and other countries rather than thinking about anything a year ahead.
    America is also busy printing money, but one would expect them to come
    up with a plan. Yet it seems there is no plan. Making the same
    statements that a nuclear Iran is `intolerable'?' he snorts cynically.
    `Fine. As we heard many times, a nuclear North Korea was also
    `unacceptable.'

    Swiftly now, in his fast, excellent English, Kasparov moves on to
    Russia. `Without Russia's technical assistance,' he notes correctly,
    `Iran wouldn't be even close to a nuclear bomb.'

    And that brings us immediately to the dark lord. Kasparov can be an
    understated, almost self-effacing and certainly a friendly presence,
    but when it comes to Putin, his body coils and his language turns
    fierce. `I said it during the Bush administration, and I repeat it
    now: Unless you make Putin listen, nothing is going to happen [to stop
    the Iranian nuclear drive]. And he's not going to listen to your
    requests or your pleading, or [respond] to some kind of sweet deal. At
    the end of the day, selling nuclear technology to Iran, selling
    anti-missile defenses, brings cash. And if America or Israel, or both,
    at a certain point attack Iran, the oil price goes up, so for Putin
    it's a win-win situation. Unless he sees real consequences for his
    well-being, he will not do anything.'

    But how, in Kasparov's view, can Putin be made to fear `real
    consequences for his well-being.' Only, it seems, via his wallet. In
    the next few minutes, Kasparov, leaning toward me from armchair to
    couch, lists a succession of Russian oligarchs who he says serve as
    the prime minister's financial henchmen ` the `family,' as he puts it,
    making considered use of Mafia terminology. `The only way to make him
    listen is to go after his money,' he says.

    Unless America is truly ready to take on some of these oligarchal
    heavyweights, says Kasparov, brow furrowed now, speaking still faster
    and with still more passion, `just don't tell me you want to stop the
    Iranian nuclear program. Iran will not stop unless Russia is ready to
    join the sanctions, because apart from the nuclear technology and
    anti-missile defense systems, Russia is a main energy supplier. It
    seems the [Obama] administration is ready to attack Goldman Sachs,' he
    says witheringly, `but it is not ready to attack Putin's financial
    interests. Which means that Iran feels safe, and rightly so.'

    How is one to `attack' the Putin `family'? On what basis?

    Kasparov looks at me a little pityingly. `I think there's enough,' he
    says after a pause, and rapidly cites a sequence of tax-evasion and
    money laundering allegations that he believes could be successfully
    pursued, were there sufficient will. `I'm sure there are many options'
    for international law enforcement. `If you believe that the Iranian
    nuclear bomb is an imminent threat, not only to Israel but also to the
    interests of the United States and the Western world, you act,' he
    says flatly. `If you don't believe it, you can find thousands of
    excuses [not to act] ` as the Western powers found 75 years ago when
    not acting against the rise of Nazi Germany.'

    Does he really want to make that comparison?

    `Putin's threat is probably not comparable to the one in the 1930s,'
    he clarifies, `but to a certain degree it will have a very serious
    impact on the Western system, because the No. 1 Russian export is not
    oil. It's corruption. And Putin has found great demand for this
    product in the West. The damage he has done to the Western political
    and business system has yet to be understood.'

    Repeating phrases I've seen him utilize in past interviews, language
    built to shock, he claims: `Where Hitler used tanks, Putin is using
    banks. And I don't know which will have the more lasting consequences.
    He doesn't use poison gas, but he uses natural gas. He's very smart in
    building his personal relationships and using enormous amounts of
    cash. I'd guess he controls more cash than anyone else on this
    planet.'

    But isn't even this horrifyingly depicted Putin concerned about
    enabling a nuclear Iran on Russia's doorstop? Kasparov's response is
    an emphatic no. `It's a legitimate question to ask about Russia,' he
    allows. Russia doesn't want a nuclear Iran. But Putin? Iran's progress
    toward nuclear weapons `doesn't affect Putin's power base in Russia,'
    he says. Actually, `it might only help... A crisis around Iran will
    boost his position. It will give him more bargaining chips at this
    geopolitical casino.'

    The Russian interest, as distinct from Putin's interest, says
    Kasparov, mirrors Israel's. He argues that, whatever their ideological
    backgrounds, Russians regard Putin's policies on radical Islam as
    `suicidal for our country.' They don't see Russia endangered by the
    West, but rather facing `the geopolitical threat from China and a
    growing threat from the south. A nuclear Iran is a terrible threat,'
    he says.

    The trouble is, he plunges on, that with Russia facing so many
    domestic problems at present, the Iranian threat is not a priority.
    `For people who live in the far east, yes, China is a priority; they
    can see the gradual Chinese invasion. For people who live in or near
    the North Caucasus, they can smell the rise of Islamic-based
    terrorism. Although it is mixed in with all kinds of local fights, you
    can still smell the rise of resistance based on Shari'a law and the
    rejection of the secular state. But Moscow is so far away. Yeah, there
    was an explosion in the Moscow subway' ` 40 people killed by two
    female suicide bombers on March 29 ` `and it clearly had a trace to
    the North Caucasus, but still, you know, it's very hard to break the
    social apathy... And in this vacuum of the national agenda, Putin can
    simply rule always with his own plans.'

    So what are Putin's plans, what is his agenda?

    `I said once that his dream is to rule like Stalin and live like
    [billionaire oil businessman and soccer club owner Roman] Abramovich,'
    Kasparov shoots back. `With the emphasis on Abramovich... It's all
    about money and power. The advantages brought by money are at the top
    of his agenda. But he knows that he cannot keep the money unless he
    stays in power.'

    Ominously, Kasparov then adds: `He probably lost his opportunity to
    walk away peacefully... At a certain point, for people who rule
    undemocratically, there is no way back. He has already crossed that
    line.'

    While he regards `puppet' as the wrong term for Medvedev, he considers
    the president - who this week infuriated Israel by meeting with Khaled
    Mashaal in Damascus and urging the inclusion of Hamas in the
    diplomatic process - to be too weak to lead what he says is a not
    insignificant level of opposition to Putin. `It may be that at a
    certain point, even Medvedev will realize that the balance of power
    shifted in his favor. But Putin made a very good choice [of
    presidential successor].'

    A good joke that's currently circulating, Kasparov says, is that
    `there are two parties in Russia: Putin's party and Medvedev's party.
    The problem is that Medvedev doesn't know which party he belongs to.'

    After that abortive bid in 2007, is Kasparov going to try to challenge
    for the presidency again?

    `In Russia, we're not fighting to win elections, we're trying to have
    elections,' he replies carefully. `Our fight is very different...
    because we do not live in a democratic country. This is something that
    people in the West and also in Israel don't want to recognize. By the
    way it is getting worse... They keep violating basic rights guaranteed
    by the constitution, and they are limiting even what is left of the
    political freedoms. In Russia today, you cannot stage any kind of
    peaceful protest without being harassed, detained, maybe arrested, and
    maybe even convicted.'

    I ASK him, this intense individual, a genius in one pursuit who has
    transferred his passion to a far more resonant field, whether he
    considers that we are untenably naïve about the dismal Russian
    dictatorship he has described.

    `It's about intellectual self-deception,' he replies with a small
    shrug. `You [in the West] don't want to hear this. If you recognize
    that Putin belongs to the group of [Belarus President Alexander]
    Lukashenko, [Zimbabwe's Robert] Mugabe and [Venezuela's Hugo] Chavez,
    you have to change your behavior. You'd rather not.'

    In the case of China, there is less hypocrisy, he points out. America
    and Europe are doing a lot of business with China, but no one is
    claiming it's a democracy. `We all understand that they rule
    differently. We do business because it's for mutual benefit. But at
    the end of the day, you know that China is China.'

    With Russia, however, the US and the world's leading democracies
    `pretend that Putin is a member of this elite club. So there's nothing
    wrong with [Italy's Silvio] Berlusconi or others making friends with
    him, and for others to be on his payroll. No one wants to touch it.
    The only reason I make parallels with the 1930s is because it's the
    same rejection of the obvious.'

    Doesn't stating `the obvious' in such open confrontation with so
    powerful a figure as Putin place Kasparov's life in danger?

    Apparently so. There is no personal protection surrounding him here,
    but `I have bodyguards in Moscow,' Kasparov notes. Still, he adds, `in
    Russia, if the state goes after you, nothing helps.'

    He pauses, relaxes and allows himself a rare half-smile. `I try to
    live a normal life.'

    http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Ar ticle.aspx?id=175544
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