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ANKARA: Reconsidering Turkey

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  • ANKARA: Reconsidering Turkey

    Reconsidering Turkey
    By Richard Falk

    Zaman, Turkey
    Sept 27 2004

    There is an exciting process of reform and reorientation taking place
    in Turkey during the last few years that has been hardly noticed in
    America, and certainly not properly appreciated.

    To the extent any attention has been given, it has been to whether
    the soft Islam of the AK Party provides the United States with an
    opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to abide a
    moderate Muslim outlook on the part of a foreign country in the
    Middle East.

    This possibility was severely strained in the weeks leading up to the
    Iraq War when the Turkish Parliament twice narrowly turned down an
    American request to use Turkish territory to launch its invasion.
    This was at the time an unexpected show of strategic independence on
    the part of Turkey, especially in the face of an American offer to
    provide Turkey with much needed financial assistance in the amount of
    $16 billion. It is worth remembering that during and after the cold
    war Turkey had shaped its foreign policy entirely on the basis of
    being a subordinate ally of the United States, and regionally since
    the early 1990s, by working in an avowed partnership with Israel.

    What was most surprising, and in the end revealing, about the Iraq
    decision initially so resented in Washington was that the Turkish
    military stayed in the barracks. In the recent past, any elected
    government in Turkey was subject to repudiation by a military coup or
    takeover if it crossed the red lines of either 'secularism' or the
    strategic relationship with the United States and Israel. There
    existed little room for maneuver on the part of politicians, and
    foreign policy in particular was regarded as the domain of 'the deep
    state,' the non-elected, non-accountable army leadership that had
    claimed for itself the uncontested role of guarding the
    constitutional order of republican Turkey as established by its
    founding leader [Mustafa] Kemal Ataturk. What is fascinating about
    this recent phase of Turkish foreign policy is this silent process of
    fundamental change that has been taking place without attracting
    notice except on an issue by issue basis. The scope and cumulative
    weight of these changes should not be exaggerated. The deep state
    remains in ultimate control of the political destiny of Turkey, and
    the red lines still limit the options for elected leaders. But the
    softening of these constraints is also part of the unfolding reality,
    and deserves more attention than it has so far received.

    Why this softening? I think the strength of the mandate received by
    the AK Party in the last round of national elections over two years
    ago, and the admitted absence of a secular alternative, has been
    crucial. But also significant is the skill and creativity of its
    leaders, particularly its Prime Minister, [Recep] Tayyip Erdogan, and
    Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, in taking steps forward in a manner
    made acceptable to the hidden military overseers, including even the
    civilianizing of the Turkish National Security Council. And overall,
    the unexpected success of the present leadership in Ankara of
    stabilizing runaway Turkish inflation while generating one of the
    world's fastest rates of economic growth has given the government an
    underpinning of credibility.

    The most obvious explanation of this Turkish opening is undoubtedly
    the consensus in Ankara that it is in the national interest of the
    country to obtain membership in the European Union at the earliest
    possible time. And it is agreed on all sides that this goal is
    attainable, if at all, only if Turkey demonstrates a willingness to
    clean up its human rights record and solve its main internal and
    external problems. This pressure was present even before the AK
    leadership arrived, and first became visible in earthquake diplomacy
    in which the Greek humanitarian response to the Turkish disaster in
    1998 led to a dramatic thawing of Greek/Turkish tensions, initiating
    a process that removed a major source of resistance to Turkey's
    presence in the EU. In that instance, Turkey responded positively,
    but it was Athens that took the initiative. But what has been
    happening more recently discloses a much greater Turkish willingness
    to take bold initiatives in foreign policy.

    I would mention several notable developments, but there are more. The
    Turkish government overcame the influence of its own formidable
    rejectionists to accept the carefully balanced proposals by Kofi
    Annan, on behalf of the United Nations, to solve the long-festering
    Cyprus crisis. When Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the plan, and
    Greek Cypriots voted to reject it, there emerged a new European and
    global realization that Turkey was moving away from its earlier
    pattern of rigid nationalism. It was also a clear signal that Turkey
    was ready to become a responsible member of the EU.

    More impressive, and more subtle, were the Turkish moves to improve
    their relations with their Islamic neighbors. Prime Minister Erdogan
    engaged in successful goodwill diplomacy with most of Turkey's
    neighbors, achieving a dramatic breakthrough by establishing an
    accommodation with Syria, and notably improved relations with Iran
    and Egypt. The Turkish government criticized Israel for the targeted
    assassinations of Hamas leaders, further solidifying its new image as
    a truly independent sovereign state that was now conducting its
    foreign policy according to ethical and legal principles, as well as
    on the basis of real politik.

    Recently, I had the benefit of long conversations with Ahmet
    Davutoglu, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
    who confirmed these trends, speaking of 'a new paradigm' in Turkish
    foreign policy. This influential policy advisor, previously a leading
    intellectual presence in the country, saw Turkey as playing a
    decisive role as participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world
    order, being still in a positive relationship with the United States
    and Israel, but also an active player in Europe, the Middle East, and
    Central Asia. Davutoglu represents a new cultural and political trend
    in Turkey associated with a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past,
    both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an
    enriched Turkish identity as a political actor. What Davutoglu
    particularly celebrates is what he calls the 'accommodative'
    character of the Ottoman Empire at its height, that is, the
    willingness to appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic
    diversity, and to deal with political conflict in a spirit of
    compromise and reconciliation. Davutoglu seeks what he calls 'a zero
    conflict' foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between
    relations with Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and with the United
    States. He agrees that much of this hinges in the end on the
    willingness of Europe to set a schedule for Turkish accession to the
    EU, and thereby confirm the benefits of this innovative approach
    being taken by the AK leadership in Ankara. Without this tangible
    positive result, there are dangers of a return to the earlier rigid
    and narrower Turkish nationalism that approached conflict in a
    somewhat paranoid and zero-sum fashion that seemed incapable of
    reaching peaceful solutions because of its intense fear of being seen
    as 'weak.'

    There are additional lingering difficulties with this rather hopeful
    line of assessment. It is still not entirely clear which way the army
    will jump in future crises, especially if it views its guardian role
    as being subverted. Furthermore, Turkish urban elites are deeply
    suspicious of the AK leadership, fearing that it conceals an
    undisclosed agenda to turn the country into an Islamic republic.
    Turkish society is quite polarized, as Kemalists refuse to
    acknowledge the progress being made, contending unconvincingly that
    any leadership would have taken similar steps. Also, there are some
    remaining open wounds that the current leadership has not yet healed.
    The acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide is still resisted, and
    keeps this disturbing issue alive. And although the AK leadership has
    taken some notable positive moves with respect to its large Kurdish
    minority, on such matters as language and cultural rights, it has not
    gone nearly far enough in providing the Kurdish regions in the
    Eastern part of the country with a measure of self-rule. As well, the
    economic picture is not rosy for the Turkish masses as unemployment,
    poverty, and a low average standard of living torment most of the
    society.

    Yet on balance, considering the darkness that has descended on so
    much of the world since 9/11, the Turkish story is encouraging. And,
    in fairness, the Bush administration has, despite the refusal of
    Turkey to join actively in the Iraq War, has welcomed these shifts in
    Turkish foreign policy, and this has mad the process possible. At
    this point, what will push the process forward is a positive response
    from Europe, setting a date for the start of accession process, which
    even optimists will take more than a decade and will be confronted by
    roadblocks along the way. Nevertheless, at this moment, those that
    believe in democracy and a peaceful world order should take heart
    from Turkey's impressive efforts to reform its foreign policy, and
    congratulate the Turkish foreign ministry for exploring the frontiers
    of the politically acceptable.

    This has been a commentary exclusively written by Mr. Falk for ZAMAN
    daily.
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