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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Jan 28 2008
Bayramoðlu: Dink would say `justice done'
Ali Bayramoðlu
Writer and intellectual Ali Bayramoðlu says slain Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink would have said "The justice has been done" if
he had seen last week's detentions of people, reportedly believed to
have close links to shadowy state networks, in connection with many
assassinations -- including Dink's own.
"We cannot accuse anybody without indictment or concrete evidence;
but Hrant was murdered as part of the ground laid by this entity. For
this reason, that entity is liable for his murder," Bayramoðlu says.
On Jan. 23 the country was awoken by the news that dozens of members
of a clandestine group had been detained in an operation called
"Ergene-kon."
Although some observers think that this operation will not result in
punitive action, as has been the case with many other past
operations, Bayramoðlu doesn't agree: "If the evidence is
substantial, I think the media and public will back the government.
Therefore I do not think there will be any retreat from this point.
Quite the contrary, I think Turkish democracy took a strong step to
prove attachment to the principle of the rule of law."
For Monday Talk, he explained why he thinks as he does.
What did you think when reading the arrest reports on Jan. 23?
It is very important that this sort of operation was carried out. I
wasn't expecting it, because we had every reason to be pessimistic
about legal, political or administrative determination considering
the fate of investigations opened in connection with the Dink murder,
some developments in 2007 and the unresolved Malatya massacre. It is
obvious that in 2007, some deep state elements cooperated with street
gangs and made their alliance known in public.
What else happened in relation to the connection between the state
and clandestine organizations?
In 2007, a military coup plot that was scheduled to take place in
2003 or 2004 was uncovered. We also witnessed antigovernment rallies
held to lay the groundwork for a military coup. The polarization
around Article 301, accusations of treason, murders in connection
with these accusations, physiological war attempts that sought to
undermine the political administration, democracy and social
stability -- they all took place in 2007. The reality behind the
civil society organizations that emerged as the supporters of the
Feb. 28 process was revealed in the same year.
What do the gang connections point to?
Some point to the Susurluk case [the first to bring into the open the
fact that national intelligence units employ others to carry out
illicit operations] and some others to the entities that organize
some sorts of social resistance activity. For instance if you take a
look at who organized the anti-government rallies prior to the July
22 elections, you will see that those who were detained a few days
ago and their organizations were involved in these rallies. These
rogue elements abused the social sensitivity over secularism by
organizing these rallies.
One of those detained had filed a lawsuit against Hrant Dink. Another
who frequently appeared at Dink's hearings was also detained...
We already knew them as members of groups that point to certain names
as targets and create the proper environment to take action. They
become public through their organizations. Back then, there were
suspicions and concerns because of the inability and reluctance of
the administration to deal with their increasing legitimization. For
this reason, I may say that it was a surprise. An operation of this
sort now implies the police and intelligence units have been working
hard and the prosecutor took a brave step, because [there was]
substantial evidence to ensure their detention.
Is bravery required to do this?
This is not easy, we have to admit that. The arrestees include
retired generals. We are now seeing the tip of the iceberg -- even
this small part of the iceberg tells a lot about the last two decades
in this country. In other words, this is the story of what happened
in the Southeast, the political assassinations, the country's
transformation associated with the European Union bid -- and it goes
back to the '80s.
Are the early versions of these gangs related to Gladio?
The statist and military guardianship system is very strong in
Turkey. If you pay attention, you will notice that there were
different methods to address the Gladio entities established in the
1950s to contain communism. The crackdown on these entities was
ensured via liberalization and democratization in Spain and in Italy.
Is Turkey going through a similar process now?
Turkey has not yet gone through a phase that will ensure greater
civilian rule in the state and further discussion of the military
domination in the political system. We were suffering from a very
authoritarian rule while Italy and Spain were making headway. We had
a military coup in the 1980s. The coup's impacts have been felt
through the 1990s. The [President Turgut] Özal era in the 1990s may
be called a civilian rule. In the aftermath, we had to deal with the
Refah (Welfare Party, RP) crisis; but there has never been a
clean-hands operation. There was no attempt to make the system more
civilian.
Former Primer Minister Bülent Ecevit and former Prime Minister
Süleyman Demirel made occasional references to organizations of this
sort...
I recall Ecevit's references to these types of entities; Demirel
implied another type. Ecevit faced an assassination attempt; Özal
almost died after being shot -- none of these incidents were
resolved. Therefore there is an entity we know little about. We say
that there is a deep state entity assigned to deal with terrorism;
this sort of attempt was made in different countries and we call it
Gladio.
Does it still exist in Turkey?
This entity is still alive in Turkey under the title "special
forces." There should be a distinction between intelligence
activities and operational actions. The intelligence agents provide
intelligence and espionage; the others carry out the operations. We
all know that there is no distinction between these two in the
Turkish military establishment. JÝTEM [the Gendarmerie Intelligence
Group Command -- the existence of which is denied by officials] was
an entity that relied on this sort of work. The existence of many
vague points in this security element's legal structure points to
there being a Gladio-like entity in our country as well. This is a
serious problem. We have no information about the relationship
between the state and this entity. We do not know if there is any
relationship between the state's legitimate elements and this
clandestine enterprise; but no matter what, the latest arrests show
that we are now facing an organization able to turn the country
upside-down. This is the visible part of Turkish Gladio; the visible
part of the iceberg.
Is the government taking a big risk with this operation?
Of course. Dealing with problems of this sort requires taking risks
but it should be recalled that what the government has done is to
facilitate the job police are doing. There is a well-working
intelligence system in Turkey. This system addresses the situation
with the support of a brave prosecutor. We are not talking about an
operation carried out by the government alone; this is an operation
launched by the police and lawyers under the support of the
government. If the evidence is substantial I think the media and the
public will back the government. Therefore I do not think there will
be any retreat from this point. Quite the contrary, I think Turkish
democracy took a strong step to prove attachment to the principle of
the rule of law.
What would you say about the allegations that the operation was
staged to proceed with lifting the headscarf ban?
This is a step taken by a state eager to become a really legitimate
one after eliminating its Gladio. You have to dismiss allegations
that claim connection between the operation and the headscarf issue.
Even these people's detention is a huge step, without seeing any
evidence yet. But I don't think it is a good move for the Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) to resolve the headscarf issue in
Parliament with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Why is that?
Because this is an issue exploitable by anybody. The
ultra-secularists may abuse it, and so do the hard-line religious
people. In the future the headscarf may be banned everywhere based on
the new article or it may be freed in every state institution. What
needs to be done is simple: the Higher Education Board (YÖK) could
have resolved this because the ban is based simply on its directive.
I do not think it would be right to resolve it via a constitutional
change. Constitutions should be concise and inclusive of fundamental
rights and freedoms. Other laws should support this and fill the
voids. If you insert details of this sort in the Constitution, you
will find a lot of dossiers before the Constitutional Court.
How do you think the government made this operation while it remains
ambivalent to abolish Article 301?
The government holds different considerations with regard to Article
301 [of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK)]. These were related to the
pre-election period; the issue of gangs is completely different. The
government is also one of the targets of clandestine enterprises. The
administration is aware that there is a problem with regard to the
implementation of Article 301 [widely considered to restrict freedom
of speech]. The mindset currently in effect will show its impact even
if you abolish Article 301, because the existence of these gangs is
the real reason for the abuse of the article. If they did not exploit
this legal mechanism that extensively, there would not have been such
an acute problem. As for the government, yes, there is some sort of
contradiction.
What kind of contradiction?
The government is ambivalent between democratic and reformist
tendencies and its own conservative tendencies. A number of AK Party
figures, including the prime minister, initially give conservative
reactions. But some time later they agree on a democratic option. At
the end, their philosophy is based on reason and pragmatism. The
government has been lucky because of its pragmatism. But it should
also be recalled that this government has conservative and statist
reflexes. Former Justice Minister and current State Minister Cemil
Çiçek's views on Article 301 are very well known. It was he who
accused the Armenian symposium's organizers of inflicting harm on the
country. This politician is a part of this government. There is a
government with liberal pragmatism; its conservatism stems from its
conservative character, its liberalism from the conjectural dynamics
and the spirit of the time.
What would Hrant Dink have thought if he knew of the current
detentions?
He would say, "My revenge has been taken." We cannot accuse anybody
without indictment or concrete evidence; but Hrant Dink was murdered
as part of the ground laid by this entity. For this reason, that
entity is liable for his murder.
Do you think this entity is going to be eliminated?
In 2003 and 2004, three out of four generals were eager to stage a
military coup; only one was not and he stopped the others. Where do
we stand now, are there any coup planners? What do the people
arrested today represent? Or what do their commanders represent? What
kind of connections do they have with officials in the state? We have
to ask these questions first. Of course the structure of the state is
changing, but that does not mean a civilian authority has been taking
over. But at least there is this feeling that an extensive operation
will be carried out to deal with the illegal entities within the
state.
Ali Bayramoðlu
He teaches sociology, humanities and Turkish cultural history at
Kültür University in Ýstanbul. A regular writer for Aksiyon
newsweekly and daily Yeni Þafak, he is also the moderator of a news
program on Kanal 24 television. He is the author of two books
published in 2001: "28 Þubat/Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi" (Feb. 28/Diary
of an Intervention) and "Türkiye'de Ýslami Harekete Sosyolojik Bir
Bakýþ 1994-2000" (Looking at the Islamic Movement in Turkey
1994-2000). He also co-authored "Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de
Ordu" (A Class, A Party: The Military in Turkey) with Ahmet Ýnsel.
28.01.2008
YONCA POYRAZ DOÐAN
Jan 28 2008
Bayramoðlu: Dink would say `justice done'
Ali Bayramoðlu
Writer and intellectual Ali Bayramoðlu says slain Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink would have said "The justice has been done" if
he had seen last week's detentions of people, reportedly believed to
have close links to shadowy state networks, in connection with many
assassinations -- including Dink's own.
"We cannot accuse anybody without indictment or concrete evidence;
but Hrant was murdered as part of the ground laid by this entity. For
this reason, that entity is liable for his murder," Bayramoðlu says.
On Jan. 23 the country was awoken by the news that dozens of members
of a clandestine group had been detained in an operation called
"Ergene-kon."
Although some observers think that this operation will not result in
punitive action, as has been the case with many other past
operations, Bayramoðlu doesn't agree: "If the evidence is
substantial, I think the media and public will back the government.
Therefore I do not think there will be any retreat from this point.
Quite the contrary, I think Turkish democracy took a strong step to
prove attachment to the principle of the rule of law."
For Monday Talk, he explained why he thinks as he does.
What did you think when reading the arrest reports on Jan. 23?
It is very important that this sort of operation was carried out. I
wasn't expecting it, because we had every reason to be pessimistic
about legal, political or administrative determination considering
the fate of investigations opened in connection with the Dink murder,
some developments in 2007 and the unresolved Malatya massacre. It is
obvious that in 2007, some deep state elements cooperated with street
gangs and made their alliance known in public.
What else happened in relation to the connection between the state
and clandestine organizations?
In 2007, a military coup plot that was scheduled to take place in
2003 or 2004 was uncovered. We also witnessed antigovernment rallies
held to lay the groundwork for a military coup. The polarization
around Article 301, accusations of treason, murders in connection
with these accusations, physiological war attempts that sought to
undermine the political administration, democracy and social
stability -- they all took place in 2007. The reality behind the
civil society organizations that emerged as the supporters of the
Feb. 28 process was revealed in the same year.
What do the gang connections point to?
Some point to the Susurluk case [the first to bring into the open the
fact that national intelligence units employ others to carry out
illicit operations] and some others to the entities that organize
some sorts of social resistance activity. For instance if you take a
look at who organized the anti-government rallies prior to the July
22 elections, you will see that those who were detained a few days
ago and their organizations were involved in these rallies. These
rogue elements abused the social sensitivity over secularism by
organizing these rallies.
One of those detained had filed a lawsuit against Hrant Dink. Another
who frequently appeared at Dink's hearings was also detained...
We already knew them as members of groups that point to certain names
as targets and create the proper environment to take action. They
become public through their organizations. Back then, there were
suspicions and concerns because of the inability and reluctance of
the administration to deal with their increasing legitimization. For
this reason, I may say that it was a surprise. An operation of this
sort now implies the police and intelligence units have been working
hard and the prosecutor took a brave step, because [there was]
substantial evidence to ensure their detention.
Is bravery required to do this?
This is not easy, we have to admit that. The arrestees include
retired generals. We are now seeing the tip of the iceberg -- even
this small part of the iceberg tells a lot about the last two decades
in this country. In other words, this is the story of what happened
in the Southeast, the political assassinations, the country's
transformation associated with the European Union bid -- and it goes
back to the '80s.
Are the early versions of these gangs related to Gladio?
The statist and military guardianship system is very strong in
Turkey. If you pay attention, you will notice that there were
different methods to address the Gladio entities established in the
1950s to contain communism. The crackdown on these entities was
ensured via liberalization and democratization in Spain and in Italy.
Is Turkey going through a similar process now?
Turkey has not yet gone through a phase that will ensure greater
civilian rule in the state and further discussion of the military
domination in the political system. We were suffering from a very
authoritarian rule while Italy and Spain were making headway. We had
a military coup in the 1980s. The coup's impacts have been felt
through the 1990s. The [President Turgut] Özal era in the 1990s may
be called a civilian rule. In the aftermath, we had to deal with the
Refah (Welfare Party, RP) crisis; but there has never been a
clean-hands operation. There was no attempt to make the system more
civilian.
Former Primer Minister Bülent Ecevit and former Prime Minister
Süleyman Demirel made occasional references to organizations of this
sort...
I recall Ecevit's references to these types of entities; Demirel
implied another type. Ecevit faced an assassination attempt; Özal
almost died after being shot -- none of these incidents were
resolved. Therefore there is an entity we know little about. We say
that there is a deep state entity assigned to deal with terrorism;
this sort of attempt was made in different countries and we call it
Gladio.
Does it still exist in Turkey?
This entity is still alive in Turkey under the title "special
forces." There should be a distinction between intelligence
activities and operational actions. The intelligence agents provide
intelligence and espionage; the others carry out the operations. We
all know that there is no distinction between these two in the
Turkish military establishment. JÝTEM [the Gendarmerie Intelligence
Group Command -- the existence of which is denied by officials] was
an entity that relied on this sort of work. The existence of many
vague points in this security element's legal structure points to
there being a Gladio-like entity in our country as well. This is a
serious problem. We have no information about the relationship
between the state and this entity. We do not know if there is any
relationship between the state's legitimate elements and this
clandestine enterprise; but no matter what, the latest arrests show
that we are now facing an organization able to turn the country
upside-down. This is the visible part of Turkish Gladio; the visible
part of the iceberg.
Is the government taking a big risk with this operation?
Of course. Dealing with problems of this sort requires taking risks
but it should be recalled that what the government has done is to
facilitate the job police are doing. There is a well-working
intelligence system in Turkey. This system addresses the situation
with the support of a brave prosecutor. We are not talking about an
operation carried out by the government alone; this is an operation
launched by the police and lawyers under the support of the
government. If the evidence is substantial I think the media and the
public will back the government. Therefore I do not think there will
be any retreat from this point. Quite the contrary, I think Turkish
democracy took a strong step to prove attachment to the principle of
the rule of law.
What would you say about the allegations that the operation was
staged to proceed with lifting the headscarf ban?
This is a step taken by a state eager to become a really legitimate
one after eliminating its Gladio. You have to dismiss allegations
that claim connection between the operation and the headscarf issue.
Even these people's detention is a huge step, without seeing any
evidence yet. But I don't think it is a good move for the Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) to resolve the headscarf issue in
Parliament with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Why is that?
Because this is an issue exploitable by anybody. The
ultra-secularists may abuse it, and so do the hard-line religious
people. In the future the headscarf may be banned everywhere based on
the new article or it may be freed in every state institution. What
needs to be done is simple: the Higher Education Board (YÖK) could
have resolved this because the ban is based simply on its directive.
I do not think it would be right to resolve it via a constitutional
change. Constitutions should be concise and inclusive of fundamental
rights and freedoms. Other laws should support this and fill the
voids. If you insert details of this sort in the Constitution, you
will find a lot of dossiers before the Constitutional Court.
How do you think the government made this operation while it remains
ambivalent to abolish Article 301?
The government holds different considerations with regard to Article
301 [of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK)]. These were related to the
pre-election period; the issue of gangs is completely different. The
government is also one of the targets of clandestine enterprises. The
administration is aware that there is a problem with regard to the
implementation of Article 301 [widely considered to restrict freedom
of speech]. The mindset currently in effect will show its impact even
if you abolish Article 301, because the existence of these gangs is
the real reason for the abuse of the article. If they did not exploit
this legal mechanism that extensively, there would not have been such
an acute problem. As for the government, yes, there is some sort of
contradiction.
What kind of contradiction?
The government is ambivalent between democratic and reformist
tendencies and its own conservative tendencies. A number of AK Party
figures, including the prime minister, initially give conservative
reactions. But some time later they agree on a democratic option. At
the end, their philosophy is based on reason and pragmatism. The
government has been lucky because of its pragmatism. But it should
also be recalled that this government has conservative and statist
reflexes. Former Justice Minister and current State Minister Cemil
Çiçek's views on Article 301 are very well known. It was he who
accused the Armenian symposium's organizers of inflicting harm on the
country. This politician is a part of this government. There is a
government with liberal pragmatism; its conservatism stems from its
conservative character, its liberalism from the conjectural dynamics
and the spirit of the time.
What would Hrant Dink have thought if he knew of the current
detentions?
He would say, "My revenge has been taken." We cannot accuse anybody
without indictment or concrete evidence; but Hrant Dink was murdered
as part of the ground laid by this entity. For this reason, that
entity is liable for his murder.
Do you think this entity is going to be eliminated?
In 2003 and 2004, three out of four generals were eager to stage a
military coup; only one was not and he stopped the others. Where do
we stand now, are there any coup planners? What do the people
arrested today represent? Or what do their commanders represent? What
kind of connections do they have with officials in the state? We have
to ask these questions first. Of course the structure of the state is
changing, but that does not mean a civilian authority has been taking
over. But at least there is this feeling that an extensive operation
will be carried out to deal with the illegal entities within the
state.
Ali Bayramoðlu
He teaches sociology, humanities and Turkish cultural history at
Kültür University in Ýstanbul. A regular writer for Aksiyon
newsweekly and daily Yeni Þafak, he is also the moderator of a news
program on Kanal 24 television. He is the author of two books
published in 2001: "28 Þubat/Bir Müdahalenin Güncesi" (Feb. 28/Diary
of an Intervention) and "Türkiye'de Ýslami Harekete Sosyolojik Bir
Bakýþ 1994-2000" (Looking at the Islamic Movement in Turkey
1994-2000). He also co-authored "Bir Zümre, Bir Parti: Türkiye'de
Ordu" (A Class, A Party: The Military in Turkey) with Ahmet Ýnsel.
28.01.2008
YONCA POYRAZ DOÐAN