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CONSEQUENCES OF FORESEEABLE CONFLICT
Shekulli
Aug 15 2008
Albania
A brief, unforeseen, and brutal war ended negatively for Georgia,
with thousands of dead, the de facto - and also perhaps de jure -
loss of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the prospective weakening
of the grip on power of its charismatic president Saakashvili. The
Western media were quick to blame the latter for his emotional moves
and his failing to make a realistic assessment of the situation as he
decided to respond to the provocations of the [Ossetian] separatists by
means of an offensive which was beaten off by the Russian intervention.
The same for the passive stand taken by the European Union, whose major
leaders, like German Chancellor Merkel, had never looked with a kind
eye on the venturesome moves of a young president who soon disappointed
his Western allies with his uncontained - if not altogether childish -
behaviour towards Russia.
Still, going from general considerations to the conclusions that may
be drawn from the sudden and dramatic development of a situation which
was precipitated within a few days, we may perhaps begin by saying
that these breakaway regions have often been likened to Kosova. This
is especially true in the Kremlin's official statements, which were all
too ready to draw destabilizing parallels between a precedent allegedly
created in international law by the way the Kosova issue was solved.
Without waiting for the proclamation of the independence of Kosova,
Moscow warned that it would entail changes in the situation in the
Caucasus.
On the other hand, in other similar situations which, apart from
Ossetia and Abkhazia, are worth mentioning - like the region of
Nagorni-Karabakh, which has for years been contested between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, or the breakaway region of Transdniester in Moldova -
the Russians are more interested in the preservation of the status
quo, that is, the frozen conflicts which are intended to maintain
Russia's influence in the region and its control of its strategic
ways of communication.
Russian policy aims at achieving the same goal over Kosova too,
by trying to impede its international recognition and any manner of
cooperation between the two state entities there - the Albanians and
the Serbs. This strengthens Russia's international position and gives
it a chance to exercise its geostrategic influence on this part of
Europe, which in return increases Serbia's dependence on Russia and
adds to its hostility to the Western world. "Frozen" conflicts increase
the negotiating power of the Russians who also wield other cards in
their hands, such as their wealth of natural resources, their control
of the means of communication with Russia's neighbouring countries,
the continuous increase of the value of the petrodollar, and the
increase of internal cohesion and the absence of an opposition -
all factors that enable Russia to play a unique political role in
bilateral and multilateral relations.
However, returning to the recent conflict in Ossetia, it is worth
stressing some of the benefits and costs for each side to see how
they may have an influence on the future diplomatic configuration of
these countries.
To begin with Georgia, it appears that it suffered a net loss in the
recent conflict, paying dearly for its desire for real independence
from the Kremlin. The loss of Southern Ossetia, which was an autonomous
region to a certain extent, brought about the establishment of a
"bastard" government and a tax and monetary management totally
independent of Tbilisi, and made both Ossetia's course as a breakaway
region and Abkhazia's ethnic cleansing (of the Georgian population)
much easier. Besides, with the calming down of the situation, the first
head to roll is expected to be that of Saakashvili's, who failed both
in his calculations and in ensuring effective international support
for his country; that is, he lost his diplomatic gamble. An isolated
Georgia, in which all roads lead to Moscow, cannot allow itself the
luxury of keeping for long a president whom Moscow considers its
"black sheep."
Another great loser may be George W. Bush who had made Georgia's and
Ukraine's NATO membership a personal point, which was rejected by his
sceptical French and German partners. The Georgian army suffered a
disastrous defeat, although it was 18,000-strong and was considered
the best US-trained army in the former Soviet republics. It must also
be borne in mind that Saakashvili enjoys the reputation of the most
pro-US and the most independent leader from Moscow among the other
leaders of the former Soviet republics. The failure of US diplomacy
in preventing and, later on, sanctioning Russia's aggressive policy
is no minor setback for a president in the last year of his term,
a president who is also known for his tough foreign policy.
Another consequence of the Georgian-Russian conflict is that the
revolutions Washington has been trying to export to the former Soviet
republics will no longer make headway, although at a point it was
supposed that there would be a general drift towards democracy in
these countries. About a year ago, Uzbekistan, which was known as
the United States' staunchest ally in Central Asia relinquished its
partnership with the United States and turned towards Moscow. But
this country's leader Karimov was not alone. Kazakhstan President
Nazarbayev also rejected an oil pipeline project that was supposed to
go around Russia and, instead, signed some important agreements on oil
and gas pipelines that will link his country not only with Russia but
also with China. His example was followed by Turkmenistan's president,
who sold to the Russians the right of exploitation of the natural gas
of a country that is considered the world's richest in this field,
thereby dashing the hopes of the Americans who were expecting that
he would change his course. For its part, Belarus is under the total
domination of its Russian neighbour, even going to such lengths as
expelling US diplomats, as it did only a little time ago. Ukraine,
Washington's last hope, is divided between the eastern part that
identifies itself with Russia and the western part that supports the
pro-Western Yushchenko-Timoshenko bloc, which is also reflected in
its parliament.
Russia's victory, however, is a relative one. Although it consolidated
its international position and put an end to speculation about the
real dominant power in Eurasia, blocked NATO's expansion towards the
east, and changed the world geopolitical and geostrategic balance to
its advantage, it cannot be said that it won everything. Russia's
affirmation and especially the reconfirmation of its influence
on the Caucasus and beyond, arouses the fear of an uncontrolled
Russian economic and military hegemony. But there is another - and
more important - problem for Russia. It cannot play simultaneously
and equally on several fronts - in the Caucasus, Iran, and Kosova
[Kosovo] - or in opposing US defensive missile systems in Azerbaijan
and, perhaps, at a later time, in Serbia too. The Americans' turning a
blind eye to what is happening in the Caucasus - where they could not
lend limitless support to an anathematized and improvident president -
along with an eventual easing of tension with Iran and the, at least on
the face of it, rehabilitation of North Korea, leaves all paths open
to what they [the Americans] insist is a major goal of the foreign
policy of [President] Bush's Administration and, in a way, the "pearl"
of his presidency: stepping up the international recognition of the
new state of Kosova and making Russia give up its intransigence on
this issue. This can by no means be considered a presidential whim
of Bush's. It serves US strategic interests in this important part
of Europe, in which the United States has not too many friends, as
well as the crowning of the diplomatic work that has long overcome
partisan differences over this issue.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Shekulli
Aug 15 2008
Albania
A brief, unforeseen, and brutal war ended negatively for Georgia,
with thousands of dead, the de facto - and also perhaps de jure -
loss of southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the prospective weakening
of the grip on power of its charismatic president Saakashvili. The
Western media were quick to blame the latter for his emotional moves
and his failing to make a realistic assessment of the situation as he
decided to respond to the provocations of the [Ossetian] separatists by
means of an offensive which was beaten off by the Russian intervention.
The same for the passive stand taken by the European Union, whose major
leaders, like German Chancellor Merkel, had never looked with a kind
eye on the venturesome moves of a young president who soon disappointed
his Western allies with his uncontained - if not altogether childish -
behaviour towards Russia.
Still, going from general considerations to the conclusions that may
be drawn from the sudden and dramatic development of a situation which
was precipitated within a few days, we may perhaps begin by saying
that these breakaway regions have often been likened to Kosova. This
is especially true in the Kremlin's official statements, which were all
too ready to draw destabilizing parallels between a precedent allegedly
created in international law by the way the Kosova issue was solved.
Without waiting for the proclamation of the independence of Kosova,
Moscow warned that it would entail changes in the situation in the
Caucasus.
On the other hand, in other similar situations which, apart from
Ossetia and Abkhazia, are worth mentioning - like the region of
Nagorni-Karabakh, which has for years been contested between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, or the breakaway region of Transdniester in Moldova -
the Russians are more interested in the preservation of the status
quo, that is, the frozen conflicts which are intended to maintain
Russia's influence in the region and its control of its strategic
ways of communication.
Russian policy aims at achieving the same goal over Kosova too,
by trying to impede its international recognition and any manner of
cooperation between the two state entities there - the Albanians and
the Serbs. This strengthens Russia's international position and gives
it a chance to exercise its geostrategic influence on this part of
Europe, which in return increases Serbia's dependence on Russia and
adds to its hostility to the Western world. "Frozen" conflicts increase
the negotiating power of the Russians who also wield other cards in
their hands, such as their wealth of natural resources, their control
of the means of communication with Russia's neighbouring countries,
the continuous increase of the value of the petrodollar, and the
increase of internal cohesion and the absence of an opposition -
all factors that enable Russia to play a unique political role in
bilateral and multilateral relations.
However, returning to the recent conflict in Ossetia, it is worth
stressing some of the benefits and costs for each side to see how
they may have an influence on the future diplomatic configuration of
these countries.
To begin with Georgia, it appears that it suffered a net loss in the
recent conflict, paying dearly for its desire for real independence
from the Kremlin. The loss of Southern Ossetia, which was an autonomous
region to a certain extent, brought about the establishment of a
"bastard" government and a tax and monetary management totally
independent of Tbilisi, and made both Ossetia's course as a breakaway
region and Abkhazia's ethnic cleansing (of the Georgian population)
much easier. Besides, with the calming down of the situation, the first
head to roll is expected to be that of Saakashvili's, who failed both
in his calculations and in ensuring effective international support
for his country; that is, he lost his diplomatic gamble. An isolated
Georgia, in which all roads lead to Moscow, cannot allow itself the
luxury of keeping for long a president whom Moscow considers its
"black sheep."
Another great loser may be George W. Bush who had made Georgia's and
Ukraine's NATO membership a personal point, which was rejected by his
sceptical French and German partners. The Georgian army suffered a
disastrous defeat, although it was 18,000-strong and was considered
the best US-trained army in the former Soviet republics. It must also
be borne in mind that Saakashvili enjoys the reputation of the most
pro-US and the most independent leader from Moscow among the other
leaders of the former Soviet republics. The failure of US diplomacy
in preventing and, later on, sanctioning Russia's aggressive policy
is no minor setback for a president in the last year of his term,
a president who is also known for his tough foreign policy.
Another consequence of the Georgian-Russian conflict is that the
revolutions Washington has been trying to export to the former Soviet
republics will no longer make headway, although at a point it was
supposed that there would be a general drift towards democracy in
these countries. About a year ago, Uzbekistan, which was known as
the United States' staunchest ally in Central Asia relinquished its
partnership with the United States and turned towards Moscow. But
this country's leader Karimov was not alone. Kazakhstan President
Nazarbayev also rejected an oil pipeline project that was supposed to
go around Russia and, instead, signed some important agreements on oil
and gas pipelines that will link his country not only with Russia but
also with China. His example was followed by Turkmenistan's president,
who sold to the Russians the right of exploitation of the natural gas
of a country that is considered the world's richest in this field,
thereby dashing the hopes of the Americans who were expecting that
he would change his course. For its part, Belarus is under the total
domination of its Russian neighbour, even going to such lengths as
expelling US diplomats, as it did only a little time ago. Ukraine,
Washington's last hope, is divided between the eastern part that
identifies itself with Russia and the western part that supports the
pro-Western Yushchenko-Timoshenko bloc, which is also reflected in
its parliament.
Russia's victory, however, is a relative one. Although it consolidated
its international position and put an end to speculation about the
real dominant power in Eurasia, blocked NATO's expansion towards the
east, and changed the world geopolitical and geostrategic balance to
its advantage, it cannot be said that it won everything. Russia's
affirmation and especially the reconfirmation of its influence
on the Caucasus and beyond, arouses the fear of an uncontrolled
Russian economic and military hegemony. But there is another - and
more important - problem for Russia. It cannot play simultaneously
and equally on several fronts - in the Caucasus, Iran, and Kosova
[Kosovo] - or in opposing US defensive missile systems in Azerbaijan
and, perhaps, at a later time, in Serbia too. The Americans' turning a
blind eye to what is happening in the Caucasus - where they could not
lend limitless support to an anathematized and improvident president -
along with an eventual easing of tension with Iran and the, at least on
the face of it, rehabilitation of North Korea, leaves all paths open
to what they [the Americans] insist is a major goal of the foreign
policy of [President] Bush's Administration and, in a way, the "pearl"
of his presidency: stepping up the international recognition of the
new state of Kosova and making Russia give up its intransigence on
this issue. This can by no means be considered a presidential whim
of Bush's. It serves US strategic interests in this important part
of Europe, in which the United States has not too many friends, as
well as the crowning of the diplomatic work that has long overcome
partisan differences over this issue.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress