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Today.Az, Azerbaijan
May 24 2008
Alexei Vlasov: "I am more likely a careful pessimist than an optimist
in the issue of the Karabakh resolution"
24 May 2008 [13:49] - Today.Az
Day.Az interview with Alexei Vlasov, Russian political scientist,
director general of the information-analytical center for research of
sociopolitical processes in the post-Soviet area.
- Do you share the opinion of the Russian leadership that the
unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence will complicate the
solution of conflicts on the post-Soviet area, as it will become a
precedent for other unrecognized countries? I mean primarily Nagorno
Karabakh.
- I do not think that the resolution of this conflict will depend on
the adopted resolution on Kosovo as historically this conflict had a
bit different structure. And furthermore, the Kosovo precedent may
affect more Europe than the so-called "frozen conflicts" in the
post-Soviet area.
It is clear even without Kosovo that Abkhazia remains problem for
Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh is a factor, isolating Azerbaijan and
Armenia and nothing will change much in this sense.
Therefore, the Kosovo precedent is more likely a break of all existing
norms and traditions of the international law, which formed in period
following the World War Second, we will feel the geopolitical
consequences for long. But I would not say that this may cardinally
influence the resolution or deterioration of the situation around
Nagorno Karabakh.
- Russia's mediatory role in the resolution of regional conflicts,
which mainly occur in the territory of Georgia is negatively assessed
in the Caucasus. The Russian leadership has once issued Russian
passports to Abkhazs and now openly uses it as a cause for
interference with possible new Georgian-Abkhaz war to defend "its
compatriots" or hints on possible annexion of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Don't you think that such policy not peace-keeping but
deteriorates the conflict even more?
- I think no annexation is possible in this case. I think a
complicated game is conducted around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, being
connected with the counteraction between Georgia and Russia.
Several factors have appeared here if speaking about Abkhazia. These
are Abkhazs' objective striving for creation of an independent country
and West's influence on Georgia, which is gradually becoming the
outpost of the US influence in the South Caucasus, unlike Azerbaijan,
which in this sense having close contacts with the West, conducts a
multi-directional and balanced policy, I think.
And the third factor is a hidden conflict between Russia and the West
in a struggle for the post-Soviet area, including on the issue of the
South Caucasus and the problem of unrecognized states.
If these factors are brought together, we will see that in fact there
is no direct counteraction between Russia and Georgia, there is a
complex geopolitical game, involving not two or three subjects, but
several sides. Therefore, it is difficult to find the common ground in
the Abkhaz, South Ossetia and Transdniestria conflicts.
But you have singled out Nagorno Karabakh, as here I do not feel any
counteraction between Russia and the West. This is the problem of
bilateral relations, of Armenia and Azerbaijan. When these countries
find common grounds on Nagorno Karabakh conflicts, the serious
breakthrough would be possible. But at present we see the results of
the mediatory efforts since 1994. They have no results.
- You have used the term "outpost" speaking about the relations of
Georgia with the West. In our region this term was previously applied
by chairman of Russian State Du,a B.Gryzlov to Armenia, whom the
speaker called "the outpost of Russia in the South Caucasus. Don't you
think such statement of a high-ranking representative of the country
which is, undoubtedly, the leading mediator in the Karabakh conflict
settlement, undermine its neutralize?
- (Laughing) You know, being a Russian political scientist, I have
already got used to that primarily it is necessary to treat seriously
the announcements of senior political leadership: Previously it was
President and not there are two of them-President and Prime Minister.
This is because for example when Luzhkov states his position on
Sevastopol, it is clear that this is his position of a politician and
a patriot (by the way, I mostly agree with all he says). But this is
not Russia's position and this does not reflect position of the senior
officials.
- A new president, who is considered to succeed to the previous one,
was inaugurated in Armenia. The same occurred in Russia. In October of
this year the elections will be held in Azerbaijan as well. Do you
hear any changes in the talks on Karabakh following the completion of
this year of elections?
- First of all, according to all my forecasts, the outcome of
elections is quite predictable in Azerbaijan.
Indeed, despite the replacement of the President in Armenia, the
policy, conducted by Kocharyan's team insite the Armenian elite, will
also remain changeless. It is possible to say about succession of
powers in Russia, as well. The replacement of the first figure on the
political Olymp will also not change two much in the first 1.5-2
years, which means that there positions, Putin fixed lately, which
will successively affect the external political course of
Medvedev. Perhaps, only the rhetorics will change a bit.
Now what we have? As for the Karabakh resolution I am more a careful
pessimist than an optimist, as, if three components are the same, any
real achievements can not be expected in such case without the due
ground. And this is not because of Russia's egoism. This is because
neither of the countries has an exact plan of resolution, though it
was worked out in the 1990s: this is primarily, liberation of the
seven regions of Azerbaijan. As I understand no achievements should be
expected for the next 1-1.5 years.
/Day.Az/
URL: http://www.today.az/news/politics/45212.html
May 24 2008
Alexei Vlasov: "I am more likely a careful pessimist than an optimist
in the issue of the Karabakh resolution"
24 May 2008 [13:49] - Today.Az
Day.Az interview with Alexei Vlasov, Russian political scientist,
director general of the information-analytical center for research of
sociopolitical processes in the post-Soviet area.
- Do you share the opinion of the Russian leadership that the
unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence will complicate the
solution of conflicts on the post-Soviet area, as it will become a
precedent for other unrecognized countries? I mean primarily Nagorno
Karabakh.
- I do not think that the resolution of this conflict will depend on
the adopted resolution on Kosovo as historically this conflict had a
bit different structure. And furthermore, the Kosovo precedent may
affect more Europe than the so-called "frozen conflicts" in the
post-Soviet area.
It is clear even without Kosovo that Abkhazia remains problem for
Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh is a factor, isolating Azerbaijan and
Armenia and nothing will change much in this sense.
Therefore, the Kosovo precedent is more likely a break of all existing
norms and traditions of the international law, which formed in period
following the World War Second, we will feel the geopolitical
consequences for long. But I would not say that this may cardinally
influence the resolution or deterioration of the situation around
Nagorno Karabakh.
- Russia's mediatory role in the resolution of regional conflicts,
which mainly occur in the territory of Georgia is negatively assessed
in the Caucasus. The Russian leadership has once issued Russian
passports to Abkhazs and now openly uses it as a cause for
interference with possible new Georgian-Abkhaz war to defend "its
compatriots" or hints on possible annexion of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Don't you think that such policy not peace-keeping but
deteriorates the conflict even more?
- I think no annexation is possible in this case. I think a
complicated game is conducted around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, being
connected with the counteraction between Georgia and Russia.
Several factors have appeared here if speaking about Abkhazia. These
are Abkhazs' objective striving for creation of an independent country
and West's influence on Georgia, which is gradually becoming the
outpost of the US influence in the South Caucasus, unlike Azerbaijan,
which in this sense having close contacts with the West, conducts a
multi-directional and balanced policy, I think.
And the third factor is a hidden conflict between Russia and the West
in a struggle for the post-Soviet area, including on the issue of the
South Caucasus and the problem of unrecognized states.
If these factors are brought together, we will see that in fact there
is no direct counteraction between Russia and Georgia, there is a
complex geopolitical game, involving not two or three subjects, but
several sides. Therefore, it is difficult to find the common ground in
the Abkhaz, South Ossetia and Transdniestria conflicts.
But you have singled out Nagorno Karabakh, as here I do not feel any
counteraction between Russia and the West. This is the problem of
bilateral relations, of Armenia and Azerbaijan. When these countries
find common grounds on Nagorno Karabakh conflicts, the serious
breakthrough would be possible. But at present we see the results of
the mediatory efforts since 1994. They have no results.
- You have used the term "outpost" speaking about the relations of
Georgia with the West. In our region this term was previously applied
by chairman of Russian State Du,a B.Gryzlov to Armenia, whom the
speaker called "the outpost of Russia in the South Caucasus. Don't you
think such statement of a high-ranking representative of the country
which is, undoubtedly, the leading mediator in the Karabakh conflict
settlement, undermine its neutralize?
- (Laughing) You know, being a Russian political scientist, I have
already got used to that primarily it is necessary to treat seriously
the announcements of senior political leadership: Previously it was
President and not there are two of them-President and Prime Minister.
This is because for example when Luzhkov states his position on
Sevastopol, it is clear that this is his position of a politician and
a patriot (by the way, I mostly agree with all he says). But this is
not Russia's position and this does not reflect position of the senior
officials.
- A new president, who is considered to succeed to the previous one,
was inaugurated in Armenia. The same occurred in Russia. In October of
this year the elections will be held in Azerbaijan as well. Do you
hear any changes in the talks on Karabakh following the completion of
this year of elections?
- First of all, according to all my forecasts, the outcome of
elections is quite predictable in Azerbaijan.
Indeed, despite the replacement of the President in Armenia, the
policy, conducted by Kocharyan's team insite the Armenian elite, will
also remain changeless. It is possible to say about succession of
powers in Russia, as well. The replacement of the first figure on the
political Olymp will also not change two much in the first 1.5-2
years, which means that there positions, Putin fixed lately, which
will successively affect the external political course of
Medvedev. Perhaps, only the rhetorics will change a bit.
Now what we have? As for the Karabakh resolution I am more a careful
pessimist than an optimist, as, if three components are the same, any
real achievements can not be expected in such case without the due
ground. And this is not because of Russia's egoism. This is because
neither of the countries has an exact plan of resolution, though it
was worked out in the 1990s: this is primarily, liberation of the
seven regions of Azerbaijan. As I understand no achievements should be
expected for the next 1-1.5 years.
/Day.Az/
URL: http://www.today.az/news/politics/45212.html