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WHY AMERICA MUST STEP UP ITS ROLE IN RESOLVING ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI CONFLICT
Yahoo News
June 10 2014
Stepping up America's direct role in advancing a resolution to the
simmering conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and
Azerbaijan is an essential step to serve not only American interests,
but to put Vladimir Putin on the defensive.
By Svante E. Cornell 7 hours ago
This May marked the 20th anniversary of the cease-fire in the conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorna-Karabakh region. That
is hardly an occasion to celebrate: This conflict remains unresolved,
and in the aftermath of the Crimea conflict, is arguably both more
dangerous and more relevant than ever to US interests.
If Crimea is the latest "frozen" conflict in Eurasia, the one over
Nagorno-Karabakh was the mother of the territorial conflicts of the
former Soviet Union. The conflict over that mountainous territory
pitted two post-Soviet republics in the strategic South Caucasus
against one another, and has remained unresolved since the cease-fire
20 years ago. It also set the tone for a series of territorial
conflicts with geopolitical overtones in South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and Transnistria - and eventually in Crimea.
Just like Crimea, Karabakh featured a territory with a disputed
history, a contentious status, and a majority population with
affiliations to a neighboring state. But like Crimea, Karabakh was
never just about the locals. The conflict always featured a third
player: Moscow, which from day one played a key role in determining the
outcome of the conflict. It helped instigate the violence and armed
both sides, calibrating releases of weapons to achieve a stalemate
that left both countries weak and exposed to Russian pressure. To this
day, it remains Russia's policy to maintain a controlled instability
between the two countries, using the conflict to cement its control
over Armenia, and to weaken pro-Western Azerbaijan.
In a tragic irony, the war turned a winner into a loser. Much smaller
than Azerbaijan in terms of wealth, population and territory, Armenia
was able to use Russian help to take control not only of the disputed
territory itself, but of seven adjacent areas of Azerbaijan. Armenia
had enjoyed considerable sympathies in the West, but its policies
of ethnic cleansing turned it into an aggressor in the eyes of the
world community. It also led to Armenia's international isolation.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan began developing its large oil and gas
resources, and its GDP is now five time larger than Armenia's. Armenia
has found itself with a shrinking population and a total dependence on
Russia to maintain its territorial gains. Yet Azerbaijan is no winner
either; as long as the conflict remains, its sovereignty is abridged,
and its population increasingly restless.
Calling this a "frozen" conflict provides a false sense of security.
After all, the term conjures the sense that there is no cost of
inaction. But with every passing year, the risk of a new war grows,
triggered either by accident or by design. In truth, the conflict is
now on track to be another Kashmir or Israel-Palestinian conflict:
featuring periods of cold peace interrupted by hot war. From my
perspective, the real question is what the timing, magnitude, and
shape of the next active part of the conflict will be.
That next war will not occur in a remote backwater. The conflict
lies at the crossroads of Eurasia, bordered by major powers. It lies
astride the main route pumping Caspian energy to Europe. And the
region provides the only logistical access point connecting NATO
to Central Asia and Afghanistan. In spite of this, international
efforts to end the conflict have been dismal. The Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe created a "Minsk Group" in 1992
to negotiate a settlement on the disputed region's status. That group
includes the United States and France as co-chairs, but also Russia,
the very power that is seeking to keep the flames alive.
The notion was that having Russia "in the tent" was better than having
it sabotaging from the outside. This pragmatism was understandable
- but requires an entirely different approach than what Washington
has mustered to be credible. In the last few years, America did not
object when Moscow, fresh from invading Georgia, decided in 2009 that
it wanted to take a lead in resolving the conflict. No one asked what
credibility Moscow had to play the peacemaker in the South Caucasus.
When that effort to strike a Russian-sponsored deal fell through,
many even pointed the blame at Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than
to Moscow, where it belonged.
Instead of putting effort into resolving the standoff, Washington
pursued a futile Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, ignoring the damage
that shoving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the back burner would do
to a vulnerable and reliable American ally, Azerbaijan. The US even
allowed its co-chairmanship of the peace process to remain vacant
for almost a year.
A skilled US diplomat, James Warlick, is now in charge of the job. But
even after Crimea, the Obama administration keeps toeing the line that
its cooperation with Russia on the Karabakh conflict is exemplary. But
the only way US-Russian cooperation on Karabakh could be harmonious
would be if the US were doing nothing to advance a settlement -
since doing something would trigger a Russian reaction. More likely,
administration officials are not ready to commit to a serious effort
to raise America's profile on this issue.
If the US is serious about confronting Vladimir Putin, this inaction
will not do. Understandably, the administration has focused so
far on Ukraine and on sanctions on Russia. But going forward,
stepping up America's direct role in advancing a resolution to the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is an essential step to serve not only
American interests, but to put Putin on the defensive. This will
not be easy, but failing to meet the challenge projects an image of
American weakness that plays straight into Putin's hands.
Svante E. Cornell is director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
http://news.yahoo.com/why-america-must-step-role-resolving-armenian-azerbaijani-131113442--politics.html
From: A. Papazian
Yahoo News
June 10 2014
Stepping up America's direct role in advancing a resolution to the
simmering conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and
Azerbaijan is an essential step to serve not only American interests,
but to put Vladimir Putin on the defensive.
By Svante E. Cornell 7 hours ago
This May marked the 20th anniversary of the cease-fire in the conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorna-Karabakh region. That
is hardly an occasion to celebrate: This conflict remains unresolved,
and in the aftermath of the Crimea conflict, is arguably both more
dangerous and more relevant than ever to US interests.
If Crimea is the latest "frozen" conflict in Eurasia, the one over
Nagorno-Karabakh was the mother of the territorial conflicts of the
former Soviet Union. The conflict over that mountainous territory
pitted two post-Soviet republics in the strategic South Caucasus
against one another, and has remained unresolved since the cease-fire
20 years ago. It also set the tone for a series of territorial
conflicts with geopolitical overtones in South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and Transnistria - and eventually in Crimea.
Just like Crimea, Karabakh featured a territory with a disputed
history, a contentious status, and a majority population with
affiliations to a neighboring state. But like Crimea, Karabakh was
never just about the locals. The conflict always featured a third
player: Moscow, which from day one played a key role in determining the
outcome of the conflict. It helped instigate the violence and armed
both sides, calibrating releases of weapons to achieve a stalemate
that left both countries weak and exposed to Russian pressure. To this
day, it remains Russia's policy to maintain a controlled instability
between the two countries, using the conflict to cement its control
over Armenia, and to weaken pro-Western Azerbaijan.
In a tragic irony, the war turned a winner into a loser. Much smaller
than Azerbaijan in terms of wealth, population and territory, Armenia
was able to use Russian help to take control not only of the disputed
territory itself, but of seven adjacent areas of Azerbaijan. Armenia
had enjoyed considerable sympathies in the West, but its policies
of ethnic cleansing turned it into an aggressor in the eyes of the
world community. It also led to Armenia's international isolation.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan began developing its large oil and gas
resources, and its GDP is now five time larger than Armenia's. Armenia
has found itself with a shrinking population and a total dependence on
Russia to maintain its territorial gains. Yet Azerbaijan is no winner
either; as long as the conflict remains, its sovereignty is abridged,
and its population increasingly restless.
Calling this a "frozen" conflict provides a false sense of security.
After all, the term conjures the sense that there is no cost of
inaction. But with every passing year, the risk of a new war grows,
triggered either by accident or by design. In truth, the conflict is
now on track to be another Kashmir or Israel-Palestinian conflict:
featuring periods of cold peace interrupted by hot war. From my
perspective, the real question is what the timing, magnitude, and
shape of the next active part of the conflict will be.
That next war will not occur in a remote backwater. The conflict
lies at the crossroads of Eurasia, bordered by major powers. It lies
astride the main route pumping Caspian energy to Europe. And the
region provides the only logistical access point connecting NATO
to Central Asia and Afghanistan. In spite of this, international
efforts to end the conflict have been dismal. The Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe created a "Minsk Group" in 1992
to negotiate a settlement on the disputed region's status. That group
includes the United States and France as co-chairs, but also Russia,
the very power that is seeking to keep the flames alive.
The notion was that having Russia "in the tent" was better than having
it sabotaging from the outside. This pragmatism was understandable
- but requires an entirely different approach than what Washington
has mustered to be credible. In the last few years, America did not
object when Moscow, fresh from invading Georgia, decided in 2009 that
it wanted to take a lead in resolving the conflict. No one asked what
credibility Moscow had to play the peacemaker in the South Caucasus.
When that effort to strike a Russian-sponsored deal fell through,
many even pointed the blame at Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than
to Moscow, where it belonged.
Instead of putting effort into resolving the standoff, Washington
pursued a futile Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, ignoring the damage
that shoving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the back burner would do
to a vulnerable and reliable American ally, Azerbaijan. The US even
allowed its co-chairmanship of the peace process to remain vacant
for almost a year.
A skilled US diplomat, James Warlick, is now in charge of the job. But
even after Crimea, the Obama administration keeps toeing the line that
its cooperation with Russia on the Karabakh conflict is exemplary. But
the only way US-Russian cooperation on Karabakh could be harmonious
would be if the US were doing nothing to advance a settlement -
since doing something would trigger a Russian reaction. More likely,
administration officials are not ready to commit to a serious effort
to raise America's profile on this issue.
If the US is serious about confronting Vladimir Putin, this inaction
will not do. Understandably, the administration has focused so
far on Ukraine and on sanctions on Russia. But going forward,
stepping up America's direct role in advancing a resolution to the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is an essential step to serve not only
American interests, but to put Putin on the defensive. This will
not be easy, but failing to meet the challenge projects an image of
American weakness that plays straight into Putin's hands.
Svante E. Cornell is director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
http://news.yahoo.com/why-america-must-step-role-resolving-armenian-azerbaijani-131113442--politics.html
From: A. Papazian