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  • Lebanon: Middle East microcosm

    Globe and Mail, Canada
    March 8 2008


    Lebanon: Middle East microcosm
    RAYYAN AL-SHAWAF

    March 8, 2008

    MIRROR OF THE ARAB WORLD
    Lebanon in Conflict
    By Sandra Mackey
    Norton, 303 pages, $29.95


    It is quite fitting that A Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in
    Conflict should be the latest offering by veteran Middle East
    journalist Sandra Mackey. Her timing is propitious for two reasons:
    Lebanon is much in the news these days due to continuing domestic
    turmoil, while the larger Arab world risks being rent asunder by
    deepening political and sectarian divisions.

    Mackey, who has authored previous books on the Arab world, Saudi
    Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Lebanon itself (Lebanon: A House Divided), now
    comes full circle, attempting "to observe through the lens of Lebanon
    many of the dynamics at work in all Arab states." Though the author
    points out that "Lebanon is not a perfect microcosm of the Arab
    world," she explains how it alone has experienced almost all the
    major crises to bedevil the region since the First World War. These
    include the propensity of sectarian loyalties to trump national
    identity, the disruptive influence of Palestinian guerrillas, the
    radicalization of the historically marginalized Shiites, and the
    widening Sunni-Shiite rift. Alongside her account of the manner in
    which such enduring phenomena have impinged upon Lebanon's stability,
    Mackey provides a strident critique of negative characteristics
    unique to Lebanon.

    Chief among these "Lebanonisms" is the role of "a coterie of
    political bosses" wielding inordinate influence and power. "In
    Lebanon prior to the civil war of 1975," Mackey writes, "the elite
    was composed of the zuama, who were to Lebanese society what the
    feudal lords were to medieval Europe and the ward heelers to American
    politics." The author notes that even rival zuama would close ranks
    when faced with any attempt to strengthen the state, which they had
    effectively supplanted by establishing elaborate patron-client
    relationships with members of their sect or region.

    Yet Mackey is overly critical of Lebanon's confessional system of
    governance, to which she unfairly ascribes most of the country's
    ills. Though admittedly skewed in favour of Christians for decades,
    and always abused by the zuama of all sects, the practice of
    allocating political office on a sectarian basis ensures the
    representation of minorities; if anything, it should be broadened to
    include a quota for women.

    Discontinuing institutional confessionalism without replacing it with
    secularism (rejected by the majority of Lebanese Muslims and some
    Christians) could easily lead to a measure of Islamization, as the
    country's Muslim majority would face no restraints on injecting Islam
    into politics. The real tragedy is that many critics of Lebanon's
    confessional system depict the 1975-1990 civil war as its logical
    outcome. This becomes a handy excuse for neighbouring Arab countries
    - where minorities are often woefully underrepresented - to dismiss
    proposals aimed at achieving proportional sectarian and ethnic
    representation.

    Mirror also suffers from factual errors. Apart from a brief remark
    placing the mutasarrifiyya, an Ottoman administrative unit for Mount
    Lebanon, in the 17th century instead of 1861-1914, Mackey makes
    several mistakes when discussing recent and contemporary issues. For
    example: Hezbollah's unprovoked attack on Israel in the summer of
    2006 did not occur in the disputed Shebaa Farms region, but in Israel
    proper; Syria's iron-fisted ruler is named Bashar (not Bashir) Assad,
    while his father Hafez died in 2000, not 2002; Lebanon's speaker of
    parliament, Nabih Berri, attended the public Lebanese University, not
    the private Beirut University College; Armenian citizens of Lebanon
    are best described as "non-Arab," rather than the author's
    "non-Lebanese"; and Ragheb Alameh is not "the Lebanese Madonna," but
    a male pop idol.

    Nevertheless, the author's undeniable erudition infuses the book with
    a depth sorely lacking in most journalistic accounts of the Middle
    East. Mackey excels when providing historical background to the
    myriad competing interests that, from 1975 until 1990, turned Lebanon
    into "a multi-layered battleground on which Christian fought Muslim,
    the political left combatted the political right, Lebanese engaged
    Palestinian, Syria sent in its army, Israel ravaged the PLO, a covey
    of Western countries blundered as peacekeepers, and Iran further
    politicized the Shia." Postwar Lebanon, characterized by Syrian
    hegemony until the assassination of former prime minister Rafic
    Hariri in 2005, also receives detailed coverage, replete with
    all-too-timely warnings that Lebanon could yet again become the
    staging ground for inter-Arab conflicts.

    Strangely, for all her talk of Lebanon reflecting its neighbours'
    struggles and dilemmas, Mackey ignores one particularly obvious
    reflection in the Lebanese mirror: Israel. Though even the most
    pro-Western Lebanese would likely shudder at the analogy, Lebanon's
    predicament clearly resembles that of the Jewish state, which "is
    geographically part of the Arab world and culturally entwined with
    the West." Yet whereas Israel's politico-cultural leanings have few
    if any external ramifications (Arab hostility toward Israel stems
    from its oppression of the Palestinians, not its westward
    orientation), Lebanon's choices in this arena are often fraught with
    danger.

    Lebanon, after all, is an Arab country whose alliances are of no
    small importance to its neighbours. A decision to align itself with
    the West politically or even culturally would provoke the wrath of
    anti-Western Arabs both inside and outside Lebanon. In the 1950s,
    '60s and '70s, this meant Sunni Arab nationalists; today, the
    culprits are Shiite Islamists backed by Syria and non-Arab Iran, or
    Sunni Islamists inspired by al-Qaeda.

    Imagine being embattled Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,
    tentatively inching his country closer to the West. In order not to
    offend the powerful Sunni establishment in the Middle East, you must
    co-ordinate your move with its two pillars: Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
    Yet to your neighbour Syria, its backer Iran and your own sizable
    Shiite population - all already uneasy about your overtures toward
    the West - such a strategy appears to place you squarely on the side
    of Sunnis and against Shiites in the ever-widening chasm between the
    two sects. Consequently, you must make concessions to the
    Syria-Iran-Hezbollah triumvirate.

    The result is admittedly very little movement in any direction, but a
    more single-minded approach would almost certainly trigger conflict.
    So whatever you do, don't do much, and try to keep everybody happy;
    directly above you, the Arab Sword of Damocles hangs precariously by
    a thread, and there are plenty of folks with scissors.

    Rayyan Al-Shawaf is a writer and freelance reviewer based in Beirut,
    Lebanon.

    http://www.theglobeandmail.com/s ervlet/story/LAC.20080308.BKLEBA08/TPStory/Enterta inment
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