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RECOGNITION OF KARABAKH BY ARMENIA SHOULD NOT BE A "SINGLE SHOT"
KarabakhOpen
03-04-2008 16:36:42
Interview with the ex-deputy foreign minister of NKR Masis Mayilyan
Mr. Mayilyan, what is you attitude toward the statement of the acting
president of Armenia Robert Kocharyan regarding the possibility of
recognition of NKR? What positive and negative results may it produce
and in what conditions is it possible?
It is gratifying that Armenia brings up the idea of the legal
recognition of NKR. However, such a move on behalf of the Republic
of Armenia, to put it figuratively, should not be a single shot. It
must be followed by similar statements by other countries. If no
preparations have been made, it is necessary to get to work as new
international relations are being established.
Theoretically, it would be desirable if Azerbaijan were among countries
which will recognize NKR first. In that case the conflict would be
settled, and opportunities for effective regional cooperation,
beneficial for all the nations of the South Caucasus, would
appear. However, since our neighbors are not ready for such actions,
NKR and Armenia must pursue a policy on the Karabakh issue in two
parallel directions. On the one hand, it is necessary to resume the
talks in the full three-party format under the aegis of the OSCE
Minsk Group, on the other hand, it is necessary to work with separate
countries and international organizations for the de jure recognition
of NKR. Such an approach is positive in every sense since the least
success on the second track will help the Minsk process move toward
progress.
A "solo" recognition of NKR by Armenia would be of vital
necessity in case of armed aggression against NKR on behalf of
Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, in this phase it would be expedient to establish
a legal basis for the military cooperation of the two states. It
will help solve a number of issues, including that of the military
service of volunteers from Armenia in the NKR Army of Defense. It is
evident that the NKR Army of Defense defends not only the border of
NKR but also the eastern border of the Republic of Armenia, from the
ridge of Mrav to the Armenian and Iranian border in the south. It
is also necessary to set down in an interstate agreement the status
of the Republic of Armenia as a guarantor of the security of NKR and
its people.
Recently Azerbaijan has been trying to replace the members of the
Minsk group. Is it possible and how may it affect the settlement of
the Karabakh issue?
The recent actions of the Azerbaijani side were like blackmail rather
than real steps toward changing the staff of the co-chairs or to
thwart the Minsk process. The point is that besides Azerbaijan there
are other sides of the conflict, and the choice of mediators is not
make by one of them. All the three sides should agree.
To some extent, this blackmail was successful. I was a little surprised
by the excusing tone of the interview of one of the co-chairs.
A conference on the development of the region was held in Kashatagh
which admitted that so far there has been no policy on settlement. Do
the social programs in Kashatagh indicate a change in the stance of
the Armenian side on the process of settlement of the conflict?
The fact of holding a conference in Kashatagh is positive. But it
is possible to judge about the policy of settlement of the liberated
territories by the efforts that must be made after the conference. If
infrastructures are laid out in the regions (such as gas pipelines
Berdzor-Minjnavan, Askeran-Aghdam-Martakert, Drmbon-Karvachar, others),
then we may talk about serious approaches.
KarabakhOpen
03-04-2008 16:36:42
Interview with the ex-deputy foreign minister of NKR Masis Mayilyan
Mr. Mayilyan, what is you attitude toward the statement of the acting
president of Armenia Robert Kocharyan regarding the possibility of
recognition of NKR? What positive and negative results may it produce
and in what conditions is it possible?
It is gratifying that Armenia brings up the idea of the legal
recognition of NKR. However, such a move on behalf of the Republic
of Armenia, to put it figuratively, should not be a single shot. It
must be followed by similar statements by other countries. If no
preparations have been made, it is necessary to get to work as new
international relations are being established.
Theoretically, it would be desirable if Azerbaijan were among countries
which will recognize NKR first. In that case the conflict would be
settled, and opportunities for effective regional cooperation,
beneficial for all the nations of the South Caucasus, would
appear. However, since our neighbors are not ready for such actions,
NKR and Armenia must pursue a policy on the Karabakh issue in two
parallel directions. On the one hand, it is necessary to resume the
talks in the full three-party format under the aegis of the OSCE
Minsk Group, on the other hand, it is necessary to work with separate
countries and international organizations for the de jure recognition
of NKR. Such an approach is positive in every sense since the least
success on the second track will help the Minsk process move toward
progress.
A "solo" recognition of NKR by Armenia would be of vital
necessity in case of armed aggression against NKR on behalf of
Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, in this phase it would be expedient to establish
a legal basis for the military cooperation of the two states. It
will help solve a number of issues, including that of the military
service of volunteers from Armenia in the NKR Army of Defense. It is
evident that the NKR Army of Defense defends not only the border of
NKR but also the eastern border of the Republic of Armenia, from the
ridge of Mrav to the Armenian and Iranian border in the south. It
is also necessary to set down in an interstate agreement the status
of the Republic of Armenia as a guarantor of the security of NKR and
its people.
Recently Azerbaijan has been trying to replace the members of the
Minsk group. Is it possible and how may it affect the settlement of
the Karabakh issue?
The recent actions of the Azerbaijani side were like blackmail rather
than real steps toward changing the staff of the co-chairs or to
thwart the Minsk process. The point is that besides Azerbaijan there
are other sides of the conflict, and the choice of mediators is not
make by one of them. All the three sides should agree.
To some extent, this blackmail was successful. I was a little surprised
by the excusing tone of the interview of one of the co-chairs.
A conference on the development of the region was held in Kashatagh
which admitted that so far there has been no policy on settlement. Do
the social programs in Kashatagh indicate a change in the stance of
the Armenian side on the process of settlement of the conflict?
The fact of holding a conference in Kashatagh is positive. But it
is possible to judge about the policy of settlement of the liberated
territories by the efforts that must be made after the conference. If
infrastructures are laid out in the regions (such as gas pipelines
Berdzor-Minjnavan, Askeran-Aghdam-Martakert, Drmbon-Karvachar, others),
then we may talk about serious approaches.