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  • Thawing Out

    THAWING OUT
    By Sergei Markedonov

    Russia Profile, Russia
    http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Inte rnational&articleid=a1209552191
    April 30 2008

    How Will the New President Handle Frozen Conflicts?

    One of the most important and pointed questions facing Dmitry Medvedev
    in terms of Russia's foreign policy is the country's relations with
    de-facto states in the post-Soviet space. There are few other foreign
    policy problems that are as closely tied to security inside Russia,
    while the ethno-political situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
    directly influence the situation in Russia's North Caucasus.

    The confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
    resulted in a significant movement of Armenian immigrants to Russia's
    Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. The number of Armenians in Kuban
    increased by 42.5 percent from 1989 to 2001. As a result, the "Armenian
    issue" became one of the most important social and political factors
    in the Krasnodar region, and anti-Armenian rhetoric became a method
    of political legitimization for the region's elite. Another example
    of interrelated ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus is the problem of
    Ossetia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict became the first interethnic
    conflict in post-Soviet Georgia, and developed into a large-scale armed
    confrontation from January 1991 to July 1992. This struggle exerted
    significant influence on the course of the first interethnic conflict
    on Russian territory--the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. The military
    phase of this conflict occurred in October and November of 1992.

    As a result of the escalation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, around
    43,000 refugees from South Ossetia and the inner regions of Georgia
    arrived in North Ossetia in the early 1990s. The refugees facilitated
    a radicalization of ethno-nationalist sentiments in North Ossetian
    society; they became mass supporters of North Ossetian radicals, who
    demanded the preservation of their republic's territorial integrity
    in the dispute with Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district.

    In much the same way, Georgia's problems with Abkhazia contributed
    to the consolidation of Adyg ethno-nationalist movements in
    Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Adygea, as well as
    to the activation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the
    Caucasus, which played a significant role in the Georgian-Abkhazian
    conflict of 1992-1993. These ethno-nationalist groups remain important
    participants, although often undeclared and unrecognized, in the
    Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

    The meltdown

    It is important to remember that Medvedev will be acting in much more
    complicated circumstances than his predecessor. The fragmentation of
    ethnic groups within the CIS only began during Vladimir Putin's time
    in office; moreover, there is now an active thawing of conflicts that
    were considered frozen during the Putin years.

    Before 2008, the attempts to change the status quo in the conflict
    zones were not part of a systematic strategy, but this changed when
    the international community began recognizing the independence
    of Kosovo. And even though the official position of Washington
    and Brussels is that Kosovo's self-determination is "unique,"
    in the capitals of the de-facto states, Kosovo is seen as a legal
    precedent. For Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, Kosovo is not a legal
    precedent, but a political one, seen as an important step toward the
    eventual loss of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the
    self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.

    This year has already seen other important developments. The largest
    armed confrontations in Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of military
    action in May 1994 occurred in March. Additionally, on March 21,
    the Russian State Duma approved an appeal to the federal government
    and the president to examine the possibility of legal recognition
    of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And a day before that, the outgoing
    Armenian president Robert Kocharyan declared that it might be possible
    to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan withdraws from the OSCE
    Minsk group.

    The world is watching

    Putin's successor must carefully examine the background of the de-facto
    states. In the first years of the 21st century, the political role of
    these states has grown noticeably. Before, they were seen as nothing
    more than a consequence of ethno-political conflicts in the post-Soviet
    space. As British researcher Laurence Browers pointed out, "Instead
    of seeing these formations as an independent political environment,
    de-facto states are only seen in the context of their relationship
    with external players and world processes." This attitude explains
    the terms "breakaway republics" and "separatist states," adopted by
    Western political scientists to refer to these areas. These terms gave
    rise to the supposition that "breakaway" republics could potentially
    "return," and such a return would be considered a "resolution of
    the ethno-political conflict" and the restoration of the territorial
    integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova was equated with the
    resolution of these conflicts. As a result of such an approach, the
    domestic political processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr
    and Nagorno-Karabakh were viewed as temporary phenomena that would
    be eliminated as soon as the existing status quo was broken and their
    status determined.

    In the 1990s, Russian politicians and diplomats shared this
    approach. As long as levers of influence on the political authorities
    of Georgia and Moldova were preserved, Moscow was not eager to
    intensify the dialogue with Tiraspol, Sukhumi, and Tskhinvali. In
    Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia initially consented to international
    conflict regulation under the auspices of the OSCE. In the case of
    Transdnestr, Moscow, along with Kiev, became a guarantor of the peace
    process. Moscow's main achievement in the 1990s was not allowing the
    conflicts to thaw. Moscow's position regarding the de-facto states
    that share a common border with Russia -- South Ossetia and Abkhazia
    -- was much more active. In 1998, Moscow prevented an escalation of
    the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in the Gal region of eastern Abkhazia.

    The year 2003 became a kind of Rubicon for Russian political
    attitudes toward the frozen conflict zones. The failure of Dmitry
    Kozak's plan to create a united federated Moldovan state that would
    include Transdnestr, and the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia, definitively
    eliminated Moldova and Georgia from Moscow's orbit. From this point on,
    the Kremlin began to consider the de-facto formations as independent
    entities that have their own significance.

    The increase of the geopolitical role of these regions occurred
    in large part due to formally external causes--the ethno-political
    self-determination in the Balkans. As a result, in 2006 the independent
    Republic of Montenegro appeared on the world map for the first
    time since 1918. In 2008, 33 states recognized the independence of
    Kosovo. And even though Montenegro, unlike Kosovo, never existed as an
    unrecognized state, the possibility of a violation of the principle of
    territorial integrity and ethno-political self-determination aroused
    a heightened interest in the country by the leaders of de-facto states.

    The response of the leaders of these de-facto states to the events
    in the Balkans forced Russia's political leaders to take a more
    drastic position on the unrecognized post-Soviet republics. Russian
    representatives, beginning with Vladimir Putin, announced a "universal"
    approach to the Kosovo problem, saying that if Kosovo can be granted
    full independence, it should not be denied to Abkhazia or South
    Ossetia. "I do not want to say that Russia will also immediately
    recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia as independent and sovereign
    states," Putin said, "but such precedents exist in international
    politics. In order to be fair, in the interest of all the people
    living in certain territories, we need commonly recognized universal
    principles for the resolution of such problems." Yet Putin's
    "universal" approach is hardly universal. He does not extend the
    Kosovo precedent to Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting its precedent-setting
    to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr. This attitude can be
    explained by the fact that Moscow has had a much more constructive
    relationship with Azerbaijan than with Moldova and Georgia, and is
    trying once again to not aggravate its relations with Baku.

    Putin's approach also found support among experts in the United States
    and Europe, who stopped viewing the situation as a case of Russia
    meddling in the domestic affairs of Georgia and Moldova. For the first
    time since the 1990s, Western political scientists began mentioning the
    de-facto states as not simply the consequences of unresolved "frozen"
    conflicts, but as formations that have their own internal dynamics and
    are capable of transformations. In the words of British expert Thomas
    de Vaal, "Many external observers mistakenly consider Abkhazia as
    simply a Russian puppet state. Of course, Russia uses its undetermined
    status for its own purposes, but Sergey Bagapsh, the acting president,
    was elected despite Moscow's wishes, and many Abkhazians are not
    happy with creeping annexation by Moscow." De Vaal also asks:
    "How long can we go on denying their right to independence? This
    is not a simple matter. But the alternative--keeping the conflicts
    frozen and keeping whole territories as the world's 'orphans'--is
    also unacceptable." Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman have also urged
    American and European politicians to be realistic, and doubt that
    the West will risk confrontation with Russia solely for the sake of
    Georgia preserving its jurisdiction over South Ossetia.

    Cooperation goes a long way

    The countries that host the frozen conflict zones have also changed
    their behavior. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili started demonstratively
    violating the Dagomys Treaty that set the rules and format for
    conflict regulation in 1992. "If the Dagomys Treaty does not permit
    raising a Georgian flag on the territory of the Tskhinvali district
    [the official name of South Ossetia in Georgia], I am ready to leave
    this treaty." Then, in spring 2006, Moldova and Ukraine decided to
    use economic instruments to change their customs policies to break
    the Transdnestr "separatists." With this action, Kiev changed its
    role from a guarantor of the peace process into an ally of one of
    the conflict sides. Late that summer, Georgia seized the Kodor Gorge
    in a military operation, violating the Moscow Treaty of 1994, which
    regulated the peacemaking operation in Abkhazia, and attempted to
    change the status quo in the conflict.

    Russia's policy with regard to the de-facto states has been based,
    first of all, on maintaining the status quo not as an end in
    itself, but as a mechanism of counteraction to the "thawing" of the
    conflicts. But this status quo is changing. Additionally, no official
    representative of Moscow has ever expressed prejudice against the
    territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia or Azerbaijan. However,
    Moscow's political patronage allows the de-facto states to work
    toward final self-determination and in 2006, there was a parade of
    referendums in these states. These referendums were more legitimate
    than those held in the conditions of open conflict in the early 1990s
    and demonstrated that Transdnestr, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all
    have their own working legislative systems.

    These referendums are another step toward final self-determination,
    but the success of this project depends in many respects on Russia's
    actions. Russia must convince the international community that
    it wants to continue to play a stabilizing role in Transdnestr,
    Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, only Russia can shepherd
    the development of democratization and modernization in these
    regions, which will benefit them in the long run, whether or not
    they become independent states. And finally, political recognition
    of these regions is much more important for Russia than legal
    recognition. After all, the United States works with Taiwan and
    finances social projects in Nagorno-Karabakh without any declarations
    recognizing these states. Israel has an active working relationship
    with Somaliland without announcing official support for the former
    British protectorate. Naturally, the UK itself "works" with the
    subjects of the former empire and the fact of legal recognition is not
    crucial here either. The most important thing is political cooperation
    and cooperation in the field of security, and the expectation of a
    favorable political situation. Russia should not force an acceleration
    of the process of official recognition for the de-facto states. Right
    now it is much more important to bring them out of the shadows,
    to provide them with political support and to appeal to political
    realism. After all, Russia is the only country that can explain that
    the disintegration of the Soviet Union will only be complete after
    the post-Soviet reality is taken into account.

    Sergey Markedonov, is the Head of the Interethnic Relations Department
    at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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