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TURKEY: CAUCASUS CRISIS LEAVES ANKARA TORN BETWEEN US AND RUSSIA
EurasiaNet
Sept 11 2008
NY
The simmering crisis brought about by Russia's recent incursion into
Georgia is putting Turkey on the spot, presenting Ankara with an
undesirable choice between backing its traditional western allies
and preserving its growing trade relations with Russia.
"Turkey is torn between the latest developments, not only between
Russia and Georgia but mainly between Russia and the United States
and NATO as well. Even if we do not go back to the Cold War, at the
point that we have arrived to today, Turkey cannot manage this crisis
with 'platonic moves,'" said a recent commentary published by the
English-language Turkish Daily News.
During the Cold War, Turkey -- a member of NATO and a long-time
ally of Washington -- found itself on the frontlines of containing
the Soviet Union. Even during the Ottoman period, Russia -- which
invaded Eastern Anatolia at the start of World War I -- was viewed
as a dangerous regional competitor.
The Turkish-Russian relationship has changed dramatically in recent
years, though. Today, Russia is Turkey's largest trading partner,
with trade between the two countries expected to reach $38 billion
this year, up from $27 billion the year before. Russia also supplies
close to half of Turkey's crude oil and 65 percent of its natural gas,
used both to heat Turkish home and to run many of the country's power
plants. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
But following the invasion of Georgia, Turkey is suddenly facing the
prospect of a resurgent Russian presence near its border. "There
is a dilemma which Turkey faces," says Ihsan Dagi, a professor
of international relations at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University. "Georgia is indispensable to Turkey's overall Caucasian
and Central Asian strategy, and is central to its claim to being an
energy corridor."
On the other hand, he says, "Russia is mostly indispensable for the
Turkish economy. What is at stake is Turkey's economic stability."
Moscow forcefully reminded Turks of this fact when it imposed new
trade restrictions in August on goods coming from Turkey, holding up
Turkish trucks at Russian border crossings for lengthy inspections. For
many Turkish observers, the new restrictions were a clear warning
for Ankara not to pick the wrong side in the Georgia crisis. Turkish
trade officials say they may lose roughly $3 billion over the short
term due to the new Russian restrictions.
Turkey's leaders, meanwhile, have been treading carefully around
the Georgia issue. Although Turkey has publicly called for Georgia's
territorial integrity to be respected, it has refrained from embracing
the stronger rhetoric coming out of Washington and Brussels. "We would
never want such a thing [a new Cold War] to happen," Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said recently. "America is our ally
and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our
number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy
from Russia ... We would be left in the dark."
In an effort to defuse the crisis, Ankara had suggested the creation
of a "Platform for security and cooperation in the South Caucasus,"
which would create a regional security framework involving Turkey,
Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But neither Washington nor
Moscow seemed especially keen on the initiative.
"The idea sounds attractive, but it will not go far. Such pacts
can work only if all members are willing to prioritize stability
and good relations over their other interests. Yet if there is one
thing we know, it is that there is no consensus for stability in
the Caucasus," Michael Reynolds, an expert on Caucasian history at
Princeton University, recently wrote in a blog maintained by Harvard's
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Given the prospect of prolonged uncertainty in the Caucasus, Ankara is
exploring options for diversifying its gas supply, in case any tensions
with Russia lead to a cut off. And when the United States recently
asked for permission for its navy ships to pass through the Turkish
controlled Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits in order to bring aid to
Georgia, Ankara at first hesitated before giving an ambivalent "yes."
This ambivalence could ultimately impact the West's future plans
for dealing with any further developments in Georgia, experts
warn. "Against a background of mixed European reaction to Russian
behavior, Turkish ambivalence could be a troubling harbinger of [a]
transatlantic disputes to come," Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey at
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, wrote in a recent policy
paper. "In theory, Turkey's proximity to the crisis and desire to play
a larger diplomatic role in the Black Sea could make Turkey a lynchpin
of NATO strategy in Georgia, especially if rapprochement with Armenia
is part of the equation. But Turkish willingness to place its territory
at the service of Western policy in Georgia is highly uncertain."
Added Lesser: "A large-scale economic and humanitarian assistance
program for Georgia is virtually inevitable, and Turkey would be a
natural partner for United States and European efforts. The United
States and at least some NATO allies may go further and opt for
significant military assistance to bolster what remains of Georgian
independence, increase the country's capacity for territorial defense,
and raise the costs of renewed Russian military operations."
"All of this will be much more difficult without Turkish political
and logistical support."
Ultimately, analysts say, the Georgian crisis may force Turkey to
reconsider elements of its foreign policy, which seeks to draw on its
Ottoman past as a power in the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus
to help it develop good relations with its neighbors and to act as
a regional mediator.
"The Georgian crisis put Turkish foreign policy in a predicament of how
to reconcile Georgians and Russians and Ossetians and Abkhazians and
Armenians and Azeris all at the same time," says METU's Dagi. "Being
a country with good relations with everyone is not possible during
a time of conflict. You have to sacrifice something."
He adds: "Using soft power in the region is fine, but when a crisis
emerges, it's time for hard choices."
Editor's Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in
Istanbul.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
EurasiaNet
Sept 11 2008
NY
The simmering crisis brought about by Russia's recent incursion into
Georgia is putting Turkey on the spot, presenting Ankara with an
undesirable choice between backing its traditional western allies
and preserving its growing trade relations with Russia.
"Turkey is torn between the latest developments, not only between
Russia and Georgia but mainly between Russia and the United States
and NATO as well. Even if we do not go back to the Cold War, at the
point that we have arrived to today, Turkey cannot manage this crisis
with 'platonic moves,'" said a recent commentary published by the
English-language Turkish Daily News.
During the Cold War, Turkey -- a member of NATO and a long-time
ally of Washington -- found itself on the frontlines of containing
the Soviet Union. Even during the Ottoman period, Russia -- which
invaded Eastern Anatolia at the start of World War I -- was viewed
as a dangerous regional competitor.
The Turkish-Russian relationship has changed dramatically in recent
years, though. Today, Russia is Turkey's largest trading partner,
with trade between the two countries expected to reach $38 billion
this year, up from $27 billion the year before. Russia also supplies
close to half of Turkey's crude oil and 65 percent of its natural gas,
used both to heat Turkish home and to run many of the country's power
plants. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
But following the invasion of Georgia, Turkey is suddenly facing the
prospect of a resurgent Russian presence near its border. "There
is a dilemma which Turkey faces," says Ihsan Dagi, a professor
of international relations at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University. "Georgia is indispensable to Turkey's overall Caucasian
and Central Asian strategy, and is central to its claim to being an
energy corridor."
On the other hand, he says, "Russia is mostly indispensable for the
Turkish economy. What is at stake is Turkey's economic stability."
Moscow forcefully reminded Turks of this fact when it imposed new
trade restrictions in August on goods coming from Turkey, holding up
Turkish trucks at Russian border crossings for lengthy inspections. For
many Turkish observers, the new restrictions were a clear warning
for Ankara not to pick the wrong side in the Georgia crisis. Turkish
trade officials say they may lose roughly $3 billion over the short
term due to the new Russian restrictions.
Turkey's leaders, meanwhile, have been treading carefully around
the Georgia issue. Although Turkey has publicly called for Georgia's
territorial integrity to be respected, it has refrained from embracing
the stronger rhetoric coming out of Washington and Brussels. "We would
never want such a thing [a new Cold War] to happen," Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said recently. "America is our ally
and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our
number one trade partner. We are obtaining two-thirds of our energy
from Russia ... We would be left in the dark."
In an effort to defuse the crisis, Ankara had suggested the creation
of a "Platform for security and cooperation in the South Caucasus,"
which would create a regional security framework involving Turkey,
Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. But neither Washington nor
Moscow seemed especially keen on the initiative.
"The idea sounds attractive, but it will not go far. Such pacts
can work only if all members are willing to prioritize stability
and good relations over their other interests. Yet if there is one
thing we know, it is that there is no consensus for stability in
the Caucasus," Michael Reynolds, an expert on Caucasian history at
Princeton University, recently wrote in a blog maintained by Harvard's
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Given the prospect of prolonged uncertainty in the Caucasus, Ankara is
exploring options for diversifying its gas supply, in case any tensions
with Russia lead to a cut off. And when the United States recently
asked for permission for its navy ships to pass through the Turkish
controlled Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits in order to bring aid to
Georgia, Ankara at first hesitated before giving an ambivalent "yes."
This ambivalence could ultimately impact the West's future plans
for dealing with any further developments in Georgia, experts
warn. "Against a background of mixed European reaction to Russian
behavior, Turkish ambivalence could be a troubling harbinger of [a]
transatlantic disputes to come," Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey at
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, wrote in a recent policy
paper. "In theory, Turkey's proximity to the crisis and desire to play
a larger diplomatic role in the Black Sea could make Turkey a lynchpin
of NATO strategy in Georgia, especially if rapprochement with Armenia
is part of the equation. But Turkish willingness to place its territory
at the service of Western policy in Georgia is highly uncertain."
Added Lesser: "A large-scale economic and humanitarian assistance
program for Georgia is virtually inevitable, and Turkey would be a
natural partner for United States and European efforts. The United
States and at least some NATO allies may go further and opt for
significant military assistance to bolster what remains of Georgian
independence, increase the country's capacity for territorial defense,
and raise the costs of renewed Russian military operations."
"All of this will be much more difficult without Turkish political
and logistical support."
Ultimately, analysts say, the Georgian crisis may force Turkey to
reconsider elements of its foreign policy, which seeks to draw on its
Ottoman past as a power in the Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus
to help it develop good relations with its neighbors and to act as
a regional mediator.
"The Georgian crisis put Turkish foreign policy in a predicament of how
to reconcile Georgians and Russians and Ossetians and Abkhazians and
Armenians and Azeris all at the same time," says METU's Dagi. "Being
a country with good relations with everyone is not possible during
a time of conflict. You have to sacrifice something."
He adds: "Using soft power in the region is fine, but when a crisis
emerges, it's time for hard choices."
Editor's Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in
Istanbul.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress