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NO DOCTRINE, NO CONSISTENT WORK
LILIT POGHOSYAN
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on April 12, 2008
Armenia
Interview with SHAVARSH KOCHARYAN, Head of the National Democratic Party
`After the March 1 events, Azerbaijan took an unprecedentedly tough
stance on the Karabakh issue. Did such exacerbations coincide with the
revolutionary maneuvers of `Levon's witnesses' by accident or, were
they different elements of the same chain?'
`Obviously, it wasn't accidental. Azerbaijan's taking a tougher stance
and addressing a challenge to the Minsk Group was not accidental
either. All that happened on the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line was
an operation called `reconnaissance in force'. The United States'
pressures and the Co-Chairs' statements (where the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan was actually touched upon for the first time)
were not accidental either. It was quite clear that all those things
were interrelated.
The fact that Turkey and Azerbaijan have set up a joint group
consisting of senior military officials with the purpose of `conducting
studies' and `elaborating a program' aimed at eliminating the PKK bases
in the territory of Artsakh should also be viewed as a component of the
same chain. The White House, as we know, has included PKK in the list
of terrorist organizations. That's to say, certain preparatory work is
being done for creating prerequisites of direct military intervention,
and if the situation in our country does not move towards
stabilization, those symptoms will be more salient and painful for
Armenia.'
`In that regard, how do you estimate the statement introduced by the
Parliament in connection with the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
Do you think it may curb Azerbaijan's desires and impart a more
`initiatory character' to the Armenian diplomacy?'
`It's obvious that we have very serious omissions in the negotiation
process. The first omission is that our foreign policy has never been
the first to launch attack. We, more frequently, responded to
Azerbaijan's steps. This has given rise to a situation which is quite
beneficial to Azerbaijan. That is, it's a territorial dispute between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and a part of Azerbaijan's territory is under
the Armenian control; therefore Armenia is an aggressor. Whereas, the
self-determination of Karabakh has prefect legal bases, but the
Armenian side keeps silent in that regard.
Otherwise, it would be definitely perceived that Karabakh rather than
Kosovo should become a precedent.
Now, they are trying to create an anti-precedent by speculating the
name of Karabakh. Why? Because in that case it is always possible to
say that if the independence of Karabakh is not recognized, the others
have absolutely no right to speak about it.
There is another important factor which, at first sight, bears no
relationship with the negotiation process but shows what initiatory
policy could mean. In particular, I mean the barbaric destruction of
the cross-stones of Jugha. Surprising though it is, the issue never
became a subject of public discussions in any high international
tribunal.
Whereas, Azerbaijan made the fictitious issue of fires in the `occupied
territories' subject to discussion in the UN Tribunal. Of course, the
fires were not fictitious; they existed everywhere, both in the
territory of Armenia and in Spain, Portugal etc. But profiting by the
occasion, Azerbaijan forced its way towards achieving the recognition
of the term `occupied territories'.
What comes out? We cannot be consistent in preserving our historical
and cultural values, while Azerbaijan voices concern over alleged fires
from the highest tribunals.
Why do I say this? Because it's really time for Armenia to clarify its
attitude and review its passive policy. From this point of view, I
consider the current parliamentary discussions useful. As to the
adoption of the statement, I consider it necessary but not useful. The
next step shall involve signing an interstate agreement between Armenia
and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.'
`Many parliamentarians believe that it's time to insist on Karabakh's
full participation in the negotiation process.'
`Insisting is not enough; it's necessary to bring specific facts. What
do I mean? If there is an agreement which says that the RA authorities
are entitled to present the interests of Karabakh (which also refers to
the negotiation process), the Armenian representatives may always say,
`Sorry, I am not authorized to act on behalf of Karabakh as much as
this matter is concerned.' In such situation, the party which has
relevant competences shall be involved in the process, no matter
whether or not it is desires to do so.
By the way, we shouldn't try to estimate the recent statements of the
West and especially, the United States as conspiracy directed against
the Armenian parties. They should be viewed in the context of the
American and Western pragmatism. They want the issue to be settled. And
there are two options for settlement: mutual concession and conflict
settlement at the expense of one of the parties. Why not take advantage
of the situation if one of the parties is weak? Recently there seemed
to be an impression that Azerbaijan was strong; strong in terms of its
oil resources, in terms of its armament, bellicose posture and active
work in different international tribunals. Armenia's passive behavior
naturally created a temptation to check to what extent the Armenian
party was ready to resist the diplomatic pressures.
If, in the outcome of the developments, we don't grow weaker but, on
the contrary, overcome the situation as a strong party and show that we
are stronger than they even think us to be, we will immediately change
the attitude of both the international organizations and the states
which take a real interest in the solution of the problem but think
that Armenia is weakened as a result of the post-electoral developments.
`Recently, the experts have been more frequently speaking about the
possibility of resuming the military operations. They even express
viewpoints that the war is inevitable. Do you think there is such
prospect threatening us?'
`There is no such threat in the near future. But there is an important
factor that should be born in mind. During the elections, the
ex-President received 350 thousand votes which is quite a high
percentage. If he had received 35 thousand or even 3.5 thousand votes,
that would again be too much. Although those votes were mainly cast in
favor of the candidate who harshly criticized the authorities, the
interested circles interpret it otherwise; they say society in Armenia
is split and ready for concessions with regard to the Karabakh issue.
This is a factor Azerbaijan will try to make use of and why not, be
tempted into solving the problem through military operations.'
LILIT POGHOSYAN
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on April 12, 2008
Armenia
Interview with SHAVARSH KOCHARYAN, Head of the National Democratic Party
`After the March 1 events, Azerbaijan took an unprecedentedly tough
stance on the Karabakh issue. Did such exacerbations coincide with the
revolutionary maneuvers of `Levon's witnesses' by accident or, were
they different elements of the same chain?'
`Obviously, it wasn't accidental. Azerbaijan's taking a tougher stance
and addressing a challenge to the Minsk Group was not accidental
either. All that happened on the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line was
an operation called `reconnaissance in force'. The United States'
pressures and the Co-Chairs' statements (where the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan was actually touched upon for the first time)
were not accidental either. It was quite clear that all those things
were interrelated.
The fact that Turkey and Azerbaijan have set up a joint group
consisting of senior military officials with the purpose of `conducting
studies' and `elaborating a program' aimed at eliminating the PKK bases
in the territory of Artsakh should also be viewed as a component of the
same chain. The White House, as we know, has included PKK in the list
of terrorist organizations. That's to say, certain preparatory work is
being done for creating prerequisites of direct military intervention,
and if the situation in our country does not move towards
stabilization, those symptoms will be more salient and painful for
Armenia.'
`In that regard, how do you estimate the statement introduced by the
Parliament in connection with the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
Do you think it may curb Azerbaijan's desires and impart a more
`initiatory character' to the Armenian diplomacy?'
`It's obvious that we have very serious omissions in the negotiation
process. The first omission is that our foreign policy has never been
the first to launch attack. We, more frequently, responded to
Azerbaijan's steps. This has given rise to a situation which is quite
beneficial to Azerbaijan. That is, it's a territorial dispute between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and a part of Azerbaijan's territory is under
the Armenian control; therefore Armenia is an aggressor. Whereas, the
self-determination of Karabakh has prefect legal bases, but the
Armenian side keeps silent in that regard.
Otherwise, it would be definitely perceived that Karabakh rather than
Kosovo should become a precedent.
Now, they are trying to create an anti-precedent by speculating the
name of Karabakh. Why? Because in that case it is always possible to
say that if the independence of Karabakh is not recognized, the others
have absolutely no right to speak about it.
There is another important factor which, at first sight, bears no
relationship with the negotiation process but shows what initiatory
policy could mean. In particular, I mean the barbaric destruction of
the cross-stones of Jugha. Surprising though it is, the issue never
became a subject of public discussions in any high international
tribunal.
Whereas, Azerbaijan made the fictitious issue of fires in the `occupied
territories' subject to discussion in the UN Tribunal. Of course, the
fires were not fictitious; they existed everywhere, both in the
territory of Armenia and in Spain, Portugal etc. But profiting by the
occasion, Azerbaijan forced its way towards achieving the recognition
of the term `occupied territories'.
What comes out? We cannot be consistent in preserving our historical
and cultural values, while Azerbaijan voices concern over alleged fires
from the highest tribunals.
Why do I say this? Because it's really time for Armenia to clarify its
attitude and review its passive policy. From this point of view, I
consider the current parliamentary discussions useful. As to the
adoption of the statement, I consider it necessary but not useful. The
next step shall involve signing an interstate agreement between Armenia
and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.'
`Many parliamentarians believe that it's time to insist on Karabakh's
full participation in the negotiation process.'
`Insisting is not enough; it's necessary to bring specific facts. What
do I mean? If there is an agreement which says that the RA authorities
are entitled to present the interests of Karabakh (which also refers to
the negotiation process), the Armenian representatives may always say,
`Sorry, I am not authorized to act on behalf of Karabakh as much as
this matter is concerned.' In such situation, the party which has
relevant competences shall be involved in the process, no matter
whether or not it is desires to do so.
By the way, we shouldn't try to estimate the recent statements of the
West and especially, the United States as conspiracy directed against
the Armenian parties. They should be viewed in the context of the
American and Western pragmatism. They want the issue to be settled. And
there are two options for settlement: mutual concession and conflict
settlement at the expense of one of the parties. Why not take advantage
of the situation if one of the parties is weak? Recently there seemed
to be an impression that Azerbaijan was strong; strong in terms of its
oil resources, in terms of its armament, bellicose posture and active
work in different international tribunals. Armenia's passive behavior
naturally created a temptation to check to what extent the Armenian
party was ready to resist the diplomatic pressures.
If, in the outcome of the developments, we don't grow weaker but, on
the contrary, overcome the situation as a strong party and show that we
are stronger than they even think us to be, we will immediately change
the attitude of both the international organizations and the states
which take a real interest in the solution of the problem but think
that Armenia is weakened as a result of the post-electoral developments.
`Recently, the experts have been more frequently speaking about the
possibility of resuming the military operations. They even express
viewpoints that the war is inevitable. Do you think there is such
prospect threatening us?'
`There is no such threat in the near future. But there is an important
factor that should be born in mind. During the elections, the
ex-President received 350 thousand votes which is quite a high
percentage. If he had received 35 thousand or even 3.5 thousand votes,
that would again be too much. Although those votes were mainly cast in
favor of the candidate who harshly criticized the authorities, the
interested circles interpret it otherwise; they say society in Armenia
is split and ready for concessions with regard to the Karabakh issue.
This is a factor Azerbaijan will try to make use of and why not, be
tempted into solving the problem through military operations.'