Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

A Diplomatic Failure?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • A Diplomatic Failure?

    A DIPLOMATIC FAILURE?

    European Voice
    November 28, 2013

    With only two deals pending with Georgia and Moldova, Andrew Gardner
    asks what the EU can learn from its Eastern Partnership project

    On Friday, a day after Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych announced
    that he would not sign political and trade deals with the European
    Union, Stefan Fule, the European commissioner for the neighbourhood,
    was asked whether the EU's Eastern Partnership was a diplomatic
    failure.

    It was a pointed question, but also to the point. The biggest of the
    EU's six eastern neighbours in the EU's Eastern Partnership, Ukraine,
    had just decided to "pause" talks with the EU. Armenia had said in
    September that it would join Russia's Eurasian Union rather than
    strike agreements with the EU.

    Belarus has never shown an interest in the partnership on offer from
    the EU, while Azerbaijan wants to cast it aside. And so, at the Eastern
    Partnership summit today and tomorrow (28-29 November), the EU will put
    its name to agreements with only two countries, Moldova and Georgia -
    both tiny and poor and neither in control of all of its territory.

    A natural conclusion to these widening differences would be to abandon
    the Eastern Partnership and pursue bilateral approaches.

    Predictably, Fule, the European commissioner for the neighbourhood,
    saw things differently. "I don't see a need [for introspection],"
    he said. He described association agreements - the political deal on
    offer, of which free trade is a part - as "an instrument with huge
    transformative power, second only to enlargement".

    He has a strong case. Four years ago, when the Eastern Partnership
    was established, the EU's offer of access to the EU's market was seen
    as vague and too remote for most of the neighbours.

    Now, Georgia and Moldova will initial political and trade deals,
    and until September Armenia was on the cusp of doing so. Ukraine has
    already initialled the deals; when its politicians find the will,
    they can pull the deals off the shelf and sign them.

    A policy approach that has brought the EU's relations with its eastern
    neighbours to this point cannot, and will not, be easily discarded.

    But, whatever Fule says, there will be plenty of introspection
    following Ukraine's decision.

    LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

    What lessons are there to learn from recent months and, in particular,
    from relations with Ukraine?

    Russia has revealed its character: Russia has held back its neighbours
    by twisting arms, a point that EU leaders have underlined by openly
    attacking the economic pressure applied by Russia to Ukraine in
    particular. (Even Moldova has been held back, under Russian pressure
    postponing EU-related energy measures required by the European Energy
    Community). West Europeans too have clarity - that Russia is a bully,
    as its post-communist members have long pointed out.

    The EU has shown greater interest in its eastern neighbourhood
    than ever before and this has produced results. In particular,
    the engagement of Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, has been a
    boost for the EU, has helped reform in Moldova especially, has put
    necessary pressure on Ukraine and has, overall, provided a back-stop
    against Russian pressure.

    The EU has all along been dealing with a multi-speed region, but it
    now has a clearer sense of the speed of individual countries. Midgets
    - Moldova and Georgia - have been willing to move forward fast. The
    giant, Ukraine, is lumbering along, but generally forward, in a
    highly unpredictable fashion. Armenia pushed ahead technically,
    but its political will was questionable. The two other countries in
    the region have much reason to be interested in Europe - Europe is
    Azerbaijan's new, best energy market, while for Belarus Europe is a
    counter-weight to Russia - but they show next to no interest in what
    the EU is offering.

    Improbable changes can happen. In 2004, large volumes of Russian
    money helped Yanukovych as he fought, ultimately unsuccessfully,
    for the presidency. As president since 2010, Yanukovych has zigzagged
    towards the EU, to the point this summer and autumn when Russia felt
    it had to apply overt and blatant pressure.

    It is unwise to pin too much hope on individual politicians. Since
    Ukraine initialled the trade and political agreements in spring
    2012, the chances of the deals being signed have depended on
    Yanukovych. All along, Yanukovych has kept his thinking largely to
    himself. He apparently gave no hint that he was willing to heed EU
    advice and grant a partial pardon to his jailed political rival,
    Yulia Tymoshenko. Only recently did he begin to tell the EU just how
    worried he was about Russian economic pressure and about the state
    of the country's finances.

    The EU can be confident about ambitious political and trade deals
    in the region only when the region has changed more. Ukraine's and
    Armenia's decisions not to press ahead with deals with the EU showed
    how closely they remain tied to Russia, economically and strategically.

    WHAT NEXT FOR THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP?

    When the Eastern Partnership summit ends tomorrow (29 November),
    it should be clearer whether the EU has learnt those lessons and
    whether its neighbours have drawn the same lessons.

    Some conclusions will be drawn, but may not be publicly expressed. For
    instance, that Ukraine and other eastern EU neighbours should now
    expect the EU to be more wary. If Ukraine signs the political and
    trade deals, possibly at the next EU-Ukraine summit in the spring,
    it can expect the ratification process, which typically lasts two to
    three years, to be difficult.

    Another possible conclusion is that the EU should adopt an approach of
    'strategic patience' towards Russia and its relations in the region.

    Russia's bullying behaviour lost it the support of the Georgian public
    long ago, is now costing it support in Moldova, and damaging it in
    the eyes of Ukrainians and Armenians.

    However, the EU's policy cannot simply be passive; it will have to
    decide what to do with its Eastern Partnership. Perhaps it should
    deepen its relations in the region bilaterally. The case is strong.

    The main elements of the EU's relations with the region - the political
    'association' agreement, the trade deals and visa liberalisation -
    are issues handled bilaterally. Some elements introduced in 2009 as
    part of the Eastern Partnership (such as more tailored and specific
    goals for individual countries, more conditions and the measuring of
    progress) do not need to be part of a broader policy package. One of
    the EU's principles in the region - more EU support for more reform -
    encourages policymaking that is more differentiated and bilateral.

    But the Eastern Partnership also introduced potentially useful
    multilateral ways of developing relations between the EU and between
    the eastern partners themselves - in the form of summits, meetings
    of foreign ministers, a parliamentary assembly (Euronest) and forums
    for civil society and business.

    Ultimately, Russia's pressure on its neighbours may guarantee that
    the Eastern Partnership continues in its current form. But the form
    of policies is less important than the aims: to make these countries
    less peripheral to Europe and the world and less vulnerable to Russia.

Working...
X