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Today's Zaman, Turkey
April 14 2013
Ergil: It was the Kurds who did not want a Kurdish state in the Treaty
of Lausanne
14 April 2013 /AYDOÄ?AN VATANDAÅ?, NEW YORK
In the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, after World War I, Allied forces
envisioned an independent Kurdish state for Kurds.
But in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, after the Turkish War of
Independence in which the Turks and Kurds fought against the Western
invaders together, this promise was ignored.
Some Kurdish intellectuals tend to blame the Turks for not delivering
the promise to the Kurds for a state of their own. They believe that
they were betrayed. But Professor DoÄ?u Ergil, one of the most renowned
political sociologists from Turkey, says it was actually the Kurds
themselves who did not ask for a state.
He explains that the Kurds `cooperated' with the Turks against the
Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left behind
by the Armenians. Professor Ergil claims that the Treaty of Lausanne
was crafted with the consent of the Kurds. `They did not want a
Kurdish state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the
ambition of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The
Kurds wanted to prevent this from happening.'
Professor Ergil also shares his insights about `neo-Ottomanism,' a
term which came into parlance right after new possibilities emerged
for Turkey in the Middle East. `If we have made such a huge shift from
the thesis that the Kurds would partition Turkey to the argument that
Kurds can flourish alongside Turks, something is wrong. Caution is
necessary in such things. The discourse on the revival of the Ottoman
Empire is improper. Contrary to what we believe, the Ottoman state is
perceived as a conqueror rather than a big brother in this region.'
Sunday's Zaman interviewed Professor Ergil in New York on some of the
most controversial issues, and once again Ergil ventured to break
taboos.
You completed your Ph.D. in the US a long time ago; what sort of
changes have you observed in American society?
The American people were influenced by Sept. 11. The American nation
was not a cowardly society. As a nation that entered World War II and
saved Europe as a conveyor of civilization, it was an amazing nation
that replaced the former empire owing to its economy, army and culture
as well as confidence. The destruction of this confidence due to the
Sept. 11 attacks and the use of these attacks by George Bush as a
pretext for an aggressive stance contributed to the emergence of a
culture of fear and doubt in the US. It further contributed to the
exacerbation of its enmity towards the rest of the world. This
attitude by the Bush administration destroyed the confidence of the
American nation and had a detrimental effect on the American
perception of the world.
We are familiar with the reasons in the Middle East for strong
opposition to the US; what is the case in Turkey?
This is in fact interesting; the American image is even worse in
Turkey. There are two social segments conveying anti-Americanism in
Turkey. One of them is the far right and the other is the left wing.
The far right views all others as the enemy. The left, on the other
hand, sees the US as a conveyor and center of imperialism. In
addition, the alliance between the US and Israel and US indifference
to the injustices done to the Palestinians raised opposition among
Muslims as well. On the other hand, because of the perception that the
US is behind the pro-Kurdish movement, both Muslims and the far right
as well as the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have adopted an
anti-American stance. The [National Security Council] MGK did not take
any decision on the March 1 motion in 2003; this was seen as the
military's reaction to the US. This is actually seen as a strong case
where all social segments, including religious people, rightists,
leftists and seculars, expressed their opposition to the US. Surveys
concluded back then revealed that the level of anti-Americanism in
Turkey was even stronger than anti-American sentiments in Iran.
How do you see the American attitude vis-Ã-vis the Kurdish issue? Do
the nationalist circles hold suspicions about the US stance?
There is no single Kurdish issue. There is a Kurdish issue that has
changed with time. Turkey is where this issue emerged. The Kurds who
contributed to the Turkification of Anatolian lands fought on the side
of the Ottomans against the Safavids and played extensive roles in
Malazgirt (1071), Çaldıran (1514), Çanakkale (1915) and the War of
Independence so that the unification of the state that was preserved
disappeared in the aftermath of 1924. They became invisible on the
political radar screen.
How and why did this happen? Why did the Kurdish state that existed in
the Treaty of Sevres disappear in Lausanne?
This did not happen in the Treaty of Lausanne because of the consent
of the Kurds. The Kurds did not accept Sèvres.
So they did not want a separate state in the Treaty of Sèvres? Or were
they incapable of this?
They did not want this for several reasons. But the primary reason was
the ambition to create an Armenia on the same land. The Kurds wanted
to prevent this from happening. The Kurds played an extensive role in
the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the appropriation of their
properties.
Can you elaborate on this?
Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on an
understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the Kurds.
They have lived like this for centuries. No room was left for
Kurdishness when Turkishness in a political sense was invented because
this place was declared as being the land of the Turks.
So did the Kurds feel betrayed and deceived?
You have to ask this to the Kurds because I am on the deceiving side;
this is the primary reason for the Kurds. The state whose creation
they contributed to ignored them. This is the real problem for the
Turks. For the Turks, the problem does not start in the 1920s. It
starts with the Kurdish uprising. For the Turks, the problem did not
even start in the 1970s when the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was
founded; the problem started in 1984 when they staged their first
violent attacks. There was no problem for the Turks up until then.
When did the US become interested in the Kurds?
The US perception of the Kurds is not limited to Turkey alone. When
there was no support from Turks at the time of the Iraq invasion, the
US counted on the guidance and concrete support of the Kurds, and they
became a loyal ally to the US. As a result, they gained the current
autonomous status in the north. But this is not our Kurds.
So when did the US become interested in our Kurds?
The PKK wing of our Kurds fell into the sphere of US interest when it
wanted to destabilize Iran. When they explored the PKK's ability to
destabilize Iran through the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)
and when Turkey was banned from taking any action through the southern
border, the PKK was supported on condition that this support would be
forwarded to PJAK. However, the support ceased when the prime minister
made an intelligence agreement with the US. The American
administration did not lend this support for use against Turkey. Well,
this might have been used for this purpose; it is a different issue.
But if, for instance, the US had given stinger missiles to the PKK,
Turkey would be adversely affected by this. The US did not do this. If
this had happened, the US would totally lose Turkey, and Turkey would
lose its airstrike ability over the PKK.
How does the US approach the rapprochement between Turkey and the
Kurdish administration in northern Iraq?
The US is uncomfortable with this. The US does not want a
disintegrated Iraq to ensure that the central Iraqi administration
does not fall into Iranian control. If a Sunni state emerges in Syria,
the unhappy Arabs in Iraq may make an alliance with Syria.
Some arguments on the integration of northern Iraq with Turkey have
been raised recently. So you do not see this as likely?
At the beginning, Turkey was also in favor of the territorial
integrity of Iraq. At that time Turkey declared the establishment of a
separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq as its red line. But when it
failed to prevent this from happening, it made reference to the
geographic and political integration of Iraq. However, when strong
relations were established with the Kurdish administration, these
relations generated great opportunities for economic benefits, and it
became evident that the Kurds in Syria might be impressed by the Kurds
in northern Iraq, so Turkey decided it would not be the end of the
world if they separated from Iraq because it held that northern Iraq
would fall into its sphere of influence.
However, this should not be exaggerated because separating off land
from another country and claiming authority over this land will
further necessitate other similar demands by which land would be
separated. If an alliance based on recognition of political and
economic interests is to be made, this would happen anyway. The legal
borders for this are not necessary, and in fact, this causes problems.
If we have made such a huge shift from the thesis that the Kurds would
partition Turkey to the argument that Kurds would grow with the Turks,
something is wrong. Caution is necessary in such things. The discourse
on the revival of the Ottoman Empire is improper. Contrary to what we
believe, the Ottoman state is perceived as a conqueror rather than a
big brother in this geography. The conqueror rules, and the ruler
seizes the local resources. This is something inherent in imperial
state behavior. It is argued that the Ottoman state did not exploit
like the Western states. It was unable to do so because there was no
industry, therefore, there was no need for the acquisition of raw
materials. It did not have automobiles, so it did not need oil. It had
no advanced mining industry, hence, it did not need mines in these
lands. The Ottomans were an agricultural society, and they exploited
as much value out of agricultural products and revenues.
Go and ask these people what the liberation days in our neighboring
countries mean to them. For this reason, foreign policy cannot rely on
patriotic discourse. Foreign policy does not tolerate emotionality.
When they hear remarks about the Ottomans, they say they want a
partner rather than a protector. For this reason, our politicians have
to remain cautious on this matter. There was a position the government
offered in the beginning on the return to Turkey of former lands of
the Ottoman Empire. This was withdrawn within a month; reference was
made to neo-Ottomanism. And then, zero problems with neighboring
countries was declared. However, you cannot establish problem-free
relations with neighboring countries, because they have inherent
problems. Turkey should rely on its soft power rather than hard power
in the Middle East. It has to establish cultural, diplomatic and
economic networks. It may instead create alliances where it may assume
a determinative role.
You were elected to the committee of wise men for the peace process.
What sort of obstacles do you see before the peace process?
Unfortunately, people have been manipulated about this matter through
several methods. In reference to the PKK, the militants were regarded
as some disordered gangsters. We did not want to believe that we were
facing an international organization. We did not accept the fact that
some militants in the mountains actually had millions of supporters in
Turkey. The reality made itself acceptable over the time. Now we have
to understand this and do whatever is necessary. The official
discourse referred to this as an issue of terrorism created by the
traitors who wanted to partition Turkey. These traitors should have
been destroyed and when soldiers were killed, revenge should have been
taken. This is a never-ending process of death. There is a clichéd
scene in Turkish movies: a man is attempting to murder another man
when somebody appears out of the blue, saying: `Stop! He is your
brother.' This is what is being told to us now. This is a project of
brotherhood. Why did we fight each other if we were brothers? We have
to confront ourselves and our past; we have not done this yet.
Sometimes there are reactions against my remarks. They ask me what I
would do if my child had been murdered. How could one possibly respond
to this question? First option: I would question the system that
caused the death of my child. Second option: I kill somebody else's
child. If they did not expect me to give the second answer, then I
would offer a third option: We should question the system that caused
all these troubles and forgive each other so that this will never
happen again because we have killed many of them, too. We have to put
an end to violence. And then, we have to establish another order where
it will not be used again.
So is this what you will be telling the people as wise men?
The government is administering the peace process in legal and actual
terms; in this situation, it does not want any partner. For this
reason, it is not our job to serve as a facilitator or a mediator.
What is expected from us is PR. In other words, we will tell the
people that unless we make peace, the bloody conflict will continue
and that this will be in no one's interests. We will also explain the
conditions under which the peace process made progress, how it
happened, the values that fostered the process and the content of the
peace language.
Do you know under which conditions the parties made an agreement?
Nobody knows.
To what extent do the Turkish people support the peace negotiations
with the PKK?
The prime minister told us that 55 percent of the people in Central
Anatolian cities support the process. I am not sure whether this is a
scientific finding or not. We, a group of researchers, also conducted
a survey. The responses of the participants vary depending on how you
asked the question. I should underline this point: Nobody opposes
peace. But they are opposed to the party with which the negotiations
are being held. They argue that the government is making peace with
terrorists and traitors. There are some concerns on this matter. They
find negotiations with a terrorist organization offensive. Sixty
percent of people are opposed to peace talks with a terrorist
organization, and this may go up to 80 percent with respect to talks
with Ã-calan. But everybody wants peace. However, every dispute is
settled by the parties to this dispute. This is our job; to explain
this to the people.
However, if you consider the messages from Kandil, you would see that
they see this problem as a matter of status rather than a matter of
cultural rights or human rights alone. Will autonomy come out of this?
The emergence of the current peace environment was made possible by
giving up a different political status. If the implementation of the
local self-government charter of the EU is required for the
democratization of Turkey, this should be done anyway. This is
something that Turkey should have done years ago. This was included in
the 1921 Constitution. This nation was not afraid of decentralization
during a time of war, so there is no reason to be fearful now.
Profile
Professor DoÄ?u Ergil is a leading figure in the field of political
sociology. He drafted a noteworthy report on the Kurdish issue in
1995, sponsored by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges (TOBB), in his capacity as adviser to the TOBB president.
The report attracted a great deal of attention, and since then he has
been regarded as an authority on the Kurdish conflict. Professor Ergil
has also conducted several research projects sponsored by
international organizations.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-312525-ergil-it-was-the-kurds-who-did-not-want-a-kurdish-state-in-the-treaty-of-lausanne.html
April 14 2013
Ergil: It was the Kurds who did not want a Kurdish state in the Treaty
of Lausanne
14 April 2013 /AYDOÄ?AN VATANDAÅ?, NEW YORK
In the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, after World War I, Allied forces
envisioned an independent Kurdish state for Kurds.
But in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, after the Turkish War of
Independence in which the Turks and Kurds fought against the Western
invaders together, this promise was ignored.
Some Kurdish intellectuals tend to blame the Turks for not delivering
the promise to the Kurds for a state of their own. They believe that
they were betrayed. But Professor DoÄ?u Ergil, one of the most renowned
political sociologists from Turkey, says it was actually the Kurds
themselves who did not ask for a state.
He explains that the Kurds `cooperated' with the Turks against the
Armenians to deport them and seized the goods and property left behind
by the Armenians. Professor Ergil claims that the Treaty of Lausanne
was crafted with the consent of the Kurds. `They did not want a
Kurdish state for several reasons. But the primary reason was the
ambition of some to create a separate Armenia in the same lands. The
Kurds wanted to prevent this from happening.'
Professor Ergil also shares his insights about `neo-Ottomanism,' a
term which came into parlance right after new possibilities emerged
for Turkey in the Middle East. `If we have made such a huge shift from
the thesis that the Kurds would partition Turkey to the argument that
Kurds can flourish alongside Turks, something is wrong. Caution is
necessary in such things. The discourse on the revival of the Ottoman
Empire is improper. Contrary to what we believe, the Ottoman state is
perceived as a conqueror rather than a big brother in this region.'
Sunday's Zaman interviewed Professor Ergil in New York on some of the
most controversial issues, and once again Ergil ventured to break
taboos.
You completed your Ph.D. in the US a long time ago; what sort of
changes have you observed in American society?
The American people were influenced by Sept. 11. The American nation
was not a cowardly society. As a nation that entered World War II and
saved Europe as a conveyor of civilization, it was an amazing nation
that replaced the former empire owing to its economy, army and culture
as well as confidence. The destruction of this confidence due to the
Sept. 11 attacks and the use of these attacks by George Bush as a
pretext for an aggressive stance contributed to the emergence of a
culture of fear and doubt in the US. It further contributed to the
exacerbation of its enmity towards the rest of the world. This
attitude by the Bush administration destroyed the confidence of the
American nation and had a detrimental effect on the American
perception of the world.
We are familiar with the reasons in the Middle East for strong
opposition to the US; what is the case in Turkey?
This is in fact interesting; the American image is even worse in
Turkey. There are two social segments conveying anti-Americanism in
Turkey. One of them is the far right and the other is the left wing.
The far right views all others as the enemy. The left, on the other
hand, sees the US as a conveyor and center of imperialism. In
addition, the alliance between the US and Israel and US indifference
to the injustices done to the Palestinians raised opposition among
Muslims as well. On the other hand, because of the perception that the
US is behind the pro-Kurdish movement, both Muslims and the far right
as well as the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) have adopted an
anti-American stance. The [National Security Council] MGK did not take
any decision on the March 1 motion in 2003; this was seen as the
military's reaction to the US. This is actually seen as a strong case
where all social segments, including religious people, rightists,
leftists and seculars, expressed their opposition to the US. Surveys
concluded back then revealed that the level of anti-Americanism in
Turkey was even stronger than anti-American sentiments in Iran.
How do you see the American attitude vis-Ã-vis the Kurdish issue? Do
the nationalist circles hold suspicions about the US stance?
There is no single Kurdish issue. There is a Kurdish issue that has
changed with time. Turkey is where this issue emerged. The Kurds who
contributed to the Turkification of Anatolian lands fought on the side
of the Ottomans against the Safavids and played extensive roles in
Malazgirt (1071), Çaldıran (1514), Çanakkale (1915) and the War of
Independence so that the unification of the state that was preserved
disappeared in the aftermath of 1924. They became invisible on the
political radar screen.
How and why did this happen? Why did the Kurdish state that existed in
the Treaty of Sevres disappear in Lausanne?
This did not happen in the Treaty of Lausanne because of the consent
of the Kurds. The Kurds did not accept Sèvres.
So they did not want a separate state in the Treaty of Sèvres? Or were
they incapable of this?
They did not want this for several reasons. But the primary reason was
the ambition to create an Armenia on the same land. The Kurds wanted
to prevent this from happening. The Kurds played an extensive role in
the expulsion of Armenians from Turkey and the appropriation of their
properties.
Can you elaborate on this?
Kurds and Armenians used to live together in East Anatolia. They
cooperated with Turkish official circles in the deportation of
Armenians and played a primary role in the redistribution of the
property and land of the deported Armenians. Their return would mean
that everything should be restored and reversed. They converted their
children to Islam and took them into Kurdish families. And, of course,
there was no Turkism back then; there was a state approach based on an
understanding of Islam. This was pretty understandable for the Kurds.
They have lived like this for centuries. No room was left for
Kurdishness when Turkishness in a political sense was invented because
this place was declared as being the land of the Turks.
So did the Kurds feel betrayed and deceived?
You have to ask this to the Kurds because I am on the deceiving side;
this is the primary reason for the Kurds. The state whose creation
they contributed to ignored them. This is the real problem for the
Turks. For the Turks, the problem does not start in the 1920s. It
starts with the Kurdish uprising. For the Turks, the problem did not
even start in the 1970s when the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was
founded; the problem started in 1984 when they staged their first
violent attacks. There was no problem for the Turks up until then.
When did the US become interested in the Kurds?
The US perception of the Kurds is not limited to Turkey alone. When
there was no support from Turks at the time of the Iraq invasion, the
US counted on the guidance and concrete support of the Kurds, and they
became a loyal ally to the US. As a result, they gained the current
autonomous status in the north. But this is not our Kurds.
So when did the US become interested in our Kurds?
The PKK wing of our Kurds fell into the sphere of US interest when it
wanted to destabilize Iran. When they explored the PKK's ability to
destabilize Iran through the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)
and when Turkey was banned from taking any action through the southern
border, the PKK was supported on condition that this support would be
forwarded to PJAK. However, the support ceased when the prime minister
made an intelligence agreement with the US. The American
administration did not lend this support for use against Turkey. Well,
this might have been used for this purpose; it is a different issue.
But if, for instance, the US had given stinger missiles to the PKK,
Turkey would be adversely affected by this. The US did not do this. If
this had happened, the US would totally lose Turkey, and Turkey would
lose its airstrike ability over the PKK.
How does the US approach the rapprochement between Turkey and the
Kurdish administration in northern Iraq?
The US is uncomfortable with this. The US does not want a
disintegrated Iraq to ensure that the central Iraqi administration
does not fall into Iranian control. If a Sunni state emerges in Syria,
the unhappy Arabs in Iraq may make an alliance with Syria.
Some arguments on the integration of northern Iraq with Turkey have
been raised recently. So you do not see this as likely?
At the beginning, Turkey was also in favor of the territorial
integrity of Iraq. At that time Turkey declared the establishment of a
separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq as its red line. But when it
failed to prevent this from happening, it made reference to the
geographic and political integration of Iraq. However, when strong
relations were established with the Kurdish administration, these
relations generated great opportunities for economic benefits, and it
became evident that the Kurds in Syria might be impressed by the Kurds
in northern Iraq, so Turkey decided it would not be the end of the
world if they separated from Iraq because it held that northern Iraq
would fall into its sphere of influence.
However, this should not be exaggerated because separating off land
from another country and claiming authority over this land will
further necessitate other similar demands by which land would be
separated. If an alliance based on recognition of political and
economic interests is to be made, this would happen anyway. The legal
borders for this are not necessary, and in fact, this causes problems.
If we have made such a huge shift from the thesis that the Kurds would
partition Turkey to the argument that Kurds would grow with the Turks,
something is wrong. Caution is necessary in such things. The discourse
on the revival of the Ottoman Empire is improper. Contrary to what we
believe, the Ottoman state is perceived as a conqueror rather than a
big brother in this geography. The conqueror rules, and the ruler
seizes the local resources. This is something inherent in imperial
state behavior. It is argued that the Ottoman state did not exploit
like the Western states. It was unable to do so because there was no
industry, therefore, there was no need for the acquisition of raw
materials. It did not have automobiles, so it did not need oil. It had
no advanced mining industry, hence, it did not need mines in these
lands. The Ottomans were an agricultural society, and they exploited
as much value out of agricultural products and revenues.
Go and ask these people what the liberation days in our neighboring
countries mean to them. For this reason, foreign policy cannot rely on
patriotic discourse. Foreign policy does not tolerate emotionality.
When they hear remarks about the Ottomans, they say they want a
partner rather than a protector. For this reason, our politicians have
to remain cautious on this matter. There was a position the government
offered in the beginning on the return to Turkey of former lands of
the Ottoman Empire. This was withdrawn within a month; reference was
made to neo-Ottomanism. And then, zero problems with neighboring
countries was declared. However, you cannot establish problem-free
relations with neighboring countries, because they have inherent
problems. Turkey should rely on its soft power rather than hard power
in the Middle East. It has to establish cultural, diplomatic and
economic networks. It may instead create alliances where it may assume
a determinative role.
You were elected to the committee of wise men for the peace process.
What sort of obstacles do you see before the peace process?
Unfortunately, people have been manipulated about this matter through
several methods. In reference to the PKK, the militants were regarded
as some disordered gangsters. We did not want to believe that we were
facing an international organization. We did not accept the fact that
some militants in the mountains actually had millions of supporters in
Turkey. The reality made itself acceptable over the time. Now we have
to understand this and do whatever is necessary. The official
discourse referred to this as an issue of terrorism created by the
traitors who wanted to partition Turkey. These traitors should have
been destroyed and when soldiers were killed, revenge should have been
taken. This is a never-ending process of death. There is a clichéd
scene in Turkish movies: a man is attempting to murder another man
when somebody appears out of the blue, saying: `Stop! He is your
brother.' This is what is being told to us now. This is a project of
brotherhood. Why did we fight each other if we were brothers? We have
to confront ourselves and our past; we have not done this yet.
Sometimes there are reactions against my remarks. They ask me what I
would do if my child had been murdered. How could one possibly respond
to this question? First option: I would question the system that
caused the death of my child. Second option: I kill somebody else's
child. If they did not expect me to give the second answer, then I
would offer a third option: We should question the system that caused
all these troubles and forgive each other so that this will never
happen again because we have killed many of them, too. We have to put
an end to violence. And then, we have to establish another order where
it will not be used again.
So is this what you will be telling the people as wise men?
The government is administering the peace process in legal and actual
terms; in this situation, it does not want any partner. For this
reason, it is not our job to serve as a facilitator or a mediator.
What is expected from us is PR. In other words, we will tell the
people that unless we make peace, the bloody conflict will continue
and that this will be in no one's interests. We will also explain the
conditions under which the peace process made progress, how it
happened, the values that fostered the process and the content of the
peace language.
Do you know under which conditions the parties made an agreement?
Nobody knows.
To what extent do the Turkish people support the peace negotiations
with the PKK?
The prime minister told us that 55 percent of the people in Central
Anatolian cities support the process. I am not sure whether this is a
scientific finding or not. We, a group of researchers, also conducted
a survey. The responses of the participants vary depending on how you
asked the question. I should underline this point: Nobody opposes
peace. But they are opposed to the party with which the negotiations
are being held. They argue that the government is making peace with
terrorists and traitors. There are some concerns on this matter. They
find negotiations with a terrorist organization offensive. Sixty
percent of people are opposed to peace talks with a terrorist
organization, and this may go up to 80 percent with respect to talks
with Ã-calan. But everybody wants peace. However, every dispute is
settled by the parties to this dispute. This is our job; to explain
this to the people.
However, if you consider the messages from Kandil, you would see that
they see this problem as a matter of status rather than a matter of
cultural rights or human rights alone. Will autonomy come out of this?
The emergence of the current peace environment was made possible by
giving up a different political status. If the implementation of the
local self-government charter of the EU is required for the
democratization of Turkey, this should be done anyway. This is
something that Turkey should have done years ago. This was included in
the 1921 Constitution. This nation was not afraid of decentralization
during a time of war, so there is no reason to be fearful now.
Profile
Professor DoÄ?u Ergil is a leading figure in the field of political
sociology. He drafted a noteworthy report on the Kurdish issue in
1995, sponsored by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges (TOBB), in his capacity as adviser to the TOBB president.
The report attracted a great deal of attention, and since then he has
been regarded as an authority on the Kurdish conflict. Professor Ergil
has also conducted several research projects sponsored by
international organizations.
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-312525-ergil-it-was-the-kurds-who-did-not-want-a-kurdish-state-in-the-treaty-of-lausanne.html