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How Did The Lands Around Karabakh Come To Be Occupied?

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  • How Did The Lands Around Karabakh Come To Be Occupied?

    Agency WPS
    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    November 3, 2004, Wednesday

    HOW DID THE LANDS AROUND KARABAKH COME TO BE OCCUPIED?

    SOURCE: Vremya Novostei, November 1, 2004, p. 5

    by Vladimir Kazimirov


    VLADIMIR KAZIMIROV, EX-HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN MEDIATORSHIP MISSION IN
    NAGORNO-KARABAKH: LEADERSHIP OF AZERBAIJAN ALSO SHARES RESPONSIBILITY
    FOR ESCALATION OF THE HOSTILITIES

    Acting on Azerbaijan's initiative, the UN General Assembly will discuss
    the situation in the Azerbaijani districts beyond Nagorno-Karabakh
    occupied by Armenian and Karabakh troops. Official Baku claims that the
    occupiers have been into mischief and atrocities there.

    Full occupation of 5 districts of Azerbaijan and partial of 2 more
    became a result of vicious fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it
    between 1992 and 1994.

    Azerbaijani diplomacy is now trying to switch the attention from the
    cause (status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the problem it is loath to try and
    tackle) to an effect (occupied territories). Hence the traditional
    figure juggling - over 1,000,000 resettlers (are the bona fide 700,000
    to 750,000 too few?) and 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan occupied
    (instead of 9%; in fact, even if Nagorno-Karabakh is counted - and it
    cannot be regarded as "occupied" - the figure does not amount to 14%).
    The problem of the occupied territories has never been solved. Both
    sides are uncompromising. No progress at all has been made in a decade
    of cease-fire. These days, Baku presents the occupation only as an
    outcome of Armenian aggression even though there is more to it than
    Azerbaijan admits.

    Suspension of hostilities and a transition to peaceful discussion of
    moot points would have prevented expansion of the aggression. Not a
    single square kilometer of land has occupied been occupied since the
    cease-fire accord arranged with Russia's help in May 1994. I remember
    how the conflict raged between 1992 and 1994 and how go-betweens were
    doing their best to put out the fire. Russia pestered the warring sides
    - directly and via the OSCE Minsk Group - with the proposal of
    negotiations. Baku and Yerevan were given a lot of chances to put an
    end to the hostilities. It was usually Baku that dismissed the chance
    and even went against the already made accords.

    A lot of hopes were pinned on the OSCE Minsk Conference. Were it not
    for the official Baku's demand of withdrawal of the Armenians from the
    overrun Shusha and Lachin, the conference would have taken place in
    June 1992.

    Instead of the conference, the OSCE Minsk Group was formed. The one
    Baku regularly criticizes nowadays. On Russia's initiative, the OSCE
    Minsk Group urged the warring sides to suspend hostilities for 30 days
    in July 1992 and for 60 days two months later. All to no avail. Yerevan
    and Stepanakert gave their consent, but it took time to get Baku's
    cooperation. The Armenians overrun the Kelbadzhar district in April
    1993. Resolution 822 of the UN Security Council demanded an immediate
    suspension of hostilities and withdrawal of all occupiers. Needless to
    say, Baku supported Armenian pullout from the occupied districts - but
    not at the cost of suspension of hostilities.

    With Russia's help, accords to restrict the hostilities were reached in
    June 1993. Moscow suggested an extension of the accord by a month on
    July 3. Stepanakert did not object, but acting defense minister of
    Azerbaijan Safar Abiyev never bothered to respond to the suggestion.
    Battle was joined again, and Agdam fell on July 23. A 5-day cease-fire
    was agreed upon with Russia's help on August 18. When the accord was
    broken, Azerbaijanis lost Fizuli and Dzhebrail. The then President of
    Azerbaijan Heidar Aliyev admitted that his regular army had regularly
    broken the cease-fire accords.

    The truce (for 10 days this time) was only resumed on August 31, when
    the Armenian troops overrun Kubatly. The Kremlin succeeded in extending
    the truce. It lasted 50 days but the Azerbaijanis wrecked it again and
    gave the Armenians an excuse to seize all of south-western Azerbaijan.

    Russia's attempts to stop the bloodshed in late 1993 failed. I was
    present when Aliyev and Karabakh leader Robert Kocharjan agreed on a
    cease-fire as of December 17. Both leaders promised to have the accord
    officially enacted, but the documents came from Stepanakert alone -
    Baku clearly stalled for time. I managed to persuade Kocharjan to order
    an unilateral cease-fire - on the basis of a "gentlemen's accord"
    (after all, everything had been agreed on the level of the president of
    Azerbaijan!) - without waiting for the text from Baku. The text from
    the capital of Azerbaijan came three days later - absolutely
    unacceptable. Everything had to be cancelled. As it turned out later,
    Baku used the breathing space to prepare an offensive on a large scale.
    On December 30, Stepanakert accepted our suggestion of a truce for the
    New Year festivities but Baku did not even respond to it.

    Only in May 1994, after murderous losses and facing the threat of a
    frontal collapse in the environs of Bardy and Yelakh, the leadership of
    Azerbaijan suggested a cease-fire. It ended in the truce that has
    already lasted for more than a decade.

    This is not a complete list, in fact. Even this abridged version shows,
    however, that Baku always relied on sheer strength of arms,
    overestimating its capacities and using what breathing space occurred
    only to regroup. Neglect of cease-fire accords and peace initiatives on
    its part merely extended the war and enabled the Armenians to expand
    the occupied territory. It means that at least a part of the blame for
    the escalation of hostilities and, therefore, on the expansion of the
    occupied territories rests on the authorities of Azerbaijan. The
    Armenians are not lily-white either, they should have withdrawn, but it
    is not they who are particularly prone to negativism in the attitude
    towards peace initiatives.

    Unfortunately, Armenian and Azerbaijani young diplomatic services are
    way too inexperienced yet, unable to avoid half-truths. It has been
    long since Baku began campaigning for an "unconditional" release of the
    territories allegedly in accordance with four resolutions of the UN
    Security Council dated 1993. In fact, however, the term "unconditional"
    is only used in Resolution 853. Resolutions 822, 874, and 884 do not
    use the term at all.

    And this is why Resolution 884 did not use the term "unconditional".
    The text of the document makes it plain who broke the cease-fire demand
    (the major demand in the hostilities and the major demand in all four
    resolutions) through the war. It was a must for the release of the
    territories in the first place. So, it was transformed from a must into
    a matter for bargaining. Neither is Baku worried by its failure to meet
    other demands of resolutions of the UN Security Council.

    These selective approach cannot be missed. Only whoever does not know
    the first thing about the conflict will take Baku's propagandistic
    tricks for real concerns. In fact, settlement of the conflict demands
    efforts on both warring sides.

    Vladimir Kazimirov, an ambassador, between 1992 and 1996 - head of the
    Russian mediator mission, Russian presidential plenipotentiary
    representative for Nagorno-Karabakh, participant and co-chairman of the
    OSCE Minsk Group.
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