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What Links Kosovo, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh?
Monday, 25 February 2008, 9:21 am
Opinion: INSS Insight
Pockets of Instability: What Links Kosovo, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh?
By Gallia Lindenstrauss , via INSS
During the week in which Kosovo declared independence, two important
elections took place elsewhere, in Cyprus and Armenia. They attracted
far less attention than did events in Kosovo, but they are also likely
to influence Europe and its neighboring areas. Furthermore, there is
some overlap between the issues raised in these election campaigns and
Kosovo's declaration of independence. While those supporting diplomatic
recognition of Kosovar independence insist that it implies no precedent
for international recognition of secessionism in other states, in
practice concerns are being voiced in other regions about similar
problems. Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, and Azeris are
among those looking closely at events in Kosovo and their possible
implications.
The elections in the Republic of Cyprus ` in the southern part of the
island ` produced a tight race between three candidates, each of whom
managed to garner more than 30% of the votes. More noteworthy, however,
is the fact that the Greek Cypriots chose not to support another term
for the incumbent president, Tassos Papadopoulos, who was among the
leaders of the opposition to the 2004 Annan Plan for the reunification
of the island. The two contenders left in the run-off election,
Communist Party leader Dimitris Christofias and former Foreign Minister
and right-wing leader Ioannis Kasoulides ` take a more pragmatic
approach to the Cypriot question, and either is more likely to succeed
in negotiating reunification. At the same time, developments in Kosovo
may encourage many on the Turkish side to support the permanent
division of the island, and some have already begun to ask if there is
any difference between the demand of Kosovar Albanians for independence
and the same demand of Turkish Cypriots.
In the case of Armenia, presidential election results were far less
close. The victory of incumbent Prime Minister Serge Sarkissian, who is
a native of Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian-majority enclave inside
Azerbaijan, over which violent conflict was waged between 1988 and
1994) came as no surprise. Most interest in the election focused on the
campaign of independent Armenia's first president, Levon
Ter-Petrossian. As president, Ter-Petrossian had adopted a moderate
approach to the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and his crushing defeat is
evidence that his approach has few supporters in Armenia today or at
least that those who do endorse it find it difficult to express their
preferences. Still, Armenia's control of 14% of Azerbaijani territory
for more than a decade since the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a
source of instability in the region. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are
investing more and more in armaments, and while energy-rich Azerbaijan
can afford to spend four times as much on weapons, the Armenians claim
that they can get away with spending less because they are able to
acquire Russian materiel at preferential prices. Whatever the case, it
seems that the two sides are preparing for a `second round' which some
predict will break out towards 2012, when Azerbaijan's oil and gas
production will peak.
Developments in Cyprus and Armenia have an impact on the foreign
relations of Turkey and its ties with the European Union. Peaceful
trends in Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh can somewhat ease Turkey's
position in its negotiations for EU membership. By contrast, renewed
violence in Nagorno-Karabakh can push Turkey, which has traditionally
cooperated with Azerbaijan and maintained complicated and high-charged
relations with Armenia, to take steps that would run counter to
European norms. By the same token, if it appears that Turkey is
retreating from its support for the Annan Plan and returning to its
traditional pro-partition policy on Cyprus, that could also work
against Turkey in the negotiations with the EU. Still, Turkey was one
of the first to recognize Kosovar independence and there are many Turks
who now hope that the international support for Kosovo might help
mitigate the overwhelming international opposition to the partition of
Cyprus. On the other hand, Kosovar independence is seen as a
problematic precedent, not only by Greeks and Greek Cypriots, but also
by Azeris. They most fear a situation in which Karabakh is permanently
separated from Azerbaijan. Thus, it is hardly surprising that
Azerbaijan declared its refusal to recognize Kosovar independence.
It has been argued that some states have agreed to recognize Kosovo
only because the combination of circumstances attending the violent
dissolution of Yugoslavia will almost certainly not arise anywhere else
and that preserving the territorial integrity of states is still in the
interest of the international system. Moreover, those who spread
horrific scenarios following Kosovo's declaration of independence are
sometimes accused of swallowing Serbian propaganda. However, the
refusal of many states confronting their own secessionist problems to
recognize Kosovo suggests that fear that other groups will emulate the
Kosovar Albanian fight for independence is also shared by those who are
not Serbia's traditional allies.
More generally, it remains very difficult to stipulate how relations
among rival ethnic groups can be rebuilt after a long history of
violence and ethnic cleansing. It is particular difficult to see how
Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh can co-exist (after mutual
ethnic cleansings that displaced more than a million people, the
majority Azeris but also very many Armenians) except through an
exchange of territory between the two countries. In the case of Cyprus,
there has been no violence between the protagonists for over three
decades, but there has been a prolonged separation following the
upheavals of the 1960s and `70s that culminated in the Turkish invasion
of 1974. Those who insist that recognition of Kosovar independence does
not constitute any kind of precedent will therefore have to work hard
to demonstrate what makes Kosovo unique. Otherwise, instability in
these other enclaves may very well leak out into the entire regional
system.
INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel
Roizman, Philadelphia
Monday, 25 February 2008, 9:21 am
Opinion: INSS Insight
Pockets of Instability: What Links Kosovo, Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh?
By Gallia Lindenstrauss , via INSS
During the week in which Kosovo declared independence, two important
elections took place elsewhere, in Cyprus and Armenia. They attracted
far less attention than did events in Kosovo, but they are also likely
to influence Europe and its neighboring areas. Furthermore, there is
some overlap between the issues raised in these election campaigns and
Kosovo's declaration of independence. While those supporting diplomatic
recognition of Kosovar independence insist that it implies no precedent
for international recognition of secessionism in other states, in
practice concerns are being voiced in other regions about similar
problems. Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, and Azeris are
among those looking closely at events in Kosovo and their possible
implications.
The elections in the Republic of Cyprus ` in the southern part of the
island ` produced a tight race between three candidates, each of whom
managed to garner more than 30% of the votes. More noteworthy, however,
is the fact that the Greek Cypriots chose not to support another term
for the incumbent president, Tassos Papadopoulos, who was among the
leaders of the opposition to the 2004 Annan Plan for the reunification
of the island. The two contenders left in the run-off election,
Communist Party leader Dimitris Christofias and former Foreign Minister
and right-wing leader Ioannis Kasoulides ` take a more pragmatic
approach to the Cypriot question, and either is more likely to succeed
in negotiating reunification. At the same time, developments in Kosovo
may encourage many on the Turkish side to support the permanent
division of the island, and some have already begun to ask if there is
any difference between the demand of Kosovar Albanians for independence
and the same demand of Turkish Cypriots.
In the case of Armenia, presidential election results were far less
close. The victory of incumbent Prime Minister Serge Sarkissian, who is
a native of Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian-majority enclave inside
Azerbaijan, over which violent conflict was waged between 1988 and
1994) came as no surprise. Most interest in the election focused on the
campaign of independent Armenia's first president, Levon
Ter-Petrossian. As president, Ter-Petrossian had adopted a moderate
approach to the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and his crushing defeat is
evidence that his approach has few supporters in Armenia today or at
least that those who do endorse it find it difficult to express their
preferences. Still, Armenia's control of 14% of Azerbaijani territory
for more than a decade since the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a
source of instability in the region. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are
investing more and more in armaments, and while energy-rich Azerbaijan
can afford to spend four times as much on weapons, the Armenians claim
that they can get away with spending less because they are able to
acquire Russian materiel at preferential prices. Whatever the case, it
seems that the two sides are preparing for a `second round' which some
predict will break out towards 2012, when Azerbaijan's oil and gas
production will peak.
Developments in Cyprus and Armenia have an impact on the foreign
relations of Turkey and its ties with the European Union. Peaceful
trends in Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh can somewhat ease Turkey's
position in its negotiations for EU membership. By contrast, renewed
violence in Nagorno-Karabakh can push Turkey, which has traditionally
cooperated with Azerbaijan and maintained complicated and high-charged
relations with Armenia, to take steps that would run counter to
European norms. By the same token, if it appears that Turkey is
retreating from its support for the Annan Plan and returning to its
traditional pro-partition policy on Cyprus, that could also work
against Turkey in the negotiations with the EU. Still, Turkey was one
of the first to recognize Kosovar independence and there are many Turks
who now hope that the international support for Kosovo might help
mitigate the overwhelming international opposition to the partition of
Cyprus. On the other hand, Kosovar independence is seen as a
problematic precedent, not only by Greeks and Greek Cypriots, but also
by Azeris. They most fear a situation in which Karabakh is permanently
separated from Azerbaijan. Thus, it is hardly surprising that
Azerbaijan declared its refusal to recognize Kosovar independence.
It has been argued that some states have agreed to recognize Kosovo
only because the combination of circumstances attending the violent
dissolution of Yugoslavia will almost certainly not arise anywhere else
and that preserving the territorial integrity of states is still in the
interest of the international system. Moreover, those who spread
horrific scenarios following Kosovo's declaration of independence are
sometimes accused of swallowing Serbian propaganda. However, the
refusal of many states confronting their own secessionist problems to
recognize Kosovo suggests that fear that other groups will emulate the
Kosovar Albanian fight for independence is also shared by those who are
not Serbia's traditional allies.
More generally, it remains very difficult to stipulate how relations
among rival ethnic groups can be rebuilt after a long history of
violence and ethnic cleansing. It is particular difficult to see how
Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh can co-exist (after mutual
ethnic cleansings that displaced more than a million people, the
majority Azeris but also very many Armenians) except through an
exchange of territory between the two countries. In the case of Cyprus,
there has been no violence between the protagonists for over three
decades, but there has been a prolonged separation following the
upheavals of the 1960s and `70s that culminated in the Turkish invasion
of 1974. Those who insist that recognition of Kosovar independence does
not constitute any kind of precedent will therefore have to work hard
to demonstrate what makes Kosovo unique. Otherwise, instability in
these other enclaves may very well leak out into the entire regional
system.
INSS Insight is published through the generosity of Sari and Israel
Roizman, Philadelphia