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WAR IN IRAN TO WORSEN TIES BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BAKU
News.Az
Wed 01 August 2012 05:07 GMT | 6:07 Local Time
News.Az interviews Maxim Minayev, leading expert of the Russian
Political Center.
How real do you think the war over Iranian problem is?
I think the military script won't come true this year for the only
mere reason that the United States is the only country that can
sanction military intervention but they are in anticipation of their
elections. And I do not think that before elections the US president
can sanction the start of a serious offensive. Especially that the
military intervention in Iran is doomed to serious implications. On
the other hand, the current situation allows the Russian political
elite to strengthen dialogue with Turkey for the political reducing
of tensions in the situation. Turkey is also cautious about the
Iran issue. This means that Russia will likely think of expansion of
diplomatic activity for the peaceful settlement of this problem.
What changes can the Russian policy in the South Caucasus experience
in case of the West's military campaign against Iran?
I think everything depends on the stage of the conflict between Iran
and the West, that is whether the matter will be limited to expansion
of economic sanctions or the issue of military intervention will
be raised. Certainly, this will have an indirect impact to Russia's
policy in the Caucasus, overall, because such a script will likely
cause changes in the balance of powers in the region, can change
configuration of interaction between the leading superpowers.
Russia's relations with some Caucasus states, in particular, with
Azerbaijan that will likely join the coalition led by the United
States and Israel may worsen in case of war. In addition, Russia
will lose the current format of ties with Iran, which in case of the
success of anti-Iranian campaign may return to the times before 1979
that is to Shah's period loyal to the United States and Great Britain.
You suppose the support of anti-Iranian campaign by Azerbaijan. But
no one has ever cancelled the Azerbaijani-Iranian agreement not to
use their territories against each others fort he interests of the
third parties.
Yes, it will clearly be the most extreme script but nonetheless it
has been discussed for already a few months and will be discussed in
the future and it cannot be ignored. By means of its companies engaged
in production of hydrocarbons in Azerbaijan, the west influences the
country's capacities and can influence it for Baku to at least listen
to Washington's opinion.
The second moment is that much will depend on the geopolitical balance
of powers in the region and the interests of the United States and
other western countries. I think that most countries that border on
Iran will at least take the position of hidden support to US. Even
Iraq will unlikely hamper the implementation of US plans.
Can the potential change in the Russian line of conduct in the South
Caucasus in case of a war in Iran soften Moscow's position in the
talks with Baku on Gabala radar for preservation of military presence
in Azerbaijan?
I think that the script of reducing Russia's presence in Azerbaijan
will likely take place. Because in this case the Russian military
presence in Azerbaijan, the potential place for dislocation of
anti-Iranian coalition, will be completely inappropriate.
And what about Armenia? Can Russia raise its military grouping in
this country?
As for Armenia, here Russia does not have a need for expansion of
military presence and raise the military grouping there in conditions
of worsening situation in adjacent countries. On the other hand,
the North Caucasus, where such growing of a military potential is
possible but will be quite local and limited since there will be no
such clearly obvious threats to Russian interests.
News.Az
Wed 01 August 2012 05:07 GMT | 6:07 Local Time
News.Az interviews Maxim Minayev, leading expert of the Russian
Political Center.
How real do you think the war over Iranian problem is?
I think the military script won't come true this year for the only
mere reason that the United States is the only country that can
sanction military intervention but they are in anticipation of their
elections. And I do not think that before elections the US president
can sanction the start of a serious offensive. Especially that the
military intervention in Iran is doomed to serious implications. On
the other hand, the current situation allows the Russian political
elite to strengthen dialogue with Turkey for the political reducing
of tensions in the situation. Turkey is also cautious about the
Iran issue. This means that Russia will likely think of expansion of
diplomatic activity for the peaceful settlement of this problem.
What changes can the Russian policy in the South Caucasus experience
in case of the West's military campaign against Iran?
I think everything depends on the stage of the conflict between Iran
and the West, that is whether the matter will be limited to expansion
of economic sanctions or the issue of military intervention will
be raised. Certainly, this will have an indirect impact to Russia's
policy in the Caucasus, overall, because such a script will likely
cause changes in the balance of powers in the region, can change
configuration of interaction between the leading superpowers.
Russia's relations with some Caucasus states, in particular, with
Azerbaijan that will likely join the coalition led by the United
States and Israel may worsen in case of war. In addition, Russia
will lose the current format of ties with Iran, which in case of the
success of anti-Iranian campaign may return to the times before 1979
that is to Shah's period loyal to the United States and Great Britain.
You suppose the support of anti-Iranian campaign by Azerbaijan. But
no one has ever cancelled the Azerbaijani-Iranian agreement not to
use their territories against each others fort he interests of the
third parties.
Yes, it will clearly be the most extreme script but nonetheless it
has been discussed for already a few months and will be discussed in
the future and it cannot be ignored. By means of its companies engaged
in production of hydrocarbons in Azerbaijan, the west influences the
country's capacities and can influence it for Baku to at least listen
to Washington's opinion.
The second moment is that much will depend on the geopolitical balance
of powers in the region and the interests of the United States and
other western countries. I think that most countries that border on
Iran will at least take the position of hidden support to US. Even
Iraq will unlikely hamper the implementation of US plans.
Can the potential change in the Russian line of conduct in the South
Caucasus in case of a war in Iran soften Moscow's position in the
talks with Baku on Gabala radar for preservation of military presence
in Azerbaijan?
I think that the script of reducing Russia's presence in Azerbaijan
will likely take place. Because in this case the Russian military
presence in Azerbaijan, the potential place for dislocation of
anti-Iranian coalition, will be completely inappropriate.
And what about Armenia? Can Russia raise its military grouping in
this country?
As for Armenia, here Russia does not have a need for expansion of
military presence and raise the military grouping there in conditions
of worsening situation in adjacent countries. On the other hand,
the North Caucasus, where such growing of a military potential is
possible but will be quite local and limited since there will be no
such clearly obvious threats to Russian interests.