Tweet
REDEFINING TURKEY'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION
Turkish Daily News
June 24 2008
As Turkey continues on its path toward redefining its strategic
orientation, Turkish national security will undergo shifts. But the
extent of external challenges are particularly daunting and pose
what are some of the most pressing threats to Turkish stability
and security. These threats are further exacerbated by the near
simultaneous set of internal changes now underway within Turkey
RICHARD GRIRAGOSIANIf the many abrupt shifts in security and
geopolitics stemming from both the global "war on terror" and the war
in Iraq, the Republic of Turkey represents one of the most dynamic
models of profound change and strategic reorientation. As a model of
change, Turkey continues to face its deepest and potentially most
disruptive degree of change, with a profound reexamination of the
very tenets of its national identity, driven by a combination of
internal reforms and external challenges. But more recently, there
has been an equally significant strategic reorientation involving
Turkey's role within the region and its future position in a broader
international context.
In terms of a powerful strategic reorientation, Turkey has already
moved well beyond an initial period of redefining its post-Cold War
role, long defined by Turkey's position as a frontline NATO member
and as a key U.S. military partner. Instead, Turkey has graduated
to a more sophisticated recognition of its strategic significance,
reflecting an imperative of looking to the EU to replace the loss of
its traditional Cold War role as a "frontline" Western ally, but also
incorporating a more recent emphasis on a greater self-sufficient
and assertive role as a regional power.
One of the most recent elements of Turkey's strategic reorientation
is also the most dramatic -a move away from a role within a larger
multilateral Western alliance toward a more unilateral assertion
as an aspiring regional power. This reorientation encompasses both
a renewed Eastern shift toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia
and a greater level of engagement within newer global and regional
security structures and arenas.
This rather profound move has been largely driven by Turkey's
frustration with its often delayed and overly complicated path toward
the European Union. Despite the obvious economic and trade benefits
of EU membership, the appeal of joining has lost much of its initial
lure. Tension between Brussels and Ankara over the pace of economic
and political reforms as prerequisites for ascension talks was not
the only factor contributing to Turkish frustration, however. After
a round of elections within the EU, the political transition in
three key European powers, Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
Turkey's candidacy was increasingly treated as either more of an
American priority or an unnecessary burden.
Expressed as an over-ambitious component of EU enlargement, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy has downplayed much of the progress Turkey
has achieved to date and has proposed to downgrade the Turkish bid for
membership to an offer of "privileged partnership" instead. Backed
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, this recent French counter
to Turkish hopes for finally garnering what Ankara sees as a just
reward for unprecedented patience, has only been strengthened by a
marked decline in British support, as Prime Minister Gordon Brown
has shown much less of a commitment to Turkish EU membership than
his predecessor Tony Blair.
The Turkish reaction, notable but natural, was viewing such an offer
of privileged partnership as an insult, even sparking Mehmet Å~^imsek,
Turkey's Minister of State responsible for economics, foreign trade
and the treasury, to warn that Turkey would accept nothing short of
full EU membership, adding that "we cannot accept dilution of the
(EU's) commitment to Turkey."
The result from such a negative shift among the three leading
EU member states has been somewhat destabilizing for Turkey, and
seriously devastating for the most determined proponents of a Turkey
within the EU. The implications from denying Turkey an avenue to the
European Union are not limited to damaging Turkey, however, but also
diminish Europe itself. As Parag Khanna affirmed, "Europe increasingly
needs Turkey," which he defines as representing a "geopolitical asset
(that) Europe cannot do without."
The recognition of Turkey as a strategic asset is not limited to
Europe, but also includes a broader role as a component of Western
security in general and as a contributor more than a consumer of
security within the context of the global war on terrorism more
specifically. Turkey and the global war on terrorism
As a contributor to security, Turkey holds an essential position within
the post-Sept. 11 security architecture and the subsequent U.S.-led
global "war on terrorism." Specifically, Turkish membership within the
EU inherently offers a greater significance and relevance for both
Brussels and Washington due to the strategic necessity of having an
Islamic, but secular Turkey as a full member of the "Christian European
Union." This view has also largely conformed to the strategic view
of many within the Turkish nationalist camp and among the Turkish
military who held that the question was now no longer one of Turkey
needing Europe, but rather, of Europe (and the West) needing Turkey.
For the Europeans, the Turkish bid for EU membership has generally
been viewed as an important defensive move-to both contain and
deter discontent and to help understand and integrate Muslims within
Europe. For the Americans, this idea of a Turkey within the EU was
also a convenient facade to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, providing
a counterweight against the mounting interpretation of the war on
terror as a war on Islam. Of course, the utility of such a position
was abruptly refuted by the realities of both the mounting insurgency
in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Yet even if Turkey's negotiations with the EU improve, the damage
has already been done. The perception of European reluctance and
resistance to a strong Turkey is even more important than the reality,
and has bolstered a new, more self-confident and assertive Turkish
reaction. Such a stance is most significant because it is now based
on shifts in Turkish national security to meet a set of more pressing
and worrisome trends. More specifically, these trends are defined
by three broader regional challenges: instability in war-torn Iraq,
and the related emergence of a Kurdish proto-state; the escalation of
tension between the West and an emboldened Iran; and the reassertion
of Russian power and influence, most notably in both the Black Sea and
the neighboring South Caucasus. A fourth, larger challenge to Turkey
comes from beyond the region and stems from a serious deterioration
in Turkish-U.S. military relations. The Kurdish challenge
One of the more ironic aspects of Turkey's Kurdish issue is the
Armenia factor. This was first evident in early 2007, when the
assassination of prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink
in Istanbul sparked a renewed focus on Turkey's troubled relations
with its small neighbor Armenia. But the most significant aspect of
Turkish-Armenian relations is its role in offering a potent economic
tool in suppressing Kurdish, and even Islamist, extremism.
Within a broader context, the Armenian issue has traditionally been
seen as a threatening element in the deeper debate over Turkish
identity, and the Turkish military has tended to be the most vocal
and strident opponent whenever the Armenian issue was raised. And
although Turkey remains critically sensitive to Armenian attempts
to pursue international recognition of the 1915 mass killings of
Armenians within the Ottoman Empire as genocide, there has been a
recent trend toward recognizing both the necessity and the benefits
of normalizing relations with Armenia.5 And it is this new view of
the Armenian issue as an integral component of stability and security
that is most profound.
The more recent record of Turkish-Armenian relations has also been
blighted by both a refusal to extend normal diplomatic relations
with Armenia and a trade embargo and transport blockade, imposed on
Armenia in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Yet by their very nature, these very same tactics are
now seen as tied to a discredited approach and a failed policy
by a disparate set of Turkish elite. The first component of this
elite originates from Turkey's leading business circles, led in
part by Kaan Soyak, the co-chair of the Turkish-Armenian Business
Development Council (TABDC), as well as the Turkish Industrialists
and Businessmen's Association (TUSÄ°AD), which sees the reopening
of the border with Armenia as offering new opportunities for Turkey
well beyond the small Armenian market but as facilitating access and
lowering transit costs for broader trade with Central Asia, Azerbaijan,
and Iran.6
A second key element of this elite consists of a group of
Western-trained young officers brought into senior posts within the
Turkish Military's General Staff. These Army colonels authored a
preliminary, semi-official internal study in late 2006 that presented
several new strategic initiatives, including a reconsideration of
Turkey's long-standing hesitance toward addressing the stalemate with
Armenia. This spurred a closed, internal debate among some senior
Turkish military figures, most of whom were centered around Army
General Edip BaÅ~_er and General Staff Chief General Buyukanıt,
over the feasibility of a strategic opening toward Armenia.7
For Turkey, however, the potential advantage of opening its border with
Armenia is rooted not simply in the benefits of trade and new markets,
but centers on the economic aspects of Turkish national security. But
the real test will be determined not by Turkish commercial interests,
but within the Turkish military, between those who see a necessity in
ending the Turkish blockade and embargo of Armenia and those that fear
it. The opponents to any breakthrough with Armenia are elements from
within the shadows of the Turkish intelligence community, security
services and the armed forces, known by some Turkish liberals as the
"deep state" that acts independently of elected governments.
The concept of the Turkish "deep state" is not new, but only surfaces
at times of crises in governance. The most ominous warning came in
an April 2005 speech by former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel,
who not only cited the existing of a "deep state" within Turkey,
but defined it as "the state itself," including the military, which
"always fears the collapse of the state." He further described the
"deep state" as only becoming active when the state is "brought
to the verge of collapse" and noted that "they are not a separate
state, but when they intervene in the administration of the state,
they become the deep state."
But as the military now sees the border issue as a tool not a threat,
the more conservative elements of such a "deep state" may actually not
act, and may even support such a move as a means toward addressing
a dangerous trend. More specifically, the Turkish military sees a
worrisome trend emanating from Iraq, as the emergence of a Kurdish
proto-state is viewed as a critical threat to Turkish security
and stability. Fears of regional instability from Iraq are only
exacerbated by internal concerns, as the restive Kurdish-populated
areas of Eastern Turkey are already showing signs of a reemergence
of a strident Kurdish nationalism.
In terms of Turkish security and longer-term stability, the
impoverished and remote Kurdish regions of Eastern Turkey pose a
formidable challenge for the Turkish military. The most productive
strategy in dealing with this threat is one of stabilization, through
economic development. And as these Kurdish regions would be the first
to benefit from border trade with neighboring Armenia, the reopening
of the Turkish-Armenian border offers the only real key to stability
and security.
Such an economic view of Turkish national security is also essential
to ensuring a more comprehensive approach to containing and combating
support for extremism. This is especially critical in light of
the January 2007 operation by the Turkish police that effectively
dismantled an Islamist network (with alleged al-Qaeda links) in
five separate Turkish provinces. Thus, the border opening issue
represents not only an economic implement to forestall the rise of
Kurdish separatism, but also offers an economic instrument to tackle
the roots of Islamist extremism. Conclusion
As Turkey continues on its path toward redefining its strategic
orientation, Turkish national security will undergo similar shifts. But
the extent of external challenges are particularly daunting and pose
what are some of the most pressing threats to Turkish stability
and security. These threats are further exacerbated by the near
simultaneous set of internal changes now underway within Turkey. Based
on this new threat environment, Turkey is now forging a sophisticated
strategy of greater engagement coupled with a bolder assertion of
power in the region. And while it remains to be seen exactly how
this strategic reorientation will conclude, with the instability in
neighboring Iraq, the rising threat from the emergence of a Kurdish
proto-state and the strengthening position of a nuclear-ambitious Iran,
it seems clear that Turkey faces its most profound test.
At the same time, Turkey's strategic significance is only enhanced
by the very same set of threats and, for the West, Turkey offers an
essential avenue toward containing threats from both Iraq and Iran,
checking a reassertion of Russian power and influence, and securing
the vital Black-Caspian Seas region. More specifically, Turkey is now
engaged in a more robust reassertion of its strategic importance,
as a global actor with an emboldened agenda of activity within a
number of international organizations, ranging from its traditional
partners like NATO and the UN, to the more unconventional, such as
GUAM and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
And most crucially, partly as a result of both frustration with the
European Union (EU) and a decline in its relationship with the United
States, this new strategic reorientation may very well determine the
future trajectory of the Turkish Republic. But the culmination of new
threats and dynamic change suggest that Turkey also faces a unique
opportunity to emerge as a key partner, and no longer as a proxy, for
both Europe and the United States.* Richard Griragosian is an analyst
specializing in international relations, with a focus on economics,
security and political developments in the former Soviet Union, the
Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. He is a regular contributor
to Radio Free Europe/Radio. This article is an abbreviated version
of Griragosian's article that was printed in the Turkish Policy
Quarterly's Summer 2007 issue (www.turkishpolicy.com).
--Boundary_(ID_ABGr455Go g4Y1HKh3oO3sA)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Turkish Daily News
June 24 2008
As Turkey continues on its path toward redefining its strategic
orientation, Turkish national security will undergo shifts. But the
extent of external challenges are particularly daunting and pose
what are some of the most pressing threats to Turkish stability
and security. These threats are further exacerbated by the near
simultaneous set of internal changes now underway within Turkey
RICHARD GRIRAGOSIANIf the many abrupt shifts in security and
geopolitics stemming from both the global "war on terror" and the war
in Iraq, the Republic of Turkey represents one of the most dynamic
models of profound change and strategic reorientation. As a model of
change, Turkey continues to face its deepest and potentially most
disruptive degree of change, with a profound reexamination of the
very tenets of its national identity, driven by a combination of
internal reforms and external challenges. But more recently, there
has been an equally significant strategic reorientation involving
Turkey's role within the region and its future position in a broader
international context.
In terms of a powerful strategic reorientation, Turkey has already
moved well beyond an initial period of redefining its post-Cold War
role, long defined by Turkey's position as a frontline NATO member
and as a key U.S. military partner. Instead, Turkey has graduated
to a more sophisticated recognition of its strategic significance,
reflecting an imperative of looking to the EU to replace the loss of
its traditional Cold War role as a "frontline" Western ally, but also
incorporating a more recent emphasis on a greater self-sufficient
and assertive role as a regional power.
One of the most recent elements of Turkey's strategic reorientation
is also the most dramatic -a move away from a role within a larger
multilateral Western alliance toward a more unilateral assertion
as an aspiring regional power. This reorientation encompasses both
a renewed Eastern shift toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia
and a greater level of engagement within newer global and regional
security structures and arenas.
This rather profound move has been largely driven by Turkey's
frustration with its often delayed and overly complicated path toward
the European Union. Despite the obvious economic and trade benefits
of EU membership, the appeal of joining has lost much of its initial
lure. Tension between Brussels and Ankara over the pace of economic
and political reforms as prerequisites for ascension talks was not
the only factor contributing to Turkish frustration, however. After
a round of elections within the EU, the political transition in
three key European powers, Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
Turkey's candidacy was increasingly treated as either more of an
American priority or an unnecessary burden.
Expressed as an over-ambitious component of EU enlargement, French
President Nicolas Sarkozy has downplayed much of the progress Turkey
has achieved to date and has proposed to downgrade the Turkish bid for
membership to an offer of "privileged partnership" instead. Backed
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, this recent French counter
to Turkish hopes for finally garnering what Ankara sees as a just
reward for unprecedented patience, has only been strengthened by a
marked decline in British support, as Prime Minister Gordon Brown
has shown much less of a commitment to Turkish EU membership than
his predecessor Tony Blair.
The Turkish reaction, notable but natural, was viewing such an offer
of privileged partnership as an insult, even sparking Mehmet Å~^imsek,
Turkey's Minister of State responsible for economics, foreign trade
and the treasury, to warn that Turkey would accept nothing short of
full EU membership, adding that "we cannot accept dilution of the
(EU's) commitment to Turkey."
The result from such a negative shift among the three leading
EU member states has been somewhat destabilizing for Turkey, and
seriously devastating for the most determined proponents of a Turkey
within the EU. The implications from denying Turkey an avenue to the
European Union are not limited to damaging Turkey, however, but also
diminish Europe itself. As Parag Khanna affirmed, "Europe increasingly
needs Turkey," which he defines as representing a "geopolitical asset
(that) Europe cannot do without."
The recognition of Turkey as a strategic asset is not limited to
Europe, but also includes a broader role as a component of Western
security in general and as a contributor more than a consumer of
security within the context of the global war on terrorism more
specifically. Turkey and the global war on terrorism
As a contributor to security, Turkey holds an essential position within
the post-Sept. 11 security architecture and the subsequent U.S.-led
global "war on terrorism." Specifically, Turkish membership within the
EU inherently offers a greater significance and relevance for both
Brussels and Washington due to the strategic necessity of having an
Islamic, but secular Turkey as a full member of the "Christian European
Union." This view has also largely conformed to the strategic view
of many within the Turkish nationalist camp and among the Turkish
military who held that the question was now no longer one of Turkey
needing Europe, but rather, of Europe (and the West) needing Turkey.
For the Europeans, the Turkish bid for EU membership has generally
been viewed as an important defensive move-to both contain and
deter discontent and to help understand and integrate Muslims within
Europe. For the Americans, this idea of a Turkey within the EU was
also a convenient facade to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, providing
a counterweight against the mounting interpretation of the war on
terror as a war on Islam. Of course, the utility of such a position
was abruptly refuted by the realities of both the mounting insurgency
in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Yet even if Turkey's negotiations with the EU improve, the damage
has already been done. The perception of European reluctance and
resistance to a strong Turkey is even more important than the reality,
and has bolstered a new, more self-confident and assertive Turkish
reaction. Such a stance is most significant because it is now based
on shifts in Turkish national security to meet a set of more pressing
and worrisome trends. More specifically, these trends are defined
by three broader regional challenges: instability in war-torn Iraq,
and the related emergence of a Kurdish proto-state; the escalation of
tension between the West and an emboldened Iran; and the reassertion
of Russian power and influence, most notably in both the Black Sea and
the neighboring South Caucasus. A fourth, larger challenge to Turkey
comes from beyond the region and stems from a serious deterioration
in Turkish-U.S. military relations. The Kurdish challenge
One of the more ironic aspects of Turkey's Kurdish issue is the
Armenia factor. This was first evident in early 2007, when the
assassination of prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink
in Istanbul sparked a renewed focus on Turkey's troubled relations
with its small neighbor Armenia. But the most significant aspect of
Turkish-Armenian relations is its role in offering a potent economic
tool in suppressing Kurdish, and even Islamist, extremism.
Within a broader context, the Armenian issue has traditionally been
seen as a threatening element in the deeper debate over Turkish
identity, and the Turkish military has tended to be the most vocal
and strident opponent whenever the Armenian issue was raised. And
although Turkey remains critically sensitive to Armenian attempts
to pursue international recognition of the 1915 mass killings of
Armenians within the Ottoman Empire as genocide, there has been a
recent trend toward recognizing both the necessity and the benefits
of normalizing relations with Armenia.5 And it is this new view of
the Armenian issue as an integral component of stability and security
that is most profound.
The more recent record of Turkish-Armenian relations has also been
blighted by both a refusal to extend normal diplomatic relations
with Armenia and a trade embargo and transport blockade, imposed on
Armenia in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Yet by their very nature, these very same tactics are
now seen as tied to a discredited approach and a failed policy
by a disparate set of Turkish elite. The first component of this
elite originates from Turkey's leading business circles, led in
part by Kaan Soyak, the co-chair of the Turkish-Armenian Business
Development Council (TABDC), as well as the Turkish Industrialists
and Businessmen's Association (TUSÄ°AD), which sees the reopening
of the border with Armenia as offering new opportunities for Turkey
well beyond the small Armenian market but as facilitating access and
lowering transit costs for broader trade with Central Asia, Azerbaijan,
and Iran.6
A second key element of this elite consists of a group of
Western-trained young officers brought into senior posts within the
Turkish Military's General Staff. These Army colonels authored a
preliminary, semi-official internal study in late 2006 that presented
several new strategic initiatives, including a reconsideration of
Turkey's long-standing hesitance toward addressing the stalemate with
Armenia. This spurred a closed, internal debate among some senior
Turkish military figures, most of whom were centered around Army
General Edip BaÅ~_er and General Staff Chief General Buyukanıt,
over the feasibility of a strategic opening toward Armenia.7
For Turkey, however, the potential advantage of opening its border with
Armenia is rooted not simply in the benefits of trade and new markets,
but centers on the economic aspects of Turkish national security. But
the real test will be determined not by Turkish commercial interests,
but within the Turkish military, between those who see a necessity in
ending the Turkish blockade and embargo of Armenia and those that fear
it. The opponents to any breakthrough with Armenia are elements from
within the shadows of the Turkish intelligence community, security
services and the armed forces, known by some Turkish liberals as the
"deep state" that acts independently of elected governments.
The concept of the Turkish "deep state" is not new, but only surfaces
at times of crises in governance. The most ominous warning came in
an April 2005 speech by former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel,
who not only cited the existing of a "deep state" within Turkey,
but defined it as "the state itself," including the military, which
"always fears the collapse of the state." He further described the
"deep state" as only becoming active when the state is "brought
to the verge of collapse" and noted that "they are not a separate
state, but when they intervene in the administration of the state,
they become the deep state."
But as the military now sees the border issue as a tool not a threat,
the more conservative elements of such a "deep state" may actually not
act, and may even support such a move as a means toward addressing
a dangerous trend. More specifically, the Turkish military sees a
worrisome trend emanating from Iraq, as the emergence of a Kurdish
proto-state is viewed as a critical threat to Turkish security
and stability. Fears of regional instability from Iraq are only
exacerbated by internal concerns, as the restive Kurdish-populated
areas of Eastern Turkey are already showing signs of a reemergence
of a strident Kurdish nationalism.
In terms of Turkish security and longer-term stability, the
impoverished and remote Kurdish regions of Eastern Turkey pose a
formidable challenge for the Turkish military. The most productive
strategy in dealing with this threat is one of stabilization, through
economic development. And as these Kurdish regions would be the first
to benefit from border trade with neighboring Armenia, the reopening
of the Turkish-Armenian border offers the only real key to stability
and security.
Such an economic view of Turkish national security is also essential
to ensuring a more comprehensive approach to containing and combating
support for extremism. This is especially critical in light of
the January 2007 operation by the Turkish police that effectively
dismantled an Islamist network (with alleged al-Qaeda links) in
five separate Turkish provinces. Thus, the border opening issue
represents not only an economic implement to forestall the rise of
Kurdish separatism, but also offers an economic instrument to tackle
the roots of Islamist extremism. Conclusion
As Turkey continues on its path toward redefining its strategic
orientation, Turkish national security will undergo similar shifts. But
the extent of external challenges are particularly daunting and pose
what are some of the most pressing threats to Turkish stability
and security. These threats are further exacerbated by the near
simultaneous set of internal changes now underway within Turkey. Based
on this new threat environment, Turkey is now forging a sophisticated
strategy of greater engagement coupled with a bolder assertion of
power in the region. And while it remains to be seen exactly how
this strategic reorientation will conclude, with the instability in
neighboring Iraq, the rising threat from the emergence of a Kurdish
proto-state and the strengthening position of a nuclear-ambitious Iran,
it seems clear that Turkey faces its most profound test.
At the same time, Turkey's strategic significance is only enhanced
by the very same set of threats and, for the West, Turkey offers an
essential avenue toward containing threats from both Iraq and Iran,
checking a reassertion of Russian power and influence, and securing
the vital Black-Caspian Seas region. More specifically, Turkey is now
engaged in a more robust reassertion of its strategic importance,
as a global actor with an emboldened agenda of activity within a
number of international organizations, ranging from its traditional
partners like NATO and the UN, to the more unconventional, such as
GUAM and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
And most crucially, partly as a result of both frustration with the
European Union (EU) and a decline in its relationship with the United
States, this new strategic reorientation may very well determine the
future trajectory of the Turkish Republic. But the culmination of new
threats and dynamic change suggest that Turkey also faces a unique
opportunity to emerge as a key partner, and no longer as a proxy, for
both Europe and the United States.* Richard Griragosian is an analyst
specializing in international relations, with a focus on economics,
security and political developments in the former Soviet Union, the
Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. He is a regular contributor
to Radio Free Europe/Radio. This article is an abbreviated version
of Griragosian's article that was printed in the Turkish Policy
Quarterly's Summer 2007 issue (www.turkishpolicy.com).
--Boundary_(ID_ABGr455Go g4Y1HKh3oO3sA)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress