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HOW MANY EGGS WILL EUROPE PUT IN RUSSIA'S BASKET?
Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, Lasha Tugushi
Turkish Daily News
Sept 11 2008
Turkey
The recent visit of the US vice-president Dick Cheney to Georgia,
followed by the U.S. 6th Fleet flagship with humanitarian cargo
anchoring off the country's port of Poti, has made the Kremlin
nervous. Russian troops, who still remain in town in circumvention of
the Sarkozy-brokered six-point agreement, have further consolidated
their military presence. Yet, Georgians, including ordinary citizens
of Poti and adjacent Russian-occupied areas lining up at shoreline
to greet the US vessel, have read it as a crucial sign of continued
Western support to Georgia's sovereignty.
In a similar peaceful fashion, more than 1.5 million people chained
up live against Russian aggression on the streets of Georgian cities
and villages on September 1st. The message was flagged to international
attention including that of the EU leaders who were sitting in Brussels
deciding on the future of "relations between the EU and Russia [that]
have reached crossroads", as formulated by the Summit decision.
The EU called Moscow to make a "fundamental choice in favor of
mutual interests, understanding and cooperation" - in other words,
to behave like a civilized state. In turn the Kremlin bounces "the
choice" to the West and urges it to accept its newly designed rules,
delivered in the shape of five guiding principles which Moscow would
want to see the world revolve around.
The New Cold War Order?
As Russia's international duello with the West advances, its real aims
and ambitions get stripped off rhetoric. Russia in fact never got over
the Soviet collapse and Cold War time thinking, despite the reminders
that this "is no longer 1968" (Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia).
It was in 2005 when Mr. Putin expressed in clearest terms possible that
demise of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the century." A restored Soviet anthem symbolized wishful thinking
for the "good old times." And Moscow obviously decided that now the
"long-cherished moment of truth" has come, as Mr. Lavrov commented
in relation to the war in Georgia.
With its statements and moves the Kremlin leaves little room for
doubt about the true origins of the August 2008 crisis in Georgia.
Moscow's desperate NATO-phobia is perhaps one of the most vivid
expressions of its Cold War bound logic. It was to a large extent
Georgia's explicit NATO bid and pro-western orientation that made
Georgia "proper" the target for Russian aggression. And along the
same logic, Ukraine, with its Crimea peninsula, might be next.
The first articulate signals in favor of NATO still during
Shevardnadze's times, motivated Russia to intensify backing
to Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's separatist regimes, obstruct
peaceful initiatives, massively and illegally convert their residents
into Russian citizens. Relating recent Georgian experience to the
Kremlin's newly revealed guiding principle to "protect Russian citizens
everywhere," many fear if Russia goes along with this self-tailored
"legitimate basis" for intervention now, other countries with Russian
speakers fall under the alert zone.
A number of "punitive measures" exercised throughout these years,
were aimed to deter the Rose Revolutionary government's pro-Western
aspirations. In April 2008 then-President Putin, perhaps encouraged
by the Bucharest NATO Summit decision to waive Georgia and Ukraine MAP
bids until repeated discussions in December, ordered the establishment
of "formal links" with Georgia's breakaway regions and withdrawal
unilaterally from the 1996 CIS summit restrictions. This was the
start of the recent series of provocations that culminated with the
August events.
Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia's two
conflict-ridden enclaves on 26 September and claimed them "special
cases" in an attempt to "retaliate" against the West for Kosovo. With
that "irresponsible decision," as labeled by President Bush, Moscow
slammed the whole international community, which was warning against
attempts to "draw new lines in Europe."
Russia decided to open a "Pandora's box" that may serve as a continuous
source of instability in the Caucasus and threaten peace from Central
Asia to the Middle East to Europe as Cheney warned on 7 September. The
leaders of many post-Socialist states feel increasingly alarmed.
Russian Costs and Benefits
Russia's aggression against Georgia carries many risks, including
for Russia herself. Moscow is already at odds with the rest of the
world. Clear confrontation with the US is the name of the game, as
Putin directly blames Washington to have master-minded the crisis in
Georgia. Moscow is also trying to crack the western alliance through
Europe's energy consumer rationale. If the plan goes wrong and the West
consolidates its position against Russian challenge, Mr. Putin warns
the "world does not end here." However, he must have felt disappointed
by Moscow's failed attempts to yield the approval of China and the
Central Asian Republics, likewise the decisions of Belarus and Armenia
about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's international image and
credibility is heavily shaken and may ultimately translate into
diplomatic isolation and even a number of sanctions.
Moscow's has already suffered substantial financial loses in terms of
the rapidly backsliding RTS benchmark indexes and out-flux of foreign
investment (estimated at around $21 billion).
And finally, the decision on Abkhazia and South Ossetia may have
boomerang effects and spark Russia's own buoyant 'powder keg' in the
Northern Caucasus and beyond.
So what are the gains Russia is betting on?
Russia hopes to bring the countries in the region under its own sway
as a result of the show of power it has carried out. It is also intent
on not compromising its position vis a vis energy, thus feels the need
to curb the development of alternative energy corridors straddling
the South Caucasus.
However, European's are naturally ever more concerned about their
energy security. They are now hardly motivated to put all eggs into the
Russian basket. To the contrary the EU Summit document of 1 September
demonstrates that recent events have triggered a sense of urgency to
diversify and secure energy sources and supply routes. A firm security
framework is essential not only to ensure safety and stability of
alternative energy conduits and strategic transport hubs but also the
democratic and economic development of the region. The NATO promise,
reaffirmed by the US recently, provides hope. Now much depends on how
the transatlantic partners, particularly those with vested interests
in the region position themselves. In line with Europe and the US,
the position of Turkey, as an important power in the region with which
Georgia enjoys strong neighborly relations is of a crucial importance.
(Ketevan Tsikhelashvili is an analyst for the ESI in Georgia. Lasha
Tughushi is the editor in chief of the daily Resonance published
in Georgia.)
Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, Lasha Tugushi
Turkish Daily News
Sept 11 2008
Turkey
The recent visit of the US vice-president Dick Cheney to Georgia,
followed by the U.S. 6th Fleet flagship with humanitarian cargo
anchoring off the country's port of Poti, has made the Kremlin
nervous. Russian troops, who still remain in town in circumvention of
the Sarkozy-brokered six-point agreement, have further consolidated
their military presence. Yet, Georgians, including ordinary citizens
of Poti and adjacent Russian-occupied areas lining up at shoreline
to greet the US vessel, have read it as a crucial sign of continued
Western support to Georgia's sovereignty.
In a similar peaceful fashion, more than 1.5 million people chained
up live against Russian aggression on the streets of Georgian cities
and villages on September 1st. The message was flagged to international
attention including that of the EU leaders who were sitting in Brussels
deciding on the future of "relations between the EU and Russia [that]
have reached crossroads", as formulated by the Summit decision.
The EU called Moscow to make a "fundamental choice in favor of
mutual interests, understanding and cooperation" - in other words,
to behave like a civilized state. In turn the Kremlin bounces "the
choice" to the West and urges it to accept its newly designed rules,
delivered in the shape of five guiding principles which Moscow would
want to see the world revolve around.
The New Cold War Order?
As Russia's international duello with the West advances, its real aims
and ambitions get stripped off rhetoric. Russia in fact never got over
the Soviet collapse and Cold War time thinking, despite the reminders
that this "is no longer 1968" (Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia).
It was in 2005 when Mr. Putin expressed in clearest terms possible that
demise of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe
of the century." A restored Soviet anthem symbolized wishful thinking
for the "good old times." And Moscow obviously decided that now the
"long-cherished moment of truth" has come, as Mr. Lavrov commented
in relation to the war in Georgia.
With its statements and moves the Kremlin leaves little room for
doubt about the true origins of the August 2008 crisis in Georgia.
Moscow's desperate NATO-phobia is perhaps one of the most vivid
expressions of its Cold War bound logic. It was to a large extent
Georgia's explicit NATO bid and pro-western orientation that made
Georgia "proper" the target for Russian aggression. And along the
same logic, Ukraine, with its Crimea peninsula, might be next.
The first articulate signals in favor of NATO still during
Shevardnadze's times, motivated Russia to intensify backing
to Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's separatist regimes, obstruct
peaceful initiatives, massively and illegally convert their residents
into Russian citizens. Relating recent Georgian experience to the
Kremlin's newly revealed guiding principle to "protect Russian citizens
everywhere," many fear if Russia goes along with this self-tailored
"legitimate basis" for intervention now, other countries with Russian
speakers fall under the alert zone.
A number of "punitive measures" exercised throughout these years,
were aimed to deter the Rose Revolutionary government's pro-Western
aspirations. In April 2008 then-President Putin, perhaps encouraged
by the Bucharest NATO Summit decision to waive Georgia and Ukraine MAP
bids until repeated discussions in December, ordered the establishment
of "formal links" with Georgia's breakaway regions and withdrawal
unilaterally from the 1996 CIS summit restrictions. This was the
start of the recent series of provocations that culminated with the
August events.
Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia's two
conflict-ridden enclaves on 26 September and claimed them "special
cases" in an attempt to "retaliate" against the West for Kosovo. With
that "irresponsible decision," as labeled by President Bush, Moscow
slammed the whole international community, which was warning against
attempts to "draw new lines in Europe."
Russia decided to open a "Pandora's box" that may serve as a continuous
source of instability in the Caucasus and threaten peace from Central
Asia to the Middle East to Europe as Cheney warned on 7 September. The
leaders of many post-Socialist states feel increasingly alarmed.
Russian Costs and Benefits
Russia's aggression against Georgia carries many risks, including
for Russia herself. Moscow is already at odds with the rest of the
world. Clear confrontation with the US is the name of the game, as
Putin directly blames Washington to have master-minded the crisis in
Georgia. Moscow is also trying to crack the western alliance through
Europe's energy consumer rationale. If the plan goes wrong and the West
consolidates its position against Russian challenge, Mr. Putin warns
the "world does not end here." However, he must have felt disappointed
by Moscow's failed attempts to yield the approval of China and the
Central Asian Republics, likewise the decisions of Belarus and Armenia
about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's international image and
credibility is heavily shaken and may ultimately translate into
diplomatic isolation and even a number of sanctions.
Moscow's has already suffered substantial financial loses in terms of
the rapidly backsliding RTS benchmark indexes and out-flux of foreign
investment (estimated at around $21 billion).
And finally, the decision on Abkhazia and South Ossetia may have
boomerang effects and spark Russia's own buoyant 'powder keg' in the
Northern Caucasus and beyond.
So what are the gains Russia is betting on?
Russia hopes to bring the countries in the region under its own sway
as a result of the show of power it has carried out. It is also intent
on not compromising its position vis a vis energy, thus feels the need
to curb the development of alternative energy corridors straddling
the South Caucasus.
However, European's are naturally ever more concerned about their
energy security. They are now hardly motivated to put all eggs into the
Russian basket. To the contrary the EU Summit document of 1 September
demonstrates that recent events have triggered a sense of urgency to
diversify and secure energy sources and supply routes. A firm security
framework is essential not only to ensure safety and stability of
alternative energy conduits and strategic transport hubs but also the
democratic and economic development of the region. The NATO promise,
reaffirmed by the US recently, provides hope. Now much depends on how
the transatlantic partners, particularly those with vested interests
in the region position themselves. In line with Europe and the US,
the position of Turkey, as an important power in the region with which
Georgia enjoys strong neighborly relations is of a crucial importance.
(Ketevan Tsikhelashvili is an analyst for the ESI in Georgia. Lasha
Tughushi is the editor in chief of the daily Resonance published
in Georgia.)