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  • The Fallacy Of Grievance-Based Terrorism

    THE FALLACY OF GRIEVANCE-BASED TERRORISM
    by Melvin E. Lee

    Middle East Forum, PA
    Jan 21 2008

    The fundamental premise of much scholarly examination and public
    discourse is that grievances with U.S. policies in the Middle East
    motivate Islamist terrorism. Such assumptions, though, misunderstand
    the enemy and its nature. In reality, the conflict is sparked not by
    grievance but rather by incompatibility between Islamist ideology and
    the natural rights articulated during the European Enlightenment and
    incorporated into U.S. political culture. Acquiescing to political
    grievances will not alter the fundamental incompatibility between
    Lockean precepts of tolerance and current interpretations of Islam:
    Only Islam's fundamental reform will resolve the conflict.

    Many scholars mark the post-World War I partition of the Ottoman Empire
    as the origin of Islamist opposition to the West.[1] The idea that
    the Middle East would be a tolerant, prosperous contributor to the
    global environment today if World War I victors had left intact the
    Ottoman Empire is a premise in the literature accompanying the rise
    of twentieth-century jihadism. Historian David Fromkin argued in his
    influential A Peace to End All Peace that present day Muslim unrest
    is the direct result of Winston Churchill's early twentieth-century
    decisions.[2] British journalist Robert Fisk also holds British
    officials responsible although he prefers to blame Arthur Balfour,
    foreign secretary between 1916 and 1919.[3] Both authors are wrong,
    though, to base their theories of grievance on such arbitrary
    demarcation of eras. The roots of jihadism and its opposition to the
    United States as part of the non-Muslim West were cast long before
    World War I erupted. The interaction between the United States and
    Muslim states and societies dates back to American independence.[4]
    Contemporary jihadism is not the result of accumulated grievance;
    rather it has for cultural reasons been an integral factor in Islamic
    societies' interaction with the United States.

    The Die is Cast Almost immediately after independence, the
    U.S. government found itself in conflict with the Barbary sheikhdoms
    of Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli. For centuries, these states
    filled their coffers by piracy, stealing cargoes, enslaving crew,
    and collecting ransom. European sea-going nations often entered
    into treaty and tribute arrangements with the Barbary leaders in
    order to buy immunity and curtail competition.[5] In 1784, Moroccan
    pirates hijacked the U.S. merchant ship Betsy in the Mediterranean
    and enslaved her crew. A year later, Algerine pirates seized two more
    vessels, the Maria from Boston and the Dauphin from Philadelphia. The
    U.S. ministers to England and France, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin,
    and Thomas Jefferson oversaw a peace treaty with Morocco, but the
    Algerine leadership refused any accommodation. In 1796, President
    George Washington ordered construction of six warships to form a
    U.S. navy and to protect U.S. shipping from Barbary pirates.

    In 1801, in the wake of an upsurge in piracy, President Thomas
    Jefferson entered into war with Tripoli, bombarding the city
    three years later and winning the release of American hostages.[6]
    Peace did not last. With the U.S. military embroiled in the War of
    1812, Algerine pirates again began terrorizing American crewmen and
    disrupting U.S. trade. They miscalculated. In 1815, President James
    Madison dispatched a squadron of U.S. Navy frigates, which defeated the
    pirate fleet and won reparations from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.[7]

    Many historians consider the Barbary wars a sideshow relative to
    contemporaneous events such as the French Revolution, Napoleon's
    conquests, and the War of 1812, but the Barbary wars are significant
    to today's conflict. Franklin, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and
    Madison each believed the Barbary wars to be a continuation of the
    American Revolution. The ground war in North America may have freed
    the United States from British tyranny, but the Barbary campaign was
    necessary to win the same freedom of action and commerce within the
    international community.[8] The episode also crystallized perceptions
    of Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the American mind. While Americans
    did not perceive the Barbary wars as a conflict between Christianity
    and Islam per se, religion was an issue. The two sides fought, not
    over theological differences, but rather as a result of the divergent
    ideologies enabled by the two faiths.[9] Washington and Adams referred
    to the Muslim leaders as "nests of banditti" while Jefferson's and
    Madison's campaign literature called them "petty tyrants."[10] The
    "despotic Turk" became the antithesis of early American republican
    identity.

    What Americans and Europeans saw as piracy, Barbary leaders justified
    as legitimate jihad. Jefferson related a conversation he had in Paris
    with Ambassador Abdrahaman of Tripoli who told him that all Christians
    are sinners in the context of the Qur'an and that it was a Muslim's
    "right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found,
    and to enslave as many as they could take as prisoners."[11] Islam gave
    great incentive to fighting infidels, Abdrahaman explained, because
    the Qur'an promised that making war against infidels ensured a Muslim
    paradise after death.[12] Richard O'Brien, the imprisoned captain of
    the Philadelphia merchantman Dauphin and later the U.S. consul to
    Algiers, related similar conversations with 'Ali Hasan, the ruler
    of Algiers.[13] Ottoman leaders used the same rationale to justify
    the enslavement and trading of captives from the Balkans, Caucasus,
    and Ukraine.[14]

    The role that jihadi ideology played in the Barbary wars is documented
    with explicit references to jihad and holy war in the treaties that
    U.S. officials entered into with Muslim rulers. Tunis and Algiers, as
    the western outposts of the Ottoman Empire, even described themselves
    to American envoys as the "frontier posts of jihad against European
    Christianity."[15]

    U.S. officials took a conciliatory attitude. Realizing that the North
    Africans were hypersensitive to the historic conflict between Islam
    and European Christianity, especially in the context of the expulsion
    of the Moors from Spain, U.S. officials bent over backwards to deny
    the religious and ideological nature of the conflict, especially to
    the Muslims themselves. They realized that religious conflict might
    jeopardize the commerce that the United States still hoped to find
    in the Mediterranean. In 1821, President John Quincy Adams was barely
    able to resist assisting the Greeks in their war of independence when
    both the American and European publics urged war with the Ottoman
    Empire.[16] The founders possessed a deep conviction for religious
    tolerance and proudly explained in the short-lived 1797 treaty with
    Tripoli that the U.S. was not a Christian state at all but rather one
    which had no official religion and maintained laws forbidding the
    prohibition of religion.[17] Perhaps their denial of the religious
    and ideological nature of the conflict foreshadowed the attitude many
    Washington policymakers adopt today. Then as now, it has become the
    basis of a fundamental misunderstanding of the root of the conflict.

    The Barbary conflict was the beginning of continuous U.S. interaction
    with the Muslim Near and Middle East. While Jefferson and Madison
    believed that a continuous U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean
    was necessary to protect U.S. national interests, in 1831, President
    Andrew Jackson secured a treaty of amity and free trade with the
    Ottoman Empire leading the secretary of the navy to report seven years
    later that it was no longer necessary to keep a U.S. fleet in the
    Mediterranean.[18] Three years after Washington withdrew the
    squadron, Ottoman privateers began raiding U.S. shipping, forcing
    the reconstitution of the fleet after the U.S. Civil War.

    No longer, though, did the U.S. government feel content to view
    relations with Muslim governments only through a commercial lens. The
    Civil War interjected discussion of natural law and freedom into U.S.

    policy formulation. American missionaries increased their presence
    in the Muslim Middle East throughout the nineteenth century although
    Muslim prohibitions on conversion to Christianity led them to focus
    their efforts more on aid and education than on proselytization.

    Simultaneously, the Ottoman sultan and other Muslim rulers began
    to pursue more pronounced repression against both Christians and
    Jews.[19] Intolerant, fundamentalist strains of Islam gained ground
    on the Arabian Peninsula and in North Africa.[20]

    By 1840, the final year of his administration, and again during his
    unsuccessful campaign for a second term in 1848, Martin Van Buren
    expressed concern for the plight of Jews in the Ottoman Empire, which
    he called "the most anti-Semitic of countries."[21] In the last quarter
    of the nineteenth century, strife between Muslims and Christians in
    the Balkans and in Istanbul led President Ulysses Grant to dispatch
    six warships to the waterways around the city to ensure the safety
    of Americans.[22] In 1882, President Chester Arthur dispatched the
    Mediterranean Squadron to Alexandria to help evacuate Americans and
    Europeans following anti-Christian violence in the city. President
    Grover Cleveland even proposed an Anglo-American intervention in
    the Ottoman Empire to assist Armenian Christians against Muslim
    violence.[23] In 1903, an assassination attempt on the U.S. consul in
    Beirut amid anti-Christian rioting led President Theodore Roosevelt
    to dispatch marines to the city. A few months later, marines landed
    in Tangiers after the kidnapping of a Greek businessman from the
    U.S. consulate there.[24] Behind each incident was Muslim violence
    toward minority Christian and Jewish communities.

    The nineteenth century foreshadowed increasing conflict between
    the United States and Muslim Middle Eastern countries. The failure
    of effective Ottoman political reform coupled with the evolution
    of Islamic reform toward greater Islamism and less tolerance set
    up a conflict between the American notion that governments rule at
    the consent of the governed and the dominant attitude among Muslim
    potentates who subscribed to an intolerant, coercive, anti-Semitic,
    and anti-Christian ideology.

    Twentieth-century Continuity Into the early twentieth century,
    successive U.S. administrations sought to remain aloof from Arab
    and Ottoman politics. President Woodrow Wilson did not include the
    Ottoman Empire in the U.S. declaration of war against Germany and the
    Austro-Hungarian Empire, an omission he said was to mitigate the risk
    of Ottoman retaliation against its Christian or Jewish populations,
    thereby implying his sense that the Porte saw the United States
    through a religious rather than just diplomatic lens.[25]

    The U.S. government sought to remain detached in all but the commercial
    sphere. The U.S. trade relationship with the Middle East expanded
    exponentially in the mid-twentieth century. In the decade following
    the end of World War II, U.S. commerce increased 167 percent. The
    next decade saw a 226 percent rise, and the following decade a 321
    percent increase in absolute terms.[26] Such involvement, though,
    had diplomatic and strategic overtones.

    During the Cold War, "armed neutrality" could no longer protect
    U.S. strategic interests. Successive administrations and the State
    Department pursued a "pro-Arab" policy in the region to stymie the
    expansion of Soviet influence into those countries. In a January 1945
    correspondence, Dean Acheson, secretary of state and chief architect
    of the U.S. Cold War Soviet containment policy, argued for a pro-Arab
    tilt to U.S. policy in order to deny the Soviet Union any possible
    inroads into the region.[27] Successive administrations embraced the
    policy. Dwight D. Eisenhower sided with Gamal Abdul Nasser against
    Israel, France, and Great Britain during the 1956 Suez crisis. While
    the U.S. government often stayed on the sidelines, in eleven of the
    twelve major Cold War and immediate post-Cold War conflicts between
    Muslims and non-Muslims, Muslims and secular forces, or Arabs and
    non-Arabs, the U.S. government supported the former group.[28]
    Washington, for example, backed the Afghan mujahideen against the
    Soviet Red Army in the 1980s and supported Bosnian Muslims against
    Serbs and Croats. U.S. administrations have even leaned hard on Israel,
    preventing the Jewish state's destruction of the Egyptian, Jordanian,
    and Syrian armies in 1967; ignoring the Israeli government's pleas
    not to sell state-of-the-art weaponry to Saudi Arabia; and pressuring
    for concessions to the Palestinian Authority despite its embrace
    of terrorism. The only exception to Washington's pro-Arab tilt has
    been U.S. diplomatic intervention in support of Israel at the United
    Nations and White House commitment to maintain Israel's qualitative
    military edge.

    During the six decades since Washington abandoned its "armed
    neutrality" policy in favor of deeper relations with Arab states,
    friction has increased between U.S. officials and Islamist
    ideologues. The pro-Arab tilt Washington pursued during the Cold
    War to stymie Soviet intrigues and maintain energy security, meant
    partnership with non-democratic regimes and often corrupt rulers
    in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Persian
    Gulf emirates. Islamists and other opposition groups argued that
    Washington should support the people and not autocrats. But such
    rhetoric is laid bare by the antagonism that U.S. support for Israel
    engendered among many of these self-professed democrats. Israel is the
    only democracy in the region. Its citizens, 17 percent of whom are
    Muslim, enjoy basic civil liberties regardless of their faith and,
    even in the West Bank, enjoy a standard of living far superior to
    that of Egyptians and Jordanians.[29]

    Jihadi Antipathy Both the United States and Jews have become the
    focus of Islamists' irrational enmity as Islamist thinkers and Arab
    demagogues deflect any internal responsibility for Muslim countries'
    woes. This was a common theme both of Sayyid Qutb, the leading Muslim
    Brotherhood ideologue and, later, Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.[30]
    In Knowing the Enemy, Mary Habeck, a professor of military history at
    Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies,
    documents how Qutb and bin Laden spread a message that the decline
    of majority Muslim polities is not the result of flaws within Islam
    itself but is instead the deliberate effort of the United States
    and the Jews.[31] Today Pakistani madrasas (Islamic schools) alone
    spin out more than one million graduates per year steeped in jihadi
    ideology.[32]

    Underlying much jihadi thought is antipathy toward democracy. Both Qutb
    and bin Laden argued that democracy is not a solution to inequity
    and corruption in Islamic societies.[33] In a video that marked
    the sixth anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, bin Laden said, "It has
    now become clear to you and the entire world the impotence of the
    democratic system and how it plays with the interest of the peoples
    and their bloody sacrificing of soldiers and populations to achieve
    the interests of major corporations."[34] While some Islamists-such as
    the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Muhammad Khatami in Iran[35]-speak
    of their embrace of democracy, seldom do they include Enlightenment
    concepts such as tolerance, rule-of-law, and property rights. They do
    not accept, as did the U.S. founding fathers, that people are endowed
    with both the natural right to freedom from coercion and the liberty to
    improve their lives. In practice, then, regardless of their rhetoric,
    they eschew democracy.

    The failure of Islamic states to incorporate the Enlightenment's
    advances in thought has caused their stagnation, if not decline,
    over the last several centuries. In contrast, the incorporation of
    Enlightenment and democratic principles into Western governance has
    resulted in history's most rapid improvement in the human condition.

    Only those Muslim countries that have embraced, in some fashion,
    Western principles of democracy, free markets, property rights,
    tolerance, and the rule of law have prospered. Most Arab states
    refuse. Bernard Lewis, perhaps the doyen of Middle East studies in the
    Western world, explained, "By all indicators from the United Nations,
    the World Bank, and other authorities, Muslim countries-in matters
    such as job creation, education, technology, and productivity-lag ever
    further behind the West. Even worse, the Arab nations also lag behind
    the more recent recruits to Western style modernity, such as Korea,
    Taiwan, and Singapore."[36] All majority Muslim countries except
    Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Turkey, which have recently adopted
    significant free market and democratic reforms, rank in the bottom
    half of world productivity; of the rest, only Morocco, Indonesia,
    Saudi Arabia, and Bangladesh reach the third quartile.[37] According
    to the World Bank, the average per capita income of all majority
    Muslim countries collectively is less than half of the average for the
    globe. Only Kuwait approaches the global average life expectancy;[38]
    all other Muslim majority states lag in the bottom half of the world
    in this important measure of health.

    Jihadis thrive in such stagnated conditions. This leads to negative
    annuity: Jihadism both grows amid stagnation and fuels stagnation. It
    accelerated coincident with the European Enlightenment and the
    relative decline of the Muslim Middle East. At its core, jihadism
    is a violent rejection of many of the fundamental principles of
    the European Enlightenment. Democracy, free markets, tolerance and
    freedom of religion, secular government, and separation between
    the religious, the political, and the individual spark religious
    fury. It is no coincidence, then, that jihadis, under the banner of
    cleansing their religion of evil Western influence, have focused
    their attentions on the United States, the clearest manifestation
    of the European Enlightenment today. They will continue to threaten
    Western civilization until they are checked.

    Fumbled Strategy One of the greatest challenges facing strategic
    leaders today is objectively examining the centuries-old roots of
    Islamic jihadism and developing a strategy that will lead to a lasting
    solution to the Western conflict with it. Many Western policymakers
    fail to assess realistically why Arab and Islamic governments have
    been unable to improve the condition of their populations, especially
    in contrast to the West. This inability to grasp the root of Islamic
    jihadism is the result of a moral relativism prominent in modern
    Western liberal thought. For example, over the last few decades,
    it has become common to value diversity and multiculturalism above
    societal well-being and improvements in the human condition.

    It is not, as Thomas Friedman argues in The World Is Flat, that the
    fruits of the American experiment-free markets, property rights,
    tolerance, democracy, and the rule of law-have left Islam behind.[39]
    On the contrary, it is Islam that has opted out of progress by
    allowing, promoting, and embracing centuries of reactionary and
    retrospective reforms that rejected the idea that humans can indeed
    improve their condition through reason and rationality. Muslim clerics
    and leaders within the impoverished nations of the Islamic world need
    to understand that they are responsible for the condition and grief
    of their people. It is Islamism's rejection of religious tolerance,
    democracy, and the rule of law, in conjunction with its embrace of
    anti-Semitism, theocracy, and sectarian strongmen exempt from law
    and privileged by the authority they have usurped, that is the real
    enemy in the Islamic world's centuries-long interaction with the
    United States. While Islamists skillfully manipulate the Western mass
    media to enunciate an a la carte menu of grievances, eighteenth- and
    nineteenth-century interactions show these are not the root cause of
    jihadi terror. Indeed, a U.S. intelligence assessment, published two
    years before Israel's independence and any subsequent jihadi grievance,
    already highlighted Islamist terrorism as a long-term threat.[40]
    So long as Western officials adopt a nearsighted, grievance-based
    view of the roots of Islamist terror, they will embolden jihadis
    through appeasement.

    It is essential that the grand strategy of the United States
    addresses this basic conflict of interest. The present conflict is
    not new. And it is religious. Believing that only a few "rogues" have
    misappropriated religion is both naïve and counterfactual. U.S. and
    Western leaders must confront the reality that jihadism is a religious
    phenomenon that has grown popular and powerful enough to threaten
    the continued progress of the American experiment and the European
    Enlightenment. In the new grand strategy to defeat Islamic jihadism,
    America must campaign, through its scholars and theologians if
    appropriate, to encourage and facilitate imams and other Islamic
    religious authority figures to reform Islam in a forward direction,
    one that breaks from the past and encourages tolerance, the rule
    of law, free inquiry, and free markets. Imams who support, either
    passively or actively, jihadism should be undermined and exposed.

    How should the United States revitalize its strategy? At home, the
    U.S. government must better educate and explain the conflict to the
    general audience. Education at all levels should inculcate U.S.

    citizens in the history, philosophy, mechanics, virtues,
    responsibilities, and achievements of the Western approach to freedom,
    liberty, and the free market. Tolerance and diversity need not mean
    acceptance of oppression and tyranny. Such an effort would entail
    reinstalling this subject matter into the curricula of public
    schools. The strategic leadership of the nation should drive the
    public education effort, much as the founders did in the eighteenth
    century. The Federalist Papers, generally attributed to James Madison,
    Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, are prototypical examples of
    effective strategic communications that aimed, among other things,
    to create a government strong enough to defend itself against the
    Barbary pirates.

    Internationally, U.S. foreign policy should reflect U.S. national
    values and long-term objectives rather than near-term expediencies
    devoid of the principles enumerated by the founding fathers. U.S.

    foreign aid programs need reform.[41] Washington should set a visible
    standard by supporting non-corrupt democracies, rather than funding
    kleptocracies. Rather than fund short-term stability in regimes where
    power is centrally concentrated, Washington should promote trade and
    development in Islamic nations supporting the rule of law, tolerance,
    and democracy. Trade and development in these nations empowers people
    and entrepreneurs, catalyzes economic progress, and decentralizes
    power in a culture that has deep tendencies toward autocracy.[42]

    The half-century-long policy of supporting Arab state stability
    regardless of its governance is a relic of the Cold War. In order
    to defeat jihadism, U.S. foreign policy should marginalize Muslim
    nations that are not supportive of the development of the rule of
    law, tolerance, and democracy. Washington should not apologize for
    supporting regional countries that seek peace, prosperity, and the
    improved well-being of their citizens. To do otherwise fuels jihadi
    rhetoric that the U.S. government seeks to oppress Muslims throughout
    the world.

    Another requirement is for the West to embark on a radical program
    to redefine how its economies obtain and distribute energy. Former
    director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey argues that denying
    jihadis the use of oil as a weapon against the United States and the
    West should be Washington's highest priority.[43]

    Finally, the history of U.S. interaction with Muslim polities shows
    that "diplomacy backed by force" is the only effective approach to
    relations with them.[44] Diplomacy is essential to ensure intentions
    are understood. Consistent diplomacy is essential to build the trust
    that majority Muslim countries need to support U.S. aims to advance
    Enlightenment ideals. Military weakness and the inability to project
    U.S. power have consistently led jihadis and Muslim kleptocrats to
    launch attacks against U.S. interests.

    Melvin E. Lee is a sea captain and a nuclear engineer in the United
    States Navy. He serves as special operations officer for the commander,
    U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and commander, U.S. 6th Fleet.

    The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
    not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the Department of
    the Navy or U.S. government.

    [1] Ussama Makdisi, "'Anti-Americanism' in the Arab World: An
    Interpretation of a Brief History," Journal of American History,
    Sept. 2002, p. 546.

    [2] David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman
    Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry
    Holt, 1989), pp. 23-62.

    [3] Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the
    Middle East (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), pp. 305-15.

    [4] Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle
    East, 1776 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

    [5] Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the
    Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), pp. 106-9.

    [6] Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History
    (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), pp. 103-30; Lambert,
    The Barbary Wars, pp. 49-78.

    [7] Kevin Baker, "The Shores of Tripoli," American Heritage,
    Feb./Mar. 2002, p. 21.

    [8] James A. Field, "Novus Ordo Seclorum," America and the
    Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
    1969), pp. 3-26; Lambert, The Barbary Wars, pp. 15-28.

    [9] Lambert, The Barbary Wars, pp. 106, 112-4.

    [10] Ibid., pp. 110, 123.

    [11] Thomas Jefferson, "'The American Commissioners' Report to John
    Jay," in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 9
    (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-5), p. 358; quoted in
    Lambert, The Barbary Wars, p. 116.

    [12] Thomas Jefferson, "The American Commissioners' Report to John
    Jay," p. 358; quoted in Lambert, The Barbary Wars, p. 117.

    [13] Lambert, The Barbary Wars, p. 110-1.

    [14] Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last
    2,000 Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 175.

    [15] "The Truce with Tunis," Naval Documents Related to the United
    States Wars with the Barbary Powers, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.:
    Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 158-9; quoted in Lambert,
    The Barbary Wars, p. 117.

    [16] Field, America and the Mediterranean World, pp. 133-40.

    [17] Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, pp. 134-5.

    [18] Field, America and the Mediterranean World, p. 209.

    [19] Ibid., pp. 345-73.

    [20] Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist
    Thought, 1750-1850," Journal of the American Oriental Society,
    July-Sept. 1993, p. 352.

    [21] Field, America and the Mediterranean World, pp. 345-73.

    [22] Ibid., pp. 368-70.

    [23] Ibid., pp. 445-7.

    [24] Anne Cipriano Venzon, "Gunboat Diplomacy in the Med," Proceedings
    of the U.S. Naval Institute, Apr. 1985, pp. 26-31.

    [25] Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp. 259-60.

    [26] Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror
    (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 126-8.

    [27] Dean Acheson, "Internal Correspondence of the U. S. Department of
    State, January 1945," quoted in Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil
    (New York: Crown, 2003), p. 79.

    [28] Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism," Foreign
    Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2002, p. 75.

    [29] R. James Woolsey, "Grand Strategy in the Middle East: The Long
    War of the 21st Century," in K. M. Campbell, ed., An American Grand
    Strategy for the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute,
    2004), p. 37.

    [30] Richard W. Bulliet, "The Crisis within Islam," The Wilson
    Quarterly, Winter 2002, p. 15.

    [31] Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadi Ideology and the War
    on Terror (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 12.

    [32] Michael G. Knapp, "The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam,"
    Parameters, Spring 2003, p. 92.

    [33] Reza Aslan, No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future
    of Islam (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 138; Habeck, Knowing the
    Enemy, p. 162; Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 159.

    [34] Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, Sept. 7, 2007; United Press
    International, Sept. 7, 2007.

    [35] Muhammad Khatami, "Islamic Civil Society," speech to the eighth
    session of the Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, Radio Islam, Dec.

    9, 1997.

    [36] Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 114.

    [37] James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and William Easterly, Economic
    Freedom of the World, 2006 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser Institute,
    2006), p. 39.

    [38] Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 113-9.

    [39] Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the
    Twenty-first Century (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005),
    pp. 470-9.

    [40] "Assessing the Islamist Threat, Circa 1946," Middle East
    Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 76-82.

    [41] Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, "Do Corrupt Governments
    Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, Sept. 2002, pp.

    1126-38.

    [42] Iqbal Z. Quadir, "The Bottleneck Is at the Top of the Bottle,"
    The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer/Fall 2002, pp. 86-8.

    [43] Woolsey, "Grand Strategy in the Middle East," pp. 33-4.

    [44] Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, p. 160.

    --Boundary_(ID_VQYhFxegeuVJxe18Y1wtow)--
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