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RUSSIA AND TURKEY TANGO IN THE BLACK SEA
By M K Bhadrakumar
Asia Times Online
September 12, 2008
Amid the flurry of diplomatic activity in Moscow last week over
the Caucasus, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took time off for an
exceptionally important mission to Turkey, which might prove a turning
point in the security and stability of the vast region that the two
powers historically shared.
Indeed, Russian diplomacy is swiftly moving even as the troops have
begun returning from Georgia to their barracks. Moscow is weaving
a complicated new web of regional alliances, drawing deeply into
Russia's collective historical memory as a power in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea.
German poet and playwright Bertolt Brecht would have marveled at
Lavrov's diary, heavily marked with "Caucasian chalk circles" through
last week, with intertwining plots and sub-plots - an Extraordinary
European Council Meeting taking place in Brussels; a meeting of the
foreign ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) in Moscow; three foreign counterparts to be hosted in Moscow -
Karl de Gucht of Belgium, Franco Frattini from Italy and Azerbaijan's
Elmar Mamedyarov; visits by the presidents of the newly independent
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and consultations with the
visiting United Nations secretary general's special representative
for Georgia, Johan Verbeke.
Yet, Moscow signaled the highest importance to consultations with
Turkey. Lavrov summarily dropped all business at home and hurried to
Istanbul on Tuesday on a working visit, essentially aimed at catching
a few hours' urgent confidential conversation with his counterpart,
Ali Babacan. Lavrov's mission underscored Russia's acute sense of
its priorities in the current regional crisis in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea.
Historical rivals becoming allies Almost inevitably, there is
great historical poignancy when Russia and Turkey discuss the Black
Sea. During the year-long siege of the Russian fortress naval base
Sevastopol in 1854-55 by the British and French, Tzarist Russia
realized one or two home truths. One, that Turkey's role could be
critical for the safety of its Black Sea fleet, and, two, without the
Black Sea fleet, Russia's penetration into the Mediterranean would
not be feasible. Most important, Russia learned that the original
ground of a war may be lost, but the protagonists could continue
with hostilities.
When peace finally came with the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Black
Sea clauses came at a tremendous disadvantage to Russia - so much
so that within the year the tzar conspired with Germany's Otto von
Bismarck, denounced the accord and proceeded with re-establishing a
fleet in the Black Sea.
The timing of Lavrov's consultations in Turkey was noteworthy. US Vice
President Dick Cheney happened to be in the region, visiting Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, drumming up anti-Russia animus.
Turkey didn't figure in his itinerary. Moscow shrewdly estimated the
need of political dynamism with regard to Turkey.
Moscow has taken careful note that unlike the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union, Turkey's reaction to
the conflict in the Caucasus has been manifestly subdued. Ankara
briefly expressed its anxiety over the developments, but almost in
pro-forma terms without taking sides. On the one hand, Turkey is a
NATO member country and it aspires to join the EU. It was a close
Cold War ally of the US. Turkey will be the net beneficiary as an
energy hub if any of the West's grandiose plans to bypass Russian
territory and access Caspian energy materialize. It is the entrepot
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
On the other hand, Russia is poised to be Turkey's number one trading
partner, with annual trade already nearing US$40 billion. Invisible
trade is also substantial, with 2.5 million Russian tourists
visiting Turkey annually and Turkish companies extensively involved
in Russia's services sector. And, Russia supplies 70% of Turkey's
needs of natural gas.
Thus, Turkey has ingeniously come up with the idea of a "Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Pact", whose main virtue would be, to quote
Turkish commentator Semih Idiz, to "provide Turkey with the option of
remaining relatively neutral in this dispute, even if this was not
to everyone's satisfaction in Washington". Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Moscow on August 12 to discuss the
proposal with the Kremlin. Idiz adds, "Put another way, Ankara is
not in a position to take sides in this dispute, at a time when a new
'East-West divide' is in the offing, even if it is a member of NATO."
Conventional wisdom is that Moscow abhors encroachments into its
"sphere of influence" in the Caucasus by outside powers. However,
in the present case, the Kremlin promptly welcomed the Turkish
proposal and agreed to have consultations on building up bilateral
and multilateral dialogue on all aspects of the Caucasus problem. The
Russian approach is pragmatic.
Primarily, it was imperative to engage Turkey, an important regional
power, which helped mitigate Russia's regional isolation in the
crisis. Second, it paid to involve Turkey on Russia's side, as it
does not form part of the EU peace initiative.
Turkey's influence in Southern Caucasus is undeniable. Turkey's annual
trade with Georgia amounts to $1 billion, a considerable volume by
the latter's yardstick. Turkish investment in Georgia is in excess
of half a billion dollars. Turkey also supplied weapons and provided
training to the Georgian military. Turkey's ties with Azerbaijan have
been traditionally close, too.
Thus, Moscow took the perspective that the Turkish proposal could
provide the basis to work out mechanisms for limiting the conflict
potential of the region and enhancing regional stability and act
as a counterweight to the West's intrusive moves directed against
Russian interests.
Lavrov told Babacan that while "it is necessary at this stage
to create appropriate conditions" for Ankara's peace initiative,
"including elimination of the consequences of the aggression against
South Ossetia", "we absolutely agree with our Turkish partners that
the groundwork for that interaction can and must be laid now".
At the core of the Russian thinking lies the preference for a regional
approach that excludes outside powers. Lavrov was open about it. He
said, "We see the chief value in the Turkish initiative in that it
rests on common sense and assumes that countries of any region and,
first of all, countries belonging to this region should themselves
decide how to conduct affairs there. And others should help, but not
dictate their recipes."
Lavrov was hinting at displeasure over the US role. He went on, "Of
course, this will be an open scheme, but the initiative role here will
belong to the countries of the region. This is about the same thing
as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in Southeast Asia,
which has a lot of partners [10], but the ASEAN members define the
work agenda for the region, and the region's life."
The Russian approach is to welcome an "entente cordiale" with Turkey in
the Black Sea region, which frustrate US attempts to isolate Russia in
its traditional backyard. During Lavrov's visit to Istanbul, the two
sides agreed about the "necessity of using more the already available
mechanisms - the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization [based
in Istanbul] and Blackseafor [regional naval force] - and developing
the Turkish idea of Black Sea harmony, which is increasingly acquiring
a multilateral and practical character."
Curiously, at the press conference in Istanbul with Babacan by his
side, Lavrov made a huge ellipsis in the thought process by linking
the Russian-Turkish shared interest in undertaking joint initiatives
to two other regional issues - Iraq and Iran. He said, "Essentially
from the same positions we also champion what needs to be undertaken
for a definitive resolution of the situation in Iraq on the basis of
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that state. Also similar
are our approaches to the necessity of a political peaceful settlement
to the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program."
The full import of Lavrov's statement needs careful analysis. Its
ramifications are profound. It can be understood against the backdrop
of the US's ideas in the past to use the eastern Black Sea coast as
a staging post for its military operations in Iraq and a potential
strike against Iran - which Ankara firmly rejected, to the great
relief of Moscow. Suffice to say, Lavrov has done brilliantly by
floating an idea to link Iraq and Iran with a Russo-Turkish regional
framework on security and cooperation.
The straits question But in immediate terms, Moscow has its eyes set
on the US's military pressure in the Black Sea. At the root of the
present situation lies the so-called "straits question". Briefly,
Moscow would like Ankara to continue to resist US attempts to revisit
the 1936 Montreux Convention, which vests in Turkish hands control
over the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles. The US was not party to
the 1936 convention, which severely restricted the passage of warships
through the two Turkish straits to the Black Sea and virtually ensured
the Black Sea as a Russo-Turkish playpen.
The Montreux Convention is critical to Russia's security. (During World
War II, Turkey denied the Axis powers permission to dispatch warships
to the Black Sea to attack the Soviet naval fleet based in Sevastopol.)
In the post-Cold War scenario, Washington has been mounting pressure on
Turkey to renegotiate the Montreux Convention so as to progressively
convert the Black Sea into a preserve of NATO. Turkey, Romania and
Bulgaria are NATO countries; the US has military bases in Romania;
the US is hoping to induct Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.
Therefore, Turkish resistance to the US entreaties regarding
renegotiating the Montreux Convention assumes great importance for
Moscow. (During the current conflict in the Caucasus, Washington
sought to dispatch two massive warships weighing 140,000 tons to the
Black Sea ostensibly to provide "aid" to Georgia, but Ankara refused
permission on the grounds that such passage through the Bosphorus
violated provisions of the Montreux Convention.)
Moscow appreciates the nuance in the Turkish policy. Actually, Moscow
and Ankara have a shared interest in maintaining the Black Sea as
their joint preserve. Second, Ankara rightly apprehends that any move
towards re-opening the Montreux Convention - which Turkey negotiated
with great dexterity, statesmanship and foresight by Kemal Ataturk
against formidable odds - would open a Pandora's box. It might well
turn out to be a step towards reopening the Lausanne Treaty of 1923,
the cornerstone which erected the modern Turkish state out of the
debris of the Ottoman Empire.
Writing in the liberal Milliyet newspaper recently, prominent Turkish
political analyst Tahya Akyol neatly summed up the paradigm: Anatolia's
geography required giving priority to looking towards the West during
the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, while never ignoring the Caucasus
and the Middle East. Of course, nuances change, depending on events
and problems.
A Turkey directed towards the West would never ignore Russia, the
Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East or the Mediterranean. The
symphony of changing and complicated nuances depends on the ability of
our foreign policy and the size of our power. There's no such thing
as an infallible policy, but Turkey has avoided making huge foreign
policy mistakes. Its basic principles are sound.
Moscow has a deep understanding of the quintessential pragmatism
of Turkey's "Kemalist" foreign policy. (Ataturk reached out to the
Bolsheviks in the early 1920s.) Lavrov gently glided over the pages
of contemporary history. He said in Istanbul that post-Soviet Russia
didn't feel any "restraining factors" on account of Turkey's NATO
membership as long as the two powers remained "truly sincere, truly
trustful and truly mutually respectful". What did he mean?
>From the Russian perspective, what matters is that Turkey shouldn't
use its NATO membership to the detriment of Russia's interests, even
while legitimately fulfilling its obligations and commitments to the
alliance. In other words, Lavrov reminded that
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forget about its "other international commitments and obligations",
such as "the framework of the international treaties that govern the
regime on the Black Sea, for example".
Lavrov drew comfort that "Turkey never places its commitments to NATO
above its other international obligations, but always strictly follows
all those obligations that it has in the totality. This is a very
important trait not characteristic for all countries. We appreciate
this, and endeavor to approach our relations likewise." To be sure,
he left behind much food for thought for his Turkish hosts.
Caucasian chessboard Meanwhile, to use Akyol's metaphor, a
new "symphony" has indeed begun in the Black Sea and Southern
Caucasus. International observers, who reduce the current discord
to one of Russia's support to the principle of self-determination,
are counting the trees and missing the wood.
After testing out NATO's real capabilities to wage a war against Russia
in the Black Sea - a Russian military expert assessed Moscow would need
20 minutes to sink the NATO fleet - Russia has announced its intent to
deploy regular troops in the newly independent states of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia under the treaties of "friendship, cooperation and mutual
assistance" that Russia signed with them in Moscow on Tuesday. Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said a contingent in excess of a brigade
each would be deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In practical terms, Russia has reinforced its presence in the Black Sea
region. Lavrov explained in Moscow on Tuesday, "Russia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia will take all possible measures jointly to remove and
prevent threats to peace or attempts to destroy peace and to counter
acts of aggression against them on the part of any country or any
group of countries." He said Moscow would henceforth expect that any
discussions by the United Nations Security Council over regional
security issues would be "senseless" without the participation of
the representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia - a precondition
Washington is certain to reject.
Equally, another Russo-Turkish symphony is heard elsewhere in the
Caucasus. On Saturday, Turkish President Abdullah Gul flew into
Yerevan, breaking the century-old ice in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Moscow encourages the thaw. Yerevan hopes to benefit from the
Russo-Turkish regional concord to normalize relations with Ankara
and reopen the Armenian-Turkish border after a gap of almost a century.
Armenian President Serge Sarkisian is expected to visit Turkey
on October 14. The back channels working quietly in Switzerland
for months are being elevated to a formal level. Pitfalls remain,
especially with regard to the complicated Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
Again, Washington might get alarmed and begin to pull strings through
the Armenian diaspora in the US - and, vice versa.
At any rate, Gul visited Baku, Azerbaijan, on Wednesday to brief
the Azeri leadership. In the same context, Azeri Foreign Minister
Elmar Mamedyarov visited Moscow last weekend, following a telephone
conversation between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his
Azerbaijan counterpart Ilkham Aliyev. Medvedev invited Aliyev to
visit Moscow. Armenian President Sarkisian recently visited Moscow.
The Russian newspaper Kommersant cited a Kremlin source to report
that Moscow could broker an Armenian-Azeri summit meeting. If so,
Russia and Turkey, working in tandem, are effectively bypassing Europe
and the US. The so-called Minsk group of the Organization of Security
and Cooperation in Europe has to date been in the driving seat of the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. (Interestingly, Russia is a member
of the Minsk group, whereas Turkey stood excluded.)
Baku snubs Cheney To quote Kommersant, "Moscow and Ankara are
consolidating their position in the Caucasus, thus weakening
Washington's influence there." The signs are already there. When Cheney
visited Baku last week on Wednesday on a mission single-mindedly aimed
at isolating Russia in the region, he came across a few rude surprises.
The Azeris made a departure from their traditional hospitality to
visiting US leaders by accorded a low-level airport reception for
Cheney. Further, Cheney was kept cooling his heels for an entire
day until Aliyev finally received him. This was despite what Cheney
always thought was his special personal chemistry with the Azeri
leader dating to his Halliburton days. (Aliyev used to head the Azeri
state-run oil company SOCRAM.)
Cheney ended up spending an entire day visiting the US Embassy in
Baku and conversing with sundry American oil executives working in
Azerbaijan. Finally, when Aliyev received him late in the evening,
Cheney discovered to his discomfiture that Azerbaijan was in no mood
to gang up against Russia.
Cheney conveyed the George W Bush administration's solemn pledge to
support the US's allies in the region against Russia's "revanchism".
He stated Washington's determination in the current situation to punish
Russia at any cost by pushing the Nabucco gas pipeline project. But
Aliyev made it clear he did not want to be drawn into a row with
Moscow. Cheney was greatly upset and made his displeasure known by
refusing to attend the Azeri state banquet in his honor.
Soon after the conversation with Cheney, Aliyev spoke to Medvedev
on phone.
The Azeri stance demonstrates that contrary to US media propaganda,
Russia's firm stance in the Caucasus has enhanced its prestige
and standing in the post-Soviet space. The CSTO at its meeting in
Moscow on September 5 strongly endorsed the Russian position on the
conflict with Georgia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin undertook
a highly significant visit to Tashkent on September 1-2 aimed at
boosting Russian-Uzbek understanding on regional security. Russia and
Uzbekistan have tied up further cooperation in the field of energy,
including expansion of the Soviet-era gas pipeline system.
Kazakhstan, which openly supported Russia in the Caucasus situation,
is mulling its oil companies acquiring assets in Europe jointly with
Russia's Gazprom. The indications are that Tajikistan has agreed to
an expansion of the Russian military presence in Tajikistan, including
the basing of its strategic bombers. Indeed, the CSTO's endorsement of
the recent Russian package of proposals on developing a (post-NATO)
European treaty on security is a valuable diplomatic gain for Moscow
at this juncture.
But in tangible terms, what gives utmost satisfaction to Moscow is
that Azerbaijan has reacted to the Caucasus tensions and the temporary
closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by pumping its oil exports
to Europe instead via the Soviet-era Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The
dramatic irony of Baku overnight switching from a US-sponsored oil
pipeline bypassing Russia to a Soviet-era pipeline that runs through
the Russian heartland couldn't have been lost on Cheney.
More worrisome for Washington is the Russian proposal that lies
on Aliyev's table offering that Moscow will be prepared to buy all
of Azerbaijan's gas at world market prices - an offer Western oil
companies cannot possibly match. It is an offer Baku will seriously
consider against the backdrop of the new regional setting.
The complete failure of Cheney's mission to Baku would appear to have
come as a rude awakening to Washington that Moscow has effectively
blunted the Bush administration's gunboat diplomacy in the Black Sea.
As the New York Times newspaper grimly assessed on Tuesday,""The Bush
administration, after considerable internal debate, has decided not
to take direct punitive action [against Russia] ... concluding it has
little leverage if it acts unilaterally and that it would be better off
pressing for a chorus of international criticism to be led by Europe."
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained to the daily that
Washington prefers a long-term strategic approach, " [and] not one
where we act reactively in a way that has negative consequences". He
added thoughtfully, "If we act too precipitously, we could be the
ones who are isolated." Cheney himself has scaled down his earlier
rhetoric to severely punish Russia. He now thinks the door for
improving relations with Russia must remain open, and casting future
relations with the US is a choice for the leaders in Moscow to make.
But Turkey appears to have made its choice. From the speed with which
Erdogan conjured up the idea of the Caucasus Stability Pact, it seems
Turkey was ready for it for a while already. It is not as easy as
it appears to invariably turn factors of geography and history to
geopolitical advantage. Besides, as its misleading name suggests, the
Black Sea is actually an iridescent blue sea full of playful dolphins,
but pirates and sailors were captivated by its dark appearance when
the sky hung low laden with storm clouds.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
By M K Bhadrakumar
Asia Times Online
September 12, 2008
Amid the flurry of diplomatic activity in Moscow last week over
the Caucasus, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov took time off for an
exceptionally important mission to Turkey, which might prove a turning
point in the security and stability of the vast region that the two
powers historically shared.
Indeed, Russian diplomacy is swiftly moving even as the troops have
begun returning from Georgia to their barracks. Moscow is weaving
a complicated new web of regional alliances, drawing deeply into
Russia's collective historical memory as a power in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea.
German poet and playwright Bertolt Brecht would have marveled at
Lavrov's diary, heavily marked with "Caucasian chalk circles" through
last week, with intertwining plots and sub-plots - an Extraordinary
European Council Meeting taking place in Brussels; a meeting of the
foreign ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) in Moscow; three foreign counterparts to be hosted in Moscow -
Karl de Gucht of Belgium, Franco Frattini from Italy and Azerbaijan's
Elmar Mamedyarov; visits by the presidents of the newly independent
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and consultations with the
visiting United Nations secretary general's special representative
for Georgia, Johan Verbeke.
Yet, Moscow signaled the highest importance to consultations with
Turkey. Lavrov summarily dropped all business at home and hurried to
Istanbul on Tuesday on a working visit, essentially aimed at catching
a few hours' urgent confidential conversation with his counterpart,
Ali Babacan. Lavrov's mission underscored Russia's acute sense of
its priorities in the current regional crisis in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea.
Historical rivals becoming allies Almost inevitably, there is
great historical poignancy when Russia and Turkey discuss the Black
Sea. During the year-long siege of the Russian fortress naval base
Sevastopol in 1854-55 by the British and French, Tzarist Russia
realized one or two home truths. One, that Turkey's role could be
critical for the safety of its Black Sea fleet, and, two, without the
Black Sea fleet, Russia's penetration into the Mediterranean would
not be feasible. Most important, Russia learned that the original
ground of a war may be lost, but the protagonists could continue
with hostilities.
When peace finally came with the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Black
Sea clauses came at a tremendous disadvantage to Russia - so much
so that within the year the tzar conspired with Germany's Otto von
Bismarck, denounced the accord and proceeded with re-establishing a
fleet in the Black Sea.
The timing of Lavrov's consultations in Turkey was noteworthy. US Vice
President Dick Cheney happened to be in the region, visiting Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, drumming up anti-Russia animus.
Turkey didn't figure in his itinerary. Moscow shrewdly estimated the
need of political dynamism with regard to Turkey.
Moscow has taken careful note that unlike the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union, Turkey's reaction to
the conflict in the Caucasus has been manifestly subdued. Ankara
briefly expressed its anxiety over the developments, but almost in
pro-forma terms without taking sides. On the one hand, Turkey is a
NATO member country and it aspires to join the EU. It was a close
Cold War ally of the US. Turkey will be the net beneficiary as an
energy hub if any of the West's grandiose plans to bypass Russian
territory and access Caspian energy materialize. It is the entrepot
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
On the other hand, Russia is poised to be Turkey's number one trading
partner, with annual trade already nearing US$40 billion. Invisible
trade is also substantial, with 2.5 million Russian tourists
visiting Turkey annually and Turkish companies extensively involved
in Russia's services sector. And, Russia supplies 70% of Turkey's
needs of natural gas.
Thus, Turkey has ingeniously come up with the idea of a "Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Pact", whose main virtue would be, to quote
Turkish commentator Semih Idiz, to "provide Turkey with the option of
remaining relatively neutral in this dispute, even if this was not
to everyone's satisfaction in Washington". Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Moscow on August 12 to discuss the
proposal with the Kremlin. Idiz adds, "Put another way, Ankara is
not in a position to take sides in this dispute, at a time when a new
'East-West divide' is in the offing, even if it is a member of NATO."
Conventional wisdom is that Moscow abhors encroachments into its
"sphere of influence" in the Caucasus by outside powers. However,
in the present case, the Kremlin promptly welcomed the Turkish
proposal and agreed to have consultations on building up bilateral
and multilateral dialogue on all aspects of the Caucasus problem. The
Russian approach is pragmatic.
Primarily, it was imperative to engage Turkey, an important regional
power, which helped mitigate Russia's regional isolation in the
crisis. Second, it paid to involve Turkey on Russia's side, as it
does not form part of the EU peace initiative.
Turkey's influence in Southern Caucasus is undeniable. Turkey's annual
trade with Georgia amounts to $1 billion, a considerable volume by
the latter's yardstick. Turkish investment in Georgia is in excess
of half a billion dollars. Turkey also supplied weapons and provided
training to the Georgian military. Turkey's ties with Azerbaijan have
been traditionally close, too.
Thus, Moscow took the perspective that the Turkish proposal could
provide the basis to work out mechanisms for limiting the conflict
potential of the region and enhancing regional stability and act
as a counterweight to the West's intrusive moves directed against
Russian interests.
Lavrov told Babacan that while "it is necessary at this stage
to create appropriate conditions" for Ankara's peace initiative,
"including elimination of the consequences of the aggression against
South Ossetia", "we absolutely agree with our Turkish partners that
the groundwork for that interaction can and must be laid now".
At the core of the Russian thinking lies the preference for a regional
approach that excludes outside powers. Lavrov was open about it. He
said, "We see the chief value in the Turkish initiative in that it
rests on common sense and assumes that countries of any region and,
first of all, countries belonging to this region should themselves
decide how to conduct affairs there. And others should help, but not
dictate their recipes."
Lavrov was hinting at displeasure over the US role. He went on, "Of
course, this will be an open scheme, but the initiative role here will
belong to the countries of the region. This is about the same thing
as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] in Southeast Asia,
which has a lot of partners [10], but the ASEAN members define the
work agenda for the region, and the region's life."
The Russian approach is to welcome an "entente cordiale" with Turkey in
the Black Sea region, which frustrate US attempts to isolate Russia in
its traditional backyard. During Lavrov's visit to Istanbul, the two
sides agreed about the "necessity of using more the already available
mechanisms - the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization [based
in Istanbul] and Blackseafor [regional naval force] - and developing
the Turkish idea of Black Sea harmony, which is increasingly acquiring
a multilateral and practical character."
Curiously, at the press conference in Istanbul with Babacan by his
side, Lavrov made a huge ellipsis in the thought process by linking
the Russian-Turkish shared interest in undertaking joint initiatives
to two other regional issues - Iraq and Iran. He said, "Essentially
from the same positions we also champion what needs to be undertaken
for a definitive resolution of the situation in Iraq on the basis of
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that state. Also similar
are our approaches to the necessity of a political peaceful settlement
to the situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program."
The full import of Lavrov's statement needs careful analysis. Its
ramifications are profound. It can be understood against the backdrop
of the US's ideas in the past to use the eastern Black Sea coast as
a staging post for its military operations in Iraq and a potential
strike against Iran - which Ankara firmly rejected, to the great
relief of Moscow. Suffice to say, Lavrov has done brilliantly by
floating an idea to link Iraq and Iran with a Russo-Turkish regional
framework on security and cooperation.
The straits question But in immediate terms, Moscow has its eyes set
on the US's military pressure in the Black Sea. At the root of the
present situation lies the so-called "straits question". Briefly,
Moscow would like Ankara to continue to resist US attempts to revisit
the 1936 Montreux Convention, which vests in Turkish hands control
over the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles. The US was not party to
the 1936 convention, which severely restricted the passage of warships
through the two Turkish straits to the Black Sea and virtually ensured
the Black Sea as a Russo-Turkish playpen.
The Montreux Convention is critical to Russia's security. (During World
War II, Turkey denied the Axis powers permission to dispatch warships
to the Black Sea to attack the Soviet naval fleet based in Sevastopol.)
In the post-Cold War scenario, Washington has been mounting pressure on
Turkey to renegotiate the Montreux Convention so as to progressively
convert the Black Sea into a preserve of NATO. Turkey, Romania and
Bulgaria are NATO countries; the US has military bases in Romania;
the US is hoping to induct Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.
Therefore, Turkish resistance to the US entreaties regarding
renegotiating the Montreux Convention assumes great importance for
Moscow. (During the current conflict in the Caucasus, Washington
sought to dispatch two massive warships weighing 140,000 tons to the
Black Sea ostensibly to provide "aid" to Georgia, but Ankara refused
permission on the grounds that such passage through the Bosphorus
violated provisions of the Montreux Convention.)
Moscow appreciates the nuance in the Turkish policy. Actually, Moscow
and Ankara have a shared interest in maintaining the Black Sea as
their joint preserve. Second, Ankara rightly apprehends that any move
towards re-opening the Montreux Convention - which Turkey negotiated
with great dexterity, statesmanship and foresight by Kemal Ataturk
against formidable odds - would open a Pandora's box. It might well
turn out to be a step towards reopening the Lausanne Treaty of 1923,
the cornerstone which erected the modern Turkish state out of the
debris of the Ottoman Empire.
Writing in the liberal Milliyet newspaper recently, prominent Turkish
political analyst Tahya Akyol neatly summed up the paradigm: Anatolia's
geography required giving priority to looking towards the West during
the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, while never ignoring the Caucasus
and the Middle East. Of course, nuances change, depending on events
and problems.
A Turkey directed towards the West would never ignore Russia, the
Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East or the Mediterranean. The
symphony of changing and complicated nuances depends on the ability of
our foreign policy and the size of our power. There's no such thing
as an infallible policy, but Turkey has avoided making huge foreign
policy mistakes. Its basic principles are sound.
Moscow has a deep understanding of the quintessential pragmatism
of Turkey's "Kemalist" foreign policy. (Ataturk reached out to the
Bolsheviks in the early 1920s.) Lavrov gently glided over the pages
of contemporary history. He said in Istanbul that post-Soviet Russia
didn't feel any "restraining factors" on account of Turkey's NATO
membership as long as the two powers remained "truly sincere, truly
trustful and truly mutually respectful". What did he mean?
>From the Russian perspective, what matters is that Turkey shouldn't
use its NATO membership to the detriment of Russia's interests, even
while legitimately fulfilling its obligations and commitments to the
alliance. In other words, Lavrov reminded that
[lg.php?bannerid=27&campaignid=23&zo neid=36&channel_ids=,&loc=http%3A%2F%2Fw
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forget about its "other international commitments and obligations",
such as "the framework of the international treaties that govern the
regime on the Black Sea, for example".
Lavrov drew comfort that "Turkey never places its commitments to NATO
above its other international obligations, but always strictly follows
all those obligations that it has in the totality. This is a very
important trait not characteristic for all countries. We appreciate
this, and endeavor to approach our relations likewise." To be sure,
he left behind much food for thought for his Turkish hosts.
Caucasian chessboard Meanwhile, to use Akyol's metaphor, a
new "symphony" has indeed begun in the Black Sea and Southern
Caucasus. International observers, who reduce the current discord
to one of Russia's support to the principle of self-determination,
are counting the trees and missing the wood.
After testing out NATO's real capabilities to wage a war against Russia
in the Black Sea - a Russian military expert assessed Moscow would need
20 minutes to sink the NATO fleet - Russia has announced its intent to
deploy regular troops in the newly independent states of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia under the treaties of "friendship, cooperation and mutual
assistance" that Russia signed with them in Moscow on Tuesday. Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said a contingent in excess of a brigade
each would be deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In practical terms, Russia has reinforced its presence in the Black Sea
region. Lavrov explained in Moscow on Tuesday, "Russia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia will take all possible measures jointly to remove and
prevent threats to peace or attempts to destroy peace and to counter
acts of aggression against them on the part of any country or any
group of countries." He said Moscow would henceforth expect that any
discussions by the United Nations Security Council over regional
security issues would be "senseless" without the participation of
the representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia - a precondition
Washington is certain to reject.
Equally, another Russo-Turkish symphony is heard elsewhere in the
Caucasus. On Saturday, Turkish President Abdullah Gul flew into
Yerevan, breaking the century-old ice in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Moscow encourages the thaw. Yerevan hopes to benefit from the
Russo-Turkish regional concord to normalize relations with Ankara
and reopen the Armenian-Turkish border after a gap of almost a century.
Armenian President Serge Sarkisian is expected to visit Turkey
on October 14. The back channels working quietly in Switzerland
for months are being elevated to a formal level. Pitfalls remain,
especially with regard to the complicated Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
Again, Washington might get alarmed and begin to pull strings through
the Armenian diaspora in the US - and, vice versa.
At any rate, Gul visited Baku, Azerbaijan, on Wednesday to brief
the Azeri leadership. In the same context, Azeri Foreign Minister
Elmar Mamedyarov visited Moscow last weekend, following a telephone
conversation between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his
Azerbaijan counterpart Ilkham Aliyev. Medvedev invited Aliyev to
visit Moscow. Armenian President Sarkisian recently visited Moscow.
The Russian newspaper Kommersant cited a Kremlin source to report
that Moscow could broker an Armenian-Azeri summit meeting. If so,
Russia and Turkey, working in tandem, are effectively bypassing Europe
and the US. The so-called Minsk group of the Organization of Security
and Cooperation in Europe has to date been in the driving seat of the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. (Interestingly, Russia is a member
of the Minsk group, whereas Turkey stood excluded.)
Baku snubs Cheney To quote Kommersant, "Moscow and Ankara are
consolidating their position in the Caucasus, thus weakening
Washington's influence there." The signs are already there. When Cheney
visited Baku last week on Wednesday on a mission single-mindedly aimed
at isolating Russia in the region, he came across a few rude surprises.
The Azeris made a departure from their traditional hospitality to
visiting US leaders by accorded a low-level airport reception for
Cheney. Further, Cheney was kept cooling his heels for an entire
day until Aliyev finally received him. This was despite what Cheney
always thought was his special personal chemistry with the Azeri
leader dating to his Halliburton days. (Aliyev used to head the Azeri
state-run oil company SOCRAM.)
Cheney ended up spending an entire day visiting the US Embassy in
Baku and conversing with sundry American oil executives working in
Azerbaijan. Finally, when Aliyev received him late in the evening,
Cheney discovered to his discomfiture that Azerbaijan was in no mood
to gang up against Russia.
Cheney conveyed the George W Bush administration's solemn pledge to
support the US's allies in the region against Russia's "revanchism".
He stated Washington's determination in the current situation to punish
Russia at any cost by pushing the Nabucco gas pipeline project. But
Aliyev made it clear he did not want to be drawn into a row with
Moscow. Cheney was greatly upset and made his displeasure known by
refusing to attend the Azeri state banquet in his honor.
Soon after the conversation with Cheney, Aliyev spoke to Medvedev
on phone.
The Azeri stance demonstrates that contrary to US media propaganda,
Russia's firm stance in the Caucasus has enhanced its prestige
and standing in the post-Soviet space. The CSTO at its meeting in
Moscow on September 5 strongly endorsed the Russian position on the
conflict with Georgia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin undertook
a highly significant visit to Tashkent on September 1-2 aimed at
boosting Russian-Uzbek understanding on regional security. Russia and
Uzbekistan have tied up further cooperation in the field of energy,
including expansion of the Soviet-era gas pipeline system.
Kazakhstan, which openly supported Russia in the Caucasus situation,
is mulling its oil companies acquiring assets in Europe jointly with
Russia's Gazprom. The indications are that Tajikistan has agreed to
an expansion of the Russian military presence in Tajikistan, including
the basing of its strategic bombers. Indeed, the CSTO's endorsement of
the recent Russian package of proposals on developing a (post-NATO)
European treaty on security is a valuable diplomatic gain for Moscow
at this juncture.
But in tangible terms, what gives utmost satisfaction to Moscow is
that Azerbaijan has reacted to the Caucasus tensions and the temporary
closure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by pumping its oil exports
to Europe instead via the Soviet-era Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The
dramatic irony of Baku overnight switching from a US-sponsored oil
pipeline bypassing Russia to a Soviet-era pipeline that runs through
the Russian heartland couldn't have been lost on Cheney.
More worrisome for Washington is the Russian proposal that lies
on Aliyev's table offering that Moscow will be prepared to buy all
of Azerbaijan's gas at world market prices - an offer Western oil
companies cannot possibly match. It is an offer Baku will seriously
consider against the backdrop of the new regional setting.
The complete failure of Cheney's mission to Baku would appear to have
come as a rude awakening to Washington that Moscow has effectively
blunted the Bush administration's gunboat diplomacy in the Black Sea.
As the New York Times newspaper grimly assessed on Tuesday,""The Bush
administration, after considerable internal debate, has decided not
to take direct punitive action [against Russia] ... concluding it has
little leverage if it acts unilaterally and that it would be better off
pressing for a chorus of international criticism to be led by Europe."
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained to the daily that
Washington prefers a long-term strategic approach, " [and] not one
where we act reactively in a way that has negative consequences". He
added thoughtfully, "If we act too precipitously, we could be the
ones who are isolated." Cheney himself has scaled down his earlier
rhetoric to severely punish Russia. He now thinks the door for
improving relations with Russia must remain open, and casting future
relations with the US is a choice for the leaders in Moscow to make.
But Turkey appears to have made its choice. From the speed with which
Erdogan conjured up the idea of the Caucasus Stability Pact, it seems
Turkey was ready for it for a while already. It is not as easy as
it appears to invariably turn factors of geography and history to
geopolitical advantage. Besides, as its misleading name suggests, the
Black Sea is actually an iridescent blue sea full of playful dolphins,
but pirates and sailors were captivated by its dark appearance when
the sky hung low laden with storm clouds.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.