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When Radicalization Becomes A Supra-Regional Threat - OpEd
By Catherine Shakdam
Dec. 16, 2014
If Azerbaijan and the Caucacus region in general have seldom generated
much media attention, that it is not say that we, the public, should
not be paying very close attention to this seemingly insignificant
part of the world.
Sitting at a geo-strategic knot of utmost importance, Azerbaijan might
be small and clustered in between regional super-powers, but that is
not to say that Baku cannot wield tremendous political gravity.
However small and lost amid a sea of greater powers, Azerbaijan and
its Caucausian neighbors ' Armenia and Georgia ' could soon prove to
carry the keys to world security and stability, especially since
radicalization and sectarian-based violence continues to corrupt and
spread far and wide into the Middle East and Eurasia, threatening to
engulf all in its path.
As noted by Eldar Mamedov ` political adviser for the social-democrats
in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP), `The
unraveling of Iraq may have some interesting, even alarming
implications for the Caspian Basin state of Azerbaijan.'
And indeed, unlike other Arab states in turmoil, including Libya and
Syria, Iraq has a religious and cultural profile that somewhat mimics
Azerbaijan's. Looking at developments in this particular region of the
world and how Islamic radicals have exploited ethnic and sectarian
fault-lines, one could use Iraq as a cautionary tale.
For one, both countries have Shia Islamic majorities with large Sunni
minorities. In addition, both have lengthy experience with coercive,
top-down secularism. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Baath Party promoted
secularism during the three-and-a-half decades it held power in the
country. In Azerbaijan, the secular tradition dates back to the
Bolsheviks' arrival in power in the 1920s and extends to the present
day.
Although it is difficult to make a linear analogy, there are two
significant ways in which the disintegration of Iraq might pose
security challenges to Azerbaijan and thus the region as a whole.
Mamedov asserted that `The first and most obvious is connected with
the rise in Iraq of a Sunni jihadist movement, known as ISIS ` Islamic
State of Iraq and Al Sham ` This development, over time, could stoke
sectarian tension in Azerbaijan, a country where, even though
secularism remains a powerful force in society, religion is making a
strong comeback.'
For Shia worldwide, including those in Azerbaijan, opposing the
violently anti-Shia ISIS movement is an existential issue, one which
could spiral out of control should radicals' advances remain
unchecked.
If for now, Shia leaders in Azerbaijan have urged sectarian restraint,
understanding that calls for action would only serve to fan further
sectarian-based animosity and enmity in between communities, that it
not to say that it will remain so.
There has already been an incident in the southern Azerbaijani town of
Sabirabad, where local Shia residents attacked a man belonging to the
Sunni Salafi movement ` ultra-orthodox Sunni.
Although such incidents are still rare in secular Azerbaijan, signs
that religious passions have been awaken are quickly emerging. As
noted by Mamadov, `a rapidly rising number of citizens are using faith
to help define their identities.'
He added, `Where older generation of Azerbaijanis saw themselves as
Muslims mostly in a cultural sense, untroubled by religious semantic
and sectarian labels, the Youth are not only very conscious of their
identities but they are globalist in their outlook.'
At such a time when the Islamic world stands to face so many immediate
existential threats, tensions in Iraq and Syria are bound to carry
throughout, galvanizing an increasingly disenfranchised generation
into action.
And if for now, few Azerbaijanis have answered the calls of radicals,
Islamists' E-propaganda could soon found a comfortable echo in the
Caucasus, where ethno-sectarian tensions against Armenia have been
already heightened since late November.
Among Azerbaijani Sunnis, the consolidation and expansion of the
territorial foothold of ISIS in Iraq could act as a magnet, attracting
the discontented to the jihadist banner. This phenomenon has already
occurred in Syria, where some Azerbaijanis, such as a prominent
An-Nusra fighter, Hattab al-Azeri, have taken up arms against Bashar
al-Assad's regime with an eye toward gaining experience that could be
used one day against Ilham Aliyev's administration in Baku. ISIS'
gains in Iraq, then, would seem to significantly increase the
opportunities for and capabilities of Azerbaijani jihadists one day to
launch terror and propaganda campaigns in Azerbaijan.
Again if such a threat remains for now remote, Azerbaijan represents
an opportunity groups such as ISIS will likely attempt to seize and
exploit, especially since like Iraq and Syria, Azerbaijan possesses
vast energy resources, and thus immense wealth.
A second set of challenges is linked to the prospect of Iraq's
disintegration along ethnic lines. The Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) has announced plans to prepare a referendum on the independence
of Iraqi Kurdistan. While a vote is not imminent, there is little
doubt that if and when it took place, the pro-independence stance
would win easily. This would encourage Kurds in Turkey and Iran to
want to join their brothers in a new Kurdish state.
And while no state other than Israel has so far expressed clear
support for an independent Kurdistan, an expectation that a Kurdish
state might be pro-Western in orientation could conceivably lead to a
subtle change in the position of the West. Indeed, the idea of
remapping the Middle East along more homogenous sectarian and ethnic
lines, once a purely mental exercise, is now being taken more
seriously in Western policy-making discussions.
The problem for Azerbaijan is that there is considerable overlap
between the Kurdish and Azeri populations in the western Iran. A
Kurdish attempt to neatly separate, then, could easily spark tension
in Iran, Azerbaijan's neighbor. That, in turn, could ignite a
nationalistic backlash among Iranian Azeris, placing the government in
Baku in a difficult position.
While Azerbaijani state officials have been keen not to antagonize
Iranian officials in order to retain functional and amicable relations
with Tehran the idea of a `greater Azerbaijan' might gain more
traction if regional borders start being re-drawn, and if the West and
Iran fail to reach a mutually acceptable nuclear deal, thus causing
new Western efforts to economically and diplomatically isolate Tehran.
A potential `greater Azerbaijan' would be as likely to be as
pro-Western and Israel-friendly as an `independent Kurdistan.'
Should such agenda be push forth though, it is most likely violent
armed confrontations will ensue, potentially putting Baku at risk of
complete institutional annihilation as both Russia and Iran will
oppose any direct pro-western `remapping.'
Although Baku cannot hope to compete or even influence developments in
Iraq, Russia and Iran, it has become evident that President Ilham
Aliyev has already grasped shifting regional polarities, aware that
whatever decisions his administration will take in regards to Armenia
and foreign relations in general will have far-reaching repercussions.
Catherine Shakdam
Catherine is a political risk analyst for the Middle East with over 7
years' experience.
A political commentator and columnist her work has appeared in many
world renown publications -- Foreign Policy Association, Press TV,
Tehran Times, Majalla, International Policy Digest, the US
Independent, RT and many more.
She is the Associate Director of Beirut Center for Middle Eastern
Studies and sits on the Russian International Affairs Council as a
contributing policy adviser and co-founded Access-Media
(www.accessmedia.webs.com)
She formerly acted as Yemen Minister of Human Rights senior media adviser.
From: Baghdasarian
When Radicalization Becomes A Supra-Regional Threat - OpEd
By Catherine Shakdam
Dec. 16, 2014
If Azerbaijan and the Caucacus region in general have seldom generated
much media attention, that it is not say that we, the public, should
not be paying very close attention to this seemingly insignificant
part of the world.
Sitting at a geo-strategic knot of utmost importance, Azerbaijan might
be small and clustered in between regional super-powers, but that is
not to say that Baku cannot wield tremendous political gravity.
However small and lost amid a sea of greater powers, Azerbaijan and
its Caucausian neighbors ' Armenia and Georgia ' could soon prove to
carry the keys to world security and stability, especially since
radicalization and sectarian-based violence continues to corrupt and
spread far and wide into the Middle East and Eurasia, threatening to
engulf all in its path.
As noted by Eldar Mamedov ` political adviser for the social-democrats
in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP), `The
unraveling of Iraq may have some interesting, even alarming
implications for the Caspian Basin state of Azerbaijan.'
And indeed, unlike other Arab states in turmoil, including Libya and
Syria, Iraq has a religious and cultural profile that somewhat mimics
Azerbaijan's. Looking at developments in this particular region of the
world and how Islamic radicals have exploited ethnic and sectarian
fault-lines, one could use Iraq as a cautionary tale.
For one, both countries have Shia Islamic majorities with large Sunni
minorities. In addition, both have lengthy experience with coercive,
top-down secularism. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's Baath Party promoted
secularism during the three-and-a-half decades it held power in the
country. In Azerbaijan, the secular tradition dates back to the
Bolsheviks' arrival in power in the 1920s and extends to the present
day.
Although it is difficult to make a linear analogy, there are two
significant ways in which the disintegration of Iraq might pose
security challenges to Azerbaijan and thus the region as a whole.
Mamedov asserted that `The first and most obvious is connected with
the rise in Iraq of a Sunni jihadist movement, known as ISIS ` Islamic
State of Iraq and Al Sham ` This development, over time, could stoke
sectarian tension in Azerbaijan, a country where, even though
secularism remains a powerful force in society, religion is making a
strong comeback.'
For Shia worldwide, including those in Azerbaijan, opposing the
violently anti-Shia ISIS movement is an existential issue, one which
could spiral out of control should radicals' advances remain
unchecked.
If for now, Shia leaders in Azerbaijan have urged sectarian restraint,
understanding that calls for action would only serve to fan further
sectarian-based animosity and enmity in between communities, that it
not to say that it will remain so.
There has already been an incident in the southern Azerbaijani town of
Sabirabad, where local Shia residents attacked a man belonging to the
Sunni Salafi movement ` ultra-orthodox Sunni.
Although such incidents are still rare in secular Azerbaijan, signs
that religious passions have been awaken are quickly emerging. As
noted by Mamadov, `a rapidly rising number of citizens are using faith
to help define their identities.'
He added, `Where older generation of Azerbaijanis saw themselves as
Muslims mostly in a cultural sense, untroubled by religious semantic
and sectarian labels, the Youth are not only very conscious of their
identities but they are globalist in their outlook.'
At such a time when the Islamic world stands to face so many immediate
existential threats, tensions in Iraq and Syria are bound to carry
throughout, galvanizing an increasingly disenfranchised generation
into action.
And if for now, few Azerbaijanis have answered the calls of radicals,
Islamists' E-propaganda could soon found a comfortable echo in the
Caucasus, where ethno-sectarian tensions against Armenia have been
already heightened since late November.
Among Azerbaijani Sunnis, the consolidation and expansion of the
territorial foothold of ISIS in Iraq could act as a magnet, attracting
the discontented to the jihadist banner. This phenomenon has already
occurred in Syria, where some Azerbaijanis, such as a prominent
An-Nusra fighter, Hattab al-Azeri, have taken up arms against Bashar
al-Assad's regime with an eye toward gaining experience that could be
used one day against Ilham Aliyev's administration in Baku. ISIS'
gains in Iraq, then, would seem to significantly increase the
opportunities for and capabilities of Azerbaijani jihadists one day to
launch terror and propaganda campaigns in Azerbaijan.
Again if such a threat remains for now remote, Azerbaijan represents
an opportunity groups such as ISIS will likely attempt to seize and
exploit, especially since like Iraq and Syria, Azerbaijan possesses
vast energy resources, and thus immense wealth.
A second set of challenges is linked to the prospect of Iraq's
disintegration along ethnic lines. The Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) has announced plans to prepare a referendum on the independence
of Iraqi Kurdistan. While a vote is not imminent, there is little
doubt that if and when it took place, the pro-independence stance
would win easily. This would encourage Kurds in Turkey and Iran to
want to join their brothers in a new Kurdish state.
And while no state other than Israel has so far expressed clear
support for an independent Kurdistan, an expectation that a Kurdish
state might be pro-Western in orientation could conceivably lead to a
subtle change in the position of the West. Indeed, the idea of
remapping the Middle East along more homogenous sectarian and ethnic
lines, once a purely mental exercise, is now being taken more
seriously in Western policy-making discussions.
The problem for Azerbaijan is that there is considerable overlap
between the Kurdish and Azeri populations in the western Iran. A
Kurdish attempt to neatly separate, then, could easily spark tension
in Iran, Azerbaijan's neighbor. That, in turn, could ignite a
nationalistic backlash among Iranian Azeris, placing the government in
Baku in a difficult position.
While Azerbaijani state officials have been keen not to antagonize
Iranian officials in order to retain functional and amicable relations
with Tehran the idea of a `greater Azerbaijan' might gain more
traction if regional borders start being re-drawn, and if the West and
Iran fail to reach a mutually acceptable nuclear deal, thus causing
new Western efforts to economically and diplomatically isolate Tehran.
A potential `greater Azerbaijan' would be as likely to be as
pro-Western and Israel-friendly as an `independent Kurdistan.'
Should such agenda be push forth though, it is most likely violent
armed confrontations will ensue, potentially putting Baku at risk of
complete institutional annihilation as both Russia and Iran will
oppose any direct pro-western `remapping.'
Although Baku cannot hope to compete or even influence developments in
Iraq, Russia and Iran, it has become evident that President Ilham
Aliyev has already grasped shifting regional polarities, aware that
whatever decisions his administration will take in regards to Armenia
and foreign relations in general will have far-reaching repercussions.
Catherine Shakdam
Catherine is a political risk analyst for the Middle East with over 7
years' experience.
A political commentator and columnist her work has appeared in many
world renown publications -- Foreign Policy Association, Press TV,
Tehran Times, Majalla, International Policy Digest, the US
Independent, RT and many more.
She is the Associate Director of Beirut Center for Middle Eastern
Studies and sits on the Russian International Affairs Council as a
contributing policy adviser and co-founded Access-Media
(www.accessmedia.webs.com)
She formerly acted as Yemen Minister of Human Rights senior media adviser.
From: Baghdasarian