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THE CAUCASUS CRISIS AND TURKEY'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
by Bulent KeneÅ~_
www.worldbulletin.net
Aug 31 2008
Turkey
The world has focused on the course of the crisis that erupted in
the Caucasus. How this crisis will develop closely interests the US,
NATO, the EU and all major countries as well as other global players.
Obviously, Turkey is one of the parties most interested in the
crisis, and for this reason, Turkey is trying to devise its foreign
policy with this in mind. Given how things have developed since the
crisis was first fueled in Georgia, one can easily assert that the
period before us is much more critical than the last month. We can
similarly suggest that the tension has the potential of escalating
at any moment. This may create new dangers and threats to Turkey.
Actually, Turkish diplomatic circles have for some time had the uneasy
feeling that such a crisis was in the making in Caucasus. Both the
NATO Bucharest summit and a speech then-Russian President Vladimir
Putin delivered at the 2007 International Security Conference in
Munich were warning signals that a crisis was brewing. However,
despite these unmistakable signs, the traditional clumsiness of the
Western alliance to make up its mind rendered the crisis inevitable.
Actually, the process of how the inevitability of this crisis has
become obvious can, in a sense, be traced back to the 9/11 attacks. As
you will remember, in the post-9/11 era, each country had adopted a
unique position and saw these attacks as an opportunity for destroying
its own "terrorists." Thus, Russia perceived Chechnya as such and
implemented its policies based on this perception. You will also
remember that under the circumstances of the time, the West did not
make much noise over Russian policy.
On the other hand, in the same period, the US was so obsessed
with dealing with its own "terrorists" - Afghanistan and Iraq --
that it failed to implement reasonable policies that would have
prevented Russia's comeback to its near abroad after reclaiming
power, made convenient by rising energy prices. Even the colorful
revolutions that changed regimes in Russia's near abroad were not
well planned. Thus, in this process, all post-Cold War era crises
that had been held in abeyance started to emerge. Feeling that it
was being cornered by unilateral security and containment moves made
hastily and aggressively by the US, Russia started to play its cards
with a self-confidence boosted by its accumulation of power. The
miscalculated move ventured by Georgian President Mikhail Sakaashvili,
who underestimated Russia with the enthusiasm of Western encouragement
and who wanted to guarantee Georgia's NATO membership, turned a local
problem into an international crisis in the blink of an eye.
Turkey has long supported Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership
provided they solve their border disputes and domestic ethnic
problems, and with the emerging crisis Turkey had to straddle both
sides. Indeed, Turkey has no chance of foregoing its relations with
Russia for the sake of the US, and vice versa. Turkey has to move very
carefully and pursue a very delicately balanced policy between its
strategic partner the US and NATO on the one hand and its biggest
trade partner and neighbor Russia on the other. Actually, it is
doing this successfully. Without acting against Russia or the US,
Turkey is striving to develop a different and sui generis policy. The
most salient element of this policy is the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Initiative. The initiative aims to eliminate the extreme
lack of confidence among countries in the region and disperse the
pessimistic atmosphere caused by the war and replace it with an
optimistic one.
We can suggest that by pushing the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Initiative to the fore, Turkish foreign policy views the Caucasus
crisis as part of a strategic whole, assessing the crisis from four
levels and developing policies based on this perception. In the early
days of the crisis, Turkish diplomacy attempted to contain the issue
as one between Georgia and South Ossetia, but it was too late. What
Turkey is today trying to do is to keep the crisis, which entered its
second phase with the military intervention by an overconfident Russia,
from growing beyond a Georgian-Russian crisis. Turkish diplomacy is
exerting its best efforts to prevent this crisis from developing
into a US-Russian conflict, or, worse yet, a Russia-NATO conflict
that would radically affect Turkey as a NATO member.
With the Caucasus initiative, Turkey is trying to keep this crisis from
taking on new and more dangerous aspects and, at the same time, from
it migrating to the Black Sea and triggering a new Nagorno-Karabakh
problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Under this unwavering policy,
Turkey is fulfilling all of its responsibilities stemming from the
Montreux Convention on the one hand, and it is opposing efforts to
make the Black Sea a NATO-controlled body of water, taking Russian
concerns into account in this respect.
With the Caucasus initiative, Turkey is attempting to contain the
emergent crisis within the borders of the region and to build
confidence among regional countries. Turkey is acting with the
awareness that all countries should win under this project. Turkey
estimates that with this initiative, Russia will be happy to contain
the crisis to the region where it is the dominant power; Georgia will
reassert its territorial integrity; Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh
problem can be discussed again in diplomatic terms; and Armenia
can save itself from isolation by developing its relations with
Turkey. Certainly, this is no easy project, but it is not utopian,
either.
I will discuss this topic further in my next article...
--Boundary_(ID_mxh4HPHrvKS52Qbdf7rpUQ) --
by Bulent KeneÅ~_
www.worldbulletin.net
Aug 31 2008
Turkey
The world has focused on the course of the crisis that erupted in
the Caucasus. How this crisis will develop closely interests the US,
NATO, the EU and all major countries as well as other global players.
Obviously, Turkey is one of the parties most interested in the
crisis, and for this reason, Turkey is trying to devise its foreign
policy with this in mind. Given how things have developed since the
crisis was first fueled in Georgia, one can easily assert that the
period before us is much more critical than the last month. We can
similarly suggest that the tension has the potential of escalating
at any moment. This may create new dangers and threats to Turkey.
Actually, Turkish diplomatic circles have for some time had the uneasy
feeling that such a crisis was in the making in Caucasus. Both the
NATO Bucharest summit and a speech then-Russian President Vladimir
Putin delivered at the 2007 International Security Conference in
Munich were warning signals that a crisis was brewing. However,
despite these unmistakable signs, the traditional clumsiness of the
Western alliance to make up its mind rendered the crisis inevitable.
Actually, the process of how the inevitability of this crisis has
become obvious can, in a sense, be traced back to the 9/11 attacks. As
you will remember, in the post-9/11 era, each country had adopted a
unique position and saw these attacks as an opportunity for destroying
its own "terrorists." Thus, Russia perceived Chechnya as such and
implemented its policies based on this perception. You will also
remember that under the circumstances of the time, the West did not
make much noise over Russian policy.
On the other hand, in the same period, the US was so obsessed
with dealing with its own "terrorists" - Afghanistan and Iraq --
that it failed to implement reasonable policies that would have
prevented Russia's comeback to its near abroad after reclaiming
power, made convenient by rising energy prices. Even the colorful
revolutions that changed regimes in Russia's near abroad were not
well planned. Thus, in this process, all post-Cold War era crises
that had been held in abeyance started to emerge. Feeling that it
was being cornered by unilateral security and containment moves made
hastily and aggressively by the US, Russia started to play its cards
with a self-confidence boosted by its accumulation of power. The
miscalculated move ventured by Georgian President Mikhail Sakaashvili,
who underestimated Russia with the enthusiasm of Western encouragement
and who wanted to guarantee Georgia's NATO membership, turned a local
problem into an international crisis in the blink of an eye.
Turkey has long supported Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership
provided they solve their border disputes and domestic ethnic
problems, and with the emerging crisis Turkey had to straddle both
sides. Indeed, Turkey has no chance of foregoing its relations with
Russia for the sake of the US, and vice versa. Turkey has to move very
carefully and pursue a very delicately balanced policy between its
strategic partner the US and NATO on the one hand and its biggest
trade partner and neighbor Russia on the other. Actually, it is
doing this successfully. Without acting against Russia or the US,
Turkey is striving to develop a different and sui generis policy. The
most salient element of this policy is the Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Initiative. The initiative aims to eliminate the extreme
lack of confidence among countries in the region and disperse the
pessimistic atmosphere caused by the war and replace it with an
optimistic one.
We can suggest that by pushing the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Initiative to the fore, Turkish foreign policy views the Caucasus
crisis as part of a strategic whole, assessing the crisis from four
levels and developing policies based on this perception. In the early
days of the crisis, Turkish diplomacy attempted to contain the issue
as one between Georgia and South Ossetia, but it was too late. What
Turkey is today trying to do is to keep the crisis, which entered its
second phase with the military intervention by an overconfident Russia,
from growing beyond a Georgian-Russian crisis. Turkish diplomacy is
exerting its best efforts to prevent this crisis from developing
into a US-Russian conflict, or, worse yet, a Russia-NATO conflict
that would radically affect Turkey as a NATO member.
With the Caucasus initiative, Turkey is trying to keep this crisis from
taking on new and more dangerous aspects and, at the same time, from
it migrating to the Black Sea and triggering a new Nagorno-Karabakh
problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Under this unwavering policy,
Turkey is fulfilling all of its responsibilities stemming from the
Montreux Convention on the one hand, and it is opposing efforts to
make the Black Sea a NATO-controlled body of water, taking Russian
concerns into account in this respect.
With the Caucasus initiative, Turkey is attempting to contain the
emergent crisis within the borders of the region and to build
confidence among regional countries. Turkey is acting with the
awareness that all countries should win under this project. Turkey
estimates that with this initiative, Russia will be happy to contain
the crisis to the region where it is the dominant power; Georgia will
reassert its territorial integrity; Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh
problem can be discussed again in diplomatic terms; and Armenia
can save itself from isolation by developing its relations with
Turkey. Certainly, this is no easy project, but it is not utopian,
either.
I will discuss this topic further in my next article...
--Boundary_(ID_mxh4HPHrvKS52Qbdf7rpUQ) --