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Syrian-Armenian Memory and the Refugee Issue in Syria under the French
Mandate (1921-46)
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/07/05/syrian-armenian-memory-and-the-refugee-issue-in-syria-under-the-french-mandate-1921-46/
Posted by Seda Altug on
July 5, 2012 in
The Armenian Weekly Magazine
April 2012
An overwhelming majority of today's Syrian-Armenians are the descendants
of Ottoman-Armenians who survived the 1915 Armenian Genocide. The
120,000-150,000 deportees in Ottoman Syria, who had hoped to return to
their homeland as soon as World War I was over, returned to Cilicia, which,
by the time of the Mudros Armistice (Oct. 30, 1918), had come under French
occupation. All hope of rebuilding their communities, however, vanished
with the Turkish National Liberation War (1919-21) and the ceding of
Cilicia to the Turkish Republic following the formalization of the
Turco-Syrian border in the Ankara agreement on Oct. 21, 1921.
[image: Near east relief 300x173 Syrian Armenian Memory and the Refugee
Issue in Syria under the French Mandate
(1921-46)]
Armenian refugees in Syria (Near East Relief)
During these years, the killing, intimidation, abduction, and
stigmatization of Armenians in Cilician cities-such as Adana, Mersin,
Tarsus, as well as in cities like Urfa, Kharpert, Malatya, Diyarbekir, and
Arabkir-continued, culminating in a second Armenian exodus towards French
Syria and Lebanon. Between 1921-23, 80,000 new refugees arrived in Syria
and Lebanon by land or by sea. Richard Hovannisian estimates that by the
end of 1925, approximately 100,000 refugees were living in Syria; 50,000 in
Lebanon; 10,000 in Palestine and Jordan; 40,000 in Egypt; 25,000 in Iraq;
and 50,000 in Iran.1
The third wave of expulsion towards French Syria, in particular
north-eastern Syria, in Jazira, took place following Turkey's military
suppression of the Kurdish Sheikh Saïd Revolt in 1925. According to figures
compiled by the League of Nations, between 8,000 and 10,000
Kurdo-Armenians, as named by the French sources, from the rural parts of
Diyarbekir, Mardin, Shirnak, Siirt, Bitlis, and Cizre, joined the Armenian
deportees who had arrived in Syria earlier, in 1915-16 and 1921=80`23.2
The history of the post-genocide world in Syria has not yet been critically
assessed. Very few scholarly works have incorporated the social and
political history of the Armenian refugees into the general history of
Syria. It seems that the politics of fear is also quite pervasive among
researchers. Accordingly, the scholarly field inevitably silences and
marginalizes controversial historical phenomena from scholarly scrutiny,
such as the issue of sectarianism or the refugee issue. This piece will
shed some light on the Armenian refugee experiences upon their arrival to
their new residence in French Syria.
In the Syrian-Armenian memory, 1915 is seen as a decisive event, a violent
ending, but also as a new beginning, and a new period of struggle in a
hostile and foreign setting. The violence of the genocide-while it
took different forms in social, class, cultural, and geographic
terms-constitutes the foundation of all the historical narratives of that
time. And they all begin with the violence the survivors were exposed to in
their home towns or on the deportation routes to Syria, namely an entire
life was left behind and would never be returned; Its fields, trees,
rivers, and climate are remembered with extreme grief, and the new refuge
is never really accepted as a substitute.
The French mandate (1921-46) rule in Syria and the colonial agency are
obscured, or rather assimilated, into a survival narrative where the main
provider is depicted as the `Syrians' if not the `community' itself. The
new life in French Syria indicates a positive change from bad to good,
namely from insecurity, fear, instability, and oppression to security,
stability, and tolerance. Generosity and respect on the part of the Syrian
Arabs are presented as the underlying factors in this safety and security.
No mention is made of the distress felt by the local Syrians due to the
refugee flow to French Syria; nor of the dominant French colonial
perspective on the Christian refugees and the fragile bargaining between
the two; nor of the tacit agreement between the Arab nationalists and later
the Armenian leadership of the early 1930's.
Obscuring the colonial period as well as the current state of things in
Syria while underscoring the 1915 memories is not a mere coincidence.
Neglect of the post-genocide Armenian experience in Syria is apparently
related to the repressive conditions that have existed there since
independence (1946). Equally important, the genocide is actually the main
event underlying the uprooting and deportations of the majority of
Armenians to Ottoman/French Syria between 1915 and the late 1930's. Being
the `unacknowledged' victims of the Turkish nationalist venture, and given
the lack of space for the Syrian-Armenians' narratives to be recognized in
Turkey, the Syrian-Armenian memory can be considered, as de Certeau reminds
us, as `unrecognized reminders of a historical and still ongoing
repression.'3 In other words, the omnipresence of the memory of 1915 is
also a response to the current denialism on the part of the Turkish state
and a segment of Turkish society. Moreover, the genocide is the main event
underlying the deracination, uprooting, and deportations of the majority of
Armenians to Ottoman/French Syria between 1915 and the late 1930's.
THE REFUGEE ISSUE IN FRENCH SYRIA
There is almost no integrated history of the controversial encounters
between the newcomer refugees and the local population during the early
days of French colonial rule in Syria.4 Nora Arissian's piece The Echoes
of the Armenian Genocide in the Syrian Press may be considered the first
attempt to write the history of the Armenian Genocide as seen through the
eyes of the Syrian Arab nationalists.5 Together with her study of the
memoirs of Syrian intellectuals on the genocide (both have been banned in
Syria), her work paved the way for further research on the topic.6 Despite
being under-researched, the refugee issue was one of the most controversial
issues in post-World War I Levant, posing serious concerns not only for the
governing colonial powers and the home state, but also for the displaced
and host populations.7
Concerned with the economic, social, and political costs of settling
refugees in inner Syria or the Turco-Syrian frontier zone, the French
authorities had to deal with the refugee issue without causing a deep
crisis of legitimacy, both in the eyes of the Muslim majority and the local
as well as refugee Christians in Syria. Justifying their presence in Syria
and Lebanon as `the protectors of Christians,' the mandate authorities
aimed to avoid increasing anxiety among the Syrian Arab nationalists. The
French archives are full of reports drafted in the 1920's about the refugee
populations-especially Armenians and Kurds from Turkey, and Assyrians from
British Iraq-and various settlement projects concerning these groups. These
documents demonstrate that the French mandatory state did not adopt a
comprehensive refugee policy, but embraced a pragmatic approach that took
into account particular political, economic, diplomatic, and social
concerns.
In the meantime, the Turkish state was fearful of an `enclave of
undesirables'-in particular, Armenians and Kurdish political
refugees-forming outside of its control, just south of its border in Jazira.
8 The correspondence between Ankara and the French High Commissariat
showcase Turkey's complaints over `malicious elements' in the form of
Armenians in the frontier zone and of rebellious Kurdish tribes residing in
Jazira.9 The settlement of the Armenians along the Turkish-Syrian border,
their recruitment into the French administration and army, and the
trans-border incursions by the Kurds into Turkey form the sine qua non topic
of the intelligence reports, telegrams, and correspondences from 1925=80`27.
The French are criticized for providing protection to the Kurdish rebels
and allowing the settlement of Armenians in areas near the border.
The French central authorities were well aware of the need to regulate the
refugee flow. The High Commissariat in Beirut had, after 1925, become more
responsive to the demands from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In a report
drafted after the Sheikh Saïd Revolt, entitled `Du passage en Syrie des
populations Kurdes ou Chrétiens ou de déserteurs Turcs,' High Commissar
Maurice Sarrail openly proposed to Paris to `organize the regulations
pertaining to accepting refugees in Syria.'10 Despite the pragmatic
approach adopted by the French central authorities, certain local officers
still held their ground and took initiative in the settlement of the
refugees, in particular Kurdish refugees from Turkey. In a letter dated
Jan. 27, 1925, a local French officer described the Turkish allegations of
Armenian colonization on the border as mistaken and exaggerated:
`Since the beginning of the armistice, the biggest problem that the
mandatory power is trying to resolve is the refugee problem. We have
received 96,450 refugees since then and they are all impoverished people.
France has made great economic sacrifices for them. Just for the sake of
relieving pressure on the north of Syria, we have settled two-thirds of
these poor people in inner Syria. The rest reside in Aleppo and in the
Sanjak of Alexandretta, and their settlements were realized calmly and in
deference to the Muslim population.'11
Among the Syrian Arab nationalists, too, the `refugee problem' was a hotly
debated issue. Until the mid-1920's, it was as much a political issue as it
was a social and economic problem, especially as the settlement of refugee
groups-in particular the Armenians, in inner Syrian cities-began to be felt
more acutely.12 Relief, food programs, and settlement arrangements were
offered to Armenian refugees by several missionary organizations, as well
as by the French mandatory authorities. The refugee issue, along with the
French surrender of some Syrian land to Turkey, formed the major criticism
expressed by the Syrian-Arab nationalist elites towards the Ankara
Agreement formalizing the Turco-Syrian border.
The arrival and settlement of the refugees either in inner Syrian towns or
in the remote corners of French Syria were directly linked to colonial
`divide and rule' politics. The flow of refugees into the Syrian space,
which continued through the 1920's without any expression of consent by the
local Syrians, evoked a `lack of agency' because of a =80=9Csovereignty deficit'
in the Syrian national self. Arguing that Syria had turned into a `whore,'
as refugees could freely enter the country, several articles in the
nationalist press demanded the regulation of the border without regard to
the ethnicity and religion of the refugee group.
The French strategy of reinforcing and expanding the political space
reserved for the Armenians in the new confessional system in French Syria
worsened the situation. In Aleppo, which had the biggest immigrant
population, the social and economic discomfort was translated into clashes
between the communities.13 Christians made up 35 percent of Aleppo's
population, and the French embarked on manipulative efforts to `counter'
Arab nationalist political activity by playing the `Christian card': The
Armenian refugees were granted Syrian citizenship and acknowledged as one
of the official sects among 14 in September 1924, after the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923.14
Anti-Armenian sentiments became especially apparent following the 1926
elections, when the High Commissioner reshuffled the existing
representative council in order to counter the nationalist vote.15 As a
result of this French manipulation of the population figures, Armenians
were accorded two representatives in the 1926 elections, despite the fact
that their population was not sufficient even for one. In 1928-when the
French authorities were trying to assure as large a Christian vote as
possible to counter the political power of the National Bloc16-French High
Commissioner Henri Ponsot affirmed that Armenian refugees residing in Syria
had the right to vote in the Constitutional Assembly election.
The refugee issue manifested itself violently in the immediate aftermath of
the first mass anti-French uprising-the Great Revolt in 1925=80'where a
battalion of Armenian-French soldiers fought Syrian anti-French rebels. The
subsequent angry attack on the Armenian Quarter in Damascus and the killing
of 30 Armenians was justified by referring to the latter's =80=9Cproven
unfaithfulness' and the claim that Armenians `have been fighting against
those in whose land they are camping.'17 The French were blamed for the
Armenian colonization in Syria and the mobilization of Armenians against
Syrians.
The last and biggest wave of refugees-mostly Armenians, Kurds, and Syriacs
from the Kurdish provinces of Turkey in the late 1920's, and of Assyrians
from Iraq to Syrian Jazira in 1933-caused extreme alarm and anxiety among
the Arab nationalists. Their unease was expressed in a new framework:
`harmful strangers vs. outraged Syrians.' A joint declaration by the main
Armenian political parties (Hnchak and Dashnak) published in an
Arabic-language article in the journal Le Liban on May 15, 1930 reassured
the Arab nationalists that there would be no attempt in founding an
Armenian state in Syria.18 `We only have one homeland; that is Armenia,'
the statement read. `In this hospitable country, our unique effort is to
provide the needs of our families and assure the education of our children.
We would like to see that the cordial relations between the Arabs and the
Armenians are maintained and the misunderstandings that give rise to
suspicions are stemmed.'19
GOOD REFUGEE VS. BAD REFUGEE
The refugee issue reappeared in a different context following the
Franco-Syrian Treaty in 1936, which promised independence to Syria within
the next five years, and foresaw the incorporation of the autonomously
administered regions into a united Syria. These regions included the Sanjak
of Alexandretta, the Sanjak of Alawites, and the Sanjak of Druze and Jazira
(north-eastern Syria). The treaty was never ratified, but the fierce
controversy over two fundamental articles in the treaty-that of the
protection of minorities and the unity of Syria-has had longlasting
implications concerning Syrian Christians, in general, and Armenians, in
particular. These controversies involved two opposing political movements
in French Syria, the Unionists and the Autonomists. The reference point for
the Unionists was the Arab nationalists, who were aspiring for full
independence in a united Syria, while that of the Autonomists was the
Francophile Syrians, who asked for an additional article in the
constitution on the protection of minorities, as well as the continuation
of the status of the autonomously administered regions under the French
mandate.
The notion of minority was contested by the rival Autonomists and Unionists
to advance their political claims. While the Autonomists promoted an
ethno-religious-based definition of minority-ness and asked for special
protection against the majority, namely the Sunni Arabs, the latter avoided
confronting the minority question. Rather, they opted for the strategy of
incorporating ethno-religious belonging into Syrian Arab national identity.
The Unionist majority expected the non-Muslim and non-Arab Syrians to
obscure and de-politicize their ethno-religious differences. The
nationalist slogan `Religion is for God and the nation is for all' evoked
such an idea.
The most explicit sign of the Syrian Christians' pragmatic consent to an
apolitical and inclusivist definition of Syrian national belonging came
after two bloody incidents in mid- 1936 and 1937: the Sunday market
incident in Aleppo and the Amouda incidents in Jazira. After each incident,
the nationalist Christian leaders intervened to calm the Christian
community and reassure the Muslim majority. The Armenian Orthodox
patriarch, Ardavazd Surmeyan, may be considered one of the first-comers to
the rapprochement scene following the Sunday market incident on Oct. 12,
1936. In his visit to the Armenian refugee camp in the north of Aleppo, he
said:
`I came here with the nationalist leaders to invite you to be calm and to
return to your work. We have every interest in having cordial relations
with the Muslims. The incidents of last Sunday's market had their origin in
the `White Badge' who are bought and paid for by certain traitors; they
create discord between the elements of the country in order to obtain their
goal. I ask therefore all Armenians to have no relations with the `White
Badge' and to even prevent these people from circulating around [the
tent-city].'20
While the Armenian political parties (Dashnak, Ramgavar, and Hnchak) were
aiming to maintain amicable relationships with both the French and Arab
nationalists, they began to take a more pragmatic approach in the
mid-1930's towards greater cooperation with the Arab nationalists in Syria,
particularly after 1936.21 The Armenian communists in the Syrian Communist
Party had always sided with the Arab nationalists' struggle for full
independence.
The interaction between the notions of political dissidence and
minority-refugee status in the Syrian Arab nationalist imagery is related
particularly to the Autonomy Movement in Syrian Jazira. The Autonomist
faction in Jazira asked for a special minority status for the Jaziran
population, which was made up of mostly Christian and Kurdish refugees from
Turkey, and aspired for the continuation of autonomous rule in the region
under the French mandate. While the Autonomists depicted the Jazirans under
the rubric of minority on the basis of being non-Arab and non-Muslim
refugees from Turkey, a significant portion of the Arab nationalists
attempted to counter the Autonomists' formulation between the status of
refugee and minority. Prime Minister Sadallah Jabiri said in a speech that
the `ex-refugees of the 1920's have integrated and become like us, thus
they should not be asking for special treatment.' The Arab nationalists
labeled the leaders of the Autonomy Movement in Jazira as `refugees who
deny favor' in upbraiding rhetoric.22 Eventually the notion of refugee came
to stand only for the `minority' and represented the =80=9Cinterest- seeker
dissident rebel.' As minority-ness conjured up the image of political
dissidents, the majority among the ex-refugees soon conjured up the image
of `simple people who are only interested in their daily bread, but
nothing else.'23 In a way, the Syrian-Armenians entered the post-colonial
era after they were stripped of transformative political agency.
Until the 1940's, French Syria was still a refuge for thousands of
`undesirables' for whom Turkish nationalism had left without a home.24 The
bargain between the colonial power and the Armenian refugees contributed to
some extent to the social and economic betterment of the Armenians, while
the bargain with the local Arab nationalists helped to calm the ever-lost
feeling of security and stability-but only through a patrimonial
relationship and at the expense of free political agency. Nevertheless,
memories of the horrors of 1915 were evoked during several instances:
during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1981, the Kurdish
resistance in Qamishli in 2003, and likely during current days of
anti-regime uprising in Syria. Memories of 1915 and the oppressive regime
generate a politically conformist discourse among the Syrian-Armenian
establishment and the community at large. The spell of the past will start
to crumble, however, when the 1915 violence is acknowledged and, as Walter
Benjamin said, when `the causes of what happened then have been eliminated.'
25
ENDNOTES
1. Richard Hovannisian, `The Ebb and Flow of the Armenian Minority in the
Arab Middle East,' Middle East Journal, xxvii, winter 1974. For different
estimates, see Thomas H. Greenshields, The Settlement of Armenian Refugees
in Syria and Lebanon, 1915-1939, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Durham, 1978.
2. For an elaborate discussion of the last wave of deportations, see Vahé
Tachjian, La France en Cilicie et en Haute Mésopotamie (Paris:
Karthala, 2004), pp. 301-317.
3. Michel de Certeau, Heterelogies (Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1986), p. 4.
4. Several works on Syria mention the bad conditions and treatment the
refugees endured prior to their arrival, but only in passing. Among the few
critical works on the refugees are: Keith Watenpaugh `Towards a New
Category of Colonial Theory: Colonial Cooperation and the Survivors'
Bargain-The Case of the Post-Genocide Armenian Community of Syria under
French Mandate,' in Peter Sluglett and Nadine Méouchy (eds.) The British
and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2004),
pp. 597-622; Keith Watenpaugh, ``A pious wish devoid of all
practicability:' Interwar Humanitarianism, The League of Nations and the
Rescue of Trafficked Women and Children in the Eastern Mediterranean,
1920-1927,' American Historical Review, 115:4 (October 2010); for Jazira,
see Seda AltuË=98g, `Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, land and
violence in the memories of World War I and the French mandate
(1915-1939),' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, June 2011, Utrecht; Seda
Altug, `Armenian Genocide, Sheikh Said Revolt, and Armenians in Syrian
Jazira,'
www.armenianweekly.com/wp-content/files/Armenian_Weekly_April_2010.pdf;
Ellen Marie Lust-Okar, `Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in
Syria,' Middle Eastern Studies, 32, 1(1996), pp. 53-68.
5. Nora Arissian, Asda' al-ibada al-armaniyya fi al-Sahafa al-Suriyya
1877-1930 (Beirut: Zakira Press, 2004).
6. Nora Arissian, Ghawa'il al-arman fi al-fikr al-suri (Beirut, Dar
al-furat, 2002).
7. John Hope Simpson, Refugees: Preliminary Report of a Survey (London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938).
8. See Seda Altug and Benjamin White, `Frontières et pouvoir
d'Ã=89tat: la
frontière turco-syrienne dans les années 1920 et 1930,' Vingtième Siècle,
September 2009.
9. Altug, `Türkiye Suriye ile Sınırını Temizlerken, 1, 2, 3,' Agos, 9,
14, 27. March 2007.
10. CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, Box 572, Service des
Renseignements, Service Central, no. 868/K.S., March 5, 1925, Beirut.
11. MAE, Série Syrie-Liban, vol. 177, Relation Turquie-Française.
12. Thomas Greenshields, `The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and
Lebanon, 1915-1939,' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham, 1978, p. 60.
13. Pierre La Mazière, Partant pour la Syrie (Paris: Libraire Baudiniere,
1926), pp. 200-203.
14. Until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the peoples residing in
the territories controlled by the French, including the Armenians, had
maintained the legal status of Ottoman citizens. Nicola Migliorino,
(Re)constructing
Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-cultural Diversity and the State in
the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books,
2008), pp. 52-55. Uri Davis, `Citizenship Legislation in the Syrian Arab
Republic,' Arab Studies Quarterly, 1, 1996, pp. 1-15.
15. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French
Mandate (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 171-172.
16. Stephen Longrigg, Syria, p. 181.
17. al-Cha'b, `al-arman wa qadiyyat askanuhum fi suriyya,' Dec. 21,
1926.
18. Taken from CADN, Cabinet Politique, Box 576, Service
Politiques, Bureau
d'études, `L'Arménie et les Arméniens, ' rédacteur: cdt. Terrrier.
19. ibid.
20. CADN-MAE, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 392, Sûreté
Générale (Aleppo),
no. 3829, Oct. 16, 1936; taken from Keith Watenpaugh, Being Modern in
the Middle East, p. 271.
21. Miglioriono, (Re)constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria, pp. 58=80`62.
22. al-qabs, Feb. 5, 1938, `wataniyya al-fiqra wa masharia' alsahra.'
23. Several newspaper articles from the Arab nationalist press construct
the `nationalist majority' in Jazira as such.
24. Watenpaugh, pp. 597-622.
25. Theodor Adorno, `The Meaning of Working Through the Past,' in Critical
Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005), p. 103.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Mandate (1921-46)
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/07/05/syrian-armenian-memory-and-the-refugee-issue-in-syria-under-the-french-mandate-1921-46/
Posted by Seda Altug on
July 5, 2012 in
The Armenian Weekly Magazine
April 2012
An overwhelming majority of today's Syrian-Armenians are the descendants
of Ottoman-Armenians who survived the 1915 Armenian Genocide. The
120,000-150,000 deportees in Ottoman Syria, who had hoped to return to
their homeland as soon as World War I was over, returned to Cilicia, which,
by the time of the Mudros Armistice (Oct. 30, 1918), had come under French
occupation. All hope of rebuilding their communities, however, vanished
with the Turkish National Liberation War (1919-21) and the ceding of
Cilicia to the Turkish Republic following the formalization of the
Turco-Syrian border in the Ankara agreement on Oct. 21, 1921.
[image: Near east relief 300x173 Syrian Armenian Memory and the Refugee
Issue in Syria under the French Mandate
(1921-46)]
Armenian refugees in Syria (Near East Relief)
During these years, the killing, intimidation, abduction, and
stigmatization of Armenians in Cilician cities-such as Adana, Mersin,
Tarsus, as well as in cities like Urfa, Kharpert, Malatya, Diyarbekir, and
Arabkir-continued, culminating in a second Armenian exodus towards French
Syria and Lebanon. Between 1921-23, 80,000 new refugees arrived in Syria
and Lebanon by land or by sea. Richard Hovannisian estimates that by the
end of 1925, approximately 100,000 refugees were living in Syria; 50,000 in
Lebanon; 10,000 in Palestine and Jordan; 40,000 in Egypt; 25,000 in Iraq;
and 50,000 in Iran.1
The third wave of expulsion towards French Syria, in particular
north-eastern Syria, in Jazira, took place following Turkey's military
suppression of the Kurdish Sheikh Saïd Revolt in 1925. According to figures
compiled by the League of Nations, between 8,000 and 10,000
Kurdo-Armenians, as named by the French sources, from the rural parts of
Diyarbekir, Mardin, Shirnak, Siirt, Bitlis, and Cizre, joined the Armenian
deportees who had arrived in Syria earlier, in 1915-16 and 1921=80`23.2
The history of the post-genocide world in Syria has not yet been critically
assessed. Very few scholarly works have incorporated the social and
political history of the Armenian refugees into the general history of
Syria. It seems that the politics of fear is also quite pervasive among
researchers. Accordingly, the scholarly field inevitably silences and
marginalizes controversial historical phenomena from scholarly scrutiny,
such as the issue of sectarianism or the refugee issue. This piece will
shed some light on the Armenian refugee experiences upon their arrival to
their new residence in French Syria.
In the Syrian-Armenian memory, 1915 is seen as a decisive event, a violent
ending, but also as a new beginning, and a new period of struggle in a
hostile and foreign setting. The violence of the genocide-while it
took different forms in social, class, cultural, and geographic
terms-constitutes the foundation of all the historical narratives of that
time. And they all begin with the violence the survivors were exposed to in
their home towns or on the deportation routes to Syria, namely an entire
life was left behind and would never be returned; Its fields, trees,
rivers, and climate are remembered with extreme grief, and the new refuge
is never really accepted as a substitute.
The French mandate (1921-46) rule in Syria and the colonial agency are
obscured, or rather assimilated, into a survival narrative where the main
provider is depicted as the `Syrians' if not the `community' itself. The
new life in French Syria indicates a positive change from bad to good,
namely from insecurity, fear, instability, and oppression to security,
stability, and tolerance. Generosity and respect on the part of the Syrian
Arabs are presented as the underlying factors in this safety and security.
No mention is made of the distress felt by the local Syrians due to the
refugee flow to French Syria; nor of the dominant French colonial
perspective on the Christian refugees and the fragile bargaining between
the two; nor of the tacit agreement between the Arab nationalists and later
the Armenian leadership of the early 1930's.
Obscuring the colonial period as well as the current state of things in
Syria while underscoring the 1915 memories is not a mere coincidence.
Neglect of the post-genocide Armenian experience in Syria is apparently
related to the repressive conditions that have existed there since
independence (1946). Equally important, the genocide is actually the main
event underlying the uprooting and deportations of the majority of
Armenians to Ottoman/French Syria between 1915 and the late 1930's. Being
the `unacknowledged' victims of the Turkish nationalist venture, and given
the lack of space for the Syrian-Armenians' narratives to be recognized in
Turkey, the Syrian-Armenian memory can be considered, as de Certeau reminds
us, as `unrecognized reminders of a historical and still ongoing
repression.'3 In other words, the omnipresence of the memory of 1915 is
also a response to the current denialism on the part of the Turkish state
and a segment of Turkish society. Moreover, the genocide is the main event
underlying the deracination, uprooting, and deportations of the majority of
Armenians to Ottoman/French Syria between 1915 and the late 1930's.
THE REFUGEE ISSUE IN FRENCH SYRIA
There is almost no integrated history of the controversial encounters
between the newcomer refugees and the local population during the early
days of French colonial rule in Syria.4 Nora Arissian's piece The Echoes
of the Armenian Genocide in the Syrian Press may be considered the first
attempt to write the history of the Armenian Genocide as seen through the
eyes of the Syrian Arab nationalists.5 Together with her study of the
memoirs of Syrian intellectuals on the genocide (both have been banned in
Syria), her work paved the way for further research on the topic.6 Despite
being under-researched, the refugee issue was one of the most controversial
issues in post-World War I Levant, posing serious concerns not only for the
governing colonial powers and the home state, but also for the displaced
and host populations.7
Concerned with the economic, social, and political costs of settling
refugees in inner Syria or the Turco-Syrian frontier zone, the French
authorities had to deal with the refugee issue without causing a deep
crisis of legitimacy, both in the eyes of the Muslim majority and the local
as well as refugee Christians in Syria. Justifying their presence in Syria
and Lebanon as `the protectors of Christians,' the mandate authorities
aimed to avoid increasing anxiety among the Syrian Arab nationalists. The
French archives are full of reports drafted in the 1920's about the refugee
populations-especially Armenians and Kurds from Turkey, and Assyrians from
British Iraq-and various settlement projects concerning these groups. These
documents demonstrate that the French mandatory state did not adopt a
comprehensive refugee policy, but embraced a pragmatic approach that took
into account particular political, economic, diplomatic, and social
concerns.
In the meantime, the Turkish state was fearful of an `enclave of
undesirables'-in particular, Armenians and Kurdish political
refugees-forming outside of its control, just south of its border in Jazira.
8 The correspondence between Ankara and the French High Commissariat
showcase Turkey's complaints over `malicious elements' in the form of
Armenians in the frontier zone and of rebellious Kurdish tribes residing in
Jazira.9 The settlement of the Armenians along the Turkish-Syrian border,
their recruitment into the French administration and army, and the
trans-border incursions by the Kurds into Turkey form the sine qua non topic
of the intelligence reports, telegrams, and correspondences from 1925=80`27.
The French are criticized for providing protection to the Kurdish rebels
and allowing the settlement of Armenians in areas near the border.
The French central authorities were well aware of the need to regulate the
refugee flow. The High Commissariat in Beirut had, after 1925, become more
responsive to the demands from the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In a report
drafted after the Sheikh Saïd Revolt, entitled `Du passage en Syrie des
populations Kurdes ou Chrétiens ou de déserteurs Turcs,' High Commissar
Maurice Sarrail openly proposed to Paris to `organize the regulations
pertaining to accepting refugees in Syria.'10 Despite the pragmatic
approach adopted by the French central authorities, certain local officers
still held their ground and took initiative in the settlement of the
refugees, in particular Kurdish refugees from Turkey. In a letter dated
Jan. 27, 1925, a local French officer described the Turkish allegations of
Armenian colonization on the border as mistaken and exaggerated:
`Since the beginning of the armistice, the biggest problem that the
mandatory power is trying to resolve is the refugee problem. We have
received 96,450 refugees since then and they are all impoverished people.
France has made great economic sacrifices for them. Just for the sake of
relieving pressure on the north of Syria, we have settled two-thirds of
these poor people in inner Syria. The rest reside in Aleppo and in the
Sanjak of Alexandretta, and their settlements were realized calmly and in
deference to the Muslim population.'11
Among the Syrian Arab nationalists, too, the `refugee problem' was a hotly
debated issue. Until the mid-1920's, it was as much a political issue as it
was a social and economic problem, especially as the settlement of refugee
groups-in particular the Armenians, in inner Syrian cities-began to be felt
more acutely.12 Relief, food programs, and settlement arrangements were
offered to Armenian refugees by several missionary organizations, as well
as by the French mandatory authorities. The refugee issue, along with the
French surrender of some Syrian land to Turkey, formed the major criticism
expressed by the Syrian-Arab nationalist elites towards the Ankara
Agreement formalizing the Turco-Syrian border.
The arrival and settlement of the refugees either in inner Syrian towns or
in the remote corners of French Syria were directly linked to colonial
`divide and rule' politics. The flow of refugees into the Syrian space,
which continued through the 1920's without any expression of consent by the
local Syrians, evoked a `lack of agency' because of a =80=9Csovereignty deficit'
in the Syrian national self. Arguing that Syria had turned into a `whore,'
as refugees could freely enter the country, several articles in the
nationalist press demanded the regulation of the border without regard to
the ethnicity and religion of the refugee group.
The French strategy of reinforcing and expanding the political space
reserved for the Armenians in the new confessional system in French Syria
worsened the situation. In Aleppo, which had the biggest immigrant
population, the social and economic discomfort was translated into clashes
between the communities.13 Christians made up 35 percent of Aleppo's
population, and the French embarked on manipulative efforts to `counter'
Arab nationalist political activity by playing the `Christian card': The
Armenian refugees were granted Syrian citizenship and acknowledged as one
of the official sects among 14 in September 1924, after the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923.14
Anti-Armenian sentiments became especially apparent following the 1926
elections, when the High Commissioner reshuffled the existing
representative council in order to counter the nationalist vote.15 As a
result of this French manipulation of the population figures, Armenians
were accorded two representatives in the 1926 elections, despite the fact
that their population was not sufficient even for one. In 1928-when the
French authorities were trying to assure as large a Christian vote as
possible to counter the political power of the National Bloc16-French High
Commissioner Henri Ponsot affirmed that Armenian refugees residing in Syria
had the right to vote in the Constitutional Assembly election.
The refugee issue manifested itself violently in the immediate aftermath of
the first mass anti-French uprising-the Great Revolt in 1925=80'where a
battalion of Armenian-French soldiers fought Syrian anti-French rebels. The
subsequent angry attack on the Armenian Quarter in Damascus and the killing
of 30 Armenians was justified by referring to the latter's =80=9Cproven
unfaithfulness' and the claim that Armenians `have been fighting against
those in whose land they are camping.'17 The French were blamed for the
Armenian colonization in Syria and the mobilization of Armenians against
Syrians.
The last and biggest wave of refugees-mostly Armenians, Kurds, and Syriacs
from the Kurdish provinces of Turkey in the late 1920's, and of Assyrians
from Iraq to Syrian Jazira in 1933-caused extreme alarm and anxiety among
the Arab nationalists. Their unease was expressed in a new framework:
`harmful strangers vs. outraged Syrians.' A joint declaration by the main
Armenian political parties (Hnchak and Dashnak) published in an
Arabic-language article in the journal Le Liban on May 15, 1930 reassured
the Arab nationalists that there would be no attempt in founding an
Armenian state in Syria.18 `We only have one homeland; that is Armenia,'
the statement read. `In this hospitable country, our unique effort is to
provide the needs of our families and assure the education of our children.
We would like to see that the cordial relations between the Arabs and the
Armenians are maintained and the misunderstandings that give rise to
suspicions are stemmed.'19
GOOD REFUGEE VS. BAD REFUGEE
The refugee issue reappeared in a different context following the
Franco-Syrian Treaty in 1936, which promised independence to Syria within
the next five years, and foresaw the incorporation of the autonomously
administered regions into a united Syria. These regions included the Sanjak
of Alexandretta, the Sanjak of Alawites, and the Sanjak of Druze and Jazira
(north-eastern Syria). The treaty was never ratified, but the fierce
controversy over two fundamental articles in the treaty-that of the
protection of minorities and the unity of Syria-has had longlasting
implications concerning Syrian Christians, in general, and Armenians, in
particular. These controversies involved two opposing political movements
in French Syria, the Unionists and the Autonomists. The reference point for
the Unionists was the Arab nationalists, who were aspiring for full
independence in a united Syria, while that of the Autonomists was the
Francophile Syrians, who asked for an additional article in the
constitution on the protection of minorities, as well as the continuation
of the status of the autonomously administered regions under the French
mandate.
The notion of minority was contested by the rival Autonomists and Unionists
to advance their political claims. While the Autonomists promoted an
ethno-religious-based definition of minority-ness and asked for special
protection against the majority, namely the Sunni Arabs, the latter avoided
confronting the minority question. Rather, they opted for the strategy of
incorporating ethno-religious belonging into Syrian Arab national identity.
The Unionist majority expected the non-Muslim and non-Arab Syrians to
obscure and de-politicize their ethno-religious differences. The
nationalist slogan `Religion is for God and the nation is for all' evoked
such an idea.
The most explicit sign of the Syrian Christians' pragmatic consent to an
apolitical and inclusivist definition of Syrian national belonging came
after two bloody incidents in mid- 1936 and 1937: the Sunday market
incident in Aleppo and the Amouda incidents in Jazira. After each incident,
the nationalist Christian leaders intervened to calm the Christian
community and reassure the Muslim majority. The Armenian Orthodox
patriarch, Ardavazd Surmeyan, may be considered one of the first-comers to
the rapprochement scene following the Sunday market incident on Oct. 12,
1936. In his visit to the Armenian refugee camp in the north of Aleppo, he
said:
`I came here with the nationalist leaders to invite you to be calm and to
return to your work. We have every interest in having cordial relations
with the Muslims. The incidents of last Sunday's market had their origin in
the `White Badge' who are bought and paid for by certain traitors; they
create discord between the elements of the country in order to obtain their
goal. I ask therefore all Armenians to have no relations with the `White
Badge' and to even prevent these people from circulating around [the
tent-city].'20
While the Armenian political parties (Dashnak, Ramgavar, and Hnchak) were
aiming to maintain amicable relationships with both the French and Arab
nationalists, they began to take a more pragmatic approach in the
mid-1930's towards greater cooperation with the Arab nationalists in Syria,
particularly after 1936.21 The Armenian communists in the Syrian Communist
Party had always sided with the Arab nationalists' struggle for full
independence.
The interaction between the notions of political dissidence and
minority-refugee status in the Syrian Arab nationalist imagery is related
particularly to the Autonomy Movement in Syrian Jazira. The Autonomist
faction in Jazira asked for a special minority status for the Jaziran
population, which was made up of mostly Christian and Kurdish refugees from
Turkey, and aspired for the continuation of autonomous rule in the region
under the French mandate. While the Autonomists depicted the Jazirans under
the rubric of minority on the basis of being non-Arab and non-Muslim
refugees from Turkey, a significant portion of the Arab nationalists
attempted to counter the Autonomists' formulation between the status of
refugee and minority. Prime Minister Sadallah Jabiri said in a speech that
the `ex-refugees of the 1920's have integrated and become like us, thus
they should not be asking for special treatment.' The Arab nationalists
labeled the leaders of the Autonomy Movement in Jazira as `refugees who
deny favor' in upbraiding rhetoric.22 Eventually the notion of refugee came
to stand only for the `minority' and represented the =80=9Cinterest- seeker
dissident rebel.' As minority-ness conjured up the image of political
dissidents, the majority among the ex-refugees soon conjured up the image
of `simple people who are only interested in their daily bread, but
nothing else.'23 In a way, the Syrian-Armenians entered the post-colonial
era after they were stripped of transformative political agency.
Until the 1940's, French Syria was still a refuge for thousands of
`undesirables' for whom Turkish nationalism had left without a home.24 The
bargain between the colonial power and the Armenian refugees contributed to
some extent to the social and economic betterment of the Armenians, while
the bargain with the local Arab nationalists helped to calm the ever-lost
feeling of security and stability-but only through a patrimonial
relationship and at the expense of free political agency. Nevertheless,
memories of the horrors of 1915 were evoked during several instances:
during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1981, the Kurdish
resistance in Qamishli in 2003, and likely during current days of
anti-regime uprising in Syria. Memories of 1915 and the oppressive regime
generate a politically conformist discourse among the Syrian-Armenian
establishment and the community at large. The spell of the past will start
to crumble, however, when the 1915 violence is acknowledged and, as Walter
Benjamin said, when `the causes of what happened then have been eliminated.'
25
ENDNOTES
1. Richard Hovannisian, `The Ebb and Flow of the Armenian Minority in the
Arab Middle East,' Middle East Journal, xxvii, winter 1974. For different
estimates, see Thomas H. Greenshields, The Settlement of Armenian Refugees
in Syria and Lebanon, 1915-1939, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Durham, 1978.
2. For an elaborate discussion of the last wave of deportations, see Vahé
Tachjian, La France en Cilicie et en Haute Mésopotamie (Paris:
Karthala, 2004), pp. 301-317.
3. Michel de Certeau, Heterelogies (Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 1986), p. 4.
4. Several works on Syria mention the bad conditions and treatment the
refugees endured prior to their arrival, but only in passing. Among the few
critical works on the refugees are: Keith Watenpaugh `Towards a New
Category of Colonial Theory: Colonial Cooperation and the Survivors'
Bargain-The Case of the Post-Genocide Armenian Community of Syria under
French Mandate,' in Peter Sluglett and Nadine Méouchy (eds.) The British
and French Mandates in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2004),
pp. 597-622; Keith Watenpaugh, ``A pious wish devoid of all
practicability:' Interwar Humanitarianism, The League of Nations and the
Rescue of Trafficked Women and Children in the Eastern Mediterranean,
1920-1927,' American Historical Review, 115:4 (October 2010); for Jazira,
see Seda AltuË=98g, `Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, land and
violence in the memories of World War I and the French mandate
(1915-1939),' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, June 2011, Utrecht; Seda
Altug, `Armenian Genocide, Sheikh Said Revolt, and Armenians in Syrian
Jazira,'
www.armenianweekly.com/wp-content/files/Armenian_Weekly_April_2010.pdf;
Ellen Marie Lust-Okar, `Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in
Syria,' Middle Eastern Studies, 32, 1(1996), pp. 53-68.
5. Nora Arissian, Asda' al-ibada al-armaniyya fi al-Sahafa al-Suriyya
1877-1930 (Beirut: Zakira Press, 2004).
6. Nora Arissian, Ghawa'il al-arman fi al-fikr al-suri (Beirut, Dar
al-furat, 2002).
7. John Hope Simpson, Refugees: Preliminary Report of a Survey (London:
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938).
8. See Seda Altug and Benjamin White, `Frontières et pouvoir
d'Ã=89tat: la
frontière turco-syrienne dans les années 1920 et 1930,' Vingtième Siècle,
September 2009.
9. Altug, `Türkiye Suriye ile Sınırını Temizlerken, 1, 2, 3,' Agos, 9,
14, 27. March 2007.
10. CADN, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, Box 572, Service des
Renseignements, Service Central, no. 868/K.S., March 5, 1925, Beirut.
11. MAE, Série Syrie-Liban, vol. 177, Relation Turquie-Française.
12. Thomas Greenshields, `The Settlement of Armenian Refugees in Syria and
Lebanon, 1915-1939,' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham, 1978, p. 60.
13. Pierre La Mazière, Partant pour la Syrie (Paris: Libraire Baudiniere,
1926), pp. 200-203.
14. Until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the peoples residing in
the territories controlled by the French, including the Armenians, had
maintained the legal status of Ottoman citizens. Nicola Migliorino,
(Re)constructing
Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-cultural Diversity and the State in
the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books,
2008), pp. 52-55. Uri Davis, `Citizenship Legislation in the Syrian Arab
Republic,' Arab Studies Quarterly, 1, 1996, pp. 1-15.
15. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French
Mandate (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 171-172.
16. Stephen Longrigg, Syria, p. 181.
17. al-Cha'b, `al-arman wa qadiyyat askanuhum fi suriyya,' Dec. 21,
1926.
18. Taken from CADN, Cabinet Politique, Box 576, Service
Politiques, Bureau
d'études, `L'Arménie et les Arméniens, ' rédacteur: cdt. Terrrier.
19. ibid.
20. CADN-MAE, Fonds Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 392, Sûreté
Générale (Aleppo),
no. 3829, Oct. 16, 1936; taken from Keith Watenpaugh, Being Modern in
the Middle East, p. 271.
21. Miglioriono, (Re)constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria, pp. 58=80`62.
22. al-qabs, Feb. 5, 1938, `wataniyya al-fiqra wa masharia' alsahra.'
23. Several newspaper articles from the Arab nationalist press construct
the `nationalist majority' in Jazira as such.
24. Watenpaugh, pp. 597-622.
25. Theodor Adorno, `The Meaning of Working Through the Past,' in Critical
Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia University Press,
2005), p. 103.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress