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22 September, 2004
''Azerbaijan's Precarious Balancing Act''
The geostrategic nerve center of the Caucasus is Azerbaijan with oil
reserves possibly totaling one-hundred billion barrels. The country is
coveted as an ally or at least a benevolent neutral by regional and
world powers: Iran, Russia, the Franco-German combination and the
United States. Each of those powers has its own interests, which
creates a complex pattern of convergence and divergence among them.
As the object of active interest by powers that are politically and
economically stronger than itself, Azerbaijan is threatened with
dependency if it falls into the hands of any one of them, but it also
has an opportunity for autonomy if it can successfully play them off
against one another and maintain a balance of power. With autonomy as
its goal, the government of President Ilham Aliyev has pursued a
"balanced" foreign policy, opening up diplomatic channels with all of
the interested states and giving each of them the hope of satisfying
some of its own aims, while Baku maneuvers to achieve its vital
interests.
As the Aliyev regime perceives them, the vital interests of Azerbaijan
are to settle jurisdictional issues over rights to Caspian Sea oil,
ensure security of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that will move the oil
west, secure investment from varied sources on the best terms to
develop its oil industry and the rest of its economy, avoid economic
or military dependence on any foreign power as it pursues development,
and resolve the issue of the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh by
regaining sovereignty over it. From Baku's viewpoint, Azerbaijan's
future is that of a rising power that will be able to maintain genuine
independence in the long term if it can manage the transition to
prosperity by skillfully performing its balancing act.
The Balanced Strategy
Baku has been able to pursue its balanced strategy because none of the
powers impinging on it poses a direct military threat to the
regime. The Franco-German combine by necessity is restricted to
economic and diplomatic influence, and neither Iran, Russia nor the
United States is currently interested in making any provocations that
would lead the others into a confrontation with it and risk
instability in the oil patch. Each of the impinging powers would like
to draw Azerbaijan into its orbit, but their room for action is
limited by the others, leaving Baku with a measure of freedom to make
deals with all of them and also to refuse their proposals.
>From the viewpoint of its vital interests, Baku counts on Washington
for help in settling Caspian Sea jurisdiction, since Iran and Russia
border Azerbaijan on the Sea and are competing interested
parties. Baku also expects Washington to make sure that the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is secure. In the sphere of economic development,
Baku wants investment from all of the interested parties, particularly
the Franco-German combination. It also wants help from any of them on
the Karabakh problem.
In return for its protection and in pursuit of its perceived vital
interests, Washington would like to establish a military presence in
Azerbaijan as part of its policy of securing oil supplies by
encircling and containing Russia and Iran. In response, Russia and
Iran want Azerbaijan to remain free of American bases. This
configuration of economic and strategic interests allows for a balance
of power in which Baku undertakes limited military cooperation with
Washington and Moscow, and maintains friendly relations with Iran,
satisfying each of them a little and antagonizing none of them. The
wild card is Karabakh, which destabilizes the balancing act.
Nagorno-Karabakh
After achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan
was faced with a rebellion in the Armenian-dominated region of
Nagorno-Karabakh, which occupies a significant portion of the
country's southwest. Several years of war, ethnic cleansing, pogroms
and massacres led to the de facto independence of the breakaway region
under the protection of Armenia. In implementing its protective role,
Armenia also occupied areas of Azerbaijan bordering Karabakh, carving
out a corridor from the region to Armenia. The troubles created bitter
hostility between the dominant ethnic group in Azerbaijan -- the
Azeris -- and the Armenians, resulting in the unwillingness of either
group to compromise.
Ever since the secession of Karabakh, Baku has been preoccupied with
regaining sovereignty over the region. Karabakh is an open wound for
the Azeri public and any regime in Baku has to reckon with deeply
irredentist and often revanchist public opinion that severely
restricts the ability to negotiate a solution. To surrender
Azerbaijanian sovereignty over Karabakh definitively would amount to a
political death sentence. As a result of intensely nationalistic
public opinion and the regime's geostrategic interest in Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, the Karabakh problem shadows and warps every
move that Baku makes in its relations with impinging powers. Trade
deals, military cooperation and attempts to attract investment always
have the added motive of securing aid in wresting Karabakh from
Armenian protection. Were it not for Karabakh, Baku would be in a much
stronger position to pursue its balancing strategy successfully,
because it would not be constrained to seek help from the impinging
powers.
Despite its economic potential and strategic importance relative to
Armenia, Azerbaijan has not received significant support for its aims
in Karabakh from interested powers. None of those powers wants any of
the others to have a dominant sphere of influence in Azerbaijan, but
they are also not interested in seeing the country become an
independent regional power in its own right. The United States, with
a large Armenian diaspora and comprehensive geostrategic interests in
the Caucasus, cannot support Baku wholeheartedly. Russia has a long
standing security relationship with Armenia that it is reluctant to
sever. France and Germany have no military influence and find it
difficult to support a turnover of Karabakh to Azerbaijan in light of
their rejection of Serbian claims to Kosovo. Iran, which has a vital
interest in limiting American presence in the Caspian region, recently
declared for the first time its support for restoration of
Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh, marking a minor breakthrough
for Baku.
Up until the present, the impinging powers have supported mediation
efforts by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(O.S.C.E.), carefully avoiding taking either side, which has
solidified the status quo to the advantage of Armenia and the Karabakh
mini-state. Another round of talks scheduled for mid-September in
Astana, Kazakhstan will bring together the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan with Russian and American facilitation.
There is no indication that the two sides are willing to compromise.
Baku insists that Armenia withdraw from all areas of Azerbaijan
outside Karabakh before it will negotiate on any other questions. It
also insists that it regain sovereignty over Karabakh in any final
agreement, though it is probably willing to concede a large degree of
autonomy to the region. Finally, Baku demands that Azeri refugees be
permitted to return to the homes that they fled in the troubles.
Yerevan refuses to withdraw from occupied areas of Azerbaijan before
negotiations on the status of Karabakh and the refugees proceed, and
is unwilling to concede Baku's sovereignty over the region.
Baku's response to the deadlock has been a mixture of frustration and
hope. Although it has had very limited success in moving interested
powers to its side, Baku expects that in the long run its growing
wealth will change the balance of power in the region, to the point
that it will be able to overmatch Armenia militarily and solve the
Karabakh problem to its satisfaction by force if necessary. In the
run-up to the Astana talks, Aliyev has stressed that if its aims are
not met by diplomatic means, Baku will eventually opt for a military
solution. There are reports that Azerbaijan is pursuing arms deals
with Ukraine and Pakistan.
Since it is not currently ready to take military action, Baku has
recently shifted its foreign policy to tilt toward Russia. In August,
the Aliyev regime put into effect a law on national security that bans
foreign military bases in the country. At the same time, it has
allowed Russia to have a radar station in Azerbaijan. Baku also did
not apply for N.A.T.O. membership at the Istanbul summit and has
dragged its feet on refreshing its troop commitment to the
American-led coalition in Iraq. Finally, Azerbaijan's foreign
minister, Eldar Mamedjarov, expressed favorable opinions on Russia's
design of a Single Economic Space within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.), of which Azerbaijan is a member.
Baku's diplomatic offensive, which includes frequent discussions with
Germany and France, as well as with Russia and Iran, is aimed at
getting movement on the Karabakh problem in the face of American
inaction. Some analysts believe that Baku is trying to trade a promise
to curtail American military presence in Azerbaijan for Russian
cooperation on Karabakh.
The tilt toward Russia and Iran by the Aliyev regime has occasioned an
American reaction, signaled by an unscheduled visit by U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Baku in August. Washington is
particularly concerned about the increasing cordiality of relations
between Baku and Tehran, and growing military cooperation between Baku
and Moscow. During the Rumsfeld visit, Baku reportedly asked for help
on the Caspian Sea jurisdiction issue and did not yield to American
pressure to distance itself from Iran and Russia.
Washington is also concerned about Aliyev's attempt to fill his
government with a new generation of officials who are loyal to him and
will replace the holdovers from his father's regime. The direction of
the changeover is toward figures who have a pro-Russian bias. For
example, pro-American National Security Minister Namik Abbasov was
recently replaced by Elman Gambarov who is in favor of closer security
ties to Russia. Although there are internal political tensions within
the regime that motivate the new tilt, it is also conditioned by the
quest for help in Karabakh.
In tilting toward Russia and Iran, Baku is running against the
familiar pattern of resorting to an extra-regional power -- here the
United States -- to balance strong regional neighbors. The Aliyev
regime has made this move because it has become clear that Washington
will not go beyond its policy of supporting the O.S.C.E. process on
Karabakh. Whether Russia, which is the major third party in the
negotiations, will exert pressure on Armenia remains to be seen.
America's Slippage in Azerbaijan
The Aliyev regime is not trying to marginalize the United States in
Azerbaijan or more broadly in the Caucasus region, but is simply
attempting to restructure the regional balance of power in its favor.
After the August announcement of American troop redeployment from
Europe to forward staging areas, Azerbaijan was prominently mentioned
as one of the prime sites for new bases. That possibility now seems to
be a dead issue after the announcement by U.S. Ambassador to
Azerbaijan Rino Harnish on September 11 that basing is not currently
under discussion. Instead, Baku and Washington will pursue more
restricted forms of military cooperation that do not jeopardize
Azerbaijan's relations with its neighbors.
American slippage in Azerbaijan is part of an overall diminution of
Washington's influence in the world after the failures of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Even if Karabakh were not an issue, Baku would be
constrained to improve relations with its powerful neighbors, because
it cannot count on the United States to be a reliable protector beyond
providing security for the pipeline. With the addition of Karabakh,
the American position is weakened even further.
In a setback to Washington, N.A.T.O. exercises that had been scheduled
to be held in Azerbaijan in late September were abruptly canceled
after the Aliyev regime, bowing to popular pressure, refused to allow
Armenian officers who were supposed to participate in the exercises to
enter the country. Hosting the exercises was a part of Baku's balanced
strategy, offsetting its cooperation with Russia and the C.I.S. by
ties with the West. Karabakh got in the way.
Conclusion
In light of its strategic situation as a relatively weak power in a
sensitive region that is impinged upon by greater powers, and its
prospects of increasing strength, Baku's balanced strategy of playing
all sides -- sometimes against one another -- is rational in terms of
serving perceived vital interests in autonomy and prosperity. In the
absence of the Karabakh issue, that strategy would have good chances
for success. The struggle over the breakaway region places stresses on
the delicate balancing act, threatening to push Baku too far in the
direction of Russia or the United States, both of which are eager to
establish a sphere of influence in Azerbaijan.
If either one of the two most important impinging powers threw its
support to Baku, the regime would be tempted to fall into its camp,
altering the balance of power in the region and impairing Azerbaijan's
autonomy. At present, Baku is tilting toward Moscow, which has common
interests with Tehran in minimizing American influence. The tilt does
not signal a decisive shift from the balanced strategy, but reflects
the quest for support on the Karabakh issue. If Baku's current
initiatives do not bear fruit, a tilt back to the United States is
possible.
Since none of the impinging powers seems ready to support Baku,
competition for influence by all parties is likely to continue within
the constraints of a common interest in avoiding significant
confrontation. As Azerbaijan's sore point, Karabakh will intrude as a
factor in Baku's decisions that will prevent it from taking full
advantage of the balanced strategy, which remains in its interest to
pursue. The impinging powers will continue to court Baku, but they
will feel no urgency to support its claims unless one of them disturbs
the consensus on avoiding provocation, setting off confrontation and
realignment. An Azerbaijan incapable of taking full advantage of its
position is currently in every impinging power's interest.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
''Azerbaijan's Precarious Balancing Act''
The geostrategic nerve center of the Caucasus is Azerbaijan with oil
reserves possibly totaling one-hundred billion barrels. The country is
coveted as an ally or at least a benevolent neutral by regional and
world powers: Iran, Russia, the Franco-German combination and the
United States. Each of those powers has its own interests, which
creates a complex pattern of convergence and divergence among them.
As the object of active interest by powers that are politically and
economically stronger than itself, Azerbaijan is threatened with
dependency if it falls into the hands of any one of them, but it also
has an opportunity for autonomy if it can successfully play them off
against one another and maintain a balance of power. With autonomy as
its goal, the government of President Ilham Aliyev has pursued a
"balanced" foreign policy, opening up diplomatic channels with all of
the interested states and giving each of them the hope of satisfying
some of its own aims, while Baku maneuvers to achieve its vital
interests.
As the Aliyev regime perceives them, the vital interests of Azerbaijan
are to settle jurisdictional issues over rights to Caspian Sea oil,
ensure security of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that will move the oil
west, secure investment from varied sources on the best terms to
develop its oil industry and the rest of its economy, avoid economic
or military dependence on any foreign power as it pursues development,
and resolve the issue of the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh by
regaining sovereignty over it. From Baku's viewpoint, Azerbaijan's
future is that of a rising power that will be able to maintain genuine
independence in the long term if it can manage the transition to
prosperity by skillfully performing its balancing act.
The Balanced Strategy
Baku has been able to pursue its balanced strategy because none of the
powers impinging on it poses a direct military threat to the
regime. The Franco-German combine by necessity is restricted to
economic and diplomatic influence, and neither Iran, Russia nor the
United States is currently interested in making any provocations that
would lead the others into a confrontation with it and risk
instability in the oil patch. Each of the impinging powers would like
to draw Azerbaijan into its orbit, but their room for action is
limited by the others, leaving Baku with a measure of freedom to make
deals with all of them and also to refuse their proposals.
>From the viewpoint of its vital interests, Baku counts on Washington
for help in settling Caspian Sea jurisdiction, since Iran and Russia
border Azerbaijan on the Sea and are competing interested
parties. Baku also expects Washington to make sure that the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is secure. In the sphere of economic development,
Baku wants investment from all of the interested parties, particularly
the Franco-German combination. It also wants help from any of them on
the Karabakh problem.
In return for its protection and in pursuit of its perceived vital
interests, Washington would like to establish a military presence in
Azerbaijan as part of its policy of securing oil supplies by
encircling and containing Russia and Iran. In response, Russia and
Iran want Azerbaijan to remain free of American bases. This
configuration of economic and strategic interests allows for a balance
of power in which Baku undertakes limited military cooperation with
Washington and Moscow, and maintains friendly relations with Iran,
satisfying each of them a little and antagonizing none of them. The
wild card is Karabakh, which destabilizes the balancing act.
Nagorno-Karabakh
After achieving independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan
was faced with a rebellion in the Armenian-dominated region of
Nagorno-Karabakh, which occupies a significant portion of the
country's southwest. Several years of war, ethnic cleansing, pogroms
and massacres led to the de facto independence of the breakaway region
under the protection of Armenia. In implementing its protective role,
Armenia also occupied areas of Azerbaijan bordering Karabakh, carving
out a corridor from the region to Armenia. The troubles created bitter
hostility between the dominant ethnic group in Azerbaijan -- the
Azeris -- and the Armenians, resulting in the unwillingness of either
group to compromise.
Ever since the secession of Karabakh, Baku has been preoccupied with
regaining sovereignty over the region. Karabakh is an open wound for
the Azeri public and any regime in Baku has to reckon with deeply
irredentist and often revanchist public opinion that severely
restricts the ability to negotiate a solution. To surrender
Azerbaijanian sovereignty over Karabakh definitively would amount to a
political death sentence. As a result of intensely nationalistic
public opinion and the regime's geostrategic interest in Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, the Karabakh problem shadows and warps every
move that Baku makes in its relations with impinging powers. Trade
deals, military cooperation and attempts to attract investment always
have the added motive of securing aid in wresting Karabakh from
Armenian protection. Were it not for Karabakh, Baku would be in a much
stronger position to pursue its balancing strategy successfully,
because it would not be constrained to seek help from the impinging
powers.
Despite its economic potential and strategic importance relative to
Armenia, Azerbaijan has not received significant support for its aims
in Karabakh from interested powers. None of those powers wants any of
the others to have a dominant sphere of influence in Azerbaijan, but
they are also not interested in seeing the country become an
independent regional power in its own right. The United States, with
a large Armenian diaspora and comprehensive geostrategic interests in
the Caucasus, cannot support Baku wholeheartedly. Russia has a long
standing security relationship with Armenia that it is reluctant to
sever. France and Germany have no military influence and find it
difficult to support a turnover of Karabakh to Azerbaijan in light of
their rejection of Serbian claims to Kosovo. Iran, which has a vital
interest in limiting American presence in the Caspian region, recently
declared for the first time its support for restoration of
Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh, marking a minor breakthrough
for Baku.
Up until the present, the impinging powers have supported mediation
efforts by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(O.S.C.E.), carefully avoiding taking either side, which has
solidified the status quo to the advantage of Armenia and the Karabakh
mini-state. Another round of talks scheduled for mid-September in
Astana, Kazakhstan will bring together the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan with Russian and American facilitation.
There is no indication that the two sides are willing to compromise.
Baku insists that Armenia withdraw from all areas of Azerbaijan
outside Karabakh before it will negotiate on any other questions. It
also insists that it regain sovereignty over Karabakh in any final
agreement, though it is probably willing to concede a large degree of
autonomy to the region. Finally, Baku demands that Azeri refugees be
permitted to return to the homes that they fled in the troubles.
Yerevan refuses to withdraw from occupied areas of Azerbaijan before
negotiations on the status of Karabakh and the refugees proceed, and
is unwilling to concede Baku's sovereignty over the region.
Baku's response to the deadlock has been a mixture of frustration and
hope. Although it has had very limited success in moving interested
powers to its side, Baku expects that in the long run its growing
wealth will change the balance of power in the region, to the point
that it will be able to overmatch Armenia militarily and solve the
Karabakh problem to its satisfaction by force if necessary. In the
run-up to the Astana talks, Aliyev has stressed that if its aims are
not met by diplomatic means, Baku will eventually opt for a military
solution. There are reports that Azerbaijan is pursuing arms deals
with Ukraine and Pakistan.
Since it is not currently ready to take military action, Baku has
recently shifted its foreign policy to tilt toward Russia. In August,
the Aliyev regime put into effect a law on national security that bans
foreign military bases in the country. At the same time, it has
allowed Russia to have a radar station in Azerbaijan. Baku also did
not apply for N.A.T.O. membership at the Istanbul summit and has
dragged its feet on refreshing its troop commitment to the
American-led coalition in Iraq. Finally, Azerbaijan's foreign
minister, Eldar Mamedjarov, expressed favorable opinions on Russia's
design of a Single Economic Space within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.), of which Azerbaijan is a member.
Baku's diplomatic offensive, which includes frequent discussions with
Germany and France, as well as with Russia and Iran, is aimed at
getting movement on the Karabakh problem in the face of American
inaction. Some analysts believe that Baku is trying to trade a promise
to curtail American military presence in Azerbaijan for Russian
cooperation on Karabakh.
The tilt toward Russia and Iran by the Aliyev regime has occasioned an
American reaction, signaled by an unscheduled visit by U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Baku in August. Washington is
particularly concerned about the increasing cordiality of relations
between Baku and Tehran, and growing military cooperation between Baku
and Moscow. During the Rumsfeld visit, Baku reportedly asked for help
on the Caspian Sea jurisdiction issue and did not yield to American
pressure to distance itself from Iran and Russia.
Washington is also concerned about Aliyev's attempt to fill his
government with a new generation of officials who are loyal to him and
will replace the holdovers from his father's regime. The direction of
the changeover is toward figures who have a pro-Russian bias. For
example, pro-American National Security Minister Namik Abbasov was
recently replaced by Elman Gambarov who is in favor of closer security
ties to Russia. Although there are internal political tensions within
the regime that motivate the new tilt, it is also conditioned by the
quest for help in Karabakh.
In tilting toward Russia and Iran, Baku is running against the
familiar pattern of resorting to an extra-regional power -- here the
United States -- to balance strong regional neighbors. The Aliyev
regime has made this move because it has become clear that Washington
will not go beyond its policy of supporting the O.S.C.E. process on
Karabakh. Whether Russia, which is the major third party in the
negotiations, will exert pressure on Armenia remains to be seen.
America's Slippage in Azerbaijan
The Aliyev regime is not trying to marginalize the United States in
Azerbaijan or more broadly in the Caucasus region, but is simply
attempting to restructure the regional balance of power in its favor.
After the August announcement of American troop redeployment from
Europe to forward staging areas, Azerbaijan was prominently mentioned
as one of the prime sites for new bases. That possibility now seems to
be a dead issue after the announcement by U.S. Ambassador to
Azerbaijan Rino Harnish on September 11 that basing is not currently
under discussion. Instead, Baku and Washington will pursue more
restricted forms of military cooperation that do not jeopardize
Azerbaijan's relations with its neighbors.
American slippage in Azerbaijan is part of an overall diminution of
Washington's influence in the world after the failures of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Even if Karabakh were not an issue, Baku would be
constrained to improve relations with its powerful neighbors, because
it cannot count on the United States to be a reliable protector beyond
providing security for the pipeline. With the addition of Karabakh,
the American position is weakened even further.
In a setback to Washington, N.A.T.O. exercises that had been scheduled
to be held in Azerbaijan in late September were abruptly canceled
after the Aliyev regime, bowing to popular pressure, refused to allow
Armenian officers who were supposed to participate in the exercises to
enter the country. Hosting the exercises was a part of Baku's balanced
strategy, offsetting its cooperation with Russia and the C.I.S. by
ties with the West. Karabakh got in the way.
Conclusion
In light of its strategic situation as a relatively weak power in a
sensitive region that is impinged upon by greater powers, and its
prospects of increasing strength, Baku's balanced strategy of playing
all sides -- sometimes against one another -- is rational in terms of
serving perceived vital interests in autonomy and prosperity. In the
absence of the Karabakh issue, that strategy would have good chances
for success. The struggle over the breakaway region places stresses on
the delicate balancing act, threatening to push Baku too far in the
direction of Russia or the United States, both of which are eager to
establish a sphere of influence in Azerbaijan.
If either one of the two most important impinging powers threw its
support to Baku, the regime would be tempted to fall into its camp,
altering the balance of power in the region and impairing Azerbaijan's
autonomy. At present, Baku is tilting toward Moscow, which has common
interests with Tehran in minimizing American influence. The tilt does
not signal a decisive shift from the balanced strategy, but reflects
the quest for support on the Karabakh issue. If Baku's current
initiatives do not bear fruit, a tilt back to the United States is
possible.
Since none of the impinging powers seems ready to support Baku,
competition for influence by all parties is likely to continue within
the constraints of a common interest in avoiding significant
confrontation. As Azerbaijan's sore point, Karabakh will intrude as a
factor in Baku's decisions that will prevent it from taking full
advantage of the balanced strategy, which remains in its interest to
pursue. The impinging powers will continue to court Baku, but they
will feel no urgency to support its claims unless one of them disturbs
the consensus on avoiding provocation, setting off confrontation and
realignment. An Azerbaijan incapable of taking full advantage of its
position is currently in every impinging power's interest.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress