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ANKARA: A Common Quest For Democracy Or Something More? (1)

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  • ANKARA: A Common Quest For Democracy Or Something More? (1)

    A COMMON QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY OR SOMETHING MORE? (1)
    MEHMET KALYONCU*

    Today's Zaman
    June 1, 2008
    Turkey

    Given the variety of opinions on the subject, it is obvious that
    the question of what kind of relationship exists between the Gulen
    movement and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) intrigues
    not only foreign observers of Turkey but also some Turks.

    While foreign observers categorically associate the Gulen movement
    and the AK Party with one another, most Turks see the two as natural
    allies in promoting democracy and liberties in the country and some
    marginal commentators speculate that the two pose a threat to the
    secular regime of the state.

    An article in the Economist magazine ("A Religious Revival," Jan. 31,
    2008) wrote: "Turkey's richest Islamic fraternity is helping the AK
    [Party] to win more Kurdish votes. [The Gulen-admirers] distributed
    meat to some 60,000 families during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice
    in December." Another one ("A farm boy on the world stage," March 6,
    2008) explained, "The [Gulen-admirers] have lots in common with the
    ruling Justice and Development Party, and they cooperate, but their
    interests are not identical." One report in the Guardian daily
    ("Islamic scholar voted world's No. 1 thinker," June 23, 2008)
    refers to an alliance between the AK Party and the Gulen movement:
    "The AKP, which is allied to Gulen, is contesting a case brought by
    Turkey's chief prosecutor to shut it down and ban it from politics
    for allegedly ... [breaching] the country's secular constitution."

    Many Turkish intellectuals and academics point rather at the
    common values that bring the Gulen movement and the AK Party
    together. Muhammed Cetin argues that Fethullah Gulen has always favored
    democratic institutions and free elections while opposing the use
    of Islam as a political ideology and a party philosophy. Ahmet Kuru
    suggests that Gulen gradually brought about change in the Turkish
    attitude toward the European Union, which was previously perceived
    as a "Christian club" and a threat to Turkish national and Muslim
    identity. According to Nevval Sevindi, Gulen struggles to promote a
    democratic, pluralistic and free society. Along similar lines, Å~^ahin
    Alpay contends that Gulen's efforts to build bridges of dialogue within
    the society have put the religion in its rightful place and prevented
    the society from polarizing into believers and nonbelievers. Therefore,
    these and many other intellectuals have perceived the Gulen movement's
    interaction with political parties, most notably with the AK Party,
    as an attempt to consolidate democracy in Turkey.

    Deeper than it seems?

    However, the controversy over the relationship between the ruling AK
    Party and the diffused social network, which happens to be called --
    for brevity -- the Gulen movement, goes beyond the issue of merely
    exchanging opinions on policy matters and promoting democracy and
    liberties. Though so far has no solid evidence surfaced regarding the
    existence of a possibly deeper relationship between the AK Party and
    the Gulen movement, certain marginal groups and media commentators
    have frequently alleged that bureaucratic positions, especially within
    the judiciary and police force, are filled with "Gulen followers" and
    that the AK Party government has been complicit, if not instrumental,
    in this happening. In addition, it has been alleged that those "Gulen
    followers" in the judiciary and the police are behind the two most
    critical organized-crime operation in republican history. One is
    the Å~^emdinli case, following which a court case extended in 2005
    against Chief of General Staff Gen. YaÅ~_ar Buyukanıt, then the
    land forces commander, for his alleged role in a plot that seemed
    to aim at instigating the ethnic-Kurds in Å~^emdinli, a southeastern
    province in Turkey.

    The other is the Ergenekon operation, which is technically ongoing,
    and yet pretty much stalled due to the closure case against the AK
    Party. It is a police operation against the so-called "deep state,"
    an organized criminal network of corrupt judges, military and
    police officials, senior bureaucrats, diplomats, politicians and the
    mafia, which is believed to have perpetrated a number of political
    assassinations and frequently obstructed the democratization process
    in the country. As a matter of fact, the Å~^emdinli case was thought
    to be the first attempt to crack down on the "deep state." Yet it was
    suddenly aborted and the prosecutor, Ferhat Sarıkaya, was banned
    from practicing law by the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges
    (HSYK) due to his allegedly having insulted the Turkish military by
    opening the case. No need to mention that the same marginal groups and
    commentators labeled liberal prosecutor Sarıkaya a "Gulen follower"
    in the due process leading to the revoking of his law credentials.

    The Å~^emdinli case is not the only one that saw its investigation
    and prosecution processes stalled. The investigations into the
    assassinations of Catholic priest Andrea Santoro, Turkish-Armenian
    journalist Hrant Dink and Council of State Judge M. Yucel Ozbilgin have
    also been subject to stalling attempts through the bringing of issues
    related to Gulen into the picture and diverting attention from the real
    suspects. From the status quo protectionists' perspective, the name
    "Fethullah Gulen" is certainly quite a lucrative one to exploit. Gulen
    has such a wide public recognition in the country that whenever his
    name is involved in any discussion, at least for a while, the topic
    shifts from the main point. As the record hitherto indicates, Gulen
    prefers not to get involved in such day-to-day debates and scandals
    and, hence, not to respond to his accusers with attacks. This makes
    it even more tempting for the status quo protectionists to exploit
    his name on every likely and unlikely occasion.

    Based on this unfair treatment of Gulen and the Gulen movement by
    the status quo protectionists, one may be tempted to conclude that
    these very same status quo protectionists are making up allegations
    one after another about an instrumental or symbiotic relationship
    between the Gulen movement and the AK Party. However, such a quick
    conclusion may also hinder one's ability to explore the true nature
    of the relationship between the Gulen movement and the AK Party.

    Similarities, differences, obligations: possible interpretations of
    the relationship

    There are similarities and differences between the Gulen movement and
    the AK Party's positions on various social, economic and political
    matters, and hence multiple ways of interpreting the relationship
    between the Gulen movement and the AK Party. Also, there are contextual
    obligations that bring the two together. On the one hand, the Gulen
    movement and the AK Party seem like they share a similar vision for
    Turkey. First of all, having bitter experiences with the status quo
    protectionists' strict interpretation and practice of secularism,
    both the Gulen movement and the AK Party have interest in promoting
    participatory democracy and civil liberties at all levels, and hence
    in creating a vibrant civil society. According to Jill Carroll
    of the University of Houston, Gulen envisions a society in which
    freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed, which is tolerant in
    matters of religious belief and practice and which allows vigorous
    inquiry and debate on all issues. The initial steps in search of
    such a society were taken in the mid-1990s by the Gulen-inspired
    Journalists and Writers' Foundation's Abant Platform, in which Turkish
    intellectuals from all camps (leftist, rightist, liberal, conservative
    and atheist) gathered together and contested their opinions. Among
    those intellectuals were politicians who later on took part in the
    formation of the AK Party. One may speculate that the "conservative
    democracy" discourse of the AK Party was inspired by those series of
    intellectual gatherings. It is hard to know for sure whether or to
    what extent the founders of the AK Party were inspired by the ideas
    presented at the platform. They may well have benefited from the Abant
    Platform or from the other idea platforms in the media initiated by
    Gulen-admirers, as these platforms have been quite active in fostering
    debate in the public sphere and in creating knowledge. However, one
    thing is certain: Today the status-quo protectionists accuse some of
    the government ministers and senior members of being "Gulen-followers"
    just because they participated in the Abant Platform and the like.

    Second, both the Gulen movement and the AK Party commonly share Mustafa
    Kemal Ataturk's vision of bringing Turkey up to the level of the modern
    civilizations, namely creating a new Turkey that is politically and
    economically capable of competing in the global arena. In his public
    speeches and writings, Gulen often notes that he had very much resented
    the fact that Turkey's opinion is not regarded in any international
    platform. Accordingly, both the Gulen movement and the AK Party seem
    to agree that creating a strong Turkey regarded by other international
    actors is possible only through full integration with the West via EU
    membership and a strong alliance with the United States. At the same
    time, they both recognize Turkey's potential in Central Asia, the
    Caucasus and the Middle East. Unlike the status quo protectionists'
    one-dimensional foreign policy, which was based on an unconditional
    attachment to the West only, the AK Party's multi-dimensional foreign
    policy is guided by the belief that Turkey can and should develop
    strong relations not only with the West but also with the East, the
    North and the South. Guided with the same belief, but long before
    the AK Party, the Gulen movement seems to have been working toward
    that goal. One can hardly deny the contribution of the Gulen-inspired
    Turkish schools in making Turkey a point of attraction in more than
    100 countries across the globe and of the movement's some 9,000-member
    Turkish Confederation of Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSKON)
    in boosting Turkey's export rates in recent years. Founded in 2006,
    TUSKON has already brought Turkish industrialists together with their
    counterparts in Eurasia, the Pacific and Africa in several business
    summits where the parties signed billion-dollar business contracts.

    --Boundary_(ID_rtgklyWkpA+GWeTrHELPoA) --
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