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WILL THE VECTOR OF RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONS CHANGE?
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
Jan 24 2008
Russia
Sergei Markedonov, Head of the International Relations Department of
the Institute for Policy and Military Analysis, Moscow
It is unlikely that after the election President Mikheil Saakashvili
has changed his position on Georgian-Russian relations. For the time
being, the statements about his wish to normalize those relations
cannot be taken seriously. Rhetoric and emotions cannot lay the
groundwork for relations, so far we lack the groundwork.
Should I remind you how President Saakashvili behaved after the
elections in 2004? The situation was the same. Saakashvili proposed
that Georgia and Russian should be on friendly terms with each
other, thanked Russia for its sound and sober position on the "Rose
Revolution" and the situation in Adjara. Some Russian mass media held
Saakashvili up as an example of the fighter against corruption. One
could say that there was a kind of "honeymoon" in the relations
between the two countries.
But as we know, the "honeymoon" didn't last long. The crisis in South
Ossetia occurred and tough statements about Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were made. So, all the statements about friendship should be backed by
actions. How can the Russian-Georgian relations improve in addressing
the issue of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? NATO question is also left
open, in particular, as the Georgian population, one can say, voted
for NATO membership at the referendum on January 5.
It should be understood that Saakashvili is a pragmatic policy-maker.
True, the Russians' opinion about him is totally different, and they
are wrong. Should Russia make substantial concessions to Georgia
on the South Ossetian and Abkhazian issues, Saakashvili could even
become a pro-Russian politician. In the 1990s some Russian generals
took a more pro-Georgian stand that the local military did.
It is another matter that the Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues
will have repercussions for the whole Caucasus. Therefore Russia
cannot afford to make serious concessions. Russia may moderate its
position partially and act as an arbiter in the conflict settlements.
But it cannot change its position drastically.
So, in the sphere of frozen conflicts there is no ground for relations
improvement. But there is such a ground in other fields - economy,
transport, education, etc.
As regards the mitigation of Saakashvili's rhetoric with respect to
the opposition, it comes quite logical. The presidential election
showed that the opposition is strong, that it is not a cluster
of fringe politicians. According to the official election returns,
Saakashvili took slightly more than 50 percent of the vote. He cannot
ignore such a strong opposition.
I would like to note the behavior of Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov who, after the election, met not only with the elected
President, but also with the opposition. Such political move is a
rare occurrence and a good example. I believe that we must behave
like this in all the new independent states, for example, in Armenia
where the presidential election will take place in February. Many
Russian policy-makers do not consider it necessary to get in touch
with the Armenian opposition. This is wrong because no matter whether
the leader of one or another state supports Russia or not, first and
foremost he takes his own interests into account. That is typical of
all the leaders of the post-Soviet states.
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
Jan 24 2008
Russia
Sergei Markedonov, Head of the International Relations Department of
the Institute for Policy and Military Analysis, Moscow
It is unlikely that after the election President Mikheil Saakashvili
has changed his position on Georgian-Russian relations. For the time
being, the statements about his wish to normalize those relations
cannot be taken seriously. Rhetoric and emotions cannot lay the
groundwork for relations, so far we lack the groundwork.
Should I remind you how President Saakashvili behaved after the
elections in 2004? The situation was the same. Saakashvili proposed
that Georgia and Russian should be on friendly terms with each
other, thanked Russia for its sound and sober position on the "Rose
Revolution" and the situation in Adjara. Some Russian mass media held
Saakashvili up as an example of the fighter against corruption. One
could say that there was a kind of "honeymoon" in the relations
between the two countries.
But as we know, the "honeymoon" didn't last long. The crisis in South
Ossetia occurred and tough statements about Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were made. So, all the statements about friendship should be backed by
actions. How can the Russian-Georgian relations improve in addressing
the issue of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? NATO question is also left
open, in particular, as the Georgian population, one can say, voted
for NATO membership at the referendum on January 5.
It should be understood that Saakashvili is a pragmatic policy-maker.
True, the Russians' opinion about him is totally different, and they
are wrong. Should Russia make substantial concessions to Georgia
on the South Ossetian and Abkhazian issues, Saakashvili could even
become a pro-Russian politician. In the 1990s some Russian generals
took a more pro-Georgian stand that the local military did.
It is another matter that the Abkhazian and South Ossetian issues
will have repercussions for the whole Caucasus. Therefore Russia
cannot afford to make serious concessions. Russia may moderate its
position partially and act as an arbiter in the conflict settlements.
But it cannot change its position drastically.
So, in the sphere of frozen conflicts there is no ground for relations
improvement. But there is such a ground in other fields - economy,
transport, education, etc.
As regards the mitigation of Saakashvili's rhetoric with respect to
the opposition, it comes quite logical. The presidential election
showed that the opposition is strong, that it is not a cluster
of fringe politicians. According to the official election returns,
Saakashvili took slightly more than 50 percent of the vote. He cannot
ignore such a strong opposition.
I would like to note the behavior of Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov who, after the election, met not only with the elected
President, but also with the opposition. Such political move is a
rare occurrence and a good example. I believe that we must behave
like this in all the new independent states, for example, in Armenia
where the presidential election will take place in February. Many
Russian policy-makers do not consider it necessary to get in touch
with the Armenian opposition. This is wrong because no matter whether
the leader of one or another state supports Russia or not, first and
foremost he takes his own interests into account. That is typical of
all the leaders of the post-Soviet states.